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THE 
DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND 
OF  THE  WAR 
1870-1914  . 

BY 

CHARLES  SEYMOUR,  Ph.D. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  HISTORY  IN 
YALE  COLLEGE 


NEW  HAVEN 
YALE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON  •  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

MDCCCCXVI 


T 


aiSl\  I 


Copyright,  1916,  by 
Yale  University  Press 


First  published,  April,  1916 
Second  printing,  August,  1916 
Third  printing,  October,  1916 
Fourth  printing,  March,  1917 
Fifth  printing,  October,  1917 
Sixth  printing,  February,  1918 
Seventh  printing,  April,  1918 


HISTORY+r 


TO 
G.  W.  S. 


?9*3 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with. funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/diplomaticbackgrOOseymrich 


PREFACE 

It  is  a  rather  surprising  fact  that  while  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  in  1914  has  led  to  the  production  of  more 
than  one  skillful  analysis  of  the  crisis  of  that  year, 
comparatively  little  attention  has  been  given  to  the 
origin  of  the  factors  leading  to  that  crisis,  factors 
which  take  us  back  irresistibly  to  the  establishment 
of  German  unity  in  1870. 

The  study  which  follows  does  not  profess  to  be  a 
detailed  history  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  past  forty-five 
years.  It  attempts  merely  to  correlate  in  their  logical 
sequence  the  most  significant  events  of  recent  Euro- 
pean history  and  to  show  how  the  great  disaster  was 
the  inevitable  result  of  their  reaction  upon  each  other. 
The  author's  aim  is  to  indicate  the  manner  in  which 
German  primacy  in  continental  politics,  first  acquired 
by  Bismarck  and  maintained  by  William  II,  led,  in 
combination  with  the  economic  and  moral  transfor- 
mation of  the  Empire,  to  Germany's  new  conception 
of  the  role  she  must  play  in  world  politics.  The,  effect 
upon  British  policy  was  such  that  a  fax-reading 
diplomatic  revolution  took  place,  and  was  succeeded 
by  the  series  of  crises  which  marked  the  diplomatic 
conflict  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  Triple  Entente. 
The  last  of  these  crises,  that  of.  1914,  was  the 
most  serious  and  could  not  be  settled  peacefully, 
partly  because  Germany  felt  it  essential  at  this  time 
to  reinforce  her  prestige,  partly  because  her  vital 
interests  in  the  Near  East  seemed-to  be  at  stake. 


viii  PREFACE 

I  am  deeply  indebted  to  those  who  have  given  their 
constant  and  invaluable  assistance :  tc^Prof  essor  S.  B. 
Hemingway,  Dr.  E.  W.  Nichols,  and  my  sister,  Mrs. 
G.  C.  St.  John,  for  criticisms  and  suggestions;  to 
Professor  S.  L.  Mims,  for  aid  in  the  reading  of  proof ; 
above  all  to  my  wife,  who  has  made  the  book  her  own 
by  untiring  labor  in  the  construction  of  every  chapter 
and  in  the  reading  of  every  page  of  proof. 

Yale  College,  March  6, 1916. 


PAGE 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Preface  ........ 

Chapter  I.     Introduction 1 

Chapter  II.  Bismarck  and  the  Triple  Alliance. 
Problems  confronting  Bismarck  after  1871 — Dis- 
ruptive elements  in  Germany — Necessity  of  inter- 
national peace — Fears  of  the  other  Powers — Special 
danger  of  French  attempt  at  revenge — Bismarck's 
hope  of  creating  an  alliance  between  Russia, 
Austria,  and  Germany — Relations  of  Prussia 
with  Russia — Relations  with  Austria — Beust  and 
Andrassy — Magyars  accept  an  understanding  with 
Bismarck — Andrassy  's  eagerness  for  an  entente 
with  Russia — The  League  of  the  Three  Emperors — 
Characteristics — Bismarck  unable  to  transform  it 
into  an  alliance — Collapse  of  the  League — The  war 
scare  of  1875 — Mutual  suspicion  of  France  and 
Germany — German  threats — Intervention  of  Rus- 
sia— Effects — The  Near  Eastern  Crisis — Conflict 
of  Austrian  and  Russian  ambitions — Russo-Turkish 
War — Peace  of  San  Stefano — Congress  of  Berlin — 
Russian  disappointment — Hostility  towards  Ger- 
many— Bismarck  concludes  an  alliance  with  Aus- 
tria— Hopes  to  include  Italy — Relations  of  Italy 
with  France  and  the  Teutonic  Powers — Anti- 
French  sentiment  in  Italy  after  1871— Effects  of 
French  occupation  of  Tunis — Formation  of  the 
Triple  Alliance — Effects — The  hegemony  of  Ger- 
many   12 


x  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter  III.  The  Dual  Alliance.  Germany's  posi- 
tion threatened  by  a,  Franco-Russian  rapproche- 
ment— Geographical  factors  favoring  such  a  com- 
bination— Checkerboard  diplomacy — Relations  of 
the  two  nations  in  the  past — Factors  of  separation — 
Effect  of  the  war  scare  of  1875— Effect  of  the 
Congress  of  Berlin — And  of  the  Austro-German 
Alliance — Franco-Russian  understanding  post- 
poned by  Bismarck's  diplomacy — Growing  senti- 
ment in  both  countries  favoring  an  alliance — 
Effect  of  the  death  of  "William  I  and  the  accession 
of  William  II — Effect  of  the  dismissal  of  Bis- 
marck— Financial  assistance  given  by  France  to 
Russia — Attitude  of  the  French  Government — Visit 
of  Admiral  Gervais'  fleet — Conclusion  of  the  Dual 
Alliance — Moral  effects — Lack  of  practical  results — 
Policy  of  the  Kaiser — Encouragement  of  French 
colonial  policy  and  Russian  expansion  in  the  Far 
East — Sentimental  rapprochement  of  France  and 
Germany — Effects  of  the  Kaiser 's  policy — Germany 
retained  her  control  of  continental  diplomacy         .       38 

Chapter  IV.  German  World  Policy:  Economic  Fac- 
tors. Relation  of  German  diplomatic  influence  to 
her  economic  development — Character  of  the  eco- 
nomic transformation  of  Germany — Growth  of  the 
population — And  consequent  economic  problem — 
Shifting  of  population — Rise  of  new  industries — 
Effect  of  German  unification — Growth  of  banks — 
Of  mineral  and  metal  industries — Development  of 
foreign  trade — Factors  in  German  success — Cheap- 
ness of  German  goods — Their  serviceability — Scien- 
tific salesmanship — Statistics  of  German  com- 
merce^— Development  of  German  shipping — Growth 
of  Hamburg — Of  the  great  steamship  lines — Crea- 
tion of  a  navy — Necessary  adjunct  to  large  mer- 
cantile  marine — Opinion    of   von    Bulow — Enthu- 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xi 

PAGE 

siasm  for  naval  development — Colonial  movement — 
The  Bagdad  Railway — Desire  for  political  world 
power — New  aspect  of  German  ambitions       .  .       61 

Chapter  V.  German  World  Policy:  Moral  Factors. 
Psychological  transformation  of  Germany — Exact 
definition  of  German  attitude  impossible — Its  vary- 
ing shades — Universal  longing  for  expansion  and 
power — The  Kaiser's  speeches — Desire  for  world 
prestige — Characteristics  of  German  mentality  that 
explain  this  attitude — Belief  in  the  world  mission 
of  Germany — And  in  the  right  to  carry  out  this 
mission  by  force — Fostered  by  University  teach- 
ings— Treitschke  and  his  doctrine — The  righteous- 
ness and  beneficence  of  war — Aggressive  tone 
adopted  in  certain  quarters  of  Germany — Confi- 
dence in  Germany's  strength  and  in  the  weakness 
of  her  rivals — In  other  quarters  German  attitude^-"""" 
tinged  with  fear — Resulting  tone  of  defiance — 
German  attitude  not  translated  into  a  single  pol- 
icy— The  Pan-Germans  and  the  Colonial  party — 
Other  shades  of  opinion — Effect  of  German  attitude  • 
upon  other  Powers  r         .         .         .       89 

Chapter  VI.  British  Foreign  Policy.  Importance  to 
Germany  of  the  British  attitude — Principle  of 
British  policy — Greatness  and  security  of  her 
colonial  and  maritime  empire  her  single  aim — 
Explanation  of  apparent  contradictions — Relations 
of  Great  Britain  with  France — Rivalry  in  Egypt — 
British  purchase  of  Suez  Canal  shares — British 
intervention  in  Egypt,  1882 — French  bitterness — 
The  British  in  the  Soudan — Gordon — Kitchener's 
expedition  for  the  recovery  of  the  Soudan — Meet- 
ing with  Marchand  at  Fashoda — Diplomatic  crisis — 
Surrender  of  France — French  hostility  towards 
Great  Britain— British  relations  with  Russia — 
Quarters  in  which  their  interests  conflicted — The 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Near  East— The  Central  East— The  Far  East- 
Russia  on  the  Pacific — Interests  of  Great  Britain 
in  China — The  acquisition  of  Hong  Kong — Effects 
of  the  rise  of  Japan — Russia,  Germany,  and  France 
forbid  Japanese  acquisition  of  Port  Arthur — The 
advance  of  Russia  in  Manchuria — British  fears — 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance — British  hostility  towards 
Russia  during  Manchurian  war — Relations  of 
Great  Britain  with  Germany — Good  feeling  between 
the  Governments  preserved  by  Bismarck  and  Salis- 
bury— Colonial  rivalry  alleviated  by  compromises — 
Various  treaties — Possibility  of  Anglo-German 
alliance — Sudden  reversal  of  British  policy  .         .     115 

Chapter  VII.  The  Diplomatic  Revolution.  Character 
of  the  diplomatic  revolution — Change  in  French 
policy — Accession  of  Delcasse  to  power — Relations 
of 'France  with  Italy — Ameliorated  by  dismissal  of 
Bismarck  and  fall  of  Crispi — Franco-Italian 
conventions — French  Mediterranean  policy — Mo- 
rocco— Delcasse 's  attitude  towards  Great  Britain — 
Accession  of  Edward  VII — Commercial  interests 
favor  a  Franco-British  reconciliation- — Efforts  of 
Edward  VII— The  Convention  of  1904— Effects- 
Settlement  of  African  questions — Step  towards  the 
restoration  of  the  balance  of  power — Tendency 
towards  a  British  understanding  with  Russia — Is- 
sues between  the  two  nations — Anglo-Russian  Con- 
vention of  1907 — Its  scope  and  effects — Its  import- 
ance^— Change  in  the  international  diplomatic  sit- 
uation since  1898 — Restoration  of  the  equilibrium    140 

Chapter  VIII.  The  Conflict  op  Alliances.  Effect 
of  the  diplomatic  revolution  upon  German  policy — 
Germany  convinced  of  necessity  of  maintaining 
diplomatic  prestige  of  the  Empire — Belief  that  Ger- 
many's  position  was  threatened  by  new  attitude  of 
France — Necessity    of    reinforcing    German    pres- 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

tige  after  1904 — The  Moroccan  affair — Disembark- 
ation of  the  Kaiser  at  Tangier — Veto  placed  upon 
French  Moroccan  policy — Resignation  of  Del- 
casse — Humiliation  of  France — The  Conference  of 
Algeciras — The  Bosnian  crisis — Relation  to  Young 
Turk  Revolution — Austria  annexes  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina — Protests  of  Serbia  and  Russia — 
Overridden  by  Austria  and  Germany — Restoration 
of  German  prestige — French  aggression  in  Mo- 
rocco— International  conditions  suitable  for  an- 
other blow  on  part  of  Germany — German  gunboat 
Panther  despatched  to  Agadir — German  de- 
mands— Resisted  by  France  who  finds  support  in 
Great  Britain — Circumstances  in  Germany  not 
favorable  for  enforcing  her  demands — Compromise 
effected — Disappointment  of  Germany — Certainty 
of  a  renewal  of  the  conflict  ....     J66^ 

Chapter  IX.  The  Near  Eastern  Question.  Import- 
ance of  the  Near  Eastern  Question — Its  character 
in  general — Aspects  of  the  problem  in  the  nine- 
teenth century — Dismemberment  of  Turkey  in 
Europe — Serbian  and  Grecian  independence — 
Later  independence  of  Rumania  and  Bulgaria — 
Aspirations  of  the  great  Powers  in  the  Near  East — 
Russian  interests — At  first  opposed  by  Great  Brit- 
ain— At  close  of  the  century  Anglo-Russian  accord 
in  Near  East  foreshadowed — Austrian  interests  in 
the  Balkans — More  vital  in  recent  times — Austrian 
hostility  towards  Russia — Germany's  interest  in 
Near  East  resulted  from  world  policy — Plans  for 
development  of  Mesopotamia — Support  given  to 
Turkey  and  Austria — Importance  of  the  Young 
Turk  revolution — Its  character — Its  effects — An- 
nexation of  Bosnia  by  Austria — Effect  upon 
Serbia — Young  Turk  regime  in  Macedonia — Effect 
upon    Bulgaria — Young    Turk    attitude    towards 


xiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAGE 


Crete — Venizelos — Policy  of  Greece — Young  Turk 
opposition  to  Italian  development  in  Tripoli — Italy- 
declares  war  on  Turkey 194 

Chapter  X.  The  Balkan  "Wars.  Significance  of 
Italy's  attack  upon  Turkey — Attitude  of  the 
Powers — The  Italian  army  in  Tripoli — The  dead- 
lock— Treaty  of  Lausanne — Attitude  of  the  Balkan 
States — Factors  favorable  to  their  union — The 
formation  of  the  Balkan  League — Hope  of  preserv- 
ing peace  with  Turkey — Beginning  of  first  Balkan 
"War — Bulgarian  victories  at  Kirk  Kilisse  and 
Lule  Burgas — Greek  and  Serbian  successes — Peace 
negotiations — Renewal  of  the  war — Turks  yield — 
Treaty  of  London — Terms — Question  of  Albania — 
Effects  of  its  settlement  upon  Serbian  policy — 
Bulgarian  desire  for  Macedonia — Attitude  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria — Bulgaria  attacks  Serbia  and 
Greece — Defeat  of  Bulgaria — Entrance  of  Ruma- 
nia— End  of  second  Balkan  War — Treaty  of 
Bukarest — Attitude  of  great  Powers — Especially 
of  Austria  and  Germany — Teutonic  Powers  deter- 
mined to  revise  Balkan  settlement — Necessity  of  a 
conflict  with  Serbia — Murder  of  the  Archduke       .     221 

Chapter  XL  The  Crisis  of  1914.  ~  Summary  of  inter- 
national conditions  in  1914 — German  anxiety 
aroused  by  the  Triple  Entente — And  by  the  failure 
of  German  efforts  to  break  it — Necessity  of  an 
alteration  in  the  Balkan  settlement — Circumstances 
favorable  for  action — Austrian  assistance  assured — 
Abstention  of  the  other  Powers  probable — Weak- 
ness of  Russia — Decadence  of  France — Great  Brit- 
ain incapable  of  interfering  on  the  Continent — 
V  Character  of  the  stroke  planned  by  Austria  and 
Germany — In  the  Balkans — The  Austrian  note  to 
Serbia — Character  of  the  Austrian  demands — The 
two   impossible   conditions — The    Serbian   reply — 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xv 

-J£_.  PAGE 

Pronounced  unsatisfactory  by  Austria — War  de- 
clared on  Serbia — Attitude  of  Russia — Determined 
to  protect  Serbia — Attempts  of  Sir  Edward  Grey 
to  find  peaceable  solution — International  confer- 
ence suggested — Refused  by  Germany — Austria 
refuses  to  continue  conversations  with  Russia — 
Austria's  belief  that  Russia  would  stand  aside — 
New  formula  suggested  by  Russia  refused  by 
Germany — Russian  mobilization— Opposite  effects 
upon  Austria  and  Germany  ....     245 

Chapter  XII.  The  Diplomatic  Break.  Effects  of 
Russian  mobilization — Austrian  concessions — Re- 
sumption of  conversations  with  Russia — Accepts 
principle  of  mediation — Contradictory  attitude  of 
Germany — The  Kaiser's  warning  to  Russia — The 
German  ultimatum — Its  character — Russia  refuses 
to  demobilize — German  declaration  of  war  on 
Russia — On  France — Germany 's  hope  of  peace  with 
Great  Britain — German  offer  of  neutrality  agree- 
ment— Refused  by  Great  Britain — German  convic- 
tion of  British  pacifism — The  question  of  Belgian 
neutrality — British  belief  in  the  necessity  of  the 
independence  of  the  Lowlands — Belgian  neutrality 
guaranteed  in  1839 — Construction  of  German  stra- 
tegic lines  on  Belgian  frontier — Germany 's  demand 
to  Belgium — Refused — Effect  on  British  policy — 
German  invasion  of  Belgium — Her  justification — 
Great  Britain  enters  the  war — German  invasion  of 
Belgium  forced  by  military  necessity — German 
aggressive  action  in  crisis  of  1914  necessitated  by 
principles  of  the  policy  adopted  since  1871  .         .     266 

Bibliography 288 

Index 295 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   BACKGROUND 
OF   THE    WAR 

1870-1914 


CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 

On  June  28,  1914,  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand, 
heir  apparent  to  the  throne  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  was  assassinated  by  a  Serbian  nationalist 
in  the  streets  of  the  chief  town  of  Bosnia.  Doubtless 
not  more  than  the  merest  handful  of  the  millions  who 
read  the  news  on  the  following  day,  realized  that  the 
murder  would  carry  in  its  train  consequences  of 
extraordinary  moment.  The  popular  mind  had  become 
accustomed  to  assassination  of  royalty.  The  Empress 
Elizabeth  of  Austria,  King  Humbert  of  Italy,  King 
Carlos  of  Portugal,  King  George  of  Greece,  had  all 
experienced  a  similar  fate  and  the  international 
diplomatic  situation  had  not  been  affected.  Who 
could  guess  that  this  new  crime  would  prove  to  be  of 
greater  significance?  And  yet  within  five  weeks  of 
the  jmurder  and  apparently  as  a  direct  result,  the  five 
greatest  Powers  of  Europe  were  battling  in  the  most 
terrific  war  of  history. 

It  very  soon  became  obvious  that  so  great  a  catas- 
trophe could  not  have  resulted  solely  from  the 
assassination  of  a  single  man,  even  though  he  were 
archduke  and  future  emperor.  Other  forces  must 
have  been  at  work,  of  wider  scope  and  more  vital 
significance.  The  murder  was  merely  the  occasion  of 
the  conflict,  the  spark  igniting  the  magazine ;  if  it  had 
not  been  for  thirty  years'  accumulation  of  powder, 
there  could  have  been  no  explosion.     History  shows 


2        DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

that  great  events  find  their  genesis  in  influences  which 
work  for  a  long  time  separately  and  silently,  but  which 
when  brought  together  by  some  comparatively  minor 
factor,  are  powerful  in  their  union  to  produce  results 
of  the  utmost  magnitude.  So  it  was  in  the  case  of  the 
war  that  broke  out  in  1914.  And  to  comprehend,  even 
in  the  most  general  fashion,  the  influences  which  by 
their  combination  resulted  in  the  titanic  conflict,  a 
survey  of  the  previous  forty-five  years  of  diplomacy 
is  essential. 

Even  the  most  superficial  consideration  of  the 
generation  that  followed  the  Franco-Prussian  War, 
leads  irresistibly  to  the  conclusion  that  the  factor  of 
vital  significance  during  this  period  was  the  develop- 
ment of  the  newjxerman  Empire.  It  was  Germany 
that  forced  the  new  conditions  which  contained  the 
germs  of  the  international  struggle.  Not  that  German 
policy  was  more  aggressive  or  more  nationally  selfish 
than  that  of  the  other  states ;  but  that  simply  by  her 
entrant  into  the  circle  of  great  nations  and  by  her 
"extraordinary  growth,  new  elements  were  introduced 
into  the  diplomatic  situation,  which  were  destined  to 
result  inevitably  in  conflict.  The  other  states  were 
simply  passive,  imihe  sense  that  they  pursued  their 
policy  along  much  the  same  lines  as  those  followed 
previous  to  1871.    Germany  was  the  active  agent. 

By  defeating  France  and  forcing  upon  her  a  humil- 
iating peace  in  1871,  Germany  attained  her  political 
unity  and  at  once  secured  a  position  of  unquestioned 
weight  in  the  councils  of  the  great  Powers.  A  decade 
later,  she  organized  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  guar- 
anteed the  support  of  Austria  and  Italy  and  soon 
assured  to  her  a  preponderant  role  in  European 
diplomacy;  by  means  of  this  coalition  of  the  three 


INTRODUCTION  3 

i 

states  of  central  Europe  and  despite  the  Dual  Alliance 
of  France  and  Russia  which  was  formed  in  1891, 
Germany  practically  controlled  the  Continent  from 
1882  to  the  end  of  the  century. 

This  position  of  primacy  she  utilized  skillfully  to 
secure  a  period  of  uninterrupted  peace  on  the  Conti- 
nent, which  gave  her  the  necessary  opportunity  for 
organizing  her  imperial  political  institutions  and 
developing  the  industrial  and  commercial  activities 
essential  to  the  economic  life  of  the  nation.  With 
increasing  intensity,  the  Germans  created  new  indus- 
tries, built  up  their  mercantile  marine,  opened  up  new 
markets,  laid  down  vessels  of  war,  dreamed  of 
colonies.  And  as  a  result  partly  of  economic  necessity 
and  partly  of  a  moral  transformation  that  came  over 
the  Empire,  German  policy  began  to  concern  itself 
not  merely  with  European  matters,  but  with  every- 
thing that  went  on  over  all  the  globe.  It  was  the 
inauguration  of  Germany's  " World  Policy.' ' 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  policy  of  the  other  states 
should  be  affected  by  the  successful  growth  of  Ger- 
many, and  when  they  recognized  its  true  significance, 
a  new  period  opened  in  the  history  of  European 
diplomacy.  The  more  far-sighted  in  France  and 
Great  Britain  perceived  with  inexorable  lucidity  that 
Germany's  new  policy  must  necessarily  threaten  the 
position  of  their  own  countries.  In  the  face  of  the 
common  danger  they  agreed  to  put  an  end  to  their 
traditional  enmity  and,  together  with  Russia,  to  form 
a  tentative  combination,  which  was  designed  merely 
to  preserve  the  balance  of  power  threatened  by  the 
growth  and  ambitions  of  Germany.  The  latter  Power, 
disquieted  by  this  apparent  barricade  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  her  hopes  and  in  order  to  reinforce  her  prestige, 


4       DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

adopted  a  policy  of  bluster,  which  was  at  times 
successful,  but  which  culminated  in  welding  the  loose 
understanding  between  the  three  Powers  into  a 
comparatively  solid  force  of  opposition. 

Under  such  conditions  there  arose  a  diplomatic 
conflict  scarcely  less  bitter  than  the  war  which  was 
to  succeed  it.  On  the  one  side  stood  the  Entente 
Powers,  unalterably  convinced  that  the  development 
of  the  German  world  policy  spelled  their  ultimate  or 
their  immediate  ruin;  on  the  other,  Germany,  equally 
determined  in  the  belief  that  failure  to  win  for  herself 
a  position  in  world  affairs  comparable  to  her  influence 
in  European  matters,  meant  economic  and  national 
disaster.  Between  such  opposite  poles  there  could 
be  no  compromise.  With  each  successive  crisis  the 
tension  increased.  Finally,  in  the  summer  of  1914, 
the  strain  suddenly  exerted  upon  the  thread  of  fate 
proved  too  severe  and  it  snapped. 

If,  as  seems  obvious,  the  development  of  Germany — 
military,  naval,  economic,  national — was  the  essential 
leit-motif  of  the  international  drama  which  was  to 
have  such  a  tremendous  denouement,  we  ought  to 
remind  ourselves  briefly  of  the  circumstances  under 
which  united  Germany  came  into  being.  The  founda- 
tion of  the  German  Empire  in  1871  was,  perhaps,  the 
greatest  political  fact  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Both  because  of  the  immediate  effects  of  the  process 
of  unification  and  because  of  the  ultimate  consequences, 
which  were  not  at  once  revealed,  any  survey  of  recent 
diplomatic  history  must  go  back  to  the  great  triumph 
of  Prussia  and  Bismarck  in  1871. 

Previous  to  that  date,  Germany  as  a  political  state 
was  non-existent.  The  hundred  and  more  kingdoms, 
principalities,  duchies  and  cities  which  were  loosely 


INTRODUCTION  5 

bound  together  in  the  German  Federation,  formed 
something  more  than  a  geographical  expression,  for 
they  were  sentimentally  united  by  language  and  by 
pride  in  a  common  literature  and  music;  but  they 
formed  nothing  like  a  nation  in  the  political  sense. 
From  disunion  comes  weakness,  and  all  through  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  Germany  was 
the  prey  of  Europe.  Although  the  two  chief  German 
states,  Austria  and  Prussia,  were  reckoned  as  great 
Powers,  their  mutual  jealousy  had  on  more  than  one 
occasion  left  Germany  impotent  before  the  attack  of 
a  powerful  foe  on  the  east  and  on  the  west. 

For  centuries  the  dream  of  a  politically  united  nation 
had  filled  the  minds  of  Germans.  The  dream  went 
back  to  the  days  of  Charlemagne  and  JSlrederick 
Barbarossa,  the  red-bearded  emperor  who,  according 
to  legend,  was  not  dead  but  sleeping,  and  was  destined 
to  awake  and  reunite  Teutonia  and  rule  the  world. 
From  the  time  of  Otto  the  Great,  all  through  the 
Middle  Ages  down  to  the  days  of  Wallenstein,  the 
unity  of  Germany  formed  the  subject  of  the  most 
exalted  plans.  But  whenever  a  definite  attempt  was 
made  to  transform  the  vision  into  fact,  the  mutual 
hatred  of  the  warring  German  states  proved  disas- 
trous and  the  dream  of  union  was  never  realized.  The 
forces  of  disintegration  always  triumphed  over  those 
of  consolidation. 

With  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  it  seemed  for  a  moment 
as  though  the  hope  of  unification  might  be  fulfilled. 
The  burst  of  patriotism  which  informed  the  war  of 
liberation  against  the  French  Emperor  was  enforced 
by  the  conviction  that  the  national  aspiration  was 
about  to  be  satisfied ;  the  youths  who  pressed  on  from 
Leipsic,  driving  the  French  across  the  Rhine,  fought 


6        DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  more  fiercely  in  the  belief  that  they  were  fighting 
for  a  united  Fatherland.  The  stirring  war  songs  of 
the  period  are  all  imbued  with  the  idea  that  once 
Germany  was  freed  from  the  foreign  yoke,  she  would 
be  united.  But  the  hopes  of  the  peoples  were  deceived 
by  the  princes.  The  popular  enthusiasm  for  national 
unity  based  upon  liberalism  was  not  in  accord  with 
the  designs  of  the  diplomats  and  sovereigns  who 
planned  the  map  of  Europe  in  1815,  and  Germany  was 
left  disunited. 

,  A  generation  later,  in  1848,  the  German  Liberals 
made  another  effort  to  attain  national  unity.  For  the 
moment  the  reactionary  Austrian  Government  was 
paralyzed  by  a  revolution  which  spread  through  all 
the  Hapsburg  possessions;  the  King  of  Prussia  was 
intimidated  by  the  Berlin  mob;  and  the  Liberals, 
meeting  at  Frankfort,  had  free  hand.  But  their 
attempt  was  again  frustrated  by  the  opposition  of  the 
princes.  Austria,  which  soon  recovered  her  control 
and  stamped  out  revolution,  refused  to  sanction  a 
centralized  Germany  founded  upon  liberal  principles. 
And  the  King  of  Prussia  would  not  take  the  imperial 
crown  from  the  hands  of  the  people,  "picked  up  out 
of  the  mud,"  as  he  said;  he  would  reign  as  emperor 
only  by  the  grace  of  God  and  at  the  invitation  of  his 
fellow  princes. 

The  failure  of  the  German  Liberals  in  1848  was 

v/  succeeded  by  the  far  different  method  of  Bismarck, 

\  which  ultimately  proved  successful,  although  the  cost 

I  was  great.     The  Liberals  had  hoped  that  unification 

might  be  accomplished  peacefully  through  a  national 

Parliament,  representing  the  German  people,  and  that 

the  result  would  be  a  liberal  confederation,  not  unlike 

the  United  States  of  America.     In  the  mind  of  Bis- 


INTRODUCTION  7 

marck,  the  sole  means  ofjmj&n_J£as  to  be_iQund_in 


the  Prussian  Kin^^anrf  jLrmy.  Austria,  the.  .great 
stumbli^ 

Germany^By^waj ;  the^ojhe^^rman_jtates  mustjia 
compelle%^yforce  to  accept  union  undeiutho  Prussian 
domination.  With  the  strongest  army  in  Europe  as 
his  instrument,  Bismarck  carried  this  policy  into  effect 
by  means  of  three  wars :  the  war  of  1864  with  Denmark, 
of  1866  with  Austria,  an<f2QB70  with  France. 

It  was  in  1862  That  Bismarck  was  calfed  to  minis- 
terial power  in  Prussia,  and  he  lost  no  time  in 
developing  his  policy.  Under  William  I,  who  had  been 
a  soldier  from  his  youth  and  had  made  the  campaigns 
against  Napoleon,  the  Prussian  army  had  been  thor-  .s 
oughly  reorganized,  and  offered  to  the^  diplomacy  of  \\ 
the  new  minister  the  material  force  necessary  for  the  ' 
success  of  his  plans.  A  quarrel  that  sprang  up  in 
1863  between  the  King  of  Denmark  and  the  German 
states,  over  the  Duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein, 
presented  the  opportunity  he  desired.  Persuading 
Austria  to  act  with  Prussia,  Bismarck  brought  on  a 
war  with  Denmark  in  1864,  in  which  the  smaller 
Power  was  naturally  overwhelmed.  Denmark  sur- 
rendered the  two  duchies  to  the  rulers  of  Austria  and 
Prussia. 

Eealizing  that  so  long  as  Austria  remained  a  member 
of  the  German  Confederation,  Prussia  could  not  hope 
to  unify  Germany  under  her  own  control,  Bismarck 
did  not  seek  to  prevent  the  quarrel  that  soon  developed 
over  the  disposition  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein.  In 
both  his  military  and  diplomatic  arrangements  he  was 
thoroughly  prepared  for  the  struggle  with  Austria 
that  was  to  decide  the  hegemony  of  Germany.  The 
Prussian  army  had  been  brought  to  the  highest  degree 


8        DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

of  efficiency  by  the  Minister  of  War,  Boon,  and  was 
led  by  that  master  of  strategy,  Moltke.  Bismarck  had 
received  from  Napoleon  III  a  guarantee  of  benevolent 
neutrality,  in  return  for  vague  promises  of  compen- 
sation for  France  along  the  Rhine.  He  obtained  the 
active  assistance  of  Italy  in  his  attack  upon  Austria 
by  promising  thafTfaly  should  win  the  province  of 
Venatia. 

The  war  with  Austria,  which  broke  forth  in  1866, 
was  brief  and  decisive ;  it  completely  fulfilled  the  hopes 
of  Bismarck.  Austria,  defeated  in  a  seven  weeks' 
campaign  and  with  her  main  army  crushed  at  Sadowa, 
agreed  to  withdraw  from  the  German  Confederation, 
and  allow  Prussia  to  organize  a_centraIizejL  union  of 
the  North  German  stales~Under  Prussian  domination. 
Hannover  and  some  five  smaller  stateswere  annexed 
to  Prussia  outrightT  despite  their  protests. 

It  was  the  first  step  towards  national  unity ;  the  new 
North  German  Federation  was  solidly  constituted  and 
led  by  Prussia  formed  a  powerful  political  entity. 
But  it  was  incomplete.  There  still  remained  the  states 
of  South  Germany,  Baden,  Bavaria,  and  Wurtemberg, 
who  were  jealous  of  Prussia,  resentful  of  the  position 
of  mastery  that  she  was  securing,  and  who  appeared 
determined  on  remaining  aloof.  Bismarck  perceived 
that  to  bring  them  into  the  union  a  third  war  would 
be  necessary,  preferably  directed  against  France,  the 
national  enemyof  Gerniany ;  a  war  in  which  the  stafes 
of  both  North  and  South  Germany  should  fight 
together  side  by  side. 

By  a  series  of  diplomatic  manoeuvres,  which  force 
our  admiration  if  not  our  approval,  and  favored  by 
the  rash  and  bellicose  attitude  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, Bismarck  precipitated  the  Franco-German  TCar 


I 


INTRODUCTION  9 

in  18J£L  With  equal  skill  he  saw  to  it  that  the  struggle 
was  regarded  as  a  national  and  not  merely  a  Prussian 
quarrel,  and  that  Soutn  Germany  stood  by  the  North 
German  Federation.  The  entire  country  was  a  unit, 
and  the  sentiment  of  national  consciousness  aroused 
by  battling  against  a  common  foe  was  enforced  by  the 
common  victory.  The  brave,  but  ill-equipped  and 
miserably  officered  French  armies  proved  totally 
incapable  of  coping  with  the  Germans,  who  were 
splendidly  organized  and  directed  by  the  genius  of 
Moiike.  Overwhelmed  at  Sedan  in  September,  1870, 
the  French  Emperor  surrendered;  four  months  later 
garis  capitulated,  and  the  Provisional  Government  of 
France  accepted  the  German  terms.  In.  orderjthat 
France  might  be  stripped  of  future  powers  of  offence 
and  defence,,  Alsace-Lorraine  was  taken  from  her,  and 
she  was  forced  to  payan  indemnity  nf  G™  biTrTnn- 
francs  (Treaty  of  Frankfort). 

Through  this  national  victory  over  France,  Bis- 
marck^ hope  of  persuading  the  South  German  states 
to  enter  the  union  was  realized.  While  the  German 
guns  were  still  thundering  outside  the  walls  of  Paris, 
at  Versailles,  in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors,  painted  with  all 
the  scenes  of  the  triumphs  of  Louis  XIV,  the  King 
of  Prussia  was  proclaimed  German  Emperor  and 
accepted  by  the  rulers  of  all  the  German  states.  A 
consolidated  unified  Germany,  in  which  the  principle 
of  centralization  triumphed  over  all  factors  of  dis- 
union, became  a  definite  fact. 

Thus  was  born  in  Europe  a  new  political  state,  whose 
entrance  upon  the  international  stage  was  destined  to 
have  the  most  far-reaching  consequences.  The  whole 
set  of  international  conditions  which  rested  upon  the 
division  of  Germany  disappeared.    France  was  humil- 


10      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

iated  and  her  material  power  broken,  at  least  for  the 
moment.     The  creation  of  united  Germany  brought 

/  with  it  the  completion  of  Italian  unity,  for  upon  the 
withdrawal  of  the  French  troops,  which  had  been 
stationed  at  Rome  to  protect  the  Pope,  Victor 
Emmanuel  was  able  to  make  of  Rome  the  capital 
of  his  kingdom.     ^^niajLjmifica^on^^ko^reopened 

I  tha.  Near  Eastern__.Qii£stion,  for  Bismarck7^n~of3er 
to  win  the  benevolent  neutrality  of  Russia  in  1870, 
had  agreed  to  her  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  the 
Black  Sea,  which  had  been  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  in  1856;  Russia  could  once  more  send  her 
warships  down  to  the  Bosphorus  and  again  threaten 
Constantinople. 

More  important  than  the  immediate  political  results 
were  the  moral  effects  of  the  methods  employed  by 
Bismarck  jn^Jjie— uni i fi cation  oF~Trermany.  Instead 
of  coming  through  the  application  of  JihexaJ  and 
nationalistic  principles,  as  the  idealists  of  1815  and 
1848  had  hoped,  it  was  consummated  in  direct  contra- 
vention to  those  principles.  It  was  the  product  of 
force  not  unadulterated  with  trickery.      The   theory 

f  of  brute  strength,  of  " blood  and  iron,"  had  triumphed. 
By  the  incorporation  of  a  Danish  duchy,  by  the  forcible 
annexation  of  Hannover  to  Prussia,  by  taking  Alsace- 
Lorraine  without  the  consent  of  its  inhabitants,  Bis- 
marck had  frankly  given  effect  to  the  doctrine  that 
might  is  right.  The  generous  nationalistic  theories 
of  the  French  Revolution  were  crushed  under  the  fist 
of  military  armaments,  and  for  them  was  substituted 
the 

good  old  plan, 
That  he  should  take  who  has  the  power, 
And  he  should  keep  who  can. 


INTRODUCTION  11 

The  effect  upon  Germany  was  inevitable.  Having 
witnessed  the  failure  of  the  liberal  and  the  success  of 
the  Bismarckian  method,  the  German  people  "  con- 
ceived thereby  a  faith  in  f orce,  a  veneration  of  power 
and  might  that  has  directed  in  large  part  the  subse^ 
Quent  course^  of  German  life  and  history."1  The 
material  prosperity  that  followed  upon  the  military 
and  political  success  of  Bismarck  only  enhanced  their 
belief  that  "iron  is  gold." 

The  world  did  not  realize  at  once  the  full  significance 
of  the  Prussian  victory  and  the  acceptance  of  Prussian 
methods  by  Germany;  and  the  ultimate  consequences 
of  Prussian  domination  in  Germany  were  not  com- 
pletely manifested  until  the  twentieth  century.  For, 
after  securing  the  unification  of  Germany,  Bismarck 
was  careful  to  allay  the  fears  caused  by  his  methods 
and  extraordinary  success.  During  the  twenty  years 
that  followed  the  birth  of  the  German  Empire,  he  made 
use  of  quite  different  weapons  than  those  by  which 
he  had  carried  out  his  earlier  policy.  War  and  brute 
force  had  served  their  turn ;  what  he  desired  after  the 
war  with  Fiance  was  a  period  of  uninterrupted  peace 
in  which  he  might  consolidate  the  Empire  and  foster 
its  economic  development.  Above  all  he  was  anxious 
to  preserve  the  new  diplomatic  prestige  that  Germany 
had  won  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  The  study 
of  how  he  worked  towards  these  ends  is  essential 
-to  an  understanding  of  contemporary  international 
relations. 

i  Priest,  Germany  since  1740,  123. 


CHAPTER  II 
BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE 

With  the  successful  termination  of  the  last  of  the 
three  wars  that  led  to  German  unity,  Bismarck  com- 
pleted the  task  which  so  many  had  attempted  and 
which  he  alone  had  been  able  to  carry  through.  But 
his  diplomatic  labors  were  not  finished,  for  the  prob- 
lem which  confronted  him  after  1871  was  one  of  hardly 
less  difficulty  and  demanded,  perhaps,  the  exercise  of 
even  greater  adroitness  than  all  his  diplomatic  and 
military  victories  of  the  earlier  period.  The  success 
of  his  policy  in  the  political  organization,  of  the  new 
Empire  and  the  preservation  of  the  European  peace 
after  the  close  of  the  war  with  France,  was  no  less 
than  that  which  he  achieved  in  the  unification  of  Ger- 
many, and  it  certainly  affected  the  recent  history  of 
Europe  to  an  equal  degree. 

His  first  problem  was  obviously  the  actual  consoli- 
dationof  the  new  federated  Germany :  the  translation 
of  the  forms  that  had  been  fixed  in  1871  into  fact.1  The 
task  was  one  of  herculean  character.  As  we  observed, 
the  states  of  southern  Germany  had  always  looked  to 
Vienna  for  guidance  and  been  jealous  of  Berlin;  the 
victory  of  Prussia  over  Austria  in  1866  had  been 
regarded  by  them  in  the  light  of  a  national  disaster. 
With  their  racial  dislike  and  their  political  fear  of 
Prussia,   they  were   none   too   enthusiastic   in   their 

i  Hanotaux,  Histoire  de  la  France  Contemporaine,  ii,  368 ;  Von 
Poschinger,  Life  of  the  Emperor  Frederick,  359. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        13 

acceptance  of  the  new  Germanic  constitution,  which 
gave  practical  hegemony  to  the  Hohenzollerns.2  Bis- 
marck had  also  to  face  the  protests  of  Poles,  Danes, 
and  Alsatians,  who  had  been  included  in  the  Empire 
against  their  will  and  in  defiance  of  the  rights  of 
nationality.  In  the  North,  Hanoverians  complained 
of  their  annexation  to  Prussia;  in  the  South,  intriguing 
prelates  fostered  the  particularist  elements,  hoping 
thus  to  weaken  the  power  of  the  State  and  increase 
that  of  the  Church.3 

With  such  factors  of  disruption  constantly  working 
against  him,  Bismarck  found  his  policy  of  centraliza- 
tion to  be  one  that  called  for  all  his  administrative  skill. 
He  finally  succeeded,  and  Germany  became  a  political 
unit,  thanks  in  large  measure  to  the  national  victory 
over  the  traditional  enemy  across  the  Rhine,  to  the 
self-abnegation  of  the  German  princes,  and  to  the 
almost  universal  consciousness  that  national  strength 
could  come  only  from  union.  But  in  order  to  succeed, 
peace  with  foreign  countries  was  necessary  and  a 
period  of  international  calm  must  be  ensured.  In 
Bismarck's  opinion,  Germany  was  " satiated"  and  her 
interests  demanded  only  the  opportunity  to  absorb 
what  she  had  secured.  As  war  during  the  preceding 
period  had  been  the  essential  condition  of  German 
unification,  so,  after  1871,  the  preservation  of  the 
status  quo  offered  the  only  assurance  of  German 
development.4 

2  Bismarck,  Reflections  and  Reminiscences  (ed.  Butler),  ii,  128;  Hano- 
taux,  op.  tit.,  ii,  372-373;  Oncken,  "The  German  Empire,' '  in  Cambridge 
Modern  History,  xii,  137;  Bourgeois,  Politique  Etrangdre,  iii,  763,  766; 
cf.  the  remark  of  the  Wittelsbach  monarch:  "Ich  unterwerfe  mich 
keinem  Hohenzollern, ' '  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen,  463. 

s  Bismarck,  Reflections,  ii,  189,  249;  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  ii,  369. 

«  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  763. 


14      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

The  difficulty  of  ensuring  the  preservation  of  the 
status  quo,  however,  was  not  small.  Notwithstanding 
the  constant  expressions  emanating  from  the  German 
Chancellor  to  the  effect  that  the  new  Empire  enter- 
tained no  further  military  ambitions,  the  other  states 
found  real  cause  for  anxiety  in  the  rapid  success  of 
Germany,  and  their  attitude  was  inevitably  one  of 
agitated  watchfulness.  The  smaller  states,  having 
witnessed  the  extent  and  variety  of  Prussian  annexa- 
tions, were  not  entirely  reassured  as  to  their  own  fate. 
Prussia  had  rendered  military  force  the  order  of  the 
day,  and  an  atmosphere  of  febrile  anxiety  resulted, 
especially  in  the  countries  that  were  impotent  to 
defend  themselves.  "  There  is  no  longer  any  protec- 
tion,' '  said  one  statesman,  "for  the  small  and  the 
weak."  The  larger  states  also  felt  that  they  must 
be  on  their  guard.  They  found  a  centralized  political 
entity,  based  on  the  strongest  army  in  the  world,  far 
less  to  their  taste  than  the  "impotent  galaxy  of 
squabbling  states,  chiefly  notable  for  literature,  art, 
and  music, ' '  which  had  been  the  Germany  of  the  earlier 
period. 

Such  distrust  was  an  obstacle  to  the  fulfilment  of 
Bismarck's  sincerely  pacific  policy.  Moreover,  he  had 
to  face  the  special  danger  of  disturbance  which  might 
arise  from  the  French  desire  for  revenge.  The 
humiliation  of  defeat  was  not  soon  forgotten  in  France, 
and  all  chance  of  closing  up  the  wound  was  prevented 
by  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  kept  it  an  open 
sore.  As  a  German  historian  has  said,  the  new 
structure  of  the  German  Empire  was  burdened  at  the 
very  outset  by  a  French  mortgage^  as  it  were,  since 
in  the  future  every  foreign  foe  of  Germany  could 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        15 

reckon  unconditionally  upon  French  support.5  It  was 
the  price  paid  for  Alsace-Lorraine.  Of  this  the 
Germans  were  not  unaware,  and  the  most  harmless 
words  and  actions  of  the  French  filled  them  with  the 
certain  belief  that  the  war  of  revenge  would  burst 
forth  on  the  day  when  the  German  armies  left  the 
French  soil ;  nor  was  theitf  conviction  lessened  by  the 
speed  with  which  the  war  indemnity  was  paid.  Bis- 
marck realized  acutely  the  danger  that  threatened, 
and  always  stood  in  deadly  fear  of  the  coalition  of 
some  state  with  France,  designed  to  break  down  the 
new  position  of  Germany.6 

As  the  best  means  of  preventing  such  an  anti- 
German  coalition  and  of  assuring  a  continuance  of 
the  status  quo,  he  sought  to  create  a  diplomatic  com- 
bination of  his  own.  He  realized  the  hazards  of 
Germany 's  position,  which  was  unprotected  by  natural 
frontiers  of  defence,  and  set  down  between  three 
Powers  with  two  of  whom  she  h_ad  recently  been  at 
war ;  and  he  considered  that  it  was  of  vitalimportance 
to  Germany  to  become  one  of  a  political  alliance  which 
would  lessen  the  chances  of  an  anti-Teutonic  combi- 
nation, and  which  would,  by  intimidation,  forestall 
any  possible  attempt  at  revenge  on  the  part  of  France. 
During  the  decade  that  followed  the  unification  of 
Germany  the  foreign  policy  of  Bismarck  was  chiefly 
directed  towards  the  creation  of  such  an  alliance.  His 
first  attempts  to  bring  Russia  and  Austria  into  a 
political  coalition  with  Germany  were  frustrated, 
largely  because  of  the  jealousy  of  the  two  first-named 
Powers  in  the  Near  East.    Au^stria,  however,  joined 

6  Oncken,  in  Cambridge  Modern  History,  xii,  136. 
«  Bismarck,  Reflections,  ii,  252. 


16      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

with  Germany,  and  in  1882  the  place  originally 
designed  for  Eussia  was  taken  by  Italy. 

As  early  as  1870  and  before  the  end  of  the  war  with 
France,  Bismarck  had  determined  that  a  permanent 
understanding,  and  if  possible  an  alliance,  between 
the  three  imperial  PowTers,  Germany,  Austria,  and 
Eussia,  should  be  the  keystone  of  his  foreign  policy.7 
Friendly  relations  with  Kussia  were,  in  his  opinion, 
natural  and  desirable  for  both  Germany  and  Eussia. 
They  were  traditional  for  each  nation  and  royal 
family;  with  the  exception  of  a  tyrief  period  during 
the  wars  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  factitious 
alliance  of  Prussia  with  Napoleon  in  1812,  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  and  Eomanofrs  had  invariably  recognized 
their  mutual  interests  and  remained  on  terms  of  close 
friendship.  Bismarck  himself  had  done  much  to  bring 
the  two  states  together  during  his  stay  as  Ambassador 
in  St.  Petersburg,  and  in  1863  he  had  further  won  the 
good-will  of  the  Tsar  by  refusing  to  take  advantage 
of  a  Polish  revolt  or  to  aid  the/  rebels.8 

During  the  war  of  1870,  the  understanding  had  not 
been  broken,  for  Bismarck  persuaded  Eussia  to  adopt 
an  attitude  of  friendly  neutrality  by  acceding  to  her 
demand  that  the  Treaty  of  Paris  be  abrogated  so  as 
to  allow  Eussia  to  send  her  warships  out  on  the  Black 
Sea.  Eussia  did  nothing  to  hinder  the  creation  of  a 
new  and  powerful  German  state,  inasmuch  as  her 
position  in  the  Near  East  found  compensation ;  hence- 
forth she  could  again  bear  aid  to  her  kinsmen  in  the 
Balkans,  and  find  a  new  opportunity  of  ^menacing 

*  Bismarck,  Reflections,  ii,  248,  249.  V 

s  Benedetti,  Studies  in  Diplomacy,  77-80 ;  Lowe,  Bismarck,  i,  241- 
245,  302-304. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE       17 

Turkey.9  The  political  bonds  which  thus  united  Ger- 
many and  Eussia  were  drawn  closer  by  the  deep 
personal  affection  that  existed  between  the  Kaiser 
William  and  his  nephew,  the  Tsar  Alexander  II.10 

To  come  to  an  understanding  with  Austria  was,  in 
Bismarck's  opinion,  no  less  desirable  for  Germany; 
but  improved  at  the  outset  more  difficult.  Two  cen- 
turies of^nutual  jealousy  and  hostility  had  left  traces 
which  were  not  to  be  eradicated  in  a  moment.  The 
conquest  of  Silesia  by  Frederick  the  Great  was  not 
entirely  forgotten  or  forgiven  by  Austria.  The  defeat 
of  1866  and  what  amounted  to  Austria's  expulsion 
from  Germany  still  rankled.  And  the  Austrian 
Chancellor,  Beijstr  had  always  been  the  bitterest  foe 
both  of  Prussia  and  of  Bismarck. 

The  restraint  displayed  by  Bismarck  in  his  treat- 
ment of  Austria  after  her  defeat  by  Prussia  had  done 
much  to*1  smooth  matters  between  the  two  states.11 
Austria,  on  her  side,  had  raised  no  objections  to  the 
union  of  Germany  under  Prussian  hegemony,  although 
it  was  contrary  to  the  Treaty  of  Prague,  and  Francis 
Joseph  saluted  the  transformation  of  Germany  with 
at  least  outward  cordiality.12  Bismarck's  readiness  to 
pass  over  the  Austrian  negotiations  with  France 
immediately  before  the  Franco-German  War,  had  also 
gone  far  to  facilitate  an  understanding.  The  real 
obstacle  to  the  uniop^of  Austria  and  Germany  was  to 
be  found  in  the  policy  of  Beust,  who  retained  his 

»  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  785. 

io  Schneider,  L'Empereur  Guillaume,  iii,  312;  Bismarck,  Beflections, 
ii,  268. 

ii  Andrews,  The  Historical  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  ii,  251. 
Although  defeated  by  Prussia,  Austria  had  suffered  no  loss  of  territory 
except  the  surrender  of  Venetia  to  Italy. 

12  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  768. 


18      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

ancient  hatred  of  Prussia  and  could  be  bribed  by  no 
offer  to  enter  into  treaty  arrangements.  Bismarck 
determined  to  get  rid  of  Beust.13 

He  found  his  opportunity  in  the  domestic  jealousy 
that  existed  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  It 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Hapsburg  Empire  was 
a  heterogeneous  compilation  of  mutually  hostile 
nationalities,  of  which  there  are  three  main  divisions : 
the  German,  the  Hungarian  or  Magyar,  and  the  jjlav. 
By  a  compromise  reached  in  186J,  the  German  and 
Magyar  elements  divided  the  power  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  Slav;  but  their  mutual  jealousy  still  persisted.14 
When  Beust,  who  represented  the  German  element 
and  was  in  difficulties  owing  to  trouble  with  the  Slavs, 
refused  to  accept  the  advances  of  Bismarck,  the  latter 
turned  to  the  Magyars. 

The  Magyar  party,  led  by  Count  Andrassy,  saw  in 
the  German  alliance  an  opportunity  for  making  them- 
selves supreme  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire. 
They  were  little  affected  by  the  Prussian  victory  of 
1866  and  felt  no  disappointment  at  the  exclusion 
of  Austria  from  Germany.  Their  ambitions  were 
directed  rather  to  th^fcitheast.  They  were  desirous 
first  of  maintaining  BlIRrar  supremacy  over  the  Slav 
races  in  the  Austrian  Empire,  and  then  of  extending 
the  hegemony  of  their  race  over  the  Slavs  of  the 
Balkans,  ^n  understanding  with  Germany  would 
undoubtedly  facilitate  the  success  of  their  policy; 
they  would  agree  to  accept  Bismarck's  offers  on 
condition  that  he  would  permit  them  to  exploit  the 
rich  field  of  the  Balkans.    A  bargain,  based  on  such 

is  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  787. 

i*Beavan,  Austrian  Policy  since  1867,  7;  Steed,  The  Hapsuurg 
Monarchy,  passim. 


/■* 

BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        19 

terms,  was  struck  with  Germany.  Bismarck,  who  had 
come  into  contact  with  Andrassy  through  the  naive 
mediation  of  Beust  himself,  planned  with  the  former 
the  overthrow  of  the  latter.  The  plot  succeeded,  Beust 
was  dismissed  in  JiJZl*  and  his,  place  was  filled  by 
Andrassy.  It  meant  that  the  new  Austrian  Govern- 
ment would  renounce  all  claim  to  its  German  heritage^ 
would  seek  compensations  in  the  Balkans,  and  would 
enter  into  terms  of  close  friendship  with  Germany.15 

Andrassy  was  the  more  ready  to  enter  into  Bis- 
marck's scheme  of  a  triple  understanding  between  the 
imperial  Powers,  since  he  sincerely  desired  to  strike 
a  bargain  withJBussia.  The  chief  obstruction  to  his 
policy  of  extending  the  sway  of  the  Magyar  race  over 
the  Slavs  of  the  Danube  and  Balkans,  was  the  assist- 
ance which  they  were  likely  to  receive  from  Russia. 
But  Russia  also  had  her  fear  of  difficulties  with  the 
Poles  of  Galicia,  who  were  supported  by  Austria. 
Andrassy  agreed  to  withdraw  the  support  that  the 
Poles  had  found  at  Vienna,  on  condition  that  Russia 
would  deliver  the  Slavs  of  the  Danube  and  Balkans 
over  to  the  Magyars.16 

The  policy  of  Andrassy  and  Bismarck  thus  coincided  q 
and  there  resulted  what  historians  have  called  the  Q^j** 
League  of  the  Three  Emperors.    Bismarck  counselled  <^^ 
his  Emperor  to  make  a  visit  to  Francis  Joseph  at 
Ischl,  in  August,  1871,  which  was  returned  by  the 
latter   at    Salzburg.     Andrassy    sent   the   Archduke 
William  to  the  Russian  manoeuvres  in  the  summer  of 
1872,  with  the  result  that  the  Tsar  consented  to  meet 
Francis  Joseph  and  the  Kaiser  William  at  Berlin 

is  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen,  471.  See  also,  Thiers,  Notes  et 
Souvenirs,  92. 

i°  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  787-789. 


20      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

in  September  of  the  same  year.  Other  interviews 
followed  in  1873  and  the  two  following  years,  appar- 
ently demonstrating  the  permanence  of  the  entente.17 
But  the  League  of  the  Three  Emperors  was  in  no 
sense  an  alliance  and  hardly  a  league,  and  Bismarck 
found  it  impossible  to  give  to  it  anything  of  real 
solidity.  Nor  could  he  use  it  as  a  weapon  of  intimi- 
dation against  France;  the  French  conviction  that  in 
the  interviews  of  the  Emperors  were  to  be  found  a 
series  of  plots  formed  against  them  under  the  malign 
genius  of  Bismarck,  was  wholly  at  fault.  Andra^sy 
favored  the  combination  solely  in  order  to  preserve 
the  status  quo  in  Central  Europe,  so  that  he  might 
carry  out  his  plan  of  subjugating  the  Slavs.  He 
entered  into  the  triple  understanding,  not  to  assist 
any  movement  directed  against  France,  but  simply  to 
come  to  a  compromise  with  Russia.18  And  the  Tsar 
was  by  no  means  willing  to  act  as  Bismarck's  tool  in 
keeping  France  entirely  disarmed  and  at  the  mercy 
of  Germany.  At  the  very  moment  of  the  interview  at 
Berlin,  in  September,  1872,  Alexander  sent  word  to 
the  French  President,  Thiers,  that  he  had  nothing 
to  fear  from  what  might  transpire  there ;  and  Gortcha- 
koff,  the  Eussian  Chancellor,  said  to  the  French 
Ambassador  at  Berlin:  "We  are  not  indifferent  to 
your  army  or  to  your  reorganization.  On  this  point 
Germany  has  not  the  right  to  address  any  criticism 
to  you.  I  have  said,  and  I  repeat  with  pleasure,  that 
we  need  a  strong  France.,n9 

it  Hanotaux,  France  Contemporaine,  i,  498 ;  Bismarck,  Reflections, 
ii,  249 ;  Seignobos,  I  'Europe  Contemporaine,  780. 

is  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  i,  500. 

is  Broglie,  La  Mission  de  M.  de  Gontaut-Biron  a  Berlin,  47.  See  also, 
Thiers,  Notes  et  Souvenirs,  333;  Gavard,  Le  Proces  d'Arnim,  59. 


BISMARCK  AND  TH2TTRIPLE.  ALLIANCE 


i% 


Bismarck's  hope  of  definit^^ transforming  the 
League  of  the  Three  Emperors  info  a  solid  alliance 
and  guaranteeing  the  status  quo  against  any  disturb- 
ance on  the  part  of  France  was  thus  not  realized. 
Even  the  understanding  that  existed  between  the  three 
Empires  was  soon  destroyed  by  the  strain  of^two^ 
crises.  Thejirst^of  these  occurred  in  1875,  when  it 
seemed  as  if  war  might  again  break  out  between  France 
and  Germany.  The  moral  assistance  brought  by 
Russia  to  France  on  this  occasion  was  such  as  to 
separate  Eussia  and  Germany.  The  second  crisis  took 
place  in  1878  as  a  result  of  the  Near  Eastern  situation, 
and  brought  Austria  and  Russia  face  to  face  in  the 
Balkans.  The  hostility  between  the  two  Powers  made 
a  continuance  of  their  understanding  impossible,  and 
forced  Bismarck  to  recognize  that  his  scheme  of  a 
triple  imperial  alliance  was  impracticable. 

The  crisis  of  ljgiLwas  the  culmination  of  the  policy 
of  intimidation  adopted  by  Bismarck  with  regard  to 
France.  From  the  moment  when  he  opened  negotia- 
tions in  1871,  he  was  determined  that  France  should 
be  so  crushed  that  she  would  be  unable  to  lift  her 
head  against  Germany  for  a  generation.  It  was  for 
this  reason  that  he  imposed  a  war  indemnity  so  heavy 
that  she  was  allowed  four  years  in  which  to  pay  it,  and 
which  he  later  regretted  as  being  too  small.20  It  was 
to  prevent  any  counter-attack  on  the  part  of  France 
that  Germany  took  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  shifted  the 
frontier  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Vosges  and  protected 
the  states  of  South  Germany  from  a  sudden  French 
invasion.  The  same  fear  of  the  recrudescence  of 
France  accounts  for  the   successful  demand  of  the 

zoGabriac,  Souvenirs  diplomatiques  de  Russie  et  de  I'Allemagne,  155. 


22      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

German  army  staff  that  the  fortress  of  Metz,  in  the 
midst  of  a  district  linguistically  French,  should  be 
taken  from  her.21  "This  treaty,"  said  Thiers  of  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort,  "is  impregnated  with  the  fear 
that  France  inspires  in  our  foe. ' ,22 

Both  Thiers  and  Bismarck  ardently  desired  the 
continuance  of  peace,  but  everything  that  they  did  to 
ensure  peace  awoke  mutual  suspicion.  To  reorganize 
France  and  .safeguard  her  national  existence  was  the 
only  care  of  the  French  leaders,  but  in  the  efforts 
made  by  Thiers  and  Gambetta  to  reorganize  their 
nation,  Bismarck  saw  preparations  for  an  immediate 
war  of  revenge.23j  On  the  other  hand,  the  French  did 
not  understand  the  mystery  of  the  interviews  of  the 
three  Emperors,  and  saw  in  them  and  in  Germany's 
construction  of  forts  and  strategic  lines,  the  active 
and  brutal  hand  of  Bismarck  always  threatening 
them.24  As  time  went  on,  the  mutual  suspicion  in- 
creased. The  success  of  the  French  monarchTsts  in 
ousting  Thiers  in  1873,  seemed  to  the  Germans  to 
presage  a  crusade  for  the  restoration  of  the  Pope's 
temporal  power  at  the  very  moment  when  Bismarck 
was  fighting  the  Papacy  in  the  Kulturkampf.  Finally 
in  1875  the  suspicion  reached  its  culmination  in  a 
serious  crisis. 

It  was  the  year  of  the  proclamation  of  the  French 
Eepublic,  and  the  Germans  saw  in  this  and  in  a  vote 

21  Oncken,  in  Cambridge  Modern  History,  xii,  136 ;  Busch,  Bismarck 
in  the  Franco-German  War,  ii,  341 ;  Blowitz,  Memoirs,  161. 

22  Bourgeois,  Politique  Etrangere,  iii,  757. 

23  Von  Poschinger,  Life  of  the  Emperor  Frederick,  360;  Gavard,  Le 
Proce~s  d'Arnim,  94;  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  i,  338,  494;  ii,  370;  Gabriac, 
Souvenirs  diplomatiques,  141. 

24  Thiers,  Liberation  du  Territoire,  ii,  182-192. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE       23 

passed  by  the  French  Legislative  Chambers,  which 
increased  the  army  of  France,  the  clearest  indication 
that  the  conflicting  parties  in  that  country  were  coming 
to  an  understanding  in  preparation  for  a  war  of 
revenge.  In  answer,  Bismarck  let  drop  a  disquieting 
phrase  to  the  effect  that  he  would  not  wait  until  France 
was  ready  for  war,  and  that  he  knew  that  she  would 
be  ready  in  two  years.25  In  April,  1875,  there  was  a 
general  rustle  of  arms  and  the  German  Crown  Prince 
did  not  conceal  the  fact  that  Berlin  was  filled  with 
warlike  tendencies.  So  far  as  Bismarck's  intentions 
went,  it  is  probable  that  he  merely  hoped  to  frighten 
France  by  his  sabre-rattling  and  that  he  found  a 
"pledge  of  peace  in  not  allowing  France  the  certainty 
of  not  being  attacked,  no  matter  what  she  did." 
Doubtless  he  hoped  to  warn  her  that  any  resumption 
of  an  aggressive  policy  on  her  part  would  not  be 
tolerated  by  Germany.28 

But  it  is  possible  that  the  German  army  party,  led 
by  Moltke,  were  more  serious  in  their  intentions  and 
were  determined  to  finish  once  and  for  all  with  France. 
They  doubtless  believed  that  an  eventual  war  was  a 
certainty  and  that  in  eighteen  months  France  would 
be  able  to  wage  it  on  nearly  equal  terms.  According 
to  one  of  the  articles  published  at  the  time,  Germany 
could  not  believe  that  Europe  would  be  tranquil  so 
long  as  a  struggle  were  possible  and  France  remained 
in  a  position  to  survive  and  recommence  the  duel. 
"Germany  was  troubled  by  the  consciousness  of  having 

25  Bourgeois,  op.  tit.,  iii,  777 ;  Hanotaux,  op.  tit.,  ii,  410 ;  Broglie,  La 
Mission  de  M.  de  Gontaut-Biron  d  Berlin,  166,  182. 

26  Oneken,  in  Cambridge  Modern  History,  xii,  141 ;  Hippeau,  Histoire 
diplomatique  de  la  troisidme  Republique,  84,  109. 


24      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

only  half  crushed  her  enemy  and  of  being  able  to 
defend  herself  only  by  sleeping  with  one  eye  open. ' ,27 

Whether  or  not  the  German  military  party  were 
really  determined  to  crush  France  at  this  opportunity 
has  never  been  definitely  established.  At  any  rate 
their  sentiments  were  thus  described  by  Blowitz  in  a 
sensational  article  in  the  Times,  which  helped  to  wake 
Europe  to  the  danger  of  the  situation.28  The  French 
Foreign  Minister  telegraphed  the  fears  of  France  to 
London  and  St.  Petersburg,  with  the  result  that  France 
was  saved  from  the  peril  of  a  German  attack,  if  peril 
there  was,  by  the  protests  of  England  and  especially 
of  Russia.  Lord  Derby  instructed  the  British  Ambas- 
sador at  Berlin  to  exert  his  influence  to  calm  the 
manifestations  of  war-fever  in  Berlin,  and  Queen 
Victoria  expressed  her  desire  that  Europe  should  be 
spared  serious  trouble.29  At  St.  Petersburg,  the  Tsar 
assured  the  French  Ambassador  that  he  would  prevent 
any  such  attack  as  Franbe  feared  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many, and  he  immediately  took  steps  to  let  the  German 
Government  know  his  sentiments.30 

Berlin  at  once  became  pacific,  and  the  danger  of  war 
between  France  and  Germany  passed.  But  the  crisis 
was*  of  the  utmost  importance,  since  it  proved  definitely 
that  the  understanding  built  up— between  the  three 
Emperors,  could  not  be  utilized  for  the  purpose  o£ 
intimidating/Fja^ce!    And  inevitably  it  opened^Trift 


27  Blowitz,  Memoirs,  102,  111;  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances, 
124;  Morier,  Memoirs,  ii,  333-345. 

28  Blowitz,  Memoirs,  103. 

29  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  ii,  407;  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  775,  780;  Gavard, 
Vn  Diplomat  d  Londres,  242-243. 

so  Bismarck,  Reflections,  ii,  188,  236;  Tardieu,  France  and  the 
Alliances,  126;  Hanotaux,  France  Contemporaine,  iii,  chap,  iv;  Daudet, 
Eistoire  diplomatique  de  V Alliance  Franco-Busse,  78-112. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        25 

between  Germany  and  Russia.  It  became  clear  that 
Germany  had  need  of  a  weak  France,  Russia  of  a  strong 
France ;  so  long  as  the  degradation  of  France  remained 
the  keystone  of  Bismarck's  policy,  an  alliance  between 
Slav  and  Teuton  was  out  of  the  question.  This  rift 
was  widened  by  the  ever-increasing  personal  animosity 
that  existed  between  Bismarck  and"  the  Russian 
Chancellor,  GortchakofF.31  With  the  Near  Eastern 
crisis  of  1878  it  became  a  gulf. 


Both  Austria  and  Russia  had  vital  interests  in  the 
Near  East  and  it  was  almost  inevitable  that  sooner 
or  later  those  interests  would  conflict.  Russia,  search- 
ing for  an  ice-free  port  and  coveting  control  of  the 
Dardanelles,  looked  upon  Constantinople  as  her  natural 
heritage.  She  was,  moreover,  the  natural  protector 
of  her  Slav  kinsmen  in  the  Balkans.  By  sentiment 
and  policy  she  was-  impelled  toward  aggressive  action 
in  the  Near  East.vAustro-Hungary,  especially  after 
her  expulsion  from  Germany,  also  looked  to  the  South- 
east as  a  field  for  expansion,  actuated  by  economic  as 
well  as  by  political  motives.  When  the  clash  with 
Russia  came,  the  understanding  entered  into  by  the 
Tsar  and  Andrassy  under  Bismarckian  auspices,  was 
doomed. 

The  temporary  rapprochement  of  the  two  Powers 
in  1872  resulted  from  the  desire  of  each  to  have  a  free 
hand  with  which  to  deal  with  internal  difficulties. 
The  domestic  problems  qfjeach  Empire  demanded  a 
more "prompl  solution  than  the  questions  of  foreign 
policy  which  sometime  must  separate  Russia  and 
Austria.  For  the  moment  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  in  the  Orient  was  as  desirable  as  in  the 
Occident,  and  like  Bismarck,  Andrassy  sought  it  in 

si  Bismarck,  Reflections,  ii,  114;  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  497. 


i) 


26      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  Russian  understanding.32  But  although  the  chances 
of  conflict  between  Austria  and  Russia  were  thus  laid 
aside,  they  were  not  destroyed,  and  in  1878  the  clash 
of  their  Near  Eastern  ambitions  took  place,  and 
definitely  terminated  Bismarck's  hope  of  a  triple 
imperial  alliance. 

For  many  years  the  decadence  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  had  presented  the  most  difficult  problem  con- 
fronting Europe ;  Ottoman  weakness  was  a  temptation 
to  the  greed  of  the  great  Powers,  and  Turkey's  treat- 
ment of  her  Christian  subjects  a  constant  provocation. 
Jnlfear  of  the  results,  should  its  Empire  go  to  pieces, 
Great  Britain  and  France  had  saved  it  from  Russia 
in  1855,  and  the  Treaty  of  Paris  had  proclaimed  the 
sacredness  of  its  integrity.  Turkish  decadence,  how- 
ever, could  not  be  remedied.  The  finances  of  the  Porte 
were  chaotic,  sustained  only  by  paper  currency  and 
foreign  loans ;  its  administration  was  weak  and  at  the 
same  time  tyrannical.  Finally  in  1875,  a  revolt  began 
in  Bosnia,  which  had  its  origin  in  the  misery  dealt  out 
by  the  Turkish  governors  and  in  the  hope  offered  by 
Turkish  weakness.  < 

For  two  years  the  Powers  of  Europe  sought  vainly 
to  arrange  matters  between  the  Sultan  and  his  Chris- 
tian subjects ;  the  rebellion  could  not  be  checked,  and 
spread  until  it  included  most  of  the  Balkan  provinces. 
Finally,  in  .1877,  after  receiving  repeated  appeals  for 
assistance  from  her  Slavic  kinsmen,  Russia  declared 
war  on  Turkey,  in  order  to  bring  them  aid.83     The 

32  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  790 ;  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  380. 

33  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  iv,  passim;  Phillips,  Modern 
Europe,  494-505;  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  793-799;  for  the  causes  of  the  war, 
Songeon,  Histoire  de  la  Bulgarie,  332  sq.;  for  its  course,  Eustow,  Der 
Krieg  in  der  TurTcei. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE       27 

campaign  was  long  and  bloody.  At  first  the  Russians 
were  unable  to  make  headway  against  the  valiant  and 
intelligent  resistance  of  the  Turks,  but  in  the  spring 
of  1878  they  broke  down  their  obstinate  defence  by 
force  of  numbers.  They  advanced  to  within  cannon- 
shot  of  Constantinople,  and  there  dictated  the  terms 
of  the  peace  (San  Stefano).84  According  to  the  treaty, 
Turkey  in  Europe  was  dismembered.  She  retained 
only  a  narrow  and  broken  strip  of  territory  from  the 
Bosphorus  to  the  Adriatic,  and  was  forced  to  see  the 
rest  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  divided  up  on  paper 
between  Bulgaria,  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro, 
the  first-named  receiving  Rumelia  to  the  south  and 
most  of  Macedonia. 

But  Russia  had  counted  without  the  other  Powers, 
and  her  partition  of  the  Balkans  was  not  allowed  to 
go  into  effect.    Grea^gritain  was  absolutely  opposed 
to  the  division  of  the  , Turkish  Empire   among  the 
Balkan  states,  and  especially  disliked  the  enormous  , 
accession   of   territory   provided   for   Bulgaria;   the 
Balkan  Principalities  would  be,  in  her  opinion,  simply  \ 
clients  of  the  Tsar  who  had  freed  them ;  the  more  their  / 
power  was  increased,  the  greater  would  be  the  influence 
of  Russia  in   the   Near   East.35     Nor  was   Austria 
inclined  to  allow  her  pathway  to  the  iEgean  and  lower 
Adriatic  to  be  barred  and  her  influence  in  the  Balkans 
nullified  by  the  threatened  protectorate  of  Russia  over 
the  Slavic  states. 

Realizing  the  determination  of  the  two  Powers, 

34Seignobos,  L 'Europe  Contemporaine,  602,  782-784;  Phillips,  op. 
cit.,  514-515;  Hippeau,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  la  troisieme  Bipublique, 
181-197. 

35  Circular  despatch  of  Lord  Salisbury,  April  1,  1878,  published  in 
Annual  Eegister,  1878,  Appendix;  Hippeau,  op.  cit.,  176. 


28      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Russia  did  not  insist  upon  the  acceptance  of  her 
scheme  and  agreed  that  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano 
should  be  discussed  and  revised  at  an  international 
congress.  A  few  months  later  she  saw  her  plan  torn 
jo  pieces  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  which  seHIed  fET" 
matter  m  July,  1878.36  Turkey  retained  the  larger 
part  of  her  former  European  possessions,  and  although 
Eumania  was  granted  absolute  independence  and 
Bulgaria  became  an  autonomous  tributary  princi- 
pality, the  latter  did  not  receive  Macedonia  nor  even 
Eastern  Rumelia.  The  power  of  Russia's  proteges 
was  thus  not  increased  as  she  had  hoped,  and  she  was 
at  the  same  time  forced  to  witness  the  development 
of  Austrian  plans  for  control  in  the  Balkans,  since 
Austria  received  permission  to  occupy  and  administer 
the  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.37  Once 
more,  as  in  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War,  Russian 
schemes  for  predominant  influence  in  the  peninsula 
were  blocked. 

After  this  diplomatic  conflict  of  Austria  and  Russia, 
a  continuance  of  the  understanding  between  the  three 
Empires  was  extremely  difficult,  and  its  development 
into  an  alliance  impossible.  The  irreconcilable  inter- 
ests of  Austria  and  Russia  in  the  Near  East  were  laid 
bare  and  any  compromise  between  the  two  Powers 
was  obviously  out  of  the  question.  The  relations 
between  Russia  and  Germany  were  also  embittered.38 
Russia,  in  her  vexation  at  the  result  of  the  Berlin 
Congress,    saw   the    explanation    of   her    diplomatic 

3«  Bismarck,  Reflections,  ii,  233-236;  Andrews,  op.  cit.,  ii,  321-323; 
Cahuet,  La  Question  d* 'Orient,  399  sq. 

37  The  text  of  the  treaty  is  printed  in  Annual  Register,  1878,  Appen- 
dix; cf.  Debidour,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  I'Europe,  ii,  515? 

38  Oncken,  in  Cambridge  Modern  History,  xii,  143. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE       29 

defeat  in  what  she  believed  to  be  the  underhand 
intrigues  of  Germany.  The  ill-feeling  that  already 
existed  between  Bismarck  and  Gortchakoff  was 
heightened;  the  Russian  Chancellor  called  the  Con- 
gress the  "  darkest  episode  in  his  career/ '  and  laid 
the  blame  entirely  upon  Bismarck.39 

Eussian  feeling  was  not  entirely  justified  by  the 
actual  facts.  It  does  not  appear  that  Bismarck  took 
sides  against  Russia  in  the  Congress,  and  he  was 
apparently  sincere  when  he  professed  his  absolute 
indifference  to  the  Eastern  Question,  saying  that  "it 
was  not  worth  the  bones  of  a  Pomeranian  grenadier. ' ' 
Furthermore,  it  was  certainly  in  consonance  with  his 
general  policy  not  to  offend  Russia;  so  that  we  may 
believe  that  he  really  did  his  utmost  at  Berlin  to  play 
the  role  of  "the  honest  broker,"  as  he  professed.40" 
But  it  was  impossible  to  convince  jRussia  that  Ger- 
many had  not  acted  as  agent  for  Austrian  ambitions 
in  the  Near  East.  The  Russian  press  covered  Bis- 
marck with  invective  and  frankly  called  him  a  traitor ; 
members  of  the  Russian  royal  family  passing  through 
Berlin  refused  to  meet  him,  the  Tsar  protested  to  the 
Kaiser  that  Bismarck  was  an  ingrate.  Russian  tariffs 
on  German  goods  were  raised,  and  Russian  armies  on 
the  German  frontier  were  increased.41 

Notwithstanding  the  wave  of  anti-German  feeling 
that  swept  through  Russia  at  this  time,  Bismarck  was 
by  no  means  inclined  to  break  with  a  Power  whose 
friendliness  he  believed  to  be  essential  for  Germany; 

39  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  127. 

40  Von  Poschinger,  Life  of  the  Emperor  Frederick,  381;  Bismarck, 
Beflections,  ii,  288. 

4i  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen,  476;  Bismarck,  Beflections,  ii,  234- 
236;  Hohenlohe,  Memoirs,  ii,  427. 


A    yr 


30      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

convinced  that  the  display  of  Russian  ill-humor  was 
merely  temporary  and  resulted  from  emotion,  he  still 
hoped  to  preserve  good  relations  with  the  Slav  state. 
But  he  could  not  fail  to  realize  that  the  break  between 
Russia  and  Austria  was  definite,  for  it  rested  upon 
the  conflict  of  interests  and  not/upon  sentimental 
grounds.  And  he  saw  plainly  that  Germany  must 
choose  between  Russia  and  Austria,  for  she  could  not 
be  the  ally  of  both.42  Not  without  difficulty  he  decided 
at  last  that  the  Austrian  alliance  would  be  more  useful 
to  Germany  than  the  Russian.  Despite  the  protests 
of  the  old  Kaiser  William,  who  could  not  but  feel  that 
alliance  with  Austria  meant  an  ultimate  break  with 
Russia,  and  was  only  persuaded  by  Bismarck's  threat 
of  resignation,  the  German  Chancellor  at  once  made 
advances  to  Andrassy.  They  were  acceptable  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government,  and  in  OctoberTJi$Z{^ 
a  defensive  alliance  was  signed  between  the  two 
Powers.43    %/ 

According  to  the  tefrns  of  the  treaty,  which  were 
secret,  if  either  Austria  or  Germany  were  attacked 
*>X  -Eassia  they^w-ere  bound  to  lend  each  other  recip- 
rocal^aid  with  the  whole  of  their  forces,  and  not  to 
conclude^peace,  except  jointly  and  in  agreement.  _If_ 
one  of  them  were  attacked  by  another  Power,  the  Ally 
was  to  observe  an  attitude  of  benevolent  neutrality; 
and  if  the  attacking  Power  were  supported  by  Russia, 
the  obligation  of  reciprocal  help  would  come  into  force 

42  Bismarck,  Beflections,  ii,  255-257;  Busch,  Diary,  ii,  223;  Hanotaux, 
op.  cit.,  i,  498. 

48  Cqrrespondence  of  William  I  and  Bismarck  (ed.  Ford),  ii,  200-202; 
Busch,  Diary,  ii,  475-489;  Bismarck,  Beflections,  ii,  266,  268;  Oncken, 
in  Cambridge  Modern  History,  xii,  144.  The  text  of  the  treaty  is 
printed  in  Price,  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  273-274. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        31 

and  the  war  would  be  waged  jointly  until  the  joint 
conclusion  of  peace. 

By  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  with  Austria, 
Bismarck  received  the  guarantee  that  he  had  been 
seeking  against  an  attempt  at  revenge  on  the  part 
of  France.  Should  Prance  dare  to  attack  Germany, 
he  was  assured  of  Austrian  neutrality,  and  if  France 
secured  the  assistance  of  Russia  against  Germany,  he 
was  certain  of  Austrian  assistance.  The  position  that 
Germany  had  won  by  the  Peace  of  Frankfort  was  thus 
stamped  with  the  character  of  stability  and  perma- 
nence. Bismarck,  however,  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
new  combination  and  sought  to  render  it  stronger  by 
the  inclusion  of  a  third  Power.  As  he  could  not  make 
assurance  doubly  sure  by  the  inclusion  of  Russia  he 
turned  to  the  south  and  determined  that  the  place  that 
Russia  was  to  have  occupied,  should  be  taken  by  Italy. 
The  adhesion  of  Italy— i&  the  Austro-German  pact 
would  set  up  in  Central  Europe  a  solid  block  of  Powers, 
sufficient  to  maintain  the  status  quo_  against  any 
opposing  group  that  could  be  marshalled  against  them. 

That  Itajy  should  have  consented  to  enter  the 
Teutonic  alliance  seems  at  first  glance  anomalous. 
A  Latin  Power,  her  racial  Jtenpathies  were  naturally 
with  France;  moreover  shevvved  ta  France  Jier  first 
advance  towardsjaational  unity,  since  it  was  Napoleon 
who  EacTdriven  the  Austrians  out  of  Lombardy  in 
1796  and  later  brought  the  whole  peninsula  under  his 
suzerainty;  to  his  genius  Italy  owed  her  civil  and 
economic  organization.  Napoleon  III  had  enabled 
Italy  again  to  free  herself  from  Austrian  misrule  in 
1859,  and  establish  her  independence  under  Victor 
Emmanuel. 

It  is  true  that  the  relations  of  Italy  with  Prussia 


32      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

had  been  close  in  1866  and  that  it  was  only  through 
Prussian  assistance  that  Italy  had  finally  won 
Venetia.44  But  Italian  gratitude  was  largely  de- 
stroyed when  Prussia  imposed  a  peace  that  left  the 
Trentino  and  Trieste  in  the  hands  of  Austria.  Italy 
had  always  regarded  Austria  as  the  traditional  and 
national  foe,  and  the  fact  that  the  Hapsburg  still  held 
territory  which  was  claimed  as  Italian,  did  not  lessen 
the  bitterness  that  informed  the  relations  of  the  two 
states.  In  Italy,  a  party  that  mad6  up  by  zeal  for  jts 
paucity  of  numbers,  demanded  loudly  and  constantly 
that  the  unredeemed  provinces  be  reclaimed  by  force. 
In  Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  the  anti-Papal  policy 
of  the  Italian  Government  gave  offence  to  the  powerful 
Catholic  party.  'Furthermore,  the  economic  and  mari- 
time interests  of  the  two  countries  clashed  in  the 
Adriatic  and  on  the  Albanian  coast,  and  the  rivalry 
in  this  quarter  seemed  so  keen  as  to  render  an  alliance 
a  practical  impossibility. 

But  circumstances  played  into  Bismarck's  hands. 
Italian  gratitude  to  France  for  the  assistance  of 
Napoleon  III  was  almost  obliterated  by  the  subsequent 
policy  of  the  Emperor,  which  the  Italians  considered 
fo  be  calculated  perfidy,. v  After  promising  that  Italy 
should  be  freed  from  the" Alps  to  the  Adriatic,  he  had 
made  a  treacherous  peace  with  Francis  Joseph,  in 
1859,  leaving  Venetia  in  Austrian  hands.  He  had, 
moreover,  maintained  the  Pope  in  Eome  for  ten  years, 
so  that  it  was  not  until  the  defeat  of  France  in  1870 
that  the  King  of  Italy  was  able  to  make  Rome  his 
capital.  4 

"Italy  had  entered  the  war  of  1866  against  Austria  with  Prussia, 
and  although  defeated  on  the  field  of  battle,  received  Venetia  as  the 
price  of  her  cooperation  and  as  the  result  of  Prussia's  victory. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        33 

Even  after  the  establishment  of  the  Third  Republic, 
French  policy  continued  to  be  ultramontane  and 
consequently  anti-Italian.  At  the  moment  when  Bis- 
marck was  winning  Italian  sympathies  by  his  struggle 
against  the  Papacy,  the  French  royalists  were  making 
noisy  manifestations  in  favor  of  the  reestablishment 
of  the  temporal  power.  The  ministers  who  showed 
themselves  hostile  to  ultramontane  demonstrations 
were  forced  to  resign :  first  Jules  Favre  in  1871,  and 
then  Thiers  in  1873.  "Our  chief  enemy/ '  said  the 
leading  Italian  paper,  "is  the  Papacy,  and  with  the 
Papacy,  France ;  that  is  to  say  the  implacable  enemies 
of  Germany.' H5  " 

The  identity  of  adversaries  and  consequently  of 
interests  thus  pushed  Italy  in  the  direction  of  an 
understanding  with  Germany,  and  Italy  began  to 
consider  the  possibility  of  an  alliance.  In  1872 
Prince  Humbert  went  to  Berlin,  where  he  was  received 
with  enthusiasm  b^  the  Prussian  Government  and 
people,  and  in  th^  following  year  Victor  Emmanuel 
visited  the  capitals  of  Austria  and  Germany.  In  1875, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  scare  and  while  Italy  was 
arming,  Francis  Joseph  came  to  Venice,  where  he  met 
the  King  of  Italy,  and  thus  publicly  affirmed  the 
reconciliation  of  the  two  countries.46  Austria  had  done 
much  to  render  a  friendly  understanding  possible  by 
her  moderate  attitude:  Francis  Joseph,  head  of  the 
most  Catholic  of  states,  accepted  the  Italian  occu- 
pation of  Eome,  and  thus  gave  to  the  Italian  ministers 
a  guarantee  that  their  most  precious  victory  would 

«  Feiling,  Italian  Policy  since  1870,  4-5;  Bourgeois,  op.  cit.,  iii,  770; 
Seignobos,  op.  cit.,  780;  King  and  Okey,  Italy  Today,  288. 
4«Hanotaux.  o%}.  cit.,  iL  378-383. 


34      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

not  be  contested  at  Vienna.47  The  Italian  Govern- 
ment, on  its  side,  exerted  efforts  to  stem  the  tide 
of  irredentism. 

Something  more,  however,  was  necessary  if  Italy 
were  to  overcome  completely  her  traditional  hostility 
towards  Austria  and  enter  into  the  Austro-German 
combination.  That  additional  factor  was  furnished 
in  1881,  largely  under  Bismarckian  auspices.  Young 
Italy  was  indulging  in  dreams  of  grandeur  and  it  was 
in  the  Mediterranean  that  she  hoped  to  realize  them. 
Especially  did  she  consider  control  of  part  of  the 
North  African  seaboard  to  be  essential  to  her  strategic 
security  as  well  as  to  her  commercial  development. 
As  early  as  1838  Mazzini  had  declared  that i  l  Northern 
Africa  is  Italy's  inheritance."48  It  was  therefore  with 
a  jealous  eye  that  she  regarded  the  French  colonial 
empire  in  Algeria,  and  with  no  secrecy  that  she  looked 
forward  to  gaining  compensation  in  Tunis.  That 
province  is  geographically  the  continuation  of  Sicily 
and  it  adjoins  Tripoli,  which  it  was  understood  might 
be  taken  by  Italy  whenever  she  dared. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  Bismarck,  seeking 
for  the  friendship  of  Italy,  would  have  assisted  her 
in  the  conquest  of  the  African  province.  But  the 
methods  of  the  German  Chancellor  were  less  direct, 
and  he  liked  to  kill  two  birds  with  one  stone.  He  knew 
that  the  French  minister,  Jules  Ferry,  was  anxious 
to  develop  the  colonial  policy  of  France  and  that  at 
the  Congress  of  Berlin  the  French  were  receiving 
encouragement  from  Great  Britain  to  extend  their 
African  empire  by  the  addition  of  Tunis.  To  this 
proposal  Bismarck  made  no  objection,  and  is  said 

u  MSmorial  diplomatique,  October  4,  1873,  626. 
*8  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  83. 


t\J 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE       35 

to  have  volunteered  his  cordial  assent.  The  colonial 
policy  of  France  would  help  to  make  the  French 
forget  the  "gap  in  the  Vosges,"  and  when  they  were 
busy  in  Tunis  they  would  cease  to  think  of  the  Ehine 
frontier.  At  the  same  time  the  acquisition  of  Tunis 
by  France  would  arouse  such  bitterness  in  Italy  that 
Bismarck  could  undoubted^  secure  the  consent  of  the 
Italian  Government  to  an  alliance  with  Austria  and 
German^.  Encouraged  by  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many, iTerry  sent  an  expedition  to  Tunis  in  1881,  and 
transformed  it  into  a  French  protectorate.40 

Bismarck's  calculations  were  justified  by  the  results. 
At  the  moment  when  the  Italian  Government  was  over- 
whelmed with  rage  and  disgust  at  the  march  stolen 
on  them  by  France,  Bismarck  had  no  difficulty  in 
persuading  Italy  that  her  interests  lay  in  an  alliance 
with  the  Teutonic  Powers.  The  ancient  enmity  to 
Austria  was  forgotten  in  the  desire  for  revenge  on 
France;  impelled  by  pique,  Italy  threw  herself  into 
the  compact  of  Germany  with  Austria,  and  in  .1882  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  thus  formed."0 

The  completion  of  this  alliance  gave  to  Bismarck 
that  solid  bulwark  for  which  he  had  been  seeking  ever 
since  the  war  with  France.  It  guaranteed  the  diplo- 
matic position  that  Germany  had  won  in  1871  and  it 
strengthened  it.  It  assured  the  status  quo  and  gave 
to  Germany  free  hand  for  the  solution  of  her  internal 

49Busch,  Diary,  ii,  475;  Crispi,  Memoirs,  ii,  97-104;  Hanotaux,  op. 
cit.,  iv,  387;  Despagnet,  La  troisieme  Bepublique  et  le  Droit  des  Gens, 
234;  Adam,  Apris  I' Abandon  de  la  'Revanche,  174,  sq.;  Pinon,  France  et 
Allemagne,  55;  Kambaud,  Le  France  Coloniale,  140  sq.;  Picquet,  Cam- 
pagnes  d'Afrique,  141  sq.;  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen,  477;  Hippeau, 
Histoire  diplomatique  de  la  troisieme  Bepublique,  383-406. 

eo  Crispi,  Politica  Estera,  44-47;  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances, 
126,  130-132;  Eeventlow,  Dcutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  8-11. 


36      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

problems.  A  single-handed  attack  on  Germany  by- 
France  would  be  the  wildest  chauvinistic  madness; 
an  attack  in  conjunction  with  Russia  would  find 
Germany  supported  by  both  Austria  and  Italy.  The 
alliance  was  purely  defensive,  but  under  the  circum- 
stances that  was  all  that  Bismarck  desired;  as  far 
as  foreign  relations  were  concerned,  Germany's 
strength  was  in  sitting  still. 

By  means  of  the  alliance  Bismarck  began  to  exercise 
what  was  virtually  a  diplomatic  mastery  oyer  Europe. 
Both  French  and  German  historians  have  agreed  that 
with  it  the  hegemony  of  Germany  began  ;51  the  military 
primacy  secured  by  the  war  with  France,  now  became 
a  political  primacy.  The  friendliness  of  Spain  was 
assured.  The  German  tendencies  of  Lord  Salisbury 
made  certain  the  cooperation  of  Great  Britain,  which 
was  furthermore  guaranteed  by  the  understanding 
between  Italy  and  Great  Britain.  And  even  the  new- 
born colonial  aspirations  of  Germany  did  not  seriously 
disturb  the  cordiality  of  Anglo-German  relations. 
France  was  isolated  and  involved  in  bitter  quarrels 
with  Italy  and  Great  Britain;  her  attention  was  thus 
distracted  from  the  continental  situation,  and  Bis- 
marck received  a  double  assurance  that  he  had  nothing 
to  fear  from  that  side  of  the  Rhine. 

The  single  cloud  on  the  horizon  was  the  possibility 
of  a  diplomatic  combination  between  France  and 
Russia.  But  Bismarck  had  perfect  confidence  in  his 
ability  to  prevent  this  contingency,  and  he  never 
neglected  an  opportunity  of  cultivating  good  feeling 
with  Russia  in  order  to  obviate  the  chance  of  her 
casting  in  her  lot  with  France.    Although  he  preferred 

si  Oncken,  in  Cambridge  Modern  History,  xii,  159;  Tardieu,  France 
and  the  Alliances,  132.     Cf.  also,  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen,  478. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE        37 

Austria,  when  forced  to  choose  between  that  Power 

and  Russia,  he  always  held  to  his  conviction  that  the 
interests  of  Germany  and  Russia  were  closely  allied, 
and  that  a  definite  breach  could  always  be  avoided. 
With  the  fall  of  Gortchakoff  the  relations  of  the  two 
countries  began  to  improve,  and  Bismarck  was  soon 
able,  in  spite  of  his  alliance  with  Austria,  to  create 
what  almost  amounted  to  an  understanding  with  the 
Government  of  the  Tsar.  In  1884  and  1887  he  con- 
cluded treatiqs  with  Russia,  stipulating  mutual  neu- 
trality if  either  Russia  or  Germany  should  be  attacked 
by  a  third  Power.52 

Bismarck  thus  reinsured  the  German  position  of 
preponderance  against  any  attack  by  a  hostile  coali- 
tion. If  France  should  threaten,  he  had  a  promise 
from  Russia  that  she  would  remain  neutral.  So  long 
as  Germany  abstained  from  aggressive  action,  there 
was  no  need  to  fear  any  assault.  Secure  from  all 
danger,  Germany  could  turn  her  whole  energy  into 
the  organization  and  consolidation  of  her  domestic 
political  system  jmd  the  oWel opmfmf.  of  h pr  latent 
economic  forces. 

B2  Bismarck,  Reflections,  ii,  271,  273;  Annual  Register,  1884,  300; 
Headlam,  Bismarck,  442,  443;  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige 
Politik,  3,  5,  18-23. 


o 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  BUAL  ALLIANCE 

The  success  of  Bismarck's  diplomacy  after  1871, 
which  isolated  France  and  led  to  German  primacy  on 
the  Continent  through  the  creation  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  forms,  perhaps,  his  chief  title  to  greatness. 
It  is  at  any  rate  a  manifestation  of  diplomatic  skill 
hardly  less  to  be  admired  than  his  earlier  policy  which 
resulted  in  the  unification  of  Germany.  Disappointed 
in  his  plan  of  an  alliance  of  the  three  Empires,  he  had 
nevertheless  succeeded  in  building  up  a  solid  coalition 
of  the  chief  states  of  central  Europe,  preserved  friend- 
ship with  Russia,  maintained  cordial  relations  with 
Great  Britain,  and,  by  encouraging  the  colonial  aspira- 
tions of  France,  fostered  quarrels  which  incapacitated 
her  for  action  on  the  Continent.  The  peace  of  Europe 
was  secured,  Germany's  political  supremacy  was 
recognized,  and  Bismarck  could  proceed  with  his  plans 
of  JntftfTiAl  fionsnlirifl^uvn  and  industrial  development. 

But  the  maintenance  of  Germany's  position  was 
a  task  of  extreme  difficulty.  Bismarckian  diplomacy 
had  succeeded,  but  it  had  sown  seeds  of  future  develop- 
ments that  were  likely  to  disturb  the  conditions  upon 
which  German  primacy  rested.  One  of  the  most 
important  of  these  conditions  was  the  separation  of 
France  and  Russia;  and  the  process  of  creating 
the  international  greatness  of  Germany  had  brought 
factors   into   play   which   made   a   diplomatic   union 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  39 

jretween  France  and  Russia  a  probability  if  not  a 
certainly!      '■ ■ ■ 

.ftach  Power  was  isolated  to  a  greater  or  less  extent 
by  the  conclusion  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  naturally 
began  to  look  to  the  other  for  support.  Each  Power, 
furthermore,  felt  itself  the  victim  of  some  stroke  of 
Bismarckian  diplomacy:  France  had  been  humiliated 
and  dismembered  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  and 
although  she  smothered  outward  manifestations  of  the 
spirit  of  revenge,  could  not  but  regard  Germany  as 
the  national  enemy;  Russia  considered  that  Germany 
had  been  largely  responsible  for  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
which  shattered  her  dream  of  control  in  the  Near  East, 
and  on  that  account  bore  her  ill-feeling.  Neither 
Power  was  content  to  accept  the  verdict  of  these 
treaties  as  final,  and  sooner  or  later  each  was 
bound  to  come  to  the  realization  that  the  continental 
equilibrium  could  be  reestablished  only  by  a  rapproche- 
ment. The_  Balkans  and  the  spire  of  Strasburg^ 
cathedral  were  destined  to  dominate  European  politics. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  suffice  to  indicate  that  from 
geographical  necessity  France  and  Russia  are  natural 
allies.  The  former  Power,  protected  on  the  north, 
west  and  south  by  the  sea,  on  the  southwest  by  the 
Pyrenees,  on  the  southeast  by  the  Alps,  finds  her 
eastern  frontier  open  at  many  points  to  the  attack 
of  a  hostile  nation.  To  distract  the  attention  of  an 
enemy  advancing  from  that  side,  she  has  need  of  a 
friend  in  the  East.  The  value  and  necessity  of  such 
a  friendship  has  constantly  been  recognized  by  the 
rulers  of  France  and  demonstrated  by  the  course  of 
her  international  relations.1 

In  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  when  the 

iDaudet,  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  V Alliance  Franco-Russe,  2-35. 


40      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

national  foe  on  her  eastern  frontier  was  Austria, 
France  sought  alliance  in  turn  with  Turkey,  with 
Sweden,  and  with  Brandenburg.  In  the  eighteenth 
century,  during  the  wars  of  Frederick  the  Great  of 
Prussia,  an  alliance  with  Austria  was  consummated. 
Half  a  century  later,  Napoleon  signed  treaties  of 
alliance  with  Eussia  on  two  separate  occasions, 
believing  that  the  friendship  of  the  Power  farthest 
east  was  the  surest  guarantee  of  the  security  of 
France's  position  and  the  success  of  her  development. 
Similarly  under  the  Eestoration  that  followed  the  fall 
of  Napoleon,  an  understanding  with  the  Tsar  helped 
France  to  regain  her  international  prestige  and 
embark  on  the  enterprise  that  was  destined  to  found 
her  colonial  empire  in  North  Africa. 

Eussia  on  her  side  had  often  sought  alliance  or 
friendship  with  France.  Peter  the  Great  realized 
keenly  the  value  of  French  support  at  the  time  when 
he  was  endeavoring  to  make  a  modern  European  state 
out  of  the  half -barbarous  Moscovy,  and  many  of  his 
successors,  notably  Catherine  II,  recognized  the  truth 
of  the  principle  that  Eussia  had  need  of  a  strong  and 
friendly  France.  The,  Empire  oiLthe  Tsars^iJialf 
AsiaticJPower,  must  have  the  assistance  of  a  western 
Power  if  it  was  to^plav  a  roleofjmportance  inJEuro- 
pelm  affairs.  France  was  the  nation  to  which  it 
looked  forassistance,  for  with  the  vast  frontiers  of 
Eussia  largely  open  to  the  attack  of  Austria  and 
Prussia,  it  naturally  sought  support  from  the  nation 
in  their  rear,  in  order  to  neutralize  the  danger. 

History  shows  that  adjacent  and  contiguous  coun- 
tries are  often,  by  the  fact  of  their  geographical 
location,  hostile  to  each  other;  those  separated  often 
have  allied  interests.    So  it  was  in  the  case  of  Eussia 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  41 

and  France.  It  is  an  example  of  what  may  be  termed 
checkerboard  diplomacy:  all  the  red  squares  have  a 
natural  tendency  to  join  in  alliance  against  the  black 
squares. 

Although    nature    and    history    thus    presented    a 
Franco-Russian    alliance    as    a    development    to    be 
/"expected  and  desired  by  both  nations,  there  existed 
(  many  obstacles  to  its  consummation,  even  after  Bis- 
J  marck  had  formed  the  Triple  Alliance.    Memories  of 
*  the  past  hindered  a  cordial  rapprochement.     Napq-  ^ 
leon's  capture  of  holy  Moscow  in  1812,  his  nephew's   !L 
attack  upon  the  Crimea  in  1855,  Russia's  indifference*^ 
[  to  the  plight  of  France  in  1870,  left  vostiges^of  mutual 
I  bitterness  in  both  countries.    Russia  remembered  that 
Napoleon  ill,  to  avenge  a  fancied  slight  and  to  gain 
the  prestige  of  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  had 
helped  to  block  the  Slav  advance  towards  Constanti- 
nople.   France  could  not  forget  that  her  call  for  help 
in  1870  had  been   silenced  by  Bismarck's  bribe  of 
acquiescence  in  the  tearing  up  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris, 
and  that  Russia  for  the  sake  of  sending  warships  on 
the  Black  Sea,  had  left  her  to  her  fate. 

The  two  countries  were  also  separated  by  the  differ^ 
,ence  jg_jbheir  jiomestic  political  regimes,  and  their 
Governments  sometimes  found  it  'difficult  to  under- 
stand each  other:  France  was  a  democratic  republic, 
and  Russia  an  auto^raticmonarchv.  The  radical 
tendencies  of  the  French  people  and  ministers  fright- 
ened the  Tsar  and  his  advisers,  who  feared  lest  their 
holy  empire  might  be  contaminated  by  contact  with 
the  nation  of  revolutions.  France  on  the  other  hand, 
had  no  sympathy  with  Russian  political  methods :  the 
efforts  of  the  Poles  to  win  their  freedom  met  with  the 
sentimental  approval,  if  not  the  material  support  of 


42      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Frenchmen;  and  Russian  revolutionaries  in  exile  not 
infrequently  found  a  kindly  haven  of  refuge  in  Paris.2 
The  personalities  and  opinions  of  their  statesmen 
also  tended  to  keep  the  two  nations  apart.  President^ 
^Greyy,  who  was  elected  to  the  supreme  office  of  France 
in  1879,  was  firmly  opposed^*  any  alliance  with 
Busgia.  He  argued  the  necessity  of  a  period  of  quiet 
during  which  France  might  recuperate,  and  he  feared 
that  negotiations  with  Russia  would  alarm  Germany 
and  lead  to  a  resumption  of  her  menaces  and  possibly 
something  worse ;  nor  did  he  believe  that  negotiations 
would  result  in  any  sort  of  a  definite  understanding. 
In  his  opinion,  complete  isolation  was  the  wisest 
policy  for  Tfranftft  and  a££oj^epL±hfi--only assurance  of 
her  peaceful  renaissance.3 /On  the  other  hand,  French 
statesmen  and  diplomats  were  unable  to  secure  the 
personal  approval  of  the  Tsar  and  his  ministers.  It 
did  not  smooth  the  path  to  friendship  that  a  man  who 
had  publicly  insulted  Alexander  in  1867  should  become 
Prime  Minister  of  France  hardly  more  than  a  decade 
later.4  And  the  representatives  of  France  at  St. 
Petersburg  were  very  frequently  in  diplomatic  hot 
water;  more  than  one  French  Ambassador  lost  the 
favor  of  the  Russian  court  by  his  faux  pas,  which 
created  the  worst  impression  in  a  circle  where  etiquette 
was  of  the  utmost  importance.5 

2  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances ,  4. 

8Daudet,  Histoire  Diplomatique,  125. 

*M.  Floquet,  who  had  become  Prime  Minister,  had  in  1867,  met  the 
Tsar  on  his  visit  to  Paris  with  the  cry,  "Vive  la  Pologne,"  Annual 
Begister,  1888,  243. 

5  Admiral  Jaures,  who  represented  France,  remarked,  when  he  was 
shown  the  portraits  of  the  ancient  Tsars,  "Who  are  those  hideous 
fellows?' '  Again  in  discussing  Nihilism  with  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  he  said,  "You  can  only  get  out  of  this  fix  by  becoming  a 
Republic,"  l>audet,  Histoire  Diplomatique,  155. 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  43 

Thus,  notwithstanding  Bismarck's  belief,  which  he 
expressed  as  early  as  1856,  that  a  Franco-Russian 
alliance  was  in  the  nature  of  things,  thp  two  pormtripa 
remained  isolated.  And  the  elements  of  hostility  were 
not  unskillfullT~expIoited  by  Bismarck,  whose  entire 
policy  was  affected  by  his  dread  of  a  coalition. 
Nevertheless,  the  general  tendency  of  the  two  nations 
to  come  together  was  discernible,  despite  incidental 
factors  of  separation.  And  the  same  events  that 
weakened  the  understanding  between  Germany  and 
Russia  assisted  the  tendency. 

It  will  not  be  forgotten  that  the  understanding  of 
the  three  Emperors  first  threatened  dissolution  as  a 
result  of  the  war  scare  of  1875.  As  we  saw,  the  jpfilicy 
of  intimidation  employed  by  Bismarck  towards  France 
resulted  in  an  atmosphere  of  mutual  suspicion  and  a 
fear  of  the  reopening  of  the  Franco-German  duel.  In 
1875  there  appeared  the  bellicose  articles  in  the 
Genn^H-i»ap£j^-which,  coupled  with  the  increase  of 
German  armamenla^  seemed  to  presage  _an  immediate 
attack  uponJVflTif».ft.  The  French  ministers,  sincerely 
terrified,  sought  the  assistance  of  the  other  Powers, 
and  particularly  that  of  Russia.  Largely  because  of 
the  firm  tone  adopted  by  the  Tsar  on  this  occasion, 
the  warlike  schemes  of  Germany,  if  they  existed,  were 
not  prosecuted.  All  through  the  crisis  Russia  encour- 
aged Eranftfi  to  have  Tin  fpar  and  to  trust  in  Ru&sj.an 
idship.  The  Tsar,  in  a  personal  interview  with 
the  French  Ambassador,  told  him  that  Russia  would 
stand  by  France,  that  the  two  countries  had  interests 
in  common,  and  that  he  hoped  that  their  relations 
would  become  more  and  more  cordial.  And  the 
Russian  Chancellor,  Gortchakoff,  announced  the  assur- 


44      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

ance  of  peace  in  such  a  way  as  to  imply  that  Russia 
was  responsible  for  the  salvation  of  France.6 

The  attitude  assumed  by  Russia  at  this  time  neces- 
sarily threw  a  cloud  over  the  German-Russian  entente 
and  increased  very  obviously  the  cordiality  of  Franco- 
Russian  relations.  The  gratitude  of  the  whole  French 
nation  rose  to  the  Tsar.  All  the  French  papers 
expatiated  upon  the  service  done  to  the  Republic  by 
her  friend  in  the  East,  and  the  President  expressed 
the  warmth  of  French  feeling  in  a  personal  letter  to 
the  Tsar.7  Thus  the  ilj-goTi airlftr pH  hmtglity  of  Gfvrman^ 
/  threats  brought  the  Franco-Russian  rapprochement 
intojhe  light  of  possibility. 

The  next  step  in  the  coming  together  of  the  two 
JX~,  nations  was  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878.  Russia 
saw  her  plan  of  control  in  the  Balkans  torn  up  and 
notwithstanding  the  protestations  of  honesty  that 
Bismarck  uttered,  she  more  than  half  suspected  that 
Germany  had  been  guilty  of  double  dealing  in  favor 
of  Russia's  rival,  Austria.  At  all  events  the  crisis, 
which  humiliated  Russia  in  her  prestige  at  the  same 
time  that  it  affected  adversely  her  material  interests, 
severed  temporarily  the  bonds  of  German-Russian 
intimacy.  It  was  a  case  of  the  farther  is  from  Ger- 
many the  nearer  is  to  France,  and  the  Russian  news- 
papers began  to  advocate  the  French  alliance  with 
warm    enthusiasm.8      The    following    year    saw  £h&~ 

realized  plainly    that.    Germany,    having    to_j3Soqse^ 
between^Russia  and  Austria,  had  deliberately  elected 

«  Hanotaux,  Histoire  de  la  France  Contemporaine,  iii,  277 ;  Daudet, 
Histoire  Diplomatique,  84. 

7  Hanotaux,  Histoire  de  la  France  Contemporaine,  iii,  285. 
s  Hanotaux,  Histoire  de  la  France  Contemporaine,  iv,  427. 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  45 

the  latter  J?ower>  When  in  1882  Italy  signified  her 
adhesion  to  the  Teutonic  combination,  the  Russian 
position,  if  not  quite  comparable  to  the  isolation  of 
France,  was  at  any  rate  that  of  an  outsider. 

For  another  decade  the  diplomatic  skill  of  Bismarck 
was  sufficient  to  keep  Russia  and  France  apart,  and 
had  he  remained  in  office  their  ultimate  rapprochement 
might  have  been  postponed  still  longer.  Notwith- 
standing the  hostility  of  the  journals  of  Russia  to 
Germany  and  the  uncompromising  antipathy  of  the 
"Slavist"  party,  and  despite  fiscal  and  commercial 
quarrels,  JBisTnarflk  manage/!,  af  ter__1884y-  to  bring 
about  a  resumption^of  ftorHial  relations  with  Russia. 
With  tact  and  adroitness  he  showed  'the  new  Tsar, 
Alexander  HI,  that  monarchical  Germany  was  likely 
to  be  a  far  better  friend  than  revolutionary  France. 
He  commanded  the  German  press  to  flatter  and 
conciliate  Russia  on  every  occasion.  The  royal 
families  of  each  nation  exchanged  visits,  and  Russian 
favor  was  secured  by  expelling  from  Berlin  all  persons 
suspected  of  hostility  to  the  Government  of  the  Tsar.9 
More  significant  still,  Bismarck  brought  about  a 
meetingof  the  three  Emperors  in  1884  at_Skjej3ievicfi, 
which  sealed  the  compact  of  reinsurance  drawn  up  by 
Bismarck  six  months  previously,  and  which  stipulated 
for  a  benevolent_jneutralitv  in  case  either  Germany 
or  Russia  were  attacked  by-another  Power.  In  188L 
this  reinsurance  treaty  was  renewed.10 

Butpresages  of  the  coming  revolution  in  diplomacy 
began  to  appear  with  increasing  frequency.  In  the 
West,  France  was  meditating  a  reinvigoration  of  her 

»  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  134-137. 

loEeventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  18-23;  Daudet,  His- 
toire  Diplomatique,  169-170. 


46      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

continental  policy,  and  for  this,  an  understanding  with 
Eussia  was  necessary.  With  the  fall  of  Jules  Ferry 
from  power  in  1885,  the  Government  of  France  lost 
much  of  its  ardor  for  colonial  expansion  and  again 
took  thought  of  the  possibility  of  revenge  on  the 
Rhine  and  of  reinforcing  the  position  of  France  in 
Europe.  The  Radical  party,  which  was  constantly 
increasing  in  numbers,  demanded  a  reversal  of  policy, 
leading  to  the  renunciation  of  distant  conquests  and 
an  alliance  with  some  foreign  Power  against  Germany, 
as  the  sole  possible  guarantee  of  the  existence  of 
France  as  a  great  nation.11  Bismarck's  attempt  to 
intimidate  France  in  1887,  by  the  arrest  of  a  French 
commissioner  of  police,  Schnoebele,  and  the  passing 
of  a  law  which  increased  the  German  army,  only 
tended  to  augment  the  rising  feeling  against  Germany 
and  the  sentiment  that  favored  a  close  understanding 
with  Russia.12 

^n  the  following  year  Germany  practically  closed 
AlsaceJLorraine  to  French  citizens  and  even  to  persons 
coming  from  France;  relations  between  the  two 
countries  became  consequently  still  more  embittered. 
The  spirit  of  nationalism  which  made  possible  the  rise 
and  popularity  of  Boulanger,  captured  the  mass  of  the 
French  nation,  seemed  likely  to  result  in  a  conflict  with 
Germany,  and  made  an  understanding  with  Russia 
still  more  popular.  Furthermore,  the  retiremejuUe£v 
*       President    Grevy,    who    was    always    the    obstinate 

n  Eckhardt,  Berlin,  Wien,  Bom,  15 ;  Due  de  Broglie,  Discours,  iii,  14, 
23;  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  70  sq.;  Albin,  Le  Coup  d'Agadir,  61  j 
Eose,  The  Origins  of  the  War,  100. 

12  Annual  Register,  1887,  213;  1888,  243;  Tardieu,  "La  Politique 
Exterieure  de  1  'Allemagne, ' '  in  Questions  Actuelles  de  Politique 
Etrangcre,  1911,  73;  Eeventlow,  Deutschlands  auswdrtige  Politik,  3. 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  47 

advocate  of  a  policy  of  isolation,  tended  to  render 
negotiations  withTTEussia  possible. 

In  the  latter  country,  notwithstanding  the  rein- 
surance treaties,  friendly  relations  with  Germany 
appeared  less  stable.  A  Near  Eastern  crisis  had 
again  separated  the  two  nations,  and  the  cordial 
supporL-jnanifested — by — France  on  this  occasion 
strengthened  the  idea  of  a  Franco-Russian  alliance.13 
Still  greater  was  the  effect  of  Bismarck's  publication, 
of  thejexjnf  thp  Triple  AlliflTipp  in  Iftftft;  Russia  was 
wounded  and  alarmed  when  she  discovered  the  extent 
of  the  preparations  made  against  her  by  Austria  and 
Germany. 

The  new  tone  of  intimidation  adopted  at  this  time 
by  Bismarck,  not  merely  towards  France  but  towards 
all  Europe,  aroused  Russian  fears.  Only  a  few  days 
after  publishing  the  text  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  the 
German  Chancellor,  in  an  acrid  speech,  asserted  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  Germany's  position  on  the 
Continent;  his  terms  were  so  unmeasured  that  it 
seemed  as  though  he  were  attempting  to  overawe  all 
the  Powers,  and  Russia  in  particular:  "The  fears 
that  have  arisen  in  the  course  of  the  present  year 
have  been  caused  by  Russia  more  even  than  by  France, 
chiefly  through  an  exchange  of  provocations,  threats, 
insults,  and  reciprocal  investigations,  which  have 
occurred  during  the  past  summer  in  the  Russian  and 
French  press.  .  .  .  God  has  given  us  on  our  flank  the 
French,  who  are  the  most  warlike  and  turbulent  nation 
that  exists,  and  He  has  permitted  the  development  in 
Russia  of  warlike  propensities  which,  until  lately,  did 
not  manifest  themselves  to  the  same  extent.  ...  By 
means   of   courtesy  and   kind  methods   we   may  be 

is  Annual  Register,  1887,  263. 


48      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

easily — too  easily  perhaps — influenced,  but  by  means 
of  threats,  never.  We  Germans  fear  God  and  nothing 
else  in  the  world. ! ,14 

In  such  terms  Bismarck  warned  France  and  Russia 
to  keep  apart  and  practically  asserted  the  mastery  of 
Germany  in  Europe.  Germany  desired  .that  the  peace 
should  be  kept,  but  it  must  be  the  Pax  Germanica. 
Whether  or  not  the  Tiarsh  and  domineering  attitude 
assumed  by  Bismarck  would  have  succeeded  in  its 
purpose  and  frightened  Russia  into  an  avoidance 
of  an  understanding  with  France,  cannot  be  deter- 
mined. Bismarck  was  sure  of  his  ground  and  certain 
of  his  ability  to  keep  the  two  nations  permanently 
separated.  What  is  certain  is  that  at  the  moment 
when  Russia  was  in  doubt  as  to  whether  she  should 
accept  Germany's  warning  and  shun  an  understanding 
with  France,  or  whether  she  should  accept  the  chal- 
lenge, the  two  personalities  which  more  than  anything 
else  held  Russia  to  Germany  were  removed  in  quick 
succession,  the  one  by  death,  the  other  by  disgrace. 

In  1888  the  aged  Kaiser  William  I  diedy  and  in 
March,  1890,  Bismarck  was  dismissed. 

The  old  Kaiser  had  always  looked  upon  Russia  and 
Prussia  as  natural  friends,  and  it  was  largely  through 
his  influence  that  the  two  nations  had  not  become 
frankly  hostile  after  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  He  had 
opposed  the  alliance  with  Austria  because  he  feared 
that  it  would  give  umbrage  to  Russia,  and  to  his  last 
day  he  had  worked  for  a  close  understanding  with  his 
beloved  great-nephew,  the  Tsar.15  To  the  Russophile 
Emperor  there  succeeded,  after  the  brief  hujidrfiddiay 

i*  Annual  Register,  1888,  267-269 ;  Singer,  Geschichte  des  Dreibundes, 
89-91 ;  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  144-145. 
is  Schneider,  L  'Empereur  Guillaume  I,  passim. 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  49 

reign  of  Frederick  III,  the  vmrfliful  prjnfifi.  William  II. 
whose  desires  and  policy  were  unknown  quantities; 
Europe  waited  in  anxiety,  wondering  whether  he  would 
use  the  enormous  power  bequeathed  to  him  for  peace 
or  for  war. 

Almost  his  first  words  seemed  a  threat.  His  acces- 
sion was  signalized  by  an  address  to  the  army  first 
of  all:  "I  swear  to  remember  that  the  eyes  of  my 
ancestors  look  down  on  me  from  the  other  world  and 
that  I  shall  one  day  have  to  render  account  to  them 
for  the  glory  and  honor  of  the  army."  On  the  same 
day  he  expressed  similar  sentiments  to  the  navy.  It 
was  not  until  three  days  later  that  he  issued  a 
proclamation  to  his  people.  ' '  Men  everywhere  remem- 
bered that  his  father  had  first  addressed  his  people, 
and  then  his  army  and  navy.  The  inference  was 
unavoidable  that  the  young  Kaiser  meant  to  be  a 
Frederick  the  Great  rather  than  a  citizen  emperor  as 
his  father  had  longed  to  be  known. ' ,16 

To  France  and  Russia,  who  were  already  agitated 
by  the  fear  of  a  resumption  of  aggressive  policy  on 
the  part  of  Germany,  this  army  order,  coming  as  it 
did,  seemed  to  proclaim  the  advent  of  a  Hohenzollern 
possessing  all  the  martial  traits  of  his  forefathers 
and  all  the  imprudence  and  recklessness  of  youth. 
Their  alarm  brought  them  closer  together.  At  such 
a  moment  when  they  were  anxiously  awaiting  some 
fresh  manifestation  of  the  Kaiser's  intentions,  arrived 
the  news  of  Bismarck's  dismissal  (March  8,  1890). 
The  one  man  who  possessed  the  power  to  separate 
France  and  Russia  thus  disappeared.  In  Russia,  the 
disgrace  of  Bismarck  aroused  not  merely  surprise  but 

is  The  proclamations  are  printed  in  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor's 
Speeches,  4-7. 


50      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

dismay.  For  despite  the  brutality  with  which  the  old 
Chancellor  had  fulminated  against  Russia  in  1888, 
he  was  recognized  as  a  force  making  for  peace;  and 
notwithstanding  his  unpopularity  with  the  Slavist 
party,  he  was  always  regarded  by  the  Tsar  as  a  friend 
of  Russia.  With  his  removal  from  the  political  stage 
it  seemed  asThough  tEe  ties  of  friendship  that  bound 
Russia  and^Gerniany  were  completely  loosened.17 

The  French  were  not  slow  to  seize  their  opportunity 
and  give  to  their  relations  with  Russia  the  character 
they  desired.  In  one  respect  these  relations  had 
been  ameliorated  in  striking  fashion  even  before  the 
dismissal  of  Bismarck,  for  Russia- was  exceedingly 
grateful  for_tke  financial  assistance  that  was  given 
by  France  at  the  moment  when  Russia  was  seeking 
capital  to  be  used  in  her  industrial  and  commercial 
development.  The  aid  brought  by  France  to  the 
Russian  economic  policy  established  a  broad  material 
basis  for  the  political  alliance  that  France  was  seeking. 

Previous  lo  1888  Russian  loans^  had  generally  been 
flpjjjecTbv  a  small  group  of  Berlin  bankers^  who 
remained  masters  of  the  market  value  of  loans  on 
Exchange.  Russia  was  thus  largely  dependent  upon 
a  coterie  of  Prussian  financiers.  But  in  1888  the 
initiative  of  a  number  of  French  bankers  led  to  a 
change  in  Russian  financial  methods.    They  suggested 

it  Hohenlohe  (Memoirs,  ii,  412,  413)  says  that  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Baden  believed  that  the  chief  cause  of  Bismarck's  disgrace  was  that 
he  desired  a  close  understanding  with  Russia,  even  if  it  meant  a  split  in 
the  Triple  Alliance.  Relations  with  Russia  were  cool  after  Bismarck's 
fall,  Ibid.,  ii,  428.  Rambaud,  on  the  other  hand,  believes  (Histoire  de 
la  Russie,  825)  that  the  retirement  of  Bismarck  did  not  hasten  the  Dual 
Alliance,  that  it  had  already  been  forced  by  his  brutality;  in  support 
of  this  thesis  he  quotes  Caprivi,  * '  The  interview  of  Kronstadt  has  simply 
made  visible  to  the  eyes  what  has  long  existed. ' ' 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  51 

that  the  Russian  loans  be  floated  on  the  French  market 
and  subscribed  for  by  the  French  people.  The  sug- 
gestion was  accepted  by  the  Russian  Minister  of 
Finance,  and  in  the  same  year  a  loan  of  five  hundred 
million  francs  was  thus  floated.  In  the  two  following 
years  other  loans,  amounting  to  more  than  a  billion 
and  a  half,  were  similarly  floated  and  were  subscribed 
for  by  more  than  a  hundred  thousand  persons.18 
Instead  of  seeing  her  commerce  and  industrial  enter- 
prises controlled  by  a  group  of  bankers,  Russia  became 
debtor  to  the  French  people.  Since  the  number  of 
subscribers  was  so  large,  it  was  impossible  to  manipu- 
late the  market  value  of  the  loans  to  Russia's  disad- 
vantage. To  France,  who  was  anxious  to  lend  the 
money  and  desired  the  favor  of  Russia,  and  to  Russia, 
who  needed  the  capital  and  liked  the  terms,  the 
arrangement  was  mutually  satisfactory. 

Taking  advantage  of  the  friendliness  created  by  the 
success  of  the  loans,  and  the  anxiety  caused  in  Russia 
by  the  accession  of  William  II  and  the  dismissal  of 
Bismarck,  the  French  Ministers  lost  no  time  in  further 
improving  relations  with  the  Slav  Government.  In 
1820  the  French  Minister  of  War  placed  at  thedisposaL  / 
of  Russia  the  great  arms  ^factory  arChatellera^^  At 
the  same  time  the  MijTJstgr_j>f_t,hft  InterJArRTTggfgd  ^_ 
a  band  of  Nihilists  engaged  in  making  bombs  to  be 
used  against  the  Tsar ;  nothing  could  have  been  found 
that  would  more  certainly  secure  the  gratitude  of  the 
Russian  Government.  The  French  Foreign  Minister, 
Ribot,  and  the  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  de 
Laboulaye,  worked  constantly  for  the  development  of 
the  friendly  feeling  with  Russia  into  an  actual  alliance. 

isDaudet,     Histoire    Diplomatique,     246-279,     282-297;     Keventlow, 
Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  3-5;  Annual  Register,  1888,  243. 


52      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

"  Every  day  the  atmosphere  grew  more  favorable. 
With  statesmanlike  perspicacity  M.  de  Laboulaye  saw 
that  the  time  had  come  for  action,  and  that  only  the 
approval  of  the  people  was  required  to  bring  to  a 
successful  issue  these  combinations,  previously  con- 
ceived in  the  secret  councils  of  the  two  Chancelleries.,,19 
To  win  the  expression  of  popular  approval  which 
was  deemed  necessary,  it  was  essential  to  stage  an 
act  which  would  publicly  make  manifest  the  rapproche- 
ment of  the  two  nations.  This  was  effected  in  the 
summer  of  1891,  when  the  French  fleet  sailed  to 
Russianj^aters  under  the  command  of  Admiral 
3  Gervais,  and  on  July  25,  anchored  off  Kronstadt. 
The  French  received  an  pnt.hnsiast.ifi  wftlcoinft  and 
there  followed  a  fraternization  of  the  sailors  and 
officers  of  the  two  fleets  which  was  warmly  applauded 
both  in  France  and  in  Russia.20  The  Tsar  visited  the 
French  flagship  and  listened  with  uncovered  head  to 
the  French  band  playing  the  national  airs  of  the  two 
countries :  the  revolutionary  Marseillaise  received  the 
homage  of  the  autocrat  of  the  East,  and  the  con- 
cord of  the  two  countries  hitherto  isolated  was  thus 
symbolized. 

The  warmth  of  approval  which  this  demonstration 
evoked  in  both  nations  made  the  de_terminjJiiin^of^onie 
sort  of  j>ac|  iTiftvi.t.fl.]}1ft.  Although  the  existence  of  the 
alliance  was  not  officially  stated  until  1896,  the  treaty 
was  signed  in  August,  1891,  nor  was  it  then  denied 
that  the  relations  of  France  and  Russia  had  entered 
upon  a  new  phase.21  >  In  the  following  year  the  alliance 
was  supplemented  by  a  military  arrangement  of  a 

is  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  11. 

soDaudet,  Histoire  Diplomatique,  299-314;  Annual  Begister,  1891,  262. 

2i  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  12-13. 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  53 

defensive  character,  which  undoubtedly  stipulated  for 
mutual  defence  in  case  either  Power  should  be 
attacked. 

The  coming  together  of  France  ancMRussia  in  a 
defensive  coalition,  apparently  ended  the  diplomatic 


hegemony  of  Germany  and  r^sjored_jthe_ eqn i  1  i  brium 
that  had  been  destroyed  by  the  German  victories  of 
1870  and  the  creation  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Diplo- 
mats in  both  France  and  Germany  believed  that  the 
balance  of  power  was  recoyereol^  and  in  the  latter 
country  not  a  few  agreed  with  Bismarck  that  German 
supremacy  would  end  with  the  rise  of  the  opposing 
combination.  The  dismissed  Chancellor  from  his 
retreat  covered  with  bitter  sarcasms  the  policy  of  the 
young  Kaiser,  who  had  been  impotent  to  prevent  what 
Bismarck  had  so  long  staved  off. 

It  is  true  that  at  first  the  new  alliance  seemed 
destined  to  have  an  enormous  moral  effect.  It  was 
not  formed  to  satisfy  the  French  ambition  for  revenge, 
nor  could  it  be  counted  upon  for  the  winning  back  of 
AlsaceTCorraine ;  in  no  sense  could  it  be  regarded 
as  an  offensive  league  against  Germany.  But  it 
apparently  announced  to  the  world  that  the  two 
nations  were  determined  that  their  independence  of 
action  should  not  be  shackled  by  German  domination. 
"It  insured  us  in  Europe  a  moral  authority  which, 
since  our  defeats,  had  been  wanting  to  us.  It  aug- 
mented our  diplomatic  value.  It  opened  to  us  the  field 
of  political  combinations,  from  which  our  isolation 
had  excluded  us.  From  mere  observation,  we  could 
pass  to  action,  thanks  to  the  recovered  balance  of 
power. ' ,22 

22  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  14 ;  cf .  Reventlow,  Deutschlands 
ausw'drtige  PolitiTc,  31. 


54      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

But  the  effects  of  the  alliance  were  more  apparent 
than  real,  and  although  the  two  nations  may  have 
acquired  a  new  moral  authority,  their  combination  did 
not  affect  the  practical  control  of  Germany  as  much 
as  had  been  expected.  For  some  years,  the  Allies, 
as  Tardieu  says,  were  too  exclusively  absorbed  in 
contemplating  the  fact  of  their  union,  and  too  desirous 
of  multiplying  outward  manifestations  that  might 
convince  the  world  at  large  of  its  reality.  There  were 
without  question  endless  official  visits  made  and 
returned,  and  a  constant  interchange  of  congratulatory 
addresses;  that  the  practical  value  of  the  alliance 
was  enhanced  by  such  demonstrations  is  by  no  means 
certain.  It  is  undeniable  that  both  nations  played 
into  the  hands  of  Germany:  France  by  allowing  her 
JWigm  ppjWJ^J^j2gT,^1y^H  hj  drnnppi.i>  di«gensi"n.«; 
I^ussia  by  di£ecliag_JLej:  activities  from  Europe—to 
Asia. 

~~ft  resulted  that  the  mastery  of  Ggrmany,  which 
Europe  had  experienced  during  the  latter  years  of 
the  Bismarck  regime,  was  indeed  less  ostentatious 
under  William  II,  but  it  was  in  reality  no  less  effective. 
For  another  decade,  following  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance,  Germany  exercised  a  very  actual  hegemony 
on  the  Continent.  The  explanation  for  this  fact,  which 
has  not  always  been  clearly  recognized,  is  to  be  sought 
in  two  directions :  partly  in  the  f ailure_j)f_J&e 
I  French  ar/i  "p,nssia.n  diplomats  clearly  to  define  and 
coordinate  the  interests  of  their  countries:  partly  in 
^  .the  skill  with  which  the  young  GermanKaiser  handled 
the  situation. 

"~To  meet  the  new  Franco -Russian  combination  Ger- 
many had  an  untried  emperor  and  was  deprived  of 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  55 

the  services  of  the  veteran  Bismarck,  whose  genius 
had  first  won  for  the  Empire  its  position  of  supremacy, 
and  then  successfully  maintained  it  so  long  as  he  was 
in  office.  In  this  difficult  situation,  the  new  sovereign, 
whose  chief  characteristic  in  popular  judgment  was 
an  opinionated  conceit  combined  with  the  ability  to 
make  bellicose  speeches,  displayed  at  once  the  enigma 
of  his  character  and  the  brilliance  of  his  diplomacy. 

^jlliarn  JI  was  then  thirty-two  years  of  age.  In 
him  there  was  to  be  found  a  melange  of  the  salient 
traits  of  his  various  ancestors.  Born  and  brought  up 
in  the  midst  of  a  n^illtaristic,  ci rc\e  and  influenced  by 
the  ancient  militarist  traditions  of  his  race,  he  never- 
theless was  to  keep  the  peace  f  6r~quarter  of  a  century ; 
the  ambition  and  aggressiveness  of  Frederick  the 
Great  was  in  him  balanced  by  the  caution  of  Frederick 
William  I.  The  flighty  brilliance  and  impetuosity  of , 
his  great  uncle,  Frederick  William  IV,  was  offset  by  j 
the  power  of  application  and  laborious  drudgery,  ' 
characteristic  of  the  Great  Elector.  Bound  by  the 
traditions  of  the  Hohenzollerns  to  the  Junkers  and 
imbued  with  a  thoroughly  m_ejliaB£a]_anirit,  he  was  at 
the  same  time  essentially  mpdernjn^-hls  tastes -and 
delighted  in  the  society  of  bourgeois  manufacturers 
and  Hebraic  capitalists. 

One  characteristic  of  his  family  was  dominant  in 
his  nature :  the  will  to  rule.  The  power  that  God  had 
bestowed  upon  the  monarch  was  not,  in  his  opinion, 
to  be  shared.  Frederick  William  IV  had  written  to 
Bunsen:  "You  all  have  good  motives  in  your  advice 
to  me  and  you  are  good  in  the  execution  of  orders, 
but  there  are  things  which  are  revealed  only  to  one 
who  is  king,  things  which  as  Crown  Prince  were 
withheld  from  me  and  which  I  have  only  learned 

/ 


56      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

by  becoming  king."  Such  were  the  feelings  of 
William  II.  His  personal  will  must  guide  the  fortunes 
of  Germany,  within  the  Empire  and  without:  "He 
who  stands  in  my  path,  him  will  I  shatter  (den 
zerschmettere  ich)." 

It  is  therefore  necessary  to  regard  Germany's  policy 
as,  to  a  large  extent,  the  Kaiser's  policy.  The 
influence  of  capitalists  and  Junkers,  of  commercials 
and  militarists  must  be  taken  into  consideration;  but 
in  the  last  instance  it  was  the  Kaiser  who  decided. 
To  him,  accordingly,  must  go  the  credit  for  the  success 
of  Germany's  policy  during  the  years  that  followed 
1891,  a  policy  marked  by  a  subtlety,  a  diplomatic 
cleverness  worthy  of  the  founder  of  the  Empire. 
For  ten  years  he  played  the  most  delicate  game, 
working  for  friendly  relations  with  each  of  the  new 
allies,  diverting  their  attention  from  European  matters 
which  might  give  them  an  opportunity  for  working 
together  against  Germany,  encouraging  their  feuds 
with  other  countries.  The  sovereign  who  was  univer- 
sally regarded  as  the  man  of  war  thus  maintained  the 
peace  so  essential  to  German  commercial  development, 
and  at  the  same  time  preserved  the  dominating 
influence  of  the  nation,  the  bequest  of  Bismarck.23 

Instead  of  losing  his  temper  over  the  Franco- 
Eussian  alliance,  the  j£aig£r  at  once  set  to  work  to 

23B6rard,  La  France  et  Guillaume  II,  19-21.  Dr.  Sarolea  (The 
Anglo-German  Problem,  327)  criticises  the  Kaiser  for  having  no  guiding 
principles  in  foreign  policy,  for  being  in  turn  Anglophile,  Francophile, 
and  Eussophile,  and  imparting  to  German  diplomacy  an  incoherence 
which  has  been  its  chief  weakness.  But  in  this  the  Kaiser  has  simply 
followed  the  very  traditions  of  his  race  and  practised  Realpolitik.  He 
has  changed  friends,  but  according  as  circumstances  changed;  they  were 
merely  the  means  to  his  end,  and  that  end,  German  continental  hegemony, 
he  has  unwaveringly  pursued. 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  57 

rob  it  of  its  force.  This  could  only  be  accomplished 
by  maintaining  friendly  relations  with  both  France 
and  Russia  and  controlling  them  through  moral 
suasion;  he  constantly  exerted  himself  to  show  a 
studied  amiability  towards  each  Power.  At  the  same 
time  he  drew  them  both  into  extra-European  adven- 
tures, often  in  company  with  Germany.  France  was 
encouraged^o__dejieiorj_her  colonial  policy  in  Africa^ 
which  since  the  occupation  of  Turns  m^l881  had 
embroiled  her  with  Italy,  and  since  the  affair  of  Egypt 
in  1882,  with  Great  Britain.  Russia  was  supported 
iujiftr  peufttrfltjofl  of  Ma^hviTiflj  which  embittered  her 
relations  with  Great  Britain  and  was  to  lead  to  the 
war  with  Japan.  With  their  energies  thus  occupied, 
France  and  Russia  had  no  opportunity  for  disputing 
with  Germany  her  position  of  supremacy  upon  the 
Continent  of  Europe. 

Both  French  and  Russian  diplomats  allowed  them- 
selves to  fall  in  with  German  plans.  In  1894  Gabriel^ 
Hajnotaux  hena/nift  ^Foreign  Minister  _jn__Fran£e,  and 
except  for  a  period  of  a  few  months,  remained  at  the 
Quai  d'Orsay  until  June,  1898.  Brought  up  in  the 
school  of  Ferry  he  was  an  ardent  advocate  of  colonial, 
^expansioji,  considered  Great  Britain  as  the  inevitable 
enemy  of  France,  and'turned  to  Germany  for  support.24 
The  Kaiser  was  not  slow  to  respond  and  expressed 
on  more  than  one  occasion  his  desire  for  an  under- 
standing with  France.  In  1895  the  common  action 
taken  in  the  Far  East  by  Germany,  France,  and  Russia 

24  See  the  debates  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  May  31  and 
June  10,  1895;  also  cf.  an  obviously  inspired  article  in  Le  Temps,  June 
19,  1895;  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  90  sq.;  Elkind,  The  German 
Emperor's  Speeches,  48;  Despagnet,  La  Diplomatic  de  la  Troisieme 
Bepuolique<  et  le  Droit  des  Gens,  765. 


58      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

seemed  almost  like  the  proof  of  a  triple  understanding 
between  the  Powers  of  the  Dual  Alliance  and  Ger- 
many.25 At  the  same  time  the  participation  of  the 
Bussian  and  French  fleets  at  the  opening  of  the  Kiel 
Cana^  emphasized  the  rapprochement  of  the  two 
nations  with  Germany.  In  1897  steps  were  taken 
towards  a  general  settlement  of  African  colonial 
questions;  Togoland  was  delimited,  and  France  and 
Germany  seemed  almost  ready  to  develop  their  colonial 
accord  into  a  general  entente.28  Eussia  and  Germany, 
in  the  meantime,  were  going  hand  in  hand  in  the 
establishment  of  their  position  in  the  Far  East.27 

This  political  understanding  so  anxiously  sought  by 
Hanotaux  and  the  colonial  party  in  France,  and 
approved  by  the  pacific  Tsar  of  Russia,  was  strength- 
ened by  the  tact  and  ^rjdiality_jiisplayed  by  the 
Kaiser  towards  the  defeated— of— J&XQu  On  every 
possible  occasion  he  assured  the  French  of  his  sym- 
pathy and  admiration;  paid  homage  to  their  courage 
when  he  celebrated  the  anniversary  of  the  victories 
over  France ;  expressed  his  grief  at  the  death  of  such 
opponents  of  Germany  as  MacMahon,  Canrobert,  and 
Jules  Simon.  He  visited  French  training  ships  and 
telegraphed  his  congratulations  "as  sailor  and  com- 
rade ' '  to  France ;  saw  that  the  German  exhibit  at  the 
Paris  exposition  was  as  brilliant  as  possible,  invited 
French  generals  to  visit  him  at  the  time  of  the  German 

25  Pinon,  La  Lutte  pour  la  Pacifique,  76,  79  ;  Reventlowj  Deutschlands 
auswartige  Politik,  82-86. 

2flAlbin,  Le  Coup  d'Agadir,  82-83;  for  the  attempt  of  Germany  to 
arrange  a  definite  entente  with  France  in  1898  immediately  before 
Hanotaux J  resignation,  see  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  53. 

27  Hohenlohe,  Memoirs,  ii,  463 ;  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige 
Politik,  103. 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE  59 

manoeuvres,  and  made  of  the  French  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  one  of  his  closest  intimates.28 

The  result  of  the  political  and  sentimental  rap- 
prochement which  the  Kaiser  maintained  with  France 
and  Russia  was  to  give  to  Germany  a  position  of 
continental  control.  The.jpraffip.rt  pflWff.  of  thf^J^flL 
Alliance  was  destroyed  by  the  willingness  of  France 
and  Bussia  to  follow  the  lines  that  Germany  degjied 
themJxL-iake.  In  France,  at  the  inspiration  of  Hano- 
taux,  the  spirit  of  revenge  was  entirely  forgotten  in 
the  ardor  for  colonies;  and  the  development  of  this 
colonial  policy  seemed  to  demand  an  understanding 
with  Germany.29  Russia's  attention  was  entirely 
directed  towards  the  Far  East.  So  far  as  its  operation 
in  Europe  went,  the  Uttr^  A11mTip.p  was  n  weapon—) 
without  edge. 

Hence,  the  Kaiser  might  fairly  claim  that  the 
diplomatic  burden  that  had  fallen  from  the  shoulders 
of   Bismarck   had  been   honorably   and   successfully 

28Tardieu,  "La  Politique  Exterieure  de  FAllemagne, ' '  in  Questions 
Actuelles  de  Politique  Etranglre,  1911,  76-79;  Pinon,  France  et  Alle- 
magne,  86-90;  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor's  Speeches,  50-51.  Imme- 
diately after  visiting  the  French  training  ship,  IphigSnie,  the  Kaiser 
wired  to  President  Loubet:  "I  have  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  young 
French  sailors  on  board  the  training  ship  Iphigenie.  Their  military 
and  sympathetic  conduct,  worthy  of  their  noble  country,  has  made  a 
deep  impression  on  me.  My  heart  as  a  sailor  and  comrade  rejoices  at 
the  kind  reception  which  was  accorded  me  .  .  .  and  I  congratulate 
myself  on  the  fortunate  circumstance  which  has  allowed  me  to  meet  the 
Iphigenie  and  your  amiable  countrymen. ' ' 

29  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  97;  Fullerton,  Proolems  of  Power, 
28-29;  General  Dubarail,  ex-Minister  of  War,  wrote,  "The  peaceful 
intentions  which  the  Emperor  William  has  manifested  since  his  acces- 
sion to  the  throne  make  it  our  duty  to  take  part  in  the  celebrations  at 
the  opening  of  the  Kiel  Canal. ' '  And  see  also  an  article  by  Jules  Simon 
filled  with  pacific  spirit  towards  Germany,  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor's 
Speeches,  49. 


60      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

carried.  His  methods  and  his  attitude  towards  France 
were  different  from  those  of  the  great  Chancellor,  but 
they  were  no  less  effective.  Bismarck  had  forced  and 
maintained  the  isolation  of  France  and  Russia;  the 
supremacy  of  Germany  that  was  built  up  on  their 
isolation  he  had  made  manifest  constantly  and  at 
times  with  brutal  frankness.  After  the  fall  of  Bis- 
marck, the  young  Kaiser  had  been  powerless  to 
prevent  the  alliance  of  Russia  and  France,  but  his 
tact  and  skill  were  sufficient  to  render  it  innocuous, 
and  the  new  opposing  combination  forgot  to  oppose. 
From  1891  to  the  end  of  the  century  the  hegemony  of 
Germany  was  concealed,  but  it  was  none  the  less  real, 
and  German  influence  was  still  as  fully  in  control  of 
continental  diplomacy  as  when  Bismarck  was  the 
recognized  dictator  of  Europe. 

The  significance  of  the  position  occupied  by  Ger- 
many during  this  period  is  realized  when  we  come  to 
consider  the  use  that  she  made  of  it.  Largely  because 
of  her  diplomatic  control  of  the  Continent  and  the 
peace  which  she  had  assured  under  conditions  most 
favorable  to  her  growth,  Germany  was  enabled  to 
pass_ through, an  extraordinary  material  and  moral 
transformation^  From  this  transformation  there 
resulted  a  change,  in  international  relations  which  led 
directly  to  the  diplomatic  crises  that  marked  the  first 
decade  of  the  century  and  finally  to  the  general  war. 


* 


CHAPTE^^, 

GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY:  ECONOMIC 
FACTORS 

The  significance  of  the  period  during  which  Ger- 
many occupied  a  position  of  virtual  mastery  in  Europe 
can  hardly  be  overestimated.  It  was  the  time  when 
the  young  empire,  having  secured  its  military  pre- 
dominance by  the  defeat  of  Austria  and  France  and 
won  political  primacy  through  the  creation  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  began  to  forge  ahead  as  a  great 
industrial  and  commercial  Power  and  even  to  threaten 
the  supremacy  so  long  held  by  Great  Britain.  Bis- 
marck never  failed"  to  recognize  the  necessity  ofv 
economic  prosperity  to  a  great  state,  and  his  desire 
to  preserve  the  peace  after  1871  was  actuated  in  no 
small  degree  by  his  ambitions  for  the  growth  of 
German  industry  and  commerce.  Largely  for  the 
same  reason,  the  Kaiser  William  II  believed  it 
necessary  to  keep  the  destinies  of  Europe  under 
German  control. 

Their  hopes  were  fulfilled.  During  the  period  of 
almost  unruffled  calm  that  followed  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  in  1878,  Germany  passed  through  an  economic 
transformation  which,  in  conjunction  with  an  equally 
significant  moral  transformation,  was  destined  to 
exercise  the  most  important  effect  upon  the  inter- 
national diplomatic  situation.  The  almost  unparalleled^ 
growth  of  Germany's  industries,  the  extension  of  her 
commerce,   her   skill   and   success   in   competing  for 


\J 


62      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

markets,  could  not  be  disregarded  by  the  nations  which 
had  hitherto  held  economic  control  in  the  world  at 
large.  The  demand  for  a  strong  navy,  for  the 
acquisition  of  colonies,  and  for  political  influence 
outside  of  Europe  followed  inevitably  in  Germany  and 
did  not  allay  the  fears  of  Germany's  neighbors.  The 
jealousy  of  German  economic  success  and  the  disquiet 
inspired  by  her  ambitions  played  no  small  part  in 
determining  the  diplomatic  revolution  which  occurred 
at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  and  which 
aimed  at  a  restoration  of  the  political  balance  of  power 
in  Europe. 

The  economic  transformation  of  Germany  which 
took  place  during  the  generation  that  followed  the  war 
with  France  surpassed  in  rapidity  and  extent  any 
similar  phenomenon  that  Europe  had  ever  seen.  In 
Japan  and  in  certain  districts  of  America  changes 
as  vast  and  as  speedy  were  characteristic  of  the 
nineteenth  century;  but  in  the  old  world  nothing 
comparable  to  the  alteration  of  Germany  had  been 
experienced,  not  even  when  the  loom  of  Arkwright 
and  the  steam  engine  of  Watts  had  made  of  agricul- 
tural England  the  first  of  industrial  communities. 
This  transformation  was  effected  in  an  infinity  of 
ways;  its  most  salient  features,  perhaps,  were /.the 
growth  of  population  andjits  shifting  from  the  rural 
districts  to  the  urban  centres,3the  development  of 
industry  based  upon  applied  science,<(the  extension  of 
foreign  trade,  and£the  creation  of  a  gigantic  mercantile 
marine. 

The  most  obvious,  and  possibly  the  basic  fact  of 
significance  in  the  economic  development  of  Germany 
was  the  enormous  growth  of  population.  The  number 
of  inhabitants  dwelling  in  the  German  Empire  in  1871 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  s  63 

was  approximately  forty-one  million.1  Because  of  the 
new  advantages  that  resulted  from  national  unity,  this 
population  could  be  supported  by  the  natural  resources 
of  the  country  with  greater  ease  and  in  a  higher  degree 
of  comfort  than  before  the  war  with  France.  The 
benefits  of  more  uniform  legislation,  the  improvement 
in  the  means  of  communication  and  transportation, 
the  security  afforded  by  a  strong  national  government, 
tended  to  lighten  the  economic  burden  that  rested 
upon  the  working  people. 

But  these  very  factors  combined  to  facilitate  a  rapid 
increase  of  population.  The  birth  rate  was  higher  in 
1876  than  ever  before,  and  although  the  ratio  of  births 
has  slowly  descended  since  that  year,  the  loss  has  been 
more  than  counteracted  by  the  continual  decrease  in 
the  death  rate.  Germany's  population  has  thus  grown 
with  startling  rapidity.  By  the  end  of  the  century, 
the  Empire  numbered  more  than  fifty-six  million  souls, 
and  after  forty  years  of  existence  it  had  advanced  to 
sixty-five  million,  thus  increasing  by  more  than  half. 
Obviously,  the  problem  that  the  Government  was 
forced  to  meet  was  how  to  find  n^eansjof  support  for 
this  human  increment ;  sixty  million  persons  could  not 
live  upon  the  same  resources  that  had  been  sufficient 
for  forty  millions.2 

One  obvious  solution  to  this  problem  was  the  develop- 
ment of  intensive  agriculture;  by  subjecting  the  soil, 
which  was  often  of  a  sterile  and  arid  nature,  to 
scientific  treatment,  it  might  be  possible  to  increase 
vastly  the  agricultural  output  of  Germany.    Nor  was 

i  Statesman's  Year  Boole,  1873,  104-106. 

2  Statesman's  Tear  Book,  1898,  1905,  1913;  Von  Biilow,  Imperial 
Germany,  13;  61st  Congress,  2d  Session,  Senate  Documents,  no.  578, 
" Statistics  for  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  France,    1867-1909,,,  151. 


U-" 


64      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

this  line  of  development  neglected,  and  the  improve- 
\y  ment  of  German  agricultural  methods  has  formed  not 
the  least  of~the  Empire's  economic  triumphs.3  But 
this  solution  was  not  wholly  adequate,  for  the  problem 
of  an  increased  population  was  further  complicated 
by  the  rapid  shifting  of  population,  the  continual 
emigration  from  the  rural  districts  to  the  towns  and 
industrial  centres.  In  1871  less  than  a  quarter  of  the 
German  people  resided  in  the  towns;  at  the  end  of 
the  century,  the  town  population  comprised  nearly 
half  of  the  whole.  The  country  districts  declined 
relatively  in  all  parts  of  Germany,  and  in  some  quar- 
ters there  was  an  absolute  decrease  of  the  rural 
population.4  In  this  shifting  of  the  centre  of  gravity 
I  from  country  to  town  there  is  to  be  found  partly  cause 
V  and  partly  effect  of  Germany's  economic  transfor- 
mation; the  problem  of  supporting  the  new  town 
population  led  to  the  growth  of  new  activities,  which 
in  their  turn  tended  continually  to  increase  the  influx. 
\/The  rise  of  such  new  activities  resulted  inevitably 
from  the  growth  of  population.  The  surplus  popu- 
lation might  have  sought  a  new  home  in  colonies 
overseas,  but  when  Germany  looked  abroad  for  spots 
suitable  for  the  life  of  Europeans,  she  found  that  they 
had  already  been  seized  upon  by  older  nations;  nor 
was  she  in  a  position  to  demand  that  land  should  be 
granted  to  her  for  the  use  of  her  surplus  population. 
Emigration  to  foreign  countries  or  alien  colonies  was 
distasteful  to  Germany  for  sentimental  and  practical 
reasons.  Germans  could  not  endure  that  the  Father- 
land should  suffer  the  loss  of  vigor  and  vitality  that 
comes  to  an  emigrating  nation ;  they  believed  that  the 

s  Dawson,  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany,  228-237. 
*  Dawson,  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany,  39,  41-43. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  65 

increase  in  their  numbers  was  essential  to  the  preser- 
vation of  their  military  strength;  and  they  could  not 
beaFthaTforeign  countrielTsEouTd  profit  by  thejjurplus 
energy  that  Germany  herself  was  unable  to  support. 
Emigration,  accordingly,  was  not  encouraged  and  after 
1870  the  annual  loss  from  this  cause  became  contin- 
ually less.  In  1885  about  171,000  persons  emigrated 
from  Germany,  but  in  1898  there  were  only  some 
23,000.5 

Under  these  circumstances  there  remained  for  Ger- 
many but  one  satisfactory  means  of  supporting  her 
increasing  population,  namely,  the  or^atiftT1  nf..J]ggL 
industries  and  the  concurrent  development  of  foreign 
commerce.  The  growth  of  such  new  industries,  both 
causing  and  resulting  from  the  opening  of  foreign 
markets,  provided  employment  and  support  for 
millions  who  otherwise  would  have  been  forced  to 
leave  Germany.  The  increase  in  number  and  size 
of  new  industrialenterprises  was  thus  the  essential 
condition  of  Germany's  ability  to  offer  a  living  to 
her  children;  in  the  minds  of  Germans,  the  sine 
qua  non  of  German  national  existence.6 

Previous  to  the  war  with  France  and  the  conse- 
quent unification  of  Germany,  her  characteristics 
were  without  question  agricultural.  The  establish- 
ment of  the  customs  union  and  its  inclusion  of  the 
chief  German  states  between  1819  and  1842,  proved 
a  strong  stimulus  to  industrial  enterprise;  but  both 
political    and    financial    conditions    were    unsuitable 

5Kohrbach,  German  World  Policies  (trans.  Von  Mach),  16-17;  Von 
Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  13;  Tonnelat,  L  'Expansion  allemande  Tiors 
d'Europe,  passim. 

« Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  14;  Speech  of  Ambassador  von 
Bemstorff,  November  6,  1909  (published  under  title  of  The  Develop- 
ment of  Germany  as  a  World  Power). 


66      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

for  the  encouragement  of  capital.  So  long  as  Ger- 
many remained  divided  and  the  jealousy  of  Austria 
and  Prussia  seemed  to  preclude  any  solid  political 
settlement,  it  was  hopeless  to  attempt  the  development 
of  manufactures  upon  a  large  scale;  nor  were  there 
any  large  banking  institutions  capable  of  standing 
behind  industrial  enterprises.  Most  of  the  manu- 
factured articles  which  we  now  associate  with  the 
inscription,  "Made  in  Germany,"  were  then  imported 
from  England  and  France.7      * 

But  the  national  victory  over  France  in  1871 
affected  the  commercial  no  less  than  the  political  life 
of  Germany.  It  led  to  the  breaking  down  of  the 
barriers  that  had  hindered  the  exercise  of  that  busi- 
ness initiative,  acumen,  and  pertinacity  characteristic 
of  the  German  middle  class.  i  i  For  the  first  time  the 
(L^^  Germans  as  a  nation  became  conscious  of  collective 
power  and  of  the  great  possibilities  which  this  power 
placed  within  their  reach.  A  new  youth — that  un- 
speakable gift  which  the  gods  so  rarely  bestow  upon 
mortals — was  given  to  them,  and  with  all  youth's  \ 
energy  and  ardor  and  audacity  they  plunged  at  once 
into  a  bold  competition  with  neighbors  of  whom  they 
had  hitherto  stood  in  a  certain  awe,  and  who  in  truth 
for  their  part  had  barely  taken  the  young  rival 
seriously. ' ,8 

A  clear  index  of  the  growth  of  German  industry  is 
to  be  found  in  the  activities  of  the  banks  during  the 
years  that  succeeded  the  war.  The  Deutsche  Bank, 
which  was  a  private  institution  unaided  by  the  state, 

i  Schierbrand,  Germany :  The  Welding  of  a  World  Power,  98 ;  States- 
man's Year  Boole,  1850-1870,  passim. 

» Dawson,  Modern  Germany,  37;  Andrillon,  L 'Expansion  de  I'Alle- 
magne,  117. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  67 

more  than  quadrupled  its  capital  in  a  decade,  advanc- 
ing from  three  millions  of  capital  in  1870  to  thirteen 
millions  in  1880.  In  the  former  year  it  carried  on  a 
business  that  amounted  to  sixty  millions;  ten  years 
later  it  had  developed  its  business  to  2500  millions  and 
doubled  its  dividends ;  in  1890  it  did  a  business  of  7000 
millions.  The  state  banks  were  equally  successful,  and 
by  the  increase  in  their  capital  and  by  its  productive 
employment  not  merely  gave  proof  of  the  success 
of  German  industry,  kit  made  possible  its  further 
development.9 

The  astonishing  growth  of  the  jnineral  and_  metal 
industries  is  equally  significant,  for  coal  and  iron  are 
usecTnfThe  other  industries  and  the  increase  in  the 
output  of  both  is  at  once  a  cause  and  result  of  the  great 
industrial  development.  The  product  of  Germany's 
coal  mines  for  the  year  following  the  war  was  tripled 
thirty  years  later  and  quadrupled  in  1906 ;  in  Prussia 
this  industry  was  sextupled  between  1871  and  1905.10 
The  production  of  iron  ore  showed  a  still  more  notable 
development,  and  the  creation  of  the  smelting  indus- 
tries was  rapid  and  successful.  The  amount  of  pig- 
iron  produced  in  1871  was  less  than  a  fifth  of  that 
put  forth  in  1901.  Forty  years  ago  Germany's  steel 
output  was  barely  half  a  million  tons  annually;  in 
1895  it  approximated  three  millions,  in  1902  it  had 
advanced  to  seven  millions,  and  in  1907  to  twelve 
millions.11  The  significance  of  this  increase  is  easily 
appreciated,   for   the    steel   trade   is    the   industrial 

» Schierbrand,  Germany,  100-101;  Statistics  for  Great  Britain,  Ger- 
many, and  France,  173  sq. 

io  Statesman's  Year  Boole,  1873,  128;  1898,  552;  1907,  1000;  Statis- 
tics for  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  France,  156,  157. 

n  Statesman 's  Tear  Book,  1873,  129;  1898,  552-553;  1907,  1001. 


68      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

barometer.  Other  indications  of  the  economic  develop- 
ment of  Germany  may  be  discovered  in  the  statistics 
df~population.  It  is  estimated  that  61  per  cent  ofth> 
earning  population  in  1843  were  engaged  in  agricul- 
ture, forestry,  gardening,  fishing,  etc.  In  1882  the 
percentage  of  persons  dependent  upon  agriculture,  etc., 
for  their  livelihood  had  decreased  to  42  per  cent,  and 
in  1895  it  had  further  declined  to  35  per  cent.  Not- 
withstanding the  growth  of  population,  the  absolute 
number  of  persons  engaged  in  agriculture  was  barely 
maintained,  and  practically  all  the  increment  went 
into  the  new  industries.12 

This  transformation  is  realized  in  more  impressive 
fashion  the  more  we  study  the  growth  of  other 
economic  activities,  especially  the  electrical,  textile, 
chemical,  and  toy  industries.  Nor  can  we  over- 
emphasize the  fact  that  it  was  regarded  by  Germans 
as  an  essential  element  in  the  existence  of  the  Father- 
land as  a  great  state.  These  industries,  gigantic  in 
J  size  and  infinite  in  number,  were  believed  to  be  the 
sole  means  by  which  the  nation  could  support  her 
vastly  increased  population,  which  otherwise  must 
perforce  emigrate  or  starve.  Germany  must  become 
a  manufacturing  state  if  she  was  to  maintain  herself 
upon  an  equality  with  the  other  Powers  of  Europe. 

Just  as  the  German  people  believed  themselves  tor 
be  thus  dependent  upon  their  industries,  so  in  turn 

d  they  believe  that  those  industries  were  dependent 
upon  the  extension  of  foreign  trade.  The  complete 
success  of  TJeriSto  industrial  energy  could  never  be 
attained  nor  ensured,  unless  it  were  certain  of  a 
permanent  position  in  the  markets  of  the  world;  for 
Germany's  industries  were  in  many  cases  absolutely 

12  Dawson,  Modern  Germany,  44-46. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  69 

dependent  upon  the  raw  materials  supplied  by  other 
countries,  and  free  access  to  oversea  markets  was 
essential  to  the  sale  of  her  goods. 

The  extraordinary  success  of  Germans  in  selling 
their  goods  has  been  no  less  marked  than  their  success 
in  producing  them  in  the  first  instance.  Although 
they  came  into  the  commercial  race  late  and  the 
established  position  of  their  competitors  laid  heavy 
handicaps  upon  them,  they  succeeded  in  outrivalling 
most  of  their  economic  opponents,  and  finally  even 
threatened  the  commercial  position  of  Great  Britain. 
Their  success  has  been  ascribed  by  an  authoritative 
writer  as  due  in  the  main  to  one  or  all  of  three  factors : 
the  cheaper  price  of  German  goods;  their  superior 
or  at  least  their  more  serviceable  character ;  the  more  %  — 
efficient  arrangements  which  the  German  makes  for  ^g 
reaching  and  attracting  purchasers.13 

All  of  these  factors  result  in  large  measure  from 
the  fact  that  the  German  has  made  of  his  industry  /  ^ 
and  commerce  a  science.  The  nations  who  entered nJ^^^ 
the  field  first  were  not  forced  by  competition  to  the 
development  of  scientific  methods  of  production  and 
distribution;  their  way  being  clear  they  proceeded 
in  hit-or-miss  fashion,  and  although  they  lost  many 
opportunities  of  cheapening  their  goods  without 
lessening  their  value,  and  neglected  many  prospective 
customers  whom  they  might  have  secured,  they  still 
made  their  necessary  profits.  And  as  time  went  on, 
even  with  the  advent  of  new  trade  rivals,  they  clung 
to  their  old-fashioned  methods.  But  the  Germans,  if 
they  were  to  overcome  the  start  that  had  been  gained 
by  the  older  nations,  were  absolutely  forced  to  the 
use  of  scientific  methods  both  in  the  making  of  the 

is  Dawson,  Modern  Germany,  79. 


70      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

goods  and  in  selling  them.  This  they  realized  defi- 
nitely, with  the  result  that  the  processes  of  manu- 
facturing and  selling  developed  by  the  Germans,  have 
become  models  for  the  world.  That  which  of  late 
years  has  been  so  characteristic  of  German  Kultur 
in  general — "the  application  of  a  trained  intelli- 
gence to  the  practical  affairs  of  life" — has  been 
preeminently  true  of  their  industrial  and  commercial 
methods. 

Science  in  method  has  been,  perhaps,  the  greatest 
reason  for  Germany's  ability  to  produce  goods  more 
cheaply  than  her  rivals.  The  development  of  mechani- 
cal labor-saving  devices  progressed  further  there 
than  in  any  other  country;  and  the  Germans'  skill 
in  the  coordination  of  the  various  processes  of  pro- 
duction has  also  enabled  them  to  cut  their  costs.14 
Their  application  of  the  natural  sciences,  especially 
) ^'chemistry,  was  another  factor  making  for  economy 
in  manufacturing  methods.  Every  new  discovery  was 
at  once  investigated  by  the  German  manufacturers 
in  the  hope  that  it  would  lead  to  some  improvement  in 
the  technical  details  of  production  and  thus  allow 

I*  A  correspondent  wrote  to  the  Times,  April  7,  1906 :  ' '  Among  the 
chief  reasons  for  the  decrease  in  the  British  iron  industry  must  be 
placed  the  tendency  to  adhere  to  antiquated  methods  of  production 
among  English  manufacturers.  As  opposed  to  this  the  German  iron- 
masters have  known  how  to  avail  themselves  fully  of  modern  improve- 
ments in  the  technical  details  of  the  metallurgy  of  iron  and  in  the 
practical  operation  of  the  blast  furnace.  In  fact,  though  during  1905 
there  were  fifty  fewer  blast  furnaces  in  Germany  than  in  Great  Britain, 
the  former  country  was  able  to  produce  no  less  than  two  million  tons 
more  of  pig-iron  than  its  rival,  even  with  this  great  disadvantage  in 
point  of  plant.' '  Dawson  shows  (Modern  Germany,  81)  that  in  1886 
the  average  production  of  a  blast  furnace  in  Germany  was  16,500  tons, 
but  by  the  building  of  larger  furnaces  and  improved  methods  the  pro- 
duction in  1908  reached  40,000  tons. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  71 

them  to  undersell  their  competitors.15  Moreover,  they 
were  assisted  by  the  fact  that  in  general  they  could 
pay  lower  wages  to  their  laborers  and  lower  industrial 
salaries  to  the  officers  of  their  companies.  And  in  the 
last  instance  they  were  apt  to  be  satisfied  with  smaller 
profits  ;_their  scale  ofTivTng  was  lower  in  general  than 
that  of  the  French  manufacturers,  and  almost  inva- 
riably than  that  of  the  British  manufacturers  of  their 
own  station.  The  amount  that  in  other  countries 
would  be  spent  upon  luxuries  was  deducted  from  the 
price  by  the  German  manufacturers.18 

Besides  producing  cheaper  articles  the  German 
learned  how  to  make  them  more  to  the  taste  of  his 
possible  purchasers.  He  watched  the  effect  of  foreign- 
made  articles  upon  purchasers,  and  then  either  imi- 
tated them  or  improved  them  in  the  details  in  which 
they  did  not  exactly  meet  the  desires  of  the  customers. 
It  has  been  said  with  insight  that  the  German  is  not 
an  inventive  genius,  but  "he  excells  in  adaptation, 
which  under  ordinary  circumstances  is  a  gift  of  even  ! 
greater  practical  value  than  inventiveness.  The  great 
inventors  have  seldom  become  rich  men;  the  prizes 
have  generally  fallen  to  the  men  who  have  had  just 
enough  originality  to  recognize  a  good  idea  when  they 
saw  it,  to  adapt  and  develop  it,  and  to  turn  it  to 
immediate  success. ' ,1T  It  is  Lavoisier,  Berthallet,  and 
Berthelot  who  created  organic  chemistry,  but  Germany  ■ 
has  exploited  their  discoveries  and  made  the  profits.18 

In  this  respect  the  German  manufacturer  has  been 

is  Stiegel,  Die  chemische  Industrie,  8. 
io  Schierbrand,  Germany,  106. 
it  Dawson,  Modern  Germany,  85. 

18  Andrillon,  L' 'Expansion  de  I'Allemagne,  120.     Cf.  Haller  in  Revue 
generate  des  Sciences,  November  30,  December  15,  30,  1912. 


t 


72      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  "WAR 

unrivalled.  He  has  been  kept  in  touch  with  the  desires 
of  his  customers  by  his  travelling  agents,  and  accord- 
ing to  their  instructions  has  modelled  his  goods.  His 
own  tastes  have  been  completely  sunk  in  those  of  the 
persons  to  whom  he  wishes  to  sell.  He  has  made 
it  his  business  to  discover  the  predilections  of  his 
prospective  customers  and  to  conform  to  them  in 
the  manufacture  of  the  articles  designed  for  that 
particular  quarter.  He  realized,  as  some  of  his  com- 
petitors did  not,  that  the  secret  of  industrial  success 
lay  not  in  forcing  the  purchaser  to  buy  goods  with 
which  he  was  not  satisfied,  but  rather  in  recognizing 
that  the  purchaser  had  the  right  to  know  what  he 
wanted  and  making  it  his  own  business  to  supply  it.19 
Becauaejof  their  adaptability  the  Germans  had  an 
enormous  advantage  over  their  British_competitors, 
who  were  apt  to  refuse  to  change  their  models  to  suit 
the  taste  of  the  persons  for  whom  they  were  designed. 
The  attitude  of  the  British  was  often  that  their 
articles  had  been  made  in  such  a  style  for  a  long  time, 
and  were  not  going  to  be  changed ;  if  the  customer  did 
not  like  them,  he  might  leave  them  and  look  for  what 
he  wanted  somewhere  else.  Especially  in  South 
American  countries  and  in  the  Far  East,  the  Germans 
secured  many  markets  simply  by  ornamenting  their 
goods  in  a  certain  style,  or  packing  them  in  attractive 
boxes  which  pleased  the  purchasers.  The  British 
failed  to  understand  that  even  though  their  own 
article  might  be  superior,  other  factors  might  be  of 
importance.  In  Europe  itself  and  in  quarters  where 
tEe^BfTHsE  had  the  advantage  of  long  established 
trade,  the  Germans  often  ousted  them  by  their  appre- 
ciation of  the  tastes  of  the  purchasers.  "Our  market,' ' 

i»  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  50,  51. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  73 

the  British  Consul  at  Cherbourg  wrote  in  1897,  "is 
overrun  with  German  hardware  and  toys.  The  region 
lives  mainly  by  its  trade  with  England;  and  yet  the 
shopkeepers  buy  nothing  in  England.  At  the  big 
bazaar,  where  I  asked  the  reason  of  this,  the  manager 
handed  me  articles  in  wood  and  fayence  made  in 
Germany  from  models  he  had  given,  and  in  sizes 
suited  to  the  taste  of  the  population,  with  views  of 
Cherbourg  and  scenes  from  Norman  history."20 

Even  if  the  Germans  had  not  possessed  the  com- 
mercial advantages  resulting  from  cheaper  goods  and 
articles  better  suited  to  the  tastes  of  their  customers, 
they  would  have  proved  dangerous  competitors  because 
of  their  more  expert  salesmen.  In  the  training  of 
their  commercial  representatives,  as  in  other  respects, 
they  took  more  pains  and  consequently  achieved  better 
results.  The  Government  founded  technical  schools 
and  mercantile  colleges  for  the  special  purpose  of 
equipping  the  young  men  with  the  qualities  necessary 
for  successful  salesmanship.  A  thorough  knowledge 
of  foreign  languages  and  a  study  of  foreign  charac- 
teristics and  methods  enabled  them  to  enter  their 
business  career  with  a  far  better  business  education 
than  that  ordinarily  given  to  young  men  of  other 
countries.  Upon  leaving  the  mercantile  college  they 
were  generally  sent  by  the  exporting  house  with  which 
they  were  to  be  connected,  on  a  trip  around  the  world, 
or  to  remain  for  a  term  of  years  in  some  foreign 
commercial  field  in  order  to  study  the  requirements 
of  the  country  in  which  they  were  placed.21 

In  this  way  the  German  commercial  houses  secured 
a  trained  corps   of  salesmen  of  excellent  technical 

20  Cited  by  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  53. 
si  Schierbrand,  op.  cit.,  108 ;  Dawson,  op.  cit.,  92-94. 


X 


74      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

education  and  well  acquainted  with  the  customs  and 
needs  of  the  foreign  market.  They  kept  the  home  firm 
in  close  connection  with  its  customers  and  made  it 
their  task  to  persuade  the  manufacturers  to  satisfy 
the  desires  of  the  purchasers.  We  need  not  wonder 
that  the  Germans  were  successful  in  their  competition 
when  they  met  the  traders  who  still  held  to  the 
antiquated  method  of  forcing  the  goods  of  the  houses 
they  represented  upon  the  market,  regardless  of  the 
tastes  of  their  customers. 

The  German  exporter  also  accommodated  himself 
to  the  modes  of  payment  habitual  in  foreign  countries, 
differing  from  the  British  trader,  who  was  apt  to 
demand  immediate  settlement  and  through  a  British 
financial  house.  The  German  granted  long  credits 
and  easy  payments.  Everything  that  could  be  done 
to  win  the  favor  of  his  customers  was  done.  The 
British  Consul  at  Havre  wrote  home :  ' l  The  Germans 
have  secured  the  contract  for  supplying  the  industrial 
school  at  Elbeuf  with  all  its  material.  They  have  laid 
down  all  the  machinery  at  a  merely  nominal  price.  .  .  . 
What  was  paid  was  for  the  sake  of  form  only.  .  .  . 
They  have  thus  gained  the  town's  good  graces.  And 
this  gift  will  be  amply  requited  by  their  obtaining  the 
future  custom  of  all  the  pupils  leaving  this  school, 
who  will  have  been  accustomed  to  the  articles,  methods, 
tools,  and  skill  of  the  Germans. ' ,22 

By  the  exercise  jiLlrained  intelligence  and  scientific 
methods  in  production  and  in  salesmanship,  the 
Germans  thus  won  a  secured  position  not  merely  in 

22  Cited  by  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  54.  For  the  German 
organization  for  influencing  the  press  and  public  opinion  of  foreign 
countries  in  favor  of  German  goods,  see  British  Parliamentary  Papers, 
1914,  no.  cd  7595,  Despatches  of  Sir  E.  Goschen. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  75 

the  markets  of  South  and  Central  America  and  the 
Far  East,  but  in  Europe  itself  and  in  the  very  homes 
of  their  competitors.  We  read  in  a  book  written  by 
a  man  who  cannot  be  suspected  of  favoring  Germany : 
"In  my  home  in  Paris  the  elevator  is  German,  elec- 
trical fixtures  are  German,  the  range  in  my  kitchen 
is  German,  the  best  lamps  for  lighting  are  Ger- 
man. .  .  .  My  cutlery  is  German,  the  chairs  in  my 
dining  room  are  German,  the  mirror  in  my  bath  room 
is  German,  some  of  my  food  products  are  German, 
and  practically  all  the  patented  drugs,  and  some  of 
the  toilet  preparations  are  German.  .  .  .  All  these 
things  have  been  purchased  in  the  Paris  markets, 
without  the  slightest  leaning  towards  or  preference 
for  articles  coming  from  the  Fatherland.  I  was  not 
aware  of  the  fact  that  I  was  buying  German  things. 
They  sold  themselves — the  old  combination  of  appear- 
ance, convenience,  and  price,  which  will  sell  any- 
thing."23 

The  success  that  attended  Germany's  efforts  to  win 
a  place  in  foreign  markets  is  realized  without  difficulty 
whSiTwe  recall  the  totals  of  German  trade  statistics. 
In  1878  German  imports  and  exports  amounted  to 
about  six  billion  marks;  by  1892  her  commerce  had 
advanced  to  seven  billions,  and  in  1900  to  ten  and  a 
half  billions,  while  in  1906  the  total  sum  of  her  imports 
and  exports  was  not  less  than  fifteen  billions.24    These 

23  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  50. 

2*  From  1870  to  1900  Germany  rose  from  fourth  to  second  place 
in  international  trade;  a  decade  later  she  had  nearly  quintupled  the 
amount  of  exports  and  imports  of  1870,  whereas  Great  Britain's  foreign 
trade  was  only  about  two  and  half  times  as  great  in  1910  as  in  1870, 
Rohrbach,  German  World  Policies,  66-81;  Andrillon,  L'Expansion  de 
VAllemagne,  117;  Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  passim;  Statistics  for  Great 
Britain,  Germany,  and  France,  153. 


76      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

enormous  figures,  as  von  Biilow  says,  are  lifeless,  but 
they  "assume  a  living  interest  when  we  consider  how 
important  they  are  for  the  welfare  of  the  Germans, 
and  that  the  work  and  very  existence  of  millions 
of  .  .  .  citizens  depends  upon  them."25  Germany's 
'vastly  increased  population  found  their  means  of 
support  in  her  new  gigantic  industries,  and  those 
industries  could  never  have  been  built  up  without 
the  rapid  and  successful  extension  of  Germany's 
^  commerce. 

Just  as  Germany's  industries  were  dependent  upon 
x— ^ner  foreign  trade,  so  that  trade  was,  to  a  large  extent, 
-^Mjlependent  upon  her  mercantile  marine.  And  the 
/k  speedy  growth  of  the  German  shipping  industry  has 
marched  abreast  of  the  expansion  in  industry  and 
commerce.  Our  attention  is  called  by  one  writer  to 
the  Latin  device  over  the  portal  of  the  Navigation 
House  in  Bremen,  "Navigare  necesse  est."26  The 
vast  majority  of  Germans  have  believed  firmly  since 
1890  that  navigation  was  an  absolute  necessity  to 
the  existence  of  the  new  industrial  state.  It  was 
necessary  for  the  feeding  of  her  enormous  population ; 
above  all  it  was  necessary  for  her  trade,  in  order  to 
ensure  the  importation  of  the  raw  materials  which 
supplied  the  great  industries,  and  to  carry  German 
manufactured  products  back  to  foreign  markets. 

The  growth  of  German  shipping  first  became 
notable  in  the  nineties.  Before  the  war  with  France, 
Germany  could  in  no  respect  claim  to  be  a  seafaring 
Power;  the  Hanseatic  ports,  which  in  mediaeval  days 
were  amongst  the  chief  centres  of  European  commerce, 
had  languished  ever  since  the  Napoleonic  blockade. 

25  Von  Billow,  Imperial  Germany,  14-15. 
2«  Schierbrand,  Germany.  131. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  77 

Hamburg,  Germany's  chief  port,  was  in  1872  not  so 
much  a  German  as  a  British  harbor :  of  the  ships  that 
put  into  that  port  the  British  vessels  surpassed  the 
German  by  two  to  one.  But  by  1887,  the  German  ships 
entering  Hamburg  slightly  surpassed  the  British  in 
number  and  tonnage,  and  in  1900  the  German  shipping 
of  Hamburg  was  more  than  double  that  of  the  British. 
A  decade  later  the  entire  trading  fleet  of  France  was 
less  than  that  of  Hamburg  alone.27 

The  increase  in  German  shipping  in  this  single  port 
was  typical  of  the  general  growth  of  Germany's 
mercantile  marine.  In  the  year  of  unification,  her 
shipping  was  almost  entirely  confined  to  the  Baltic 
and  consisted  chiefly  of  sailing  vessels.  By  the  end 
of  the  century  she  had  quintupled  her  mercantile 
tonnage  and  possessed  thirteen  hundred  steamers 
plying  the  high  seas  and  entering  all  the  ports  of  the 
world.  With  more  than  four  thousand  sea-going 
vessels,  her  mercantile  marine  was  surpassed  by  that 
of  Great  Britain  alone.28  The  development  of  certain 
lines  was  especially  notable.  In  1855  the  Hamburg- 
American  line  had  but  two  steamers,  one  of  them  built 
in  England ;  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century 
this  line  was  the  largest  in  the  world,  no  British  or 
French  company  comparing  with  it  either  in  size  or 
in  steamer  connections.  Besides  its  regular  service 
to  New  York  and  other  American,  Mexican,  Canadian, 
and  South  American  ports,  it  had  extended  branch 
lines  to  Italy,  the  West  Indies,  around  Africa,  and  to 

27  Schierbrand,  op.  cit.,  132-134;  Clapp,  The  Port  of  Hamburg, 
passim;  Statesman's  Year  Boole,  1873,  177;  Statistics  for  Great  Britain, 
Germany,  and  France,  166. 

28  Dawson,  Modern  Germany,  70-71;  Andrillon,  Lf Expansion  de 
VAllemagne,  126-127;  Statesman's  Year  Book,  1898,  555-558;  1907, 
1007-1009. 


78      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  Far  East.  The  North  German  Lloyd  operated 
twenty-seven  steamer  lines  to  all  continents,  and 
possessed  forty-six  steamers  engaged  in  Chino-Indian 
trade.29 

The  natural  corollary  to  the  growth  of  Germany's 
mercantile  marine  was  the  creation  of  her  navy.  It 
was  inconceivable  that  the  Germans  should  be  willing 
to  trust  the  security  of  their  ships  to  the  chances  of 
fortune  and  the  generosity  of  rival  Powers;  for  they 
believed  that  their  commerce  and  industry  depended 
absolutely  on  the  preservation  of  their  mercantile 
marine.  On  this  point  von  Biilow  expressed  the 
conviction  of  the  German  people  with  unmistakable 
lucidity:  "We  have  entrusted  millions  to  the  ocean, 
and  with  these  millions  the  weal  and  woe  of  many  of 
our  countrymen.  If  we  had  not  in  good  time  provided 
protection  for  these  valuable  and  indispensable  pos- 
sessions, we  should  have  been  exposed  to  the  danger 
of  having  one  day  to  look  on  defencelessly  while  we 
were  deprived  of  them.  But  we  could  not  have 
returned  then  to  the  comfortable  economic  and  political 
existence  of  a  purely  inland  state.  We  should  have 
been  placed  in  the  position  of  being  unable  to  employ 
and  support  a  considerable  number  of  our  millions 
of  inhabitants  at  home.  The  result  would  have 
^j  been  an  economic  crisis  which  might  easily  attain 
\the  proportions  of  a  national  catastrophe. ' ,30 

29  For  German  pride  in  these  lines,  see  Rohrbach,  German  World 
Policies,  100-101. 

so  Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  17.  Cf.  also  Professor  Paulsen: 
"The  German  Empire  has  participated  in  the  policy  of  expansion  out 
of  Europe* — at  first  modestly,  of  late  with  growing  decision.  The 
enormous  increase  of  its  industrial  production  and  its  trade  compelled 
it  to  take  measures  for  the  extension  and  the  security  of  its  overseas 
interests.     In  the  course  of  a  single  generation  Germany,  as  an  indus- 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  79 

Convinced  of  the  economic  necessity  of  a  formidable 
navy,  Germany,  although  she  entered  the  race  late, 
proceded  to  make  up  for  lost  time.  In  1888  the 
German  naval  estimates  amounted  only  to  some  sixty- 
five  million  marks  annually,  and  ten  years  later  only 
to  one  hundred  million;  in  the  former  year  the  navy 
was  manned  by  fifteen  thousand  officers  and  sailors, 
in  the  latter  the  number  was  twenty-three  thousand. 
In  1898  she  possessed  only  nine  armored  ships  of  war. 
But  in  that  year  and  two  years  later  she  adopted  a 
far-sighted  programme  of  naval  development  which, 
with  the  complementary  law  of  1906,  promised  her  a 
fleet  which  would  soon  be  of  great  defensive  strength 
and  by  1920  might  hope  to  dispute  even  Great 
Britain's  supremacy  on  the  sea.  By  1908  the  annual 
naval  estimates  had  risen  from  one  hundred  million 
marks  to  about  four  hundred  twenty  million.  The 
number  of  officers  and  seamen  in  the  navy  had 
increased  to  over  fifty  thousand.  The  programme 
of  1900  was  intended  to  bring  the  navy  by  the  year 
1920  to  a  strength  of  thirty-eight  line  ships  and 
fourteen  large  cruisers.  But  the  complementary  laws 
of  1906  and  1908  gave  notable  increases  so  that 
Germany  was  promised  at  least  eighty  war  ships  of 
the  latest  type  in  1920.31 

trial  and  mercantile  State,  has  worked  it9  way  into  the  second  position 
in  Europe ;  today  England  alone  is  ahead  of  it,  yet  by  no  great  distance, 
and  the  distance  decreases  every  year.  The  necessity  of  protecting  this 
position  by  a  strong  naval  force  has  during  recent  decades  become  a 
dominant  factor  in  the  political  thought  of  the  nation,' '  Internationale 
Wochenschrift  fur  Wissenschaft,  Kunst,  und  Technik,  October  26,  1907, 
p.  18.    Cf.  Usher,  Pan-Germanism,  102. 

si  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  PolitiTc,  57-62 ;  Dawson, 
Modern  Germany,  351;  the  German  Naval  programmes  are  printed  in 
Hurd  and  Castle,  German  Sea-Power,  328  sq. 


kJ 


80      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

The  movement  for  a  great  fleet  was  supported  by 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  people  and  above  all  by  the 
determination  of  the  Kaiser.    "Our  future  lies  upon 

e  sea,"  said  William  II.  And  again,  "As  my  grand- 
father worked  for  the  reconstitution  of  this  army,  so 
I  will  work  without  allowing  myself  to  be  checked 
to  reconstitute  this  navy."32  The  Naval  League, 
organized  to  win  popular  support  for  Germany's 
new  aspirations,  soon  included  nine  hundred  thousand 
members  and  disposed  of  an  annual  budget  of  a 
million  marks.33  Aided  by  a  wealth  of  human  material, 
the  great  lack  of  which  in  Great  Britain  and  France 
was  undeniable,  the  new  German  navy  rapidly  ap- 
proached the  position  where  it  could  assure  the  safety 
of  German  commerce  and  German  control  of  markets. 
y  Correlative  with  the  growth  of  the  German  navy- 
was  the  hope  of  acquiring  new  colonies  or  at  least 
spheres  of  influence  in  the  undeveloped  portions  of 
the  globe.  Enthusiasm  for  colonies  by  no  means 
equalled  that  for  a  great  navy  at  the  beginning  of  the 
century,  but  there  were  many  who  insisted  upon  the 
economic  necessity  of  an  active  colonial  policy.  In 
their  minds  the  acquisition  of  colonies  which  should 
furnish  raw  materials  to  German  industries  and  in 
return  purchase  manufactured  goods  was  an  essential 
safeguard  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Empire's  new 
industries. 

The  German  Empire  had  come  into  political  exist- 
ence so  late  that  the  fairest  portions  of  the  globe  had 

82  Speeches  at  Stettin,  September  23,  1898,  and  at  Berlin,  January  1, 
1900. 

ss  By  1907,  the  Navy  League  's  organ,  Die  Flotte,  had  a  circulation 
of  275,000  and  during  the  course  of  the  year  700  lectures  on  naval  sub- 
jects were  delivered  under  its  auspices,  Annual  Begister,  1908,  293. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  81 

already  been  taken  by  the  older  states.  In  the  early 
seventies  Germany  might  have  secured  valuable  terri- 
tory in  North  and  Central  Africa  had  not  Bismarck 
felt  it  necessary  to  restrict  the  scope  of  his  policy  to 
the  European  Continent.  But  both  the  Chancellor 
and  William  I  were  opposed  to  a  policy  of  colonial 
aggrandizement;  they  considered  that  it  would  be  a 
"political  over-capitalizing"  of  the  young  Empire, 
and  they  feared  the  jealousy  of  Great  Britain.34  As 
Bismarck  said,  they  valued  British  friendship  more 
than  the  whole  East  Coast  of  Africa.  We  have  also 
seen  how  Bismarck  attempted  to  distract  the  attention 
of  the  French  from  the  "gap  in  the  Vosges"  by 
encouraging  Ferry  in  his  colonial  schemes,  thereby 
foregoing  any  opportunity  of  winning  territory  for 
Germany  on  the  North  African  Coast.35 

But  in  the  eighties  Germany  was  caught  in  the  wave 
of  enthusiasm  for  colonies  that  swept  over  Europe, 
and  the  initiative  of  her  traders  secured  certain 
territories  for  her.  In  1882  a  bay  on  the  west  coast 
of  Africa  was  seized  by  Herr  von  Luderitz,  and  two 
years  later,  as  a  result  of  a  quarrel  with  the  British 
at  Cape  Town,  Bismarck  declared  the  annexation  of 
the  West  African  coast  and  hinterland  from  the 
Orange  River  to  Cape  Frio.  During  the  next  two 
years  Germany  won  territory  in  the  Cameroons  ,and 
Togoland,  as  well  as  on  the  East  African  coast.  At 
the  same  time  she  secured  various  islands  in  the 
Pacific:  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland,  Solomon  Islands,  the 
Bismarck  Archipelago,  the  Marshall  Islands.    In  1897 

34  Bismarck  believed  that  Germany  already  had  "too  much  hay  on 
the  fork"  to  make  any  large  scheme  of  colonization  prudent,  Sir  Bartle 
Frere,  How  the  Transvaal  Trouble  arose,  258. 

35  Supra,  chap.  II. 


V 


82      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  aggressive  action  of  Germany  in  the  Far  East 
led  to  the  acquisition  of  Kiau  Chau,  and  in  1899  she 
secured  the  Caroline  Islands  and  two  of  the  Samoa 
group.38 

The  German  colonies,  however,  were  not  of  great 
value  to  the  mother  country,  with  the  exception  of 
Kiau  Chau,  which  offered  a  fortified  naval  base  in  the 
Far  East  and  gave  to  Germany  commercial  control 
of  the  province  of  Shantung.  The  others,  regarded 
either  as  commercial  ventures  or  as  coaling  stations 
and  strategic  points  for  the  exercise  of  German 
political  influence,  were  failures.  Serious  trouble 
developed  in  Southwest  Africa  and  its  latent  resources 
were  not  developed.  Elsewhere  the  colonial  methods 
of  the  German  administrators  proved  to  be  ill-suited 
to  the  problems  they  had  to  meet.  The  strategic  value 
of  the  Cameroons  and  Togoland  was  nullified  by  the 
position  of  the  British  and  French.  The  Pacific 
Islands  were  leftovers.87 
\S  We  can  therefore  understand  why,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth  century,  German  enthusiasm  for 
.colonies  was  not  warm.  They  were  regarded  as  a 
poor  investment  by  the  capitalists  and  the  mass  of 
the  nation  looked  on  them  with  indifference.  But  the 
rapid  growth  of  the  Pan-Germanist  element  tended 
to  revive  ambition  for  colonial  success,  and  in  1907 
the  formation  of  a  Colonial  Office  gave  new  impetus 
\ 

s«  Zimmerman,  Geschichte  der  Deutschen  KolonialpolitiJc,  passim.  For 
a  discussion  of  German  colonies,  Keller,  "Beginnings  of  German 
Colonisation  and  Colonial  Policy,' *  Tale  Review,  x,  30;  xi,  390;  xii,  57. 
See  also  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft  Jahresberichte  and  Deutsche 
Kolonialzeitung. 

**  For  the  failure  of  German  officials,  see  Bohrbach,  German  World 
Policies,  152-156. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  83 

to  the  movement.  The  first  Colonial  Secretary,  Dr. 
Dernburg,  brought  to  his  task  abilities  of  the  first 
order  and  the  enthusiasm  that  proceeded  from  his 
conviction  that  the  development  of  colonies  was  a 
" great  imperial  concern.' '  In  his  opinion,  they  were 
chiefly  important  as  capable  of  providing  in  future 
the  raw  products  so  necessary  for  German  industries. 
He  confined  his  colonial  ambitions  to  the  development 
of  the  territories  that  Germany  already  possessed 
into  profitable  plantation  colonies.38 

Others,  however,  allowed  their  aspirations  to  soar 
higher,  and  began  to  insist  that  colonies  suitable  for 
emigrating  Germans  should  be  demanded  from  the 
older  nations.  "For  centuries  the  overflow  of  the 
strength  of  the  German  nation  has  poured  into  foreign 
countries  and  been  lost  to  our  Fatherland  and  to  our 
nationality;  it  is  absorbed  by  foreign  nations  and 
steeped  with  foreign  sentiments.  Even  today  the 
German  Empire  possesses  no  colonial  territories 
where  its  increasing  population  may  find  remunerative 
work  and  a  German  way  of  living.  This  is  obviously 
not  a  condition  which  can  satisfy  a  powerful  nation, 
or  which  corresponds  to  the  greatness  of  the  German 
people  and  their  intellectual  importance. ' ,39 

Immediate  aggression  that  would  lead  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  colonies  suitable  to  the  life  of  Europeans  was 
not,  however,  favored  by  more  than  the  smallest 
number  of  German  chauvinists.  Most  of  the  influential 
classes  resigned  themselves  to  the  alternative  of 
opening  and  assuring  new  markets,  sufficiently  large 
to  absorb  the  constantly  increasing  volume  of  German 

38  Dernburg,  Zeilpunkte  des  deutschen  Kolonialismus  (Berlin,  1907). 
a»  Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  76. 


84      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

exports,  upon  which  the  new  increment  of  German 
population  depended  for  its  support.  "We  must 
resign  ourselves  in  all  clearness  and  calm,"  wrote 
Bohrbach,  "to  the  fact  that  there  is  no  possibility  of 
acquiring  colonies  suitable  for  emigration.  But  if 
we  cannot  have  such  colonies  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  we  cannot  obtain  the  advantages  if  only  to  a 
limited  extent,  which  make  these  colonies  desirable. 
It  is  a  mistake  to  regard  the  mere  possession  of  exten- 
sive transoceanic  territories,  even  when  they  are  able 
to  absorb  a  part  of  the  national  surplus  of  population, 
as  necessarily  a  direct  increase  of  power.  Australia, 
Canada,  and  South  Africa  do  not  increase  the  power 
of  the  British  Empire  because  they  are  British 
possessions,  nor  yet  because  a  few  million  British 
emigrants  with  their  descendants  live  in  them,  but 
because  by  the  trade  with  them  the  wealth  and  with 
it  the  defensive  strength  of  the  mother  country  are 
increased.  Colonies  which  do  not  produce  that  result 
have  but  little  value ;  and  countries  which  possess  this 
importance  for  a  nation,  even  though  they  are  not  its 
colonies,  are  in  this  decisive  point  a  substitute  for 
colonial  possessions  in  the  ordinary  sense.,,4° 

The  value  of  commercial  penetration  which  gave  to 
Germany  a  share  in  important  markets,  although  it 
did  not  lead  to  the  acquisition  of  colonies,  had  already 
been  proved,  and  it  was  clear  that  rich  districts  were 
still  open  to  German  industrial  enterprise.  This  was 
especially  true  of  South  America,  the  Far  East, 
Africa,  and  the  Central  East,  and  in  each  district 
extensive  commercial  penetration  was  planned  by 
German  individuals  and  societies. 

4oKohrbach,  Deutschland  unter  den  Weltvollcern,  159,  160. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  85 

In  Brazil,  as  early  as  1849,  Germans  had  begun  to 
establish  commercial  houses,  and  a  generation  later 
serious  plans  were  on  foot  for  the  acquisition  of 
territory  that  might  be  developed  into  a  sort  of 
German  colony.  In  1908  it  was  said  that  there  were 
no  less  than  400,000  Germans  resident  in  Brazil. 
Commercial  penetration,  however,  in  this  instance, 
could  hardly  lead  to  political  control  of  any  sort.  The 
growth  in  power  of  Brazil  itself  blocked  any  such 
scheme,  and  behind  Brazil  stood  the  other  South 
American  States  who  showed  clearly  that  they  were 
not  inclined  to  permit  any  European  colonization.41 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  furthermore,  could  not  easily 
be  brushed  aside.  In  the  Far  East  the  extension  of 
German  influence,  which  had  been  established  by  the 
acquisition  of  Kiau  Chau  in  1897,  proceeded  rapidly. 
The  commercial  penetration  of  the  province  of  Shan- 
tung was  developed,  and  the  Pan-Germanists  looked 
forward  to  winning  political  control  of  an  enormous 
stretch  of  territory,  of  the  utmost  commercial  and 
strategic  value,  should  the  break-up  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  not  be  arrested.42 

But  the  best  opportunities  seemed  to  lie  in  Morocco, 
Persia,  and  Mesopotamia.  In  South  America  and  the 
Far  East  German  traders  were  confronted  with  the 
competition  of  British  and  Americans,  a  competition 
which  they  often  met  successfully  by  the  superiority 
of  their  commercial  methods  but  which  made  impos- 
sible absolute  control.    In  the  Near  and  Central  East 

4i  Sievers,  Sudamerilca  und  die  deutschen  Interessen;  Ballod,  Die 
Bedeutung  von  Siidorasilien  fur  die  deutsche  Kolonisation ;  Von  Berns- 
torff,  The  Development  of  Germany  as  a  World  Power,  13. 

«  Andrillon,  L' Expansion  de  I'Allemagne,  171-175. 


86      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Germany  might  hope  to  develop  markets  capable  of 
absorbing  vast  quantities  of  German  manufactured 
goods  and  win  control  of  districts  which  could  furnish 
the  raw  materials  so  necessary  to  German  industries! 
Both  commercial  and  political  motives  seemed  to  indi- 
cate the  necessity  of  developing  the  friendship  of  the 
Turk  and  the  extension  of  German  influence  in  the 
Near  East.  The  weakening  of  the  Slav  element  in  the 
Balkans  and  the  inclusion  of  Austro -Hungary  and 
Turkey  in  the  understanding  would  open  a  path  from 
Germany  to  Mesopotamia,  where  the  Germans  hoped 
to  find  a  country  of  unrivalled  resources,  a  monopoly 
of  markets,  and  a  strategic  position  of  unrivalled 
importance  in  respect  to  the  British  dormnionm  Egypt 
and  India.  **> — — 

Nor  would  it  be  long  before  Syria,  Palestine,  Persia, 
and  Arabia  might  fall  under  German  commercial 
control.  Holding  thus  the  shortest  overland  route  to 
the  East,  the  route  of  the  mediaeval  traders,  the 
Germans  might  hope  ultimately  to  enter  India  and 
compete  with  the  British  for  the  fifty  millions  of 
commerce  controlled  by  Great  Britain.  Such  com- 
mercial penetration  into  Mesopotamia  might  first  be 
of  a  peaceful  nature.  But  ultimately  the  commercial 
control  of  Germany  and  her  allies  might  be  trans- 
formed into  a  political  domination.  Doubtless  the 
more  optimistic  or  the  more  aggressive  hoped  that 
the  establishment  of  German  influence  in  the  valleys 
of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  would  be  merely  the  first 
step  in  an  attack  upon  the*  British  Moslem  colonies, 
which  would  be  assisted  by  the  revolt  of  all  the 
Mohammedans  subject  to  British  rule.  At  all  events 
the  Bagdad  Railway  was  planned  for  the  development 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY 


87 


of  Germany's  Mesopotamian  policy  and  at  the  end 
of  the  century  was  definitely  undertaken.43 

It  is  clear  that  motives  other  than  economic  played 
their  part  in  such  aspirations.  It  was  not  merely  the 
extension  of  commerce,  but  also  of  political  influence 
that  Germany  was  aiming  at.  Unquestionably  her 
Mesopotamian  policy  as  well  as  the  almost  universal 
enthusiasm  for  the  navy  rested  largely,  at  least  in 
their  inception,  upon  economic  grounds.  The  Germans 
believed  that  they  had  been  forced  by  necessity  to 
develop  their  industries  upon  a  grandiose  scale  because 
of  the  growth  of  their  population  and  because  of  the 
constant  emigration  from  country  to  town.  This 
industrial  development  compelled  them  in  turn  to 
extend  their  overseas  commerce  and  to  create  a 
gigantic  mercantile  marine.  Their  success  in  com- 
merce, which  cannot  be  over-emphasized,  seemed  to 
them  contingent  upon  the  security  of  their  mercantile 
marine  and  their  commercial  position  in  foreign 
markets.  That  security  was  to  be  assured  only  by  a 
strong  navy.  Inevitably  there  began  to  grow  up  also 
a  feeling  that  Germany's  political  position  in  the 
world  at  large  ought  to  be  extended  for  the  sake  of 
her  trade  interests.  If  she  was  to  maintain  her  rapidly 
developing  commercial  empire,  she  ought  to  win  for 
herself  political  influence  in  proportion  to  the  economic 
influence  that  she  held. 

This  sentiment,  which  towards  the  end  of  the  century 
began  to  crystallize  into  a  demand  for  a  sort  of 
political  world  empire,  comparable  to  the   German 

*3Rohrbach,  Die  Bagdadbdhn;  Cheradame,  Le  Chemin  de  Fer  de 
Bagdad;  Mazel,  Le  Chemin  de  Fer  de  Bagdad;  Reventlow,  Deutschlands 
auswartige  Politik,  33;  Rohrbach,  Deutschland  unter  den  WeltvolJcern, 
177.    See  infra,  chap.  IX. 


y 


\ 


88      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

commercial  world  empire,  was  thus  in  part  based  upon 
economic  factors,  Bnt  it  would  never  have  become 
of  vital  international  importance,  unless  it  also  found 
support  in  the  mental  and  moral  transformation  that 
was  coming  over  Germany.  The  nation  was  calling 
for  world  empire,  not  merely  in  the  interests  of  its 
commerce  and  industries,  but  also  because  it  was  filled 
with  a  vague  desire  for  power  in  general.  In  1900 
the  German  Government  definitely  made  plain  this 
new  aspect  of  Germany's  ambitions:  "We  shall  not 
let  ourselves  be  thrust  out  from  an  equality  with  other 
Powers.  We  shall  not  suffer  ourselves  to  be  denied 
the  right  to  speak  as  they  do  in  the  world.  There 
was  a  time  when  Germany  was  only  a  geographical 
expression,  when  she  was  denied  the  name  of  a  great 
Power.  Since  then,  we  have  become  a  great  Power; 
and  with  the  help  of  God,  we  hope  to  remain  so.  We 
shall  not  permit  the  abolition  or  limitation  of  our 
claim  to  a  world  policy  based  upon  reflection  and 
reason.''44  The  psychological  factors  which  lay  back 
of  this  new  world  policy  have  been,  perhaps,  of  even 
greater  importance  than  the  economic,  ,and  to  them 
must  be  ascribed  in  large  measure  the  new  status  of 
international  relations  which  characterized  the  first 
years  of  the  twentieth  century. 

4*  Cited  by  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  51. 


CHAPTER  V 
GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY:  MORAL  FACTORS 

The  industrial  and  commercial  transformation  of 
Germany  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  was 
obviously  of  enormous  importance  in  determining  the 
course  of  her  imperial  policy;  the  growth  of  her 
commerce  and  mercantile  mariitepupon  which  German 
industry  largely  depended,  led  naturally  to  a  demand 
for  the  creation  of  a  navy,  the  development  of  colonies, 
and  the  extension  of  political  influence  which  would 
ensure  the  control  of  markets ;  the  economic  interests 
of  the  Empire  must  necessarily  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration by  the  diplomats  of  Wilhelmstrasse. 

Of  equal  or  greater  importance  was  the  moral 
transformation  of  Germany:  the  gradual  assumption 
of  a  new  attitude  towards  her  neighbors  and  the 
growth  of  a_new_conception  of  the  role  that  Germany 
ought  to  play  in  the  world.  The  importance  of  this 
moral  transformation  it  is  almost  impossible  to  over- 
state; for  the  diplomatic  policy  of  Germany  during 
the  past  fifteen  years  has  resulted  not  merely  from 
economic  necessity,  or  what  the  nation  believed  to 
be  economic  necessity,  but  also  from  the  frame  of 
mind  characteristic  of  influential  Germans.  Nor  have 
the  fears  of  other  nations  been  aroused  by  the  economic 
success  of  the  Empire  so  much  as  by  the  new  tone 
that  she  assumed  in  her  international  relations. 

A    specific    definition    of    the    attitude    that    was 


w 


90      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  "WAR 

becoming  apparent  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century  can  hardly  be  formulated.1  It  differed  in 
different  parts  of  the  country  and  in  different  classes. 
It  varied  from  time  to  time  as  the  temper  of  an 
individual  varies.  The  more  aggressively  minded 
enthusiasts,  who  came  to  be  known  as  Pan-Germanists, 
laid  down  a  clear-cut  policy  of  acquiring  colonies,  or 
at  least  "spheres  of  influence,' '  in  Asia  or  Africa. 
Many  others  with  varying  degrees  of  intensity  merely 
demanded  that  Germany  should  develop  and  maintain 
political  influence  in  the  world  at  large  and  not  solely 
upon  the  Continent;  an  attitude  typified  by  the 
Kaiser's  remark  that  "nothing  must  go  on  anywhere 
in  the  world  in  which  Germany  does  not  play  a  part." 
With  not  a  few,  the  new  spirit  remained  simply  a 
frame  of  mind,  never  crystallizing  into  proposals 
designed  to  lead  to  a  specific  course  of  action. 

Even  this  frame  of  mind  was  by  no  means  uniform 
throughout  the   Empire.     There  were   those   whose 

V attitude  was  characterized  by  suprejne_co:iiteinpt  for 
the  nations  who  already  held  the  empire  of  the  world 
and  by  unwavering  belief  that  their  imperialism  was 
hollow  and  effete.     Others  were  chiefly  actuated  by 

^f ear :  the  fear  that  Germany  might  not  be  allowed 
to  keep  wnatshe  had  already  acquired,  and  that 
her  progress  would  be  ultimately  blocked.  Some 
clamored  for  war  at  the  first  opportune  moment;  a 
large  number,  on  the  other  hand,  trusted  that  the 
conflict  of  force  might  be  long  postponed. 

With  all,  however,  or  nearly  all,  there  came  to  exist 
a  sentiment  almost  unanimous,  that  Germany  should 
play  a  part  in  the  world  proportionate  to  her  wealth 
and  population:   Germany  was  a  great  nation  and 

i  Cf.  Kohrbach,  Deutschland  unter  den  Weltvolkern,  55. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  91 

must  be  acknowledged  as  such.  This  sentiment, 
furthermore,  was  accompanied  by  the  belief  that  the 
recognition  of  Germany  could  come  only  through  the 
exercise  of  force;  it  was  also  accompanied  by  the 
consciousness  of  military  strength  sufficient  to  support 
any  demands  she  might  make.  No  matter  how 
insistent  or  sincere  might  be  the  German  contention 
that  the  dictates  of  self-preservation  inspired  such  an 
attitude,  that  the  German  policy  was  one  of  self- 
defence,  the  German  frame  of  mind  was  becoming 
undeniably  aggressive  and  defiant  in  the  latter  years 
of  the  century.  It  was  then  that  the  effects  of  Prussian 
hegemony  in  Germany  began  to  be  realized,  and 
Prussian  policy  has  ever  been  characterized  by  a 
longing  for  expansion,  by  aggression,  and  by  trust  in 
force. 

This  longing  for  expansion  was,  perhaps,  first  made 
manifest  and  found  its  satisfaction  in  the  extraordi- 
nary industrial,  commercial,  and  mercantile  develop- 
ment that  followed  the  unification  of  Germany.  That 
development  resulted  largely  from  economic  causes, 
but  in  it  there  is  also  to  be  found  as  motive  force  the 
German  ambition  for  power.  The  demand  for  a  navy 
also  expressed  Germany's  ambition  for  greatness  in 
the  abstract,  and  the  warm  enthusiasm  of  the  nation 
which  supported  that  demand  did  not  proceed 
altogether  from  economic  causes.  It  is  true  that  the 
industrial  classes  desired  a  strong  navy  chiefly  for 
economic  reasons,  regarding  money  spent  on  arma- 
ments as  an  insurance  premium  paid  for  the  safe- 
guarding of  German  trade;  but  the  unhesitating 
support  given  to  the^nayal  policy  of  William  II  by 
the  influential  "Intellectuals"  was  based  on  broader 
grounds,  namely,  the  preservation  and  extension  of 


92      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Germany's  political  interests  in  the  world  at  large. 
The  conference  of  professors  and  representatives  of 
science  and  learning  which  listened  to  Dr.  Dernburg's 
presentation  of  his  imperialist  programme  in  January, 
1907,  made  plain  the  feeling  that  German  greatness 
must  find  an  expression  in  political  as  well  as 
economic  fields.  Their  formal  resolution  reads:  "A 
great  civilized  nation  like  the  German  nation  cannot 
permanently  restrict  itself  to  internal  politics,  but 
must  take  part  with  other  great  nations  in  colonial  and 
world  politics. '  ,2 

Even  the  Socialists,  despite  their  anti-militarist 
principles,  were  not  as  a  party  opposed  to  naval 
development,  and  it  is  a  significant  fact/ that  they  based 
their  attitude  primarily  upon  the  necessity  of  Ger- 
many's maintaining  her  political  prestige  amongst 
other  nations.  "It  cannot  be  expected  of  one's 
country,"  said  an  influential  Socialist,  "that  it  shall 
take  an  exceptional  position.  As  matters  are  to-day, 
the  prestige  of  a  State  abroad  depends  on  its  readiness 
for  war,  both  on  sea  and  land."3 

The  new  attitude  of  Germany  was.. shown  still 
more  clearly  lfTtheKaiser  's  speeche  s,  in  which  a 
different  note  was  constantly  struck  after  1895,  when 
the  economic  necessity  of  sea-power  began  to  be 
overshadowed  by  more  general  political  motives. 
"Imperial  power,"  he  said  in  1897,  "denotes  sea- 
power,  and  imperial  power  and  sea-power  are  com- 
plementary; the  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other."4 
Again  in  1900  he  spoke  more  plainly:  "The  wave- 
beat  knocks  powerfully  at  our  national  gates  and  calls 

2  Dawson,  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany,  352. 

s  Sozialistische  Monatshefte,  November,  1905. 

* '  *  Keichsgewalt  ist  Seegewalt  und  Seegewalt,  Eeichsgewalt. ' ' 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  93 

us  as  a  great  nation  to  maintain  our  place  in  the  world, 
in  other  words  to  follow  world  policy.  The  ocean  is 
indispensable  for  Germany's  greatness,  but  the  ocean 
also  reminds  us  that  neither  on  it  nor  across  it  in  the 
distance  can  any  great  decision  be  again  consummated 
without  Germany  and  the  German  Emperor.  It  is 
not  my  opinion  that  our  German  people  conquered  and 
bled  thirty  years  ago  under  the  leadership  of  their 
princes  in  order  to  be  pushed  on  one  side  when  great 
and  momentous  foreign  decisions  are  come  to.  Were 
that  so  there  would  once  for  all  be  an  end  of  the 
world  power  of  the  German  nation  and  I  am  not  going 
to  allow  that  to  happen.  To  use  the  fittest  and  if 
necessary  the  most  drastic  means  to  prevent  this  is 
not  only  my  duty  but  my  noblest  privilege. ' ,5 

Obviously  the  idea  that  was  in  the  Kaiser's  mind 
on  this  occasion  was  not  specially  connected  with 
commerce  or  industry.  The  ambition  for  sea-power 
wag"Msed  primarily  not  on  economic  motives,  but 
rather  on  the  belief  that  sea-power  was  to  be  the  path 
leading  Germany  to  an  ill-defined  but  very  actual 
position  of  political  influence  in  every  part  of  the 
world:  The  longing  for  expansion,  first  manifested 
in  the  field  of  commerce,  was  gradually  being  transl 
ferred  to  a  broader  field.  Germany  began  to  feel  that 
she  ought  to  exercise  an  influence  in  the  world 
politically,  commensurate  with  that  which  by  1900  she 
already  exercised  commercially.  The  strength  of  that 
sentiment  was  enforced  by  the  fear  that  unless  she 
secured  her  influence  in  the  world  at  large,  her  influence 
on  the  Continent,  possibly  her  national  existence, 
would  be  jeopardized. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  the 

5  Speech  at  Kiel,  July  5,  1900. 


94      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

feeling  that  Germany  must  win  all  in  order  to  preserve 
what  she  already  had  was  expressed  with  constantly 
increasing  emphasis.  A  widely  read  author  wrote  in 
1905:  "The  question  for  us  is  whether  we  shall 
devote  all  our  strength  in  the  determination  to  gain — 
or  more  truly  regain — for  ourselves  a  place  by  the 
side  of  those  nations  now  ahead  of  us;  whether  we 
shall  maintain  our  position  amongst  the  nations  by 
which  in  the  twentieth  century  and  later  world-history 
will  be  made,  or  shall  modestly  agree  to  take  second 
place  in  the  concert  of  world  policy.,,6  And  another 
writer,  a  few  years  later:  "Even  if  we  succeed  in 
guarding  our  possessions  in  the  East  and  West,  and 
in  preserving  the  German  nationality  in  its  present 
form  throughout  the  world,  we  shall  not  be  able  to 
maintain  our  present  position,  powerful  as  it  is,  in  the 
great  competition  with  the  other  Powers,  if  we  are 
contented  to  restrict  ourselves  to  our  present  sphere 
of  power,  while  the  surrounding  countries  are  busily 
extending  their  dominions.  If  we  wish  to  compete 
further  with  them,  a  policy  which  our  population  and 
our  civilization  both  entitle  and  compel  us  to  adopt, 
we  must  not  hold  back  in  the  hard  struggle  for  the 
sovereignty  of  the  world."7 

This  longing  for  expansion,  not  merely  economic  in 
its  bearing,  this  desire  for  world  prestige,  this  tone 
of  aggression  and  defiance  was  to  be  found  more  and 
more  generally  throughout  Germany  after  1900.    To 

8  Rohrbach,  Deutschland  unter  den  Weltvolkern,  149. 

7  Bernhardt,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  79.  Cf.  also  the  same 
writer  (Ibid.,  104):  "We  have  fought  in  the  last  great  wars  for  our 
national  union  and  our  position  among  the  Powers  of  Europe;  we  must 
now  decide  whether  we  wish  to  develop  into  and  maintain  a  World 
Empire  and  procure  for  German  spirit  and  German  ideas  that  fit 
recognition  that  has  hitherto  been  withheld  from  them. ' ' 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  95 

understand  it  we  must  take  cognizance  of  various 
characteristics  of  the  German,  and  especially  of  the 
Prussian,  mentality;  for  since  1870,  despite  her 
unpopularity  in  southern  Germany,  Prussia  has 
undoubtedly  exercised  a  moral  as  well  as  a  political 
domination. 

Foremost  among  the  characteristics  which  account 
in  some  degree  for  the  aspirations  that  began  to  take 
form  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  is  the  German's 
belief  in  the  destiny  of  his  country.  Since  the  days  of  J 
Charlemagne  he  has  been  convinced  that  to  him  fell 
the  mission  of  Rome  in  the  ancient  world :  the  spread- 
ing abroad  of  civilization  and  culture.  From  the  early 
nineteenth  century  the  idea  of  this  mission  has  taken 
constantly  stronger  hold  upon  the  German  mind. 
"Not  merely  Alsace  and  Lorraine,"  wrote  Heine, 
"but  all  France,  Europe,  and  the  whole  world  will  be 
ours.  Yes,  the  whole  world  will  be  German.  I  have 
often  thought  of  this  mission,  of  this  universal 
domination  of  Germany. ' ,8  "  Germany  has  a  particular 
task  clearly  indicated  by  Providence,"  wrote  von 
Meisendorf ;  ' l  she  must  pursue  the  accomplishment  of 
the  special  mission  which  falls  to  her  in  the  work 
of  civilization."9 

A  study  of  the  Kaiser's  speeches  leaves  no  doubt 
that  he  was  penetrated  with  the  idea  of  the  German 
mission.  Witness  his  famous  speech  at  the  Saalburg 
Museum  in  1900:  "I  hope  that  it  will  be  granted  to 
our  German  Fatherland  to  become  in  the  future  as 
closely  united,  as  powerful,  and  as  authoritative  as 
once  the  Eoman  world  empire  was,  and  that  just  as 
in  old  times  they  said,  Civis  romanus  sum,  one  may 

s  Liehtenberger,  Henri  Heine,  227. 

9  Von  Meisendorf,  La  France  sous  les  Armes  (French  translation),  12. 


96      DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

in  the  future  need  only  to  say,  Ich  bin  ein  deutscher 
Burger."10  A  few  years  later  at  Bremen  he  said: 
"God  has  called  us  to  civilize  the  world:  we  are  the 
missionaries  of  human  progress.' '  Shortly  after- 
wards, again :  ' l  The  German  people  will  be  the  block 
of  granite  on  which  our  Lord  will  be  able  to  elevate 
and  achieve  the  civilization  of  the  world."11  Nor  in 
the  German  literature  produced  by  the  war  has  there 
been  any  lack  of  similar  expressions  indicating  the 
sincerity  with  which  this  tenet  of  German  jfoatlt  was 
held. 
^  /  Belief  in  the  existence  and  necessity  of  Germany's 

/  civilizing  mission  was  reinforced  by  the  conviction, 
|  (    by  no   means   universal   but   widely   held,   that   the 

\  German  race  was  different  and  on  the  whole  superior 
\to--all  others.  Giesebrecht  wrote:  "Domination 
belongs  to  Germany  because  it  is  a  superior  nation, 
a  noble  race,  and  it  is  fitting  that  it  should  control  its 
neighbors,  just  as  it  is  the  right  and  duty  of  every 
individual  endowed  with  superior  intellect  and  force 
to  control  inferior  individuals  about  him. ' m  "  We  are 
the  superior  race  in  the  fields  of  science  and  of  art; 
we  are  the  best  colonists,  the  best  sailors,  the  best 
merchants."13  Nor  is  it  difficult  to  discover  in  the 
language  of  the  Kaiser  the  belief  that  the  spirit  of 
Germanism  was  destined  to  dominate  the  world 
because  of  the  superiority  of  the  German  nature. 
"Far  away  over  the  sea,"  he  said  in  1902,  "our  speech 
is  spreading  and  far  away  flows  the  stream  of  our 

10  Speech  at  Imperial  Limes  Museum,  Saalburg,  October  11,  1900. 

11  Speeches  at  Bremen,  March  22,  1905,  and  at  Miinster,  September 
1,  1907. 

12  Zeller,  Origines  de  I  'Allemagne,  27. 
is  Bley,  La  Situation  mondiale  du  Germanisme,  21. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  97 

knowledge  and  research.  There  is  no  work  in  the 
realm  of  later  research  which  is  not  written  in  onr 
language  and  no  thought  is  born  of  science  which  is 
not  first  utilized  by  us  in  order  later  to  be  taken  over 
by  other  nations. ■ ,14 

Educators  and  scientific  writers  did  not  fail  to 
impress^theldea  of  German  superiority  upon  the  youth 
ana  the  masses  ot  tne  nation.  fJ?he  anthropologist 
Woltmann  wrote  that  "the  German  is  the  superior 
type  of  the  homo  sapiens,  from  the  physical  as  well 
as  the  intellectual  point  of  view. ' '  Hartmann  taught 
that  the  European  family  is  divided  into  two  races, 
male  and  female,  of  which  the  first  was  of  course 
exclusively  German,  while  the  second  included  Latins, 
Celts,  and  Slavs.  Text-booJcsjisedjiLSchools  asserted 
that  the  beat  and  strongest  elements  of  all  European 
races  are_German;  Frenchmen  are  monkeys,  and 
Russians  are  slaves,  as  is  shown  by  their  name.15 
"The  proud  conviction  forces  itself  with  irresistible 
power  upon  us,"  said  Bernhardi,  "that  a  high  if  not 
the  highest  importance  for  the  entire  development  of 
the  human  race  is  ascribable  to  this  German  people. ' ,16 

Doubtless  similar  quotations  could  be  extracted 
from  the  literature  of  other  nations  illustrating  their 
belief  in  their  own  superiority.  But  in  no  other 
nation  has  there  been  such  a  mass  of  literature  on  this 
point  as  in  Germany  during  the  past  fifteen  years. 
It  is  a  fact  that  belief JLn-JJie-Jiiission^of  the  Germans, 
as  a  superioTTFac^pW-ciyilize  the  world,  was  held  by 
a  large  number  of  the  influential  classes  and  without 

«  Speech  at  Aix,  June  19,  1902. 

is  Andrillon,  L 'Expansion  de  I'Allemagne,  13;  Gibbons,  The  New 
Map  of  Europe,  29-30. 

is  Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  72. 


/ 

DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

question  pervaded  all  classes  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  What  rendered  this  belief  significant  was  the 
complementary  belief  that  to  carry  out  the  mission, 
the  political  empire  of  the  world  must  be  German. 
In  the  interests  of  humanity  the  German  dream  of 
world  empire, must  materialize;  it^j^as.  a  moral 
respQnsibility  laid  upon  Germany :  ' '  The  dominion  of 
German  thought  can  only  be  extended  under  the  aegis 
of  political  power,  and  unless  we  act  in  conformity 
to  this  idea,  we  shall  be  untrue  to  our  great  duties 
towards  the  human  race. ' m 

ThatGermany  had  the  right  to  carry  out  her  mission 
evenif  it  mvolyed  the  use  ofT)ruteJorce,  was  never 
doubtedr-o^L-qnestioned.  Many  were  prepared  to  wait 
and  had  no  wish  to  precipitate  a  conflict  for  world 
empire  that  might  be  long  avoided:  the  security  of 
peace,  the  desire  for  wealth,  the  fear  of  disaster, 
tempered  their  ambition.  But  by  many  others,  whose 
influence  constantly  increased  after  1900,  preparation 
for  the  struggle  was  felt  to  be  the  most  important 
duty  of  the  German  Government.  "We  must  under- 
stand,' '  said  von  der  Goltz,  "and  make  the  youth  of 
our  generation  understand  that  the  time  for  repose 
has  not  yet  come,  that  the  prediction  of  a  final  struggle 
to  assure  the  existence  and  grandeur  of  Germany  is 
not  a  mere  fancy  born  in  the  minds  of  ambitious  fools, 
but  that  it  will  come  one  day  inevitably,  violent  and 
serious  as  is  every  decisive  struggle  between  peoples 
of  whom  the  one*  desires  to  have  its  superiority  over 
the  others  definitely  recognized. ' ,18 

if  Bernhardi,  op.  cit.,  77. 

is  Von  der  Goltz,  La  Nation  armee  (French  translation),  458.  See 
also  Bernhardi  (op.  cit.,  84,  103):  "We  must  be  quite  clear  on  this 
point  that  no  nation  has  had  to  reckon  with  the  same  difficulties  and 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  99 

Often  unconsciously,  but  none  the  less  inevitably, 
the  attitude— of  the  German  nation  was  becoming 
belligerent.  World  sovereignty  of  some  kind  or 
another  was  felt  to  be  desirable  not  only  on  economic 
but  also  on  moral  grounds ;  it  was  to  be  won  by  force 
alone;  it  should  be  the  State's  first  care  to  make 
Germany  powerful  enough  so  that  she  might  inaugu- 
rate the  conflict  at  the  opportune  moment  when  victory 
would  be  certain. 

Such  sentiments  were  natural  to  Prussians,  who 
have  been  men  of  war  since  the  beginning  of  their 
history.  They  were  enforced  by  the  lessons  of  the 
past :  in  no  country  has  military  strength  or  weakness 
played  so  important  a  part  in  determining  national 
history  as  in  Prussia.  It  was  through  brute  force  that 
Prussia  was  first  built  up  in  the  days  of  the  Great 
Elector  and  Frederick  the  Great;  to  her  military 
weakness  Prussia  owed  her  bitter  humiliation  by 
Napoleon  in  1807 ;  to  her  military  force  again,  in  the 
time  of  Bismarck,  both  Prussia  and  Germany  owed 
their  glory,  and,  as  Germans  believed,  their  subsequent 
prosperity. 

Belief  in  the^ece^sil^and-jnarality  of  the  use  of 
force  was  also  fostered  by  the  universities  and  found 
invariable  support  in  i  intellectuaT^circlesL  ItTs  easy  / 
to  exaggerate  the  inmience~6rThe  professors,  and  it 
is  by  no  means  exact  to  state  that  they  were  of  them- 
selves responsible  for  the  sentiment,  always  existing 
in  Germany  and  latterly  increasing,  which  favored  the 

hostility  as  ours.  .  .  .  What  we  now  wish  to  attain  must  be  fought  for 
and  won  against  a  superior  force  of  hostile  interests  and  Powers.  .  .  . 
Since  the  struggle  is,  as  appears  on  a  thorough  investigation  of  the 
international  question,  necessary  and  inevitable,  we  must  fight  it  out, 
cost  what  it  may." 


100    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

exercise  of  force.  Their  teachings,  however,  repro- 
duced, in  general^  the  emotions  and  desires  of  the 
masses,  and  in  the  case  of  certain  notable  individuals 
undoubtedly  <Iid  much  to  mould  and  create  opinion. 
The  significance  of  university  sentiment  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  minimized,  for  the  great  German  universities 
occupy  a  peculiar  position,  not  dissimilar  to  that  of 
the  press  in  other  nations:  they  mirror  and  they 
influence  the  thoughts  of  the  masses.19 

Whether  regarded  as  an  index  or  a  cause,  the  teach- 
ings of  the  German  professors  have  been  characterized 
by  their  advocacy  of  force,  and  by  their  insistence  that 
Germany  could  fulfil  her  destiny  only  by  the  use  of 
force  exerted  at  the  proper  moment.  The  motives 
underlying  their  doctrines  differed.  Some  of  the 
professors  argued  from  historical  premises  and  in 
admiration  of  the  success  of  Great  Britain,  which  they 
regarded  as  the  model  Power.  The  arguments  of 
others  were  philosophical  in  their  character,  and  many 
of  them  were  distinguished  by  contempt  for  the 
British  Empire,  which  was  supposed  to  have  resulted 
from  blind  fortune  and  trickery  and  therefore  to  be 
deserving  neither  of  admiration  nor  fear. 

The  economic  school  of  German  professors  based 

their    arguments    in    favor    of    force    largely    upon 

^examples    drawn    from    the    past.      Almost    without 

exception  they  taught  that  history  proves  definitely 

that  physical  might  and  its   exercise   at  opportune 

\moments  is  essential  to  material  well  being.     In  the 

lo  Cf.  Emery,  "German  Economics  and  the  War,"  Tale  Review, 
January,  1915,  248.  Andrillon  (L'Expansion  de  I'Allemagne,  52) 
points  out  that  Nietzsche  simply  condensed  in  his  system  doctrines 
already  understood  and  practised  by  statesmen:  a  decade  before  his 
writings  appeared,  his  ideas  were  diffused  about  him  by  the  actions 
of  Bismarck. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  Iftl 

government  of  states,  facts  must  be  faced;  as 
Schmoller  taught,  a  nation  must  be  either  "hammer 
or  anvil,"  and  it  behooved  the  Government  to  see 
that  the  nation  it  ruled  was  not  anvil.  The  professors 
did  not  attempt  to  justify  the  exercise  of  brute  force 
nor  did  they  contend  that  it  was  morally  right.  But 
they  felt  that  it  was  useless  to  blink  the  "regrettable 
fact  that  in  the  history  of  the  world  too  often  moral 
ideas  have  been  sacrificed  to  material  advantage,  and 
that  right  has  been  sacrificed  to  might.  Since  this  is 
the  brutal  lesson  of  history,  Germany,  to  survive,  must 
meet  the  regrettable  fact  by  action,  not  words.,,2° 

The  economic  prosperity  that  had  resulted  to  Ger- 
many from  the  well-planned  use  of  brute  force  by 
Bismarck  was  patent  to  everyone,  and  served  to  give 
point  to  the  doctrines  of  the  German  economists. 
Looking  abroad  they  contended  that  the  greatness  of 
England  came  from  her  exercise  of  force  at  the 
psychological  moment.  If  Germany  was  to  meet  Eng- 
land successfully  in  the  future,  she  must  take  a  leaf 
from  the  English  book  and  fight  her  with  her  own 
weapons.21  German  commerce  must  be  carried  every- 
where, said  Voigt,  "under  the  protection  of  German  - 
cannon. ' ,22 

20  Emery,  German  Economics  and  the  War,  258.  See  the  contributions 
of  German  economists  to  Bandels-  und  Machtpolitilc,  1900.  These  essays 
"are  in  a  sense  a  manifesto  of  the  general  school  which  believes  that 
the  economic  prosperity  of  Germany  and  the  actual  daily  comfort  of 
her  people  depends  upon  the  capacity  of  maintaining  by  force  of  arms 
the  commerce  of  Germany  both  at  home  and  in  other  parts  of  the 
world. ' ' 

21  « ' We  have  had  frequent  occasions  to  mention  English  ways  as 
the  pattern  we  should  follow  and  ...  we  should  not  shrink  from  going 
to  school  to  England/ '  Eohrbach,  German  World  Policies,  205. 

22  Emery,  op.  cit.,  261.  Cf.  Seeley's  remark,  "Commerce  leads  to 
war  and  war  nourishes  commerce." 


102    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

With  equal  intensity  the  philosophic  historians 
preached  the  necessity  of  force,  although  they  based 
their  teachings  upon  different  grounds.  Foremost 
amongst  the  professors  who  have  influenced  German 
opinion  in  this  respect  stood  Heinrich  von  Treitschke. 
Unlike  Nietzsche,  who  preached  force  as  a  virtue  in 
itself,  as  the  sublime  virtue  leading  to  the  annihilation 
of  the  weak  and  the  ultimate  creation  of  the  superman, 
Treitschke  never  advocated  force  as  an  end  in  itself. 
The  State  must  be  guided  by  what  is  right  and  must 
always  follow  duty  in  its  highest  sense.  "The  State 
is  not  physical  power  as  an  end  in  itself,  it  is  power 
to  protect  and  promote  the  higher  interests.' '  Like 
Kant,  Treitschke  believed  that  duty  was  supreme  over 
all  " interests,' '  and  that  the  State  and  commonwealth 
of  States  must  be  pervaded  by  the  sense  of  law.23 
/  But  while  for  the  individual  the  highest  duty  is 
/self-sacrifice,  for  the  State  the  first  duty  is  self- 
/  preservation;  hence  the  necessity  of  power  and  force 
\  for  the  State.-4  "Its  highest  moral  duty  is  to  increase 
its  power.  The  individual  must  sacrifice  himself  for 
the  higher  community  of  which  he  is  a  member;  but 
the  State  is  the  highest  conception  in  the  wider 
community  of  men,  and  therefore  the  duty  of  self- 
annihilation  does  not  enter  into  the  case.  The 
Christian  duty  of  sacrifice  for  something  higher 
does  not  exist  for  the  State,  since  there  is  nothing 
higher  than  it  in  the  world's  history;  consequently 
it  cannot  sacrifice  itself  to  something  higher."25 
Since  the  State  is  supreme  and  what  is  right  for  it 

23  Treitschke,  Politik,  i,  $  3.     Cf.  Hadley,  "The  Political  Teachings 
of  Treitschke, ' '  Yale  Beview,  January,  1915,  242. 

24  Ernest  Barker,  Nietzsche  and  Treitschke,  18. 

25  Treitschke,  Politik,  ii,  $  31. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  103 

is  determined  by  its  interests,  any  self -limitation  that 
it  may  have  placed  upon  itself  is  purely  voluntary, 
and  may  be  repudiated  when  the  State  considers  it 
best.  International  treaties*  need  not  be  kept  and 
international  law  loses  its  stability.  In  the  last 
instance,  questions  can  only  be  settled  by  the  sword; 
in  the  performance  of  what  it  conceives  to  be  right 
the  State  must  be  prepared  to  carry  out  its  duty  with 
all  possible  force.  "When  a  State  sees  its  downfall 
staring  it  in  the  face,  we  applaud  if  it  succumbs 
sword  in  hand.  A  sacrifice  made  to  an  alien  nation 
is  not  only  immoral,  but  contradicts  the  idea  of  self- 
preservation  which  is  the  highest  ideal  of  a  State.' ' 
And  again:  "Among  all  political  sins,  the  sin  of 
feebleness  is  the  most  contemptible ;  it  is  the  political 
sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost. ' ,28 

We  are  less  concerned  with  Treitschke 's  philosophy 
than  with  the  way  in  which  it  affected  the  German 
nation.  His  audience  was  enormous  and  among  certain 
classes,  not  the  least  influential,  his  ideas  were 
accepted  without  question.  But  the  nuances  of  his 
philosophy  disappeared,  as  his  doctrines  were  absorbed 
by  the  masses,  and  there  remained  only  the  idea  most 
easily  caught  by  the  popular  intelligence,  namely  that 
the  be-all  and  end-all  of  a  State  is  power,  and  that 
"he  who  is  not  man  enough  to  look  this  truth  in  the 
face  should  not  meddle  in  politics. ' ,2T  Those  who 
already  believed  in  the  necessity  and  political  value 
of  war  were  not  sorry  to  find  what  seemed  to  them  a 
philosophic  defence  of  the  State's  exercise  of  force 
through  war. 

The  argument  that  war  is  anJnstrumjBnt  of  blessing 


26  Treitschke,  op.  tit.,  i,  $  3 ;  ii,  $  31. 

27  Treitschke,  op.  tit.,  ii,  $  28. 


I 


104    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

found  ready  acceptance  in  Germany,  the  more  readily 
since  it  was  not  entirely  new.  Some  years  before, 
Moltke  had  said  without  arousing  criticism:  "Per- 
manent peace  is  a  dream  and  not  even  a  beautiful  one. 
But  war  is  an  essential  element  of  God's  scheme  for 
the  world."28  And  so  far  back  as  the  sixteenth 
century,  Luther  had  said:  "It  is  very  true  that  men 
write  and  say  often  how  great  a  curse  war  is.  But 
they  ought  to  consider  how  much  greater  is  that  curse 
which  is  averted  by  war.  Briefly  in  the  business  of 
war,  men  must  not  regard  the  massacres,  the  burnings, 
the  battles,  the  marches,  etc. — that  is  what  the  petty 
and  simple  do,  who  only  look  with  the  eyes  of  children 
at  the  surgeon,  how  he  cuts  off  the  hand  or  saws  off 
the  leg,  but  do  not  see  or  notice  that  he  does  it  in  order 
to  save  the  whole  body.  Thus  we  must  look  at  the 
business  of  war  or  the  sword  with  the  eyes  of  men, 
asking,  Why  these  murders  and  horrors?  It  will  be 
shown  that  it  is  a  business,  divine  in  itself,  and  as 
needful  and  as  necessary  to  the  world  as  eating  or 
drinking,  or  any  other  work."  And  Treitschke  him- 
self summarized  the  matter  by  saying,  "God  will  see 
to  it  that  war  always  recurs  as  a  drastic  medicine  for 
the  human  race."29 

The  doctrine  of  the  beauty  and  grandeur  of  war  was 
naturally  taken  up  by  a  host  of  smaller  writers,  who 
found  ready  auditors ;  for  this  spirit  has  always  lived 
in  Germany.    "It  echoes  the  vigor  of  Norse  sea-king 

28  Letter  to  Bluntschli,  cited  by  Andrillon,  L'Expansion  de  I'Alle- 
magne,  24.  Cf.  Moltke 's  speeches  in  the  Reichstag  of  February  16, 
1874,  and  January  11,  1887;  also  Bismarck's  remark  (Matter,  Bismarck 
et  son  Temps,  i,  160):  "It  is  not  by  discussions  that  we  can  decide: 
sooner  or  later  the  God  of  battles  determines." 

29  Luther,  Whether  Soldiers  can  be  in  a  State  of  Salvation,  cited  by 
Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  55. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  105 

and  Teutonic  champion,  of  Siegfried  and  Arminius. 
It  is  instinct  with  the  rude  heroism  of  the  Nibelung, 
the  strength  and  cunning  which  enabled  the  early- 
heroes  to  overcome  their  foes  ...  It  is  Heldenthwn, 
the  spirit  of  war  and  adventure,  of  triumph  through 
danger,  conflict,  and  suffering. ' ,30  Bernhardi  was  only 
reflecting  ideas  that  had  for  many  years  inspired  a 
large  part  of  the  German  nation,  when  he  wrote: 
"The  inevitableness,  the  idealism,  and  the  blessing  of 
war,  as  an  indispensable  and  stimulating  law  of 
development,  must  be  repeatedly  emphasized.  The 
apostles  of  the  peace  idea  must  be  confronted  with 
Goethe's  manly jscords: 

*  Dreams  of  a  peaceful  day? 
Let  him  dream  who  may. 
"War  is  our  rallying  cry, 
Onward  to  victory. '  "31 

These  various  elements  in  the  German,  and  espe- 
cially the  Prussian,  mentality,  which  we  have  briefly 
considered,  help  to  explain  the  German  attitude 
towards  international  affairs  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth  century.  The  sense  of  their  own  superiority 
over  other  nations  and  of  their  world-civilizing  mis- 
sion impelled  them  to  an  ambition^for  world _empire. 
The  Ionfflng^Fexrjansion~was  gradually  transferred 
from  the  economicto  the_brpader  political  field. 
Germans~were~aTso^  acutely  conscious  of  the  necessity 
of  force  if^her^^^py^nT^^T  world  empire,  and 
they  were  largely  convinced  of  therighteousness_and 

so  Abbott,  "Germany  and  the  Prussian  Propaganda, ' '  Yale  Beview, 
July,  1915,  666. 

si  Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  37. 


106    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

beauty  of  the  use  of  force.  Inevitably  the  attitude 
of  the  nation  began  to  assume  an  aggressive  and  at 
the  same  time  a  defiant  character :  aggressive,  because 
with  some,  confidence  in  German  strength  and  in  the 
weakness  of  her  enemies  predominated ;  defiant,  since 
with  others,  there  existed  the  anxiety  that  Germany 
might  not  be  allowed  by  the  other  nations  to  fulfil  her 
dream. 

Without  question  Germany  had  a  right  to  have 
supreme  confidence  in  her  physical  strength.  The 
military  force  of  Prussia  was  undeniable;  whenever 
capably  organized  her  armies  have  never  been  excelled 
and  their  success  in  war  has  been  unbroken.  In  the 
latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  few  questioned 
the  worth  of  the  German  army,  and  its  organization 
was  the  model  for  the  world.  In  case  of  war  Germany 
could  draw  upon  a  human  supply  far  richer  than 
could  be  found  in  France  or  England.  In  numbers, 
morale,  and  equipment  she  was  inconte stably  supreme 
on  land;  and  her  power  on  sea  threatened  to  become 
a  factor  of  vital  importance.  Furthermore,  there 
existed  not  merely  this  consciousness  of  strength,  but 
a  "consciousness  of  virtue — the  consciousness  of 
possessing  a  particular  group  of  war-like  virtues, 
the  stern  self-discipline,  the  thrift,  the  persistence 
and  self-devotion,  which  had  raised  Prussia  in  spite 
of  her  poor  and  barren  soil  to  be  the  foremost  of 
German  states,  and  which  .  .  .  had  animated  the 
German  army  in  the  great  war  of  liberation  from  the 
Napoleonic  tyranny."32  Such  virtues,  according  to 
the  Germans,  were  peculiar  to  their  own  race  and  had 
never  been  displayed  by  any  of  their  enemies. 

To  such  general  confidence  in  German  strength  was 

82  Sanday,  The  Deeper  Causes  of  the  War,  9. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  107 

added  in  many  quarters  the  belief  in  the  essential 
weakness  of  theT>oweTs~^whicir  threatened  to  block 
German_expansion.  France  was  decadent  and  effete, 
hopelessly  pacific,  inspired  by  the  lowest  ideals. 
Russia  was  a  giant,  but  a  giant  that  did  not  know  his 
own  strength  nor  how  to  use  it.  The  day  of  English 
greatness  had  passed  and  Germany  need  not  fear  to 
measure  swords  with  her  whenever  the  opportune 
moment  arrived.  British  strength  in  the  past  was 
due  in  large  part  to  the  weakness  of  her  rivals  and 
to  the  fortune  of  history:  "It  is  not  genius,  it  is  not 
valor,  it  is  not  even  great  policy,  as  in  the  case  of 
Venice,  which  has  built  up  the  British  Empire;  but 
the  hazard  of  her  geographical  situation,  the  supine- 
ness  of  other  nations,  the  measureless  duplicity  of  her 
ministers,  and  the  natural  and  innate  hypocrisy  of 
the  nation  as  a  whole.  These  have  let  this  monstrous 
empire  grow — a  colossus  with  feet  of  clay."33 

When  the  British  Empire  should  be  put  to  the  test 
by  Germany,  so  many  Germans  believed,  it  would  fall 
to  pieces.  Already  the  native  races  in  the  Moslem 
colonies  were  on  the  point  of  revolt;  the  bond  that 
held  Australia  and  Canada  to  the  mother  country  was 
one  of  sentiment  and  could  not  stand  the  force  of 
material  circumstances.  The  home  government  was 
hopelessly  unfitted  by  its  liberal  and  parliamentary 
principles  for  the  control  of  an  over-seas  empire,  and 
whatever  governing  qualities  England  had  ever 
possessed  had  vanished  in  the  era  of  peace  and 
prosperity  that  had  demoralized  the  whole  nation. 
*  '  Britain  's  world  predominance  is  out  of  all  proportion 
to  Britain's  real  strength  and  to  her  worth  and  value, 
whatever  that  worth  be  considered  in  the  political, 

33Cramb  (paraphrasing  Treitschke),  Germany  and  England,  94. 


108    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  intellectual,  or  the  moral  sphere. f '  Her  dominion 
was  based  on  a  myth  and  the  first  conflict  with  a  Power 
willing  to  meet  her  would  pitifully  reveal  her  fatal 
weakness.34 

But  while  such  conviction  of  the  weakness  of  the 
opposing  nations  filled  the  minds  of  many  Germans 
'  and  gave  to  their  tone  that  timbre  of  confident 
aggression  which  we  have  noticed,  in  other  quarters 
the  German  attitude  was  not  untinged  with  fear.  Not 
a  few  were  unable  to  rid  themselves  of  the  feeling  that 
there  was  a  special  Providence  that  looked  after  the 
affairs  of  England;  and  their  study  of  history  filled 
them  with  a  respect  for  the  success  of  British  methods.35 
They  feared  lest  Germany  should  find  her  path  blocked 
in  the  expansion  of  her  commerce  and  development 
of  her  marine  and  navy,  lest  the  necessary  markets 
should  be  closed  to  them.36    More  generally  they  feared 

34  Usher,  Pan-Germanism,  19-36;  Cramb,  Germany  and  England,  93. 
Cf.  Eohrbach,  Deutschland  unter  den  WeltvolTcern,  67-164;  and  the  secret 
report  of  a  German  agent  dated  at  Berlin,  March  19,  1913,  published  in 
the  French  Yellow  Book,  1914,  no.  2:  "If  the  enemy  attacks  us,  or  if 
we  wish  to  overcome  him,  we  will  act  as  our  brothers  did  a  hundred 
years  ago;  the  eagle  thus  provoked  will  soar  in  his  flight,  will  seize  the 
enemy  in  his  steel  claws  and  render  him  harmless.  We  will  then 
remember  that  the  provinces  of  the  ancient  German  Empire,  the  County 
of  Burgundy  and  a  large  part  of  Lorraine  are  still  in  the  hands  of  the 
French;  that  thousands  of  brother  Germans  in  the  Baltic  provinces  are 
groaning  under  the  Slav  yoke." 

35  * *  The  English  empire  as  the  creation  of  the  English  idea  ...  is 
a  thing  of  such  grandeur  that  one  cannot  speak  of  it  except  with 
admiration, ' '  Eohrbach,  German  World  Policies,  59. 

36  Emery  {German  Economics  and  the  War,  249  sq.)  discusses  the 
profound  dread  that  obtained  in  certain  quarters  in  Germany,  that  the 
future  of  Germany  was  gravely  endangered,  and  the  feeling  that  every 
effort  must  be  made  to  anticipate  a  final  test.  He  describes  Sering's 
opinion  that  Germany  would  fall  to  a  subordinate  position  but  only 
after  the  most  strenuous  exertions  on  her  part  and  probably  after  a 
titanic  conflict  fought  to  prevent  herself  from  being  crushed. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  109 

lest  the  German  nationality  scattered  over  the  world 
should  he  definitely  lost  to  the  Fatherland,  and  finally 
lest  the  Te^toa]ic^^lementJn  Europe  itself  should  be 
unable  to  resist-tha^Slavonic  advance.37 

Such  fears,  coupled,  with  the  belief  in  the  inevitable- 
ness  of  the  approaching  conflict,  gave  to  the  tone  of 
many  Germans  a  certain  ring  of  defiance.38  It  was  the 
attitude  of  the  man  with  his  back  to  the  wall,  contending 
against  odds,  but  thoroughly  armed  and  determined  \| 
to  resist  to  the  last.  Paradoxically,  the  two  opposing 
elements  oiconMerrcjr^ 

in  Germany  the  tone  of  belligerence,  jwhich  has  been 
manifested  during  the  past  fifteen  years. 

This  attitude  was  not  of  a  year's  growth  and  was 

37  The  fear  of  the  Slav  appears  clearly  in  the  pamphlet,  Truth  about 
Germany,  1914,  authorized  by  the  most  distinguished  intellectual  figures 
of  Germany;  it  is  also  discussed  sympathetically  by  J.  W.  Burgess  in 
a  letter  to  the  Springfield  Republican,  dated  August  17,  1914. 

88  Curiously  enough  this  rather  defiant  tone  is  characteristic  of  per- 
sons who,  because  of  their  fear  of  a  conflict,  were  certainly  sincere  in 
their  desire  for  peace.  "Not  only  our  goods,' '  said  Rohrbach,  "but 
also  our  national  existence  and  the  future  of  our  national  idea  in  the 
world  are  at  stake  when  our  defences  by  land  and  sea  are  insufficient 
to  make  our  opponents  look  on  an  attack  upon  us  as  too  great  a  risk. 
It  does  not  occur  to  us  to  deny  the  superiority  of  the  English  fleet,  and 
if  the  English  people  want  very  much  to  use  the  word  '  supremacy ' 
rather  than  'superiority*  they  are  welcome  to  do  so.  But  when  they 
interpret  their  supremacy  to  mean  that  our  interests  shall  yield  to 
theirs  everywhere  in  the  world,  they  compel  us  to  fight  with  them  for 
our  future,  that  is  to  say  for  our  national  existence.  If  they  wish  to 
prescribe  to  us  how  far  we  may  go  in  the  world  to  spread  our  ideas, 
we  should  be  fools  and  cowards  if  we  were  to  acknowledge  this  foreign 
command  as  binding,  without  recourse  to  arms, ' '  German  World  Policies, 
188;  see  also  Ibid.,  195,  196.  And  von  Biilow  (Speech  in  the  Reichstag, 
November  15,  1906):  "A  policy  which  aimed  at  encircling  Germany 
in  order  to  isolate  us  and  paralyze  us  would  be  very  dangerous  for  peace. 
The  formation  of  such  a  ring  is  not  possible  unless  pressure  is  exercised; 
pressure  creates  counter-pressure;  pressure  and  counter-pressure  may 
easily  produce  explosions. '  ■ 


110    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

definitely  influenced  and  accentuated  by  the  opposing 
attitude  of  the  other  nations,  in  particular,  after  1905, 
of  Great  Britain.  There  was  comparatively  little  of 
it  during  the  Bismarck  regime,  except  in  certain 
cliques.  During  the  early  years  of  the  present  Kaiser 's 
reign  and  concurrently  with  the  growth  and  success 
of  German  world  commerce,  it  began  to  develop.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  it  had  become 
so  general  as  to  be  almost  characteristic  of  the  German 
nation.  But  it  was  only  during  the  two  or  three  years 
that  preceded  the  war  that  the  aggressive  and  defiant 
attitude  of  Germany  became  definitely  marked,  largely 
in  reaction  to  what  she  believed  to  be  the  hostile 
designs  of  her  enemies. 

Nor,  as  we  have  seen,  was  this  attitude  invariably 
translated  into  a  definite  scheme  of  policy,  notwith- 
standing the  term  " world  policy' '  generally  applied 
to  it.  The  more  aggressive  certainly  insisted  upon 
the  necessity  of  seizing  colonies.  This  was  their 
interpretation  of  the  policy  of  obtaining  a  "  place  in 
the  sun. ' '  The  rapid  growth  of  Pan-German  societies 
continued  and  their  conferences  discussed  the  possi- 
bility of  reclaiming  and  absorbing  the  Teutonic 
elements  in  the  countries  bordering  the  German 
Empire :  Holland,  Switzerland,  and  Poland.  Develop- 
ment of  German  enterprise  in  Africa  was  encouraged 
and  the  expansion  of  German  influence  in  Mesopotamia 
was  sedulously  cared  for.89 

But  on  the  whole  " world  policy' '  remained  a  rather 

39  For  the  aims  of  Pan-Germanists,  see  Class  (ed.),  Zwanzig  Jahre 
alldeutscher  Arbeit  und  Kampfe  (Leipsic,  1910).  This  is  a  collection 
of  reports,  addresses,  and  papers  delivered  at  meetings  of  the  Pan- 
Germanist  Society.  See  also,  Andrillon,  L'Expansion  de  I'Allemagne, 
80  sq.,  204-236. 


GERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  111 

indefinite  expression.  As  understood  by  the  indi- 
viduals and  classes  which  controlled  the  diplomatic 
actions  of  Germany,  it  meant  simply  the  development 
of  the  fleet,  the  protection  of  commerce,  and  the 
preservation  of  free  access  to  all  markets,  accompanied 
by  the  demand  that  Germany's  right  to  a  share  in  the 
settlement  of  all  questions  be  universally  acknowl- 
edged.40 It  was  believed  by  such  classes  that  Ger- 
many's development  could  best  be  maintained  by 
preserving  peace,  at  least  for  the  present,  always 
provided  that  the  prestige  of  Germany  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe  remained  undimmed. 

The  pacific  attitude  of  the  Government,  which 
continued  until  1905,  was  often  assailed  by  the  Pan- 
Germanists  with  violence,  and  at  times  by  the  com- 
mercial classes.  But  it  was  insisted  upon  as  a 
necessity  to  German  success  by  influential  diplomats, 
such  as  von  Btilow,  and  by  the  Kaiser  himself.41 
"Only  so  long  as  peace  reigns,"  said  the  latter,  "are 
we  at  liberty  to  bestow  our  earnest  thoughts  upon  the 
great  problems  the  solution  of  which  in  fairness  and 
equity  I  consider  the  most  prominent  duty  of  our 

40' 'England  herself  offers  the  instance  of  a  country  much  more 
densely  populated  than  Germany,  with  insignificant  numbers  of  emigrants 
and  enjoying  the  acme  of  economic  prosperity  and  political  power 
because  it  is  able  to  provide  its  people  with  safe  access  to  the  markets 
of  the  world.  This  and  nothing  else  is  what  we  need.  If  we  can  have 
a  navy  which  will  keep  our  commerce  from  destruction  we  have  no  need 
of  an  outlet  for  our  population  either  now  or  in  the  immediate 
future.  .  .  .  The  policy  of  the  German  idea  in  the  world  does  not 
contemplate,  according  to  our  view,  any  conquest  or  violence.  .  .  .  We 
must  realize  the  idea  of  national  expansion  on  which  our  ability  to 
exist  as  a  nation  of  the  first  rank  depends,  by  making  ourselves  so 
strong  in  the  first  place  on  land  and  sea  that  nobody  will  attack  us,M 
Eohrbach,  German  World  Policies,  202-204. 

*i  Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  36-40. 


112    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  £HE  WAR 

time."  And  again:  "It  will  be  my  sole  task  for  the 
future  to  see  to  it,  that  the  seeds  which  have  been 
sown  may  develop  in  peace  and  security. ' M2  Nor  did 
the  Kaiser  in  any  of  his  speeches  on  the  necessity  of 
world  empire  for  Germany,  or  in  his  demands  for 
a  "place  in  the  sun"  commit  himself  to  any  specific 
means  of  attaining  his  end. 

But  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  no  official  seal 
was  placed  upon  the  Pan-Germanist  propaganda  and 
that  German  world  policy  remained  wholly  indefinite 
in  its  meaning,  and  despite  the  stress  laid  by  the 
Kaiser  on  the  necessity  of  preserving  peace,  the  other 
nations  of  Europe  could  not  fail  to  be  affected  by  the 
new  spirit  manifest  in  Germany.  They  were  naturally 
troubled  by  the  probable  effects  of  German  success 
in  the  development  of  industry  and  commerce  and  by 
the  rapid  increase  in  size  of  the  German  mercantile 
marine.  The  demand  for  colonies  and  the  startling 
growth  of  a  navy  that  threatened  soon  to  become 
formidable  troubled  them  yet  more.  "If  the  German 
fleet  were  destroyed,  the  peace  of  Europe  would  be 
assured  for  two  generations,,;  "there  are  many 
people,  both  in  England  and  on  the  Continent,  who 
consider  the  German  fleet  the  only  serious  menace  to 
the  preservation  of  peace  in  Europe.' '  Such  expres- 
sions attest  the  anxiety  felt  by  the  older  nations 
because  of  the  rise  of  this  youngest  but  possibly 
strongest  of  Powers.43 

The  chief  cause  of  anxiety,  however,  was  not  so 
much  the  growth  of  German  commerce  and  the  creation 
of  a  navy  that  might  prove  dangerous,  as  the  new  spirit 
that  was  believed  to  lie  behind  these  outward  mani- 

«  Speech  at  Hamburg,  June  18,  1901. 
43  Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  35. 


qERMAN  WORLD  POLICY  113 

festations  of  strength  and  ambition.  Although  the 
Government,  at  least  until  1905,  reiterated  its  desire 
for  a  lasting  peace,  it  was  plain  that  the  almost 
universal  demand  for  expansion  and  political  influence 
in  the  world  at  large  must  soon  bring  Germany  into 
conflict  with  the  nations  which  already  held  predomi- 
nant power  in  the  world  outside  of  Europe.  With 
the  passing  of  each  year,  the  attitude  of  belligerence 
and  defiance  became  more  and  more  pronounced.44 
Not  merely  the  military  party,  but  the  nation  as  a 
whole  were  believed  to  be  ready  to  take  any  steps  that 
would  lead  to  the  attainment  of  the  ideals  of  German 
expansion.45  Not  even  the  Socialists  could  be  counted 
upon  as  a  definitely  moderating  factor.46 

Great  Britain  was  the  nation  that  seemed  to  be  most 
directly  menaced,  and  with  the  first  clear  indication 

44  Characteristic  of  the  feeling  is  the  fact  that  in  May,  1906,  a 
manufacturer  left  a  legacy  of  6000  marks  to  the  military  administration, 
which  was  to  accumulate  until  Germany  entered  a  war  with  a  European 
Power.  Two-thirds  of  it  was  then  to  be  given  to  the  first  soldier  who 
captured  a  flag  from  the  enemy,  and  the  rest  to  the  first  soldier  who 
took  a  cannon.  A  popular  subscription  for  aerial  craft  started  in 
March,  1909,  amounted,  a  month  later,  to  six  million  marks,  Andrillon, 
op.  cit.j  61. 

« "It  would  be  no  exaggeration, ' '  wrote  a  former  French  Ambas- 
sador, "to  say  that  if  the  German  Government  were  of  a  democratic 
character,  the  most  unfortunate  consequences  would  result.  It  is  a 
very  curious  phenomenon  to  see  the  Government,  and  the  Kaiser  himself 
in  front  line,  obliged  to  restrain  the  manifestations  of  disgust  and  anger 
which  constantly  appear  in  the  press  and  in  the  daily  conversation  of 
citizens.  Anything  the  Government  would  do  to  bother  England  or 
France  is  sure  to  be  applauded  by  the  people, "  La  Bevue,  August  15, 
1907. 

40  At  Essen,  in  1907,  Bebel  made  it  clear  that  the  German  Socialists 
were  nationalistic  and  would  take  no  steps  in  conjunction  with  Socialists 
of  other  countries  which  might  harm  German  national  interests.  "We 
have  need  of  the  country  where  we  were  born,"  he  said,  "the  land 
where  we  live,  of  the  tongue  we  speak,  to  make  our  country  the  most 


114    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

of  the  new  attitude  of  the  German  nation,  British 
statesmen  did  not  hesitate  to  take  steps  to  meet  it. 
In  order  to  understand  the  significance  of  the  diplo- 
matic revolution  that  resulted  and  its  reactionary 
effect  upon  German  diplomatic  policy,  we  should  first 
consider  briefly  the  relations  of  Great  Britain  with 
the  continental  Powers  previous  to  1900. 

beautiful  and  perfect  in  the  world.' '  In  January,  1906,  before  the 
Socialist  Congress  at  Amsterdam,  during  the  discussion  of  the  use  of 
the  general  strike  as  a  means  of  preventing  war,  he  asserted  that 
German  Socialists  would  definitely  refuse  any  such  proposition;  and 
in  1911,  before  the  Congress  at  Jena,  he  said:  "French  Socialists  can, 
if  they  want,  declare  the  general  strike,  but  German  Socialists  consider 
the  general  strike  out  of  the  question,  if  war  should  arise, ' '  La  Depeche, 
January  24,  1906  j  Andrillon,  op,  cit,  63. 


CHAPTER  VI 
BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY 

The  success  of  German  foreign  policy  during  the 
generation  that  followed  the  creation  of  united  Ger- 
many depended  largely  upon  two  conditions.  £lt  was 
essential  that  the  Franco-Russian  combination  should 
be  kept  innocuous  ©vFrench  policy  must  remain  passive 
ancj?the  attention  of  Russia  must  be  distracted  from 
the  European  situation  to  the  Far  East^  Jt  was  also  v  / 
of  vital  importance  to  Germany  that  her  control  of  I 
continental  diplomacy  should  not  be  disturbed  by  the 
opposition  of  Great  Britain.  Towards  the  close 
of  the  century,  therefore,  when  Germany  began  to 
conceive  her  schemes  of  world  policy,  the  attitude 
of  Great  Britain  was  of  the  greatest  concern  to 
German  diplomats. 

British  foreign  policy,  since  the  time  of  Elizabeth, 
has  been  determined  mainly  by  colonial  and  maritime 
interests ;  underneath  all  the  apparently  contradictory 
manifestations  of  Great  Britain's  policy,  this  single 
motive  is  to  be  found.  At  times,  as  for  example 
during  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV  and  the  eras_  of 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon,  a  concern  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  contjnentaljegjiili^iu  has  been 
the  chief  characteristic  oTTJreat^ Britain's  attitude. 
At  other  times,  she  has  rigidly  excluded  herself  from 
continental  complications,  and  taken  up  a  position  of 
isolation.    The  superficial  contradiction  in  her  policy 


116    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

has,  furthermore,  been  accentuated  by  her  frequent 
changes  in  alliances.  Friendship  with  France  in  the 
sixteenth  century  was  exchanged  for  the  bitter  hos- 
tility with  which  she  regarded  Louis  XIV  in  the 
seventeenth  and  Napoleon  in  the  nineteenth  centuries. 
After  the  fall  of  Napoleon  her  foreign  relations  were 
characterized  by  rivalry  with  Eussia;  while  in  the 
first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  her  ancient  feuds 
with  France  and  Eussia  were  entirely  forgotten  in 
the  growing  enmity  manifested  towards  Germany. 

Such  contradictions  are  more  apparent  than  real. 
They  have  been  determined  by  a  single  aim— the 
greatness  and  security  of  the  British  Empire.  That 
has  been  the  sole  object  of  her  policy,  and  her  systems 
of  alliances  have  been  merely  the  means  toward  that 
end.  History  shows  that  there  are  two  methods  of 
diplomacy :\" The  one  is  a  policy  of  system ;  alliances 
are  the  object,  particular  questions  are  the  means. 
In  Realpolitik,  on  the  other  hand, ^alliances  are  the 
means,  national  questions  the  object."1  Realpolitik 
has  always  been  the  method  employed  by  Great 
Britain,  as  it  was  by  Bismarck  and  Cavour.  Her 
supremacy  on  the  seas  and  the  security  of  her 
colonies  has  been  her  guiding  principle.  Her  policy 
has  thus  been  successively  anti-French,  anti-Eussian, 
and  anti-German;  for  in  the  last  hundred  years  she 
has  had  to  fear  the  French  in  Africa,  the  Eussians  in 
the  Near,  Central,  and  Far  East,  and  finally  the  com- 
petition of  the  Germans  all  over  the  world.  She  has 
travelled  towards  her  goal  "by  the  shortest  route, 
and  has  changed  friends  on  the  way."2 

iBenS  Millet  in  Questions  Actuelles  de  Politique  Etrangbre,  1911,  61. 
2  Millet,  op.  cit.,  61. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  117 

Since  the  collapse  of  the  Empire  of  the  first  Napoleon 
the  relations  of  Great  Britain  with  France  have  been 
outwardly  pacific.  There  has  been  no  break  in  the 
diplomatic  connection  of  the  two  nations  and  the  not 
infrequent  rumors  of  war  have  never  materialized 
into  actual  hostilities.  But  it  was  a  very  thin  veneer 
of  official  friendliness  that  covered  the  underlying 
traditional  enmity.  Relations  were  strained  during 
the  period  when  Napoleon  III  was  attempting  to  carry 
out  a  policy  of  action,  and  after  1870  the  colonial 
aspirations  of  the  Third  Republic  inaugurated  an  era 
of  Anglo-French  rivalry  which  threatened  at  times 
to  develop  into  an  open  break.  This  rivalry  centred 
chiefly  around  the  question  of  domination  in  Africa. 

Both  France  and  Great  Britain  had  interests  in 
Egypt :  France  was  concerned  over  her  trade  with  the 
Levant,  and  because  of  her  protectorate  in  Algeria 
could  not  afford  to  be  indifferent  to  anything  that 
related  to  the  North  African  seaboard ;  Great  Britain 
considered  that  Egypt  was  the  key  to  India.  In  1875 
Great  Britain  fortified  her  position  in  Egypt  and 
obtained  a  decisive  voice  in  the  control  of  a  highway 
that  was  of  vital  importance  to  her  interests,  by  pur- 
chasing from  the  bankrupt  Khedive  his  shares  in  the 
Suez  Canal  Company.  The  shares  had  been  offered  to 
the  French  Government  and  had  been  declined,  owing 
to  the  timidity  of  the  French  statesmen,  who  were  at 
the  moment  distracted  by  the  German  war  scare.  But 
although  France  had  thus  through  her  own  fault 
missed  her  opportunity,  she  could  not  but  feel  that 
Great  Britain  had  unfairly  stolen  a  march  on  her; 
and  the  diplomatic  assistance  rendered  by  Lord  Derby 


118    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

in  the  continental  crisis  of  1875  did  not  entirely  remove 
the  sense  of  injury  that  resulted.3 

French  ill-feeling  was  not  alleviated  by  further 
developments  in  Egypt.  The  financial  paralysis  of 
the  Egyptian  Government  led  in  1876  to  the  establish- 
ment of  the  "Dual  Control"  by  France  and  Great 
Britain,  and  shortly  afterwards  to  the  deposition  of 
the  Khedive.  A  nationalist  rebellion  under  Arabi 
Pasha  flamed  forth,  culminating  in  an  outburst  of 
Moslem  fury  in  Alexandria  that  seemed  to  call  for 
the  intervention^ef  the  controlling  Powers.  But 
France  hung  back;  Gambetta  had  just  fallen  and  the 
new  Ministry  feared  to  involve  the  country  in  compli- 
cations, so  long  as  her  continental  position  was 
threatened  by  Germany.  Great  Britain  therefore 
proceeded  alone  to  the  rather  unwelcome  task  of 
crushing  the  rebellion  and  restoring  order.  Alexandria 
was  bombarded  on  Jury  11,  1882,  and  in  September, 
Sir  Garnet  Wolseley  forced  Arabi  and  his  followers 
to  lay  down  their  arms.4 

The  difficulty  of  bringing  order  out  of  a  state  of 
financial  and  administrative  chaos,  and  of  reducing 
the  turbulent  nationalist  spirit  to  a  condition  of 
quiescence,  was  not  lessened  by  the  anomalous  status 
of  the  British  Government  in  Egypt,  for  England 
refused  to  assume  a  protectorate  and  declared  that 
her  function  in  Egypt  was  confined  to  the  giving  of 
advice  to  the  Khedive.  The  meaning  placed  upon  the 
word  " advice,' '  however,  was  such  that  the  rivals  of 

&  Annual  Register,  1873,  1875,  passim;  Tardieu,  France  and  the 
Alliances,  42;  Hippeau,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  la  Troisidme  Repub- 
lique,  410-443;  Freycinet,  La  Question  d'Egypte,  99-205. 

*  Cromer,  Modern  Egypt,  i,  149-348;  Freycinet,  La  Question  d'Egypte, 
205-325;  Wallace,  Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  Question,  62-108. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  119 

Great  Britain  recognized  clearly  that  Egypt  had 
become  for  practical  purposes  an  essential  part  of  the 
British  Empire.  "It  should  be  made  clear  to  the 
Egyptian  ministers  and  governors  of  provinces,'' 
wrote  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  "that  the 
responsibility  which  for  a  time  rests  upon  England, 
obliges  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  insist  on  the 
adoption  of  the  policy  which  they  recommend,  and 
that  it  will  be  necessary  that  those  ministers  and 
governors  who  do  not  follow  this  course  should  cease 
to  hold  their  office."5 

This  position  of  the  British  in  Egypt,  although  it 
resulted  mainly  from  the  unwillingness  of  the  French 
to  assume  new  burdens,  could  not  fail  to  accentuate 
the  ill-feeling  already  existing  between  England  and 
France.  The  French  felt  that  they  had  been  robbed 
of  a  sphere  of  influence  essential  to  their  position  as 
a  Mediterranean  and  Far  Eastern  Power;  and  their 
vexation  was  not  lessened  by  the  realization  that  the 
result  was  largely  due  to  their  own  timidity.  For 
half  a  generation  every  difference  between  the  two 
nations  was  embittered  by  French  jealousy  of  England 
in  Egypt;  and  finally  the  smouldering  embers  of 
colonial  rivalry  and  national  hatred  were  almost 
fanned  into  open  war  at  Fashoda,  in  1898. 

Fashoda  is  a  fortress  on  the  upper  Nile  in  the 
Soudan,  where  a  British  force  under  Kitchener  met 
with  a  French  expeditionary  corps  commanded  by 
Marchand,  September  19,  1898.  The  Soudan  had 
formerly  been  a  dependency  of  Egypt,  but  in  1883 
had    revolted   under   the   leadership    of   a    religious 

s  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815,  559;  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances, 
43;  Milner,  England  in  Egypt,  24  sq. 


120    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

fanatic  known  as  the  Mahdi.  He  had  proclaimed  a 
religions  war  and  completely  annihilated  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  troops  sent  against  him.  Gladstone,  who 
was  at  the  head  of  the  British  Government  in  1884, 
decided  to  abandon  the  Sondan,  but  sent  Chinese 
Gordon  np  the  Nile  to  investigate  the  situation  and 
report  upon  the  best  method  of  withdrawal.  Gordon, 
whose  heroism  and  chivalry  are  unquestioned,  but 
whose  judgment  is  not  above  reproach,  allowed  him- 
self to  be  confined  in  Khartoum  by  the  rebellious 
Mahdists;  the  British  Government  was  dilatory  in 
the  despatch  of  a  relief  expedition,  and  two  days  before 
its  arrival  Gordon  was  massacred  with  eleven  thou- 
sand of  his  men  (January  26,  1885 ).6  For  ten  years 
the  horror  and  disgrace  of  Khartoum  remained 
unavenged,  and  the  Soudan  was  left  to  the  Dervishes. 
In  1896  an  expedition  for  the  recovery  of  the  upper 
Nile  was  sent  out  under  Kitchener.  The  belief  that 
control  of  the  Soudan  was  essential  to  the  stability  of 
the  British  regime  in  Egypt  combined  with  the  fear 
of  French  expansion  in  Central  Africa  to  force  the 
Government  into  a  policy  of  action.  Kitchener 
advanced  slowly  up  the  Nile,  and  on  September  2, 
1898,  crushed  the  Dervishes  at  Omdurman.  But 
British  control  of  the  Soudan  was  not  to  be  uncon- 
tested, for  a  simultaneous  attempt  to  reach  the  upper 
Nile  was  being  made  by  the  French;  and  when 
Kitchener,  proceeding  up  the  river,  reached  Fashoda, 
he  found  the  fort  flying  the  French  flag  and  occupied 
by  Marchand  and  his  small  force.  Neither  the  British 
nor  the  French  would  retire,  the  former  being  superior 

e  Cromer,    Modern    Egypt,    i,    349-592;    ii,    3-18;    Blunt,    Gordon    at 
Khartoum. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  121 

in  numbers  and  having  assured  communications,  the 
latter  having  been  the  first  on  the  spot.7 

The  diplomatic  tension  that  resulted  from  the 
ensuing  crisis  was  extreme,  for  there  seemed  to  be 
no  possible  compromise  between  the  claims  of  Great 
Britain  and  France,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  shortly 
before  declared  that  any  intervention  in  the  Soudan 
on  the  part  of  a  foreign  Power  would  be  considered 
an  "hostile  act."  On  the  other  hand,  France  looked 
forward  to  linking  her  possessions  in  East  and  West 
Africa  by  the  control  of  the  upper  Nile,  and  M. 
Hanotaux  had  insisted  that  France  would  preserve 
full  liberty  of  action  in  that  quarter.  The  danger 
from  the  clash  of  interests  in  Central  Africa  was  the 
greater  because  France  feared  the  ambitions  of  the 
British  in  Morocco,  which  adjoined  Algeria ;  in  the  Far 
East  also,  Franco-British  rivalry  had  been  rapidly 
becoming  acute  during  the  years  immediately  pre- 
ceding. For  the  moment  it  seemed  likely  that  the 
whole  question  of  French  and  British  colonial  antago- 
nism and  national  bitterness  would  be  settled  by  the 
sword.8 

The  situation  was  saved  by  the  surrender  of  the 
French  claims  and  the  recognition  by  France  of  the 
British  and  Egyptian  control  in  the  Soudan.  The 
military  situation  in  France  left  her  in  no  condition 
to  prosecute  a  general  war,  and  little  assistance  could 
be  expected  from  Russia,  which  was  deeply  engaged 
in  Far  Eastern  affairs,  and  was  also,  in  the  person 
of  the  Tsar,  advocating  a  general  system  that  would 
ensure  international  peace.     Great  Britain  on  the 

*De    Caix,    "La    Politique    Anglaise,"    in    Questions    Actuelles    de 
Politique  Etrangdre,  30;  Hanotaux,  Fachoda. 
s  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  43-45. 


122    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

other  hand,  although  the  struggle  with  the  Boers  was 
imminent,  seemed  to  be  in  a  position  to  carry  on  a 
colonial  war  against  France  with  all  chances  of 
success. 

The  diplomatic  victory  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
Fashoda  crisis  did  not  tend  to  ameliorate  her  relations 
with  France.  The  latter  country  manifested  more 
clearly  than  ever  sentiments  of  jealousy  and  hatred 
towards  the  nation  across  the  Channel,  and  during 
the  Boer  War  a  press  campaign  of  the  utmost  virulence 
was  directed  against  her  rivaL^  It  was  even  whispered 
that  France  made  overtures"™  Germany  which  might 
have  led  to  a  continental  coalition,  with  the  destruction 
of  the  British  colonial  empire  as  its  object.9  In 
England,  France  continued  to  be  regarded  as  the 
national  enemy,  and  the  nineteenth  century  closed 
with  Franco-British  relations  strained  to  the  limit  and 
with  the  hope  of  a  reconciliation  apparently  excluded 
from  the  realm  of  possibility. 

The  intense  hostility  that  existed  between  France 
and  England  was  equalled  or  surpassed  by  that  which 
had  grown  up  in  the  nineteenth  century  between 
Russia  and  England.  In  general  the  interests  of  the 
two  nations  have  conflicted  in  three  quarters:  in  the 
Near  East,  in  Afghanistan  and  Persia,  and  in  the 
Far  East.  In  the  Near  and  Central  East,  the  hostility 
of  Great  Britain  towards  Russia  was  largely  deter- 
mined by  her  fear  for  the  security  of  India:  the 
advance  of  Russia  towards  Constantinople  endangered 
her  .communications  with  her  most  valuable  colonial 
possession;  Russian  intrigues  amongst  the  border 
trjljes^  in  Af ghanistan^  and  Persia  threatened^ India 

o  Interview  with  the  Kaiser,  published  in  Daily  Telegraph,  October 
28,  1908. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  123 

directly.     In  the  Far  East  the  rivalry  was  chiefly 
commercial  in  character. 


On  more  than  one  occasion  Great  Britain  has  proved 
the  chief  stumbling  block  to  the  fulfilment  of  Russia's 
ambition  of  securing  control  of  the  Balkans  and 
Dardanelles.  The  foresight  of  Canning  in  1827 
brought  England  into  the  war  of  Grecian  independence 
in  order  that  Russia  might  not  unduly  exploit  the 
defeat  of  the  Turks.  In  1841,  the  Treaty  of  the  Straits, 
for  which  Great  Britain  was  largely  responsible,  closed 
the  Dardanelles  to  ships  of  war.  Again  in  1855  Great 
Britain,  in  conjunction  with  France,  defended  the 
integrity  of  Turkey  against  Russia  and  inflicted  a 
striking  defeat  upon  the  Slav  Power  in  the  Crimean 
War.  Nor  was  the  action  of  Disraeli  in  1878  at  the 
Congress  of  Berlin,  although  it  was  confined  to  the 
diplomatic  field,  less  vigorous  in  its  opposition  to 
Russian  influence  in  the  Near  East.10 

The  result  was  that  Russian  ambitions,  blocked  in 
this  quarter,  turned  to  the  Central  East,  where  for 
more  than  a  generation  the  advance  of  the  Slav 
occasioned  the  British  in  India  the  utmost  anxiety, 
for  it  seemed  a  matter  of  certainty  that  the  intriguing 
agents  of  the  Tsar  were  preparing  for  a  descent  upon 
India,  or  at  least  for  the  control  of  the  Persian  Gulf. 
During  the  sixties,  Russian  armies  took  possession 
of  Bokhara  and  established  themselves  upon  the 
borders  of  Afghanistan;  should  that  country  fall 
under  their  control,  the  passes  leading  into  India 
itself  would  be  open  to  them. 

During  the  next  ten  years  Russia's  threats  became 
more  direct.  Her  representatives  secured  the  favor 
of  the  Ameer,  who  was  alienated  from  Great  Britain 

loDriault,  La  Question  d 'Orient,  'passim. 


124    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

by  the  vacillation  of  her  policy,  which  under  the 
direction  of  Gladstone  was  anaemic,  and  under  that 
of  Disraeli,  hasty  and  ill-considered.  In  the  late 
seventies,  a  Russian  army  was  on  the  march  for  the 
frontier  and  General  Skobelef  had  drawn  up  two 
plans  for  the  invasion  of  India.  But  Russia's  deter- 
mination faltered,  and  her  attention  was  distracted 
by  difficulties  at  home;  in  the  following  year  she  lost 
much  of  her  advantage  when  a  British  force  under 
Roberts  was  sent  into  Afghanistan  and  largely 
reestablished  British  influence.11 

But  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Russia  declared 
explicitly  that  she  would  not  interfere  with  the  special 
position  of  Great  Britain  in  Afghanistan,  British 
statesmen  continued  to  regard  the  presence  of  Russian 
merchants  there  as  indicating  that  the  danger  had  not 
passed.  And  at  certain  times  it  was  undeniable  that 
the  Afghans  showed  themselves  restive  under  British 
influence  and  were  doubtless  not  unready  to  accept 
Russian  assistance  whenever  opportunity  offered. 
Until  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  British 
suspicion  of  Russian  intrigues  in  this  quarter  main- 
tained the  atmosphere  of  hostility  between  the  two 
nations.  In  1905,  Mr.  Balfour  identified  the  "problem 
of  the  British  Army"  with  the  defence  of  Afghanistan. 

In  Persia,  Russia  carried  on  a  successful  commercial 
and  financial  development  which  did  not  tend  to  lessen 
British  fears  or  jealousy  of  Russian  influence  in  the 
Central  East.  Russian  trade  with  Persia  doubled 
during  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and 

nEoberts,  Forty-one  Years  in  India,  chs.  43-44,  46-51,  60-62; 
Hippeau,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  la  Troisieme  Republique,  521 ; 
Eambaud,  Histoire  de  la  Bussie,  705,  776,  sq.;  "0.  K.,"  STcooeleff  and 
the  Slavonic  Cause,  320-337. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  125 

through  the  skill  of  Russian  financiers,  the  Russian 
Loan  Bank  became  the  sole  creditor  of  Persia,  a 
position  which  naturally  secured  for  Russia  important 
political  advantages.  Lord  Curzon's  attempts  to 
offset  the  influence  thus  gained  were  not  entirely 
successful  and  served  to  increase  Anglo-Russian 
enmity.12 

In  Thibet  the  ambitions  of  the  two  nations  also 
clashed.  In  this  quarter  the  British  had  constantly 
shown  a  disposition  to  advance.  Finally  in  1903  Lord 
Curzon  despatched  Colonel  Younghusband  on  a  mis- 
sion which  might  have  been  commercial  in  character 
as  asserted,  but  which  Russia  regarded  as  likely  to 
lead  to  British  political  supremacy  over  the  "Roof 
of  the  World."  For  the  moment,  Russian  attention 
was  directed  to  the  war  in  Manchuria  and  she  could 
do  no  more  than  express  her  displeasure  at  the 
Younghusband  mission.  But  the  British  penetration 
of  Thibet  was  not  the  least  amongst  the  factors  that 
seemed  to  be  making  for  a  conflict  between  Great 
Britain  and  Russia.13 

In  the  Far  East,  Russian  and  British  ambitions 
clashed  no  less  directly  than  in  the  Central  East,  and 
at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  rivalry  was 
such  in  this  quarter  as  to  make  imminent  the  danger 
of  open  conflict.  Russia's  interests  on  the  Pacific 
seaboard  date  back  to  the  seventeenth  century,  when 
in  her  expansion  eastwards,  she  founded  the  town  of 
Okhotsk.    It  was  omy  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 

12  De  Caix,  "La  Politique  Anglaise,"  in  Questions  Actuelles  de 
Politique  Etrangdre,  19M,  19;  Tardieu,  Franbe  and  the  Alliances,  243- 
245;  Whigham,  The  PetmJJ^Eroplem,  332-371 

13  Fraser,  India  under  Curzon  Imd^&ffaf^l 8-146;  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  xy,  490. 


126    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

century,  however,  that,  in  the  pursuit  of  an  ice-free 
port,  she  sought  to  extend  southwards  her  possessions 
on  the  Pacific,  and  began  the  attack  on  the  integrity 
of  China.  In  1860  she  acquired  from  China  a  strip 
of  territory  to  the  east  of  Manchuria,  known  as  the 
Maritime  Province,  at  the  southern  end  of  which  she 
established  the  naval  base  of  Vladivostok.  Here  she 
was  stopped  for  the  moment.  But  Vladivostok  is  not 
an  ice-free  harbor,  and  Russia  looked  to  the  south  for 
further  accessions  of  territory;  she  especially  hoped 
to  acquire  Korea,  Port  Arthur  at  the  head  of  the 
Yellow  Sea,  and  also  the  province  of  Manchuria,  which 
would  give  direct  communication  between  Korea  and 
Siberia.14 

The  interests  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Far  East  were 
first  established  in  1842.  Previous  to  that  time  China 
had  preserved  her  isolation  from  the  rest  of  the  world ; 
foreigners  had  been  permitted  to  trade  in  a  single 
port,  Canton,  but  under  such  restrictions  that  no 
country  was  able  to  carry  on  regular  commerce;  no 
foreign  ambassadors  or  consuls  were  allowed  to  reside 
in  China.  In  1840  this  wall  between  the  Celestial 
Empire  and  the  modern  world  was  broken  down.  A 
quarrel  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Chinese 
Government  over  the  smuggling  of  opium  culminated 
in  the  so-called  Opium  War  of  1840,  in  which  China 
was  speedily  crushed.  By  the  treaty  of  Nanking, 
Great  Britain  forced  China  to  open  to  British  trade 
four  ports  besides  Canton ;  she  also  secured  for  herself 
the  island  of  Hong  Kong. 

During  the  next  two  decades  the  British  acquired 
further  rights,  including  that  of  maintaining  consuls 

14  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815,  681-682;  Rambaud,  Histoire  de  la 
Russie,  780  sq.,  853.  t 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  127 

in  the  treaty  ports,  and  rapidly  extended  their  Far 
Eastern  trade  and  their  influence  on  the  Pacific. 
In  the  meantime,  other  Powers  established  trading 
centres  in  the  Chinese  Empire,  and  China's  commerce 
with  Europe  increased  by  leaps  and  bounds.  But 
Great  Britain  remained  the  predominant  Power  in 
the  Far  East,  partly  because  of  her  possession  of 
Hong  Kong,  the  most  important  naval  and  commercial 
base  on  the  Pacific  coast,  partly  because  of  her 
initiative  and-activity.15 

Acute  rivalry  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain  in 
the  Far  East  was  long  postponed.  Eussia  was  far  to 
the  north,  Great  Britain  to  the  south,  and  so  long  as 
the  integrity  of  China  was  maintained  there  was  little 
chance  of  a  clash.  Russia  had  no  ports  which  would 
allow  her  to  develop  commerce  likely  to  rival  that  of 
Great  Britain,  and  the  latter  Power  regarded  Russia's 
possession  of  the  ice-bound  coast  of  the  Maritime 
Province  with  indifference.  But  in  the  early  nineties 
the  sudden  rise  of  Japan  and  her  successful  war  with 
China  produced  effects  that  gave  to  Russia  an  oppor- 
tunity of  winning  Korea  and  acquiring  a  position  of 
predominance  on  the  Pacific;  which  seemed  to  Great 
Britain  dangerously  threatening.  v    / 

Japan's  policy  of  isolation,  to  which  she  had  long-' 
adhered,  was  broken  down  as  a  result  of  Commodore 
Perry's  visit  in  1854.  The  request  that  a  port  be 
opened  to  American  trade  was  accompanied  by  a  naval 
demonstration.  Japan  heeded  the  request  and  entered 
into  relations  with  foreign  nations.  There  followed 
an  internal  revolution  disposing  of  the  feudal  system 
and  introducing  European  institutions.  The  national 
transformation  which   resulted  finds  no   parallel  in 

is  Innes,  England  and  the  British  Empire,  iv,  218. 


128    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

history.  Within  two  decades  Japan  made  of  herself 
a  modern  Power,  whose  material  efficiency  was  proved 
conclusively  by  the  victories  over  China  in  1894  and 
Eussia  in  1904-1905. 

The  first  of  these  wars  resulted  from  the  ancient 
quarrel  of  China  and  Japan  over  Korea,  which  was 
coveted  by  Japan  because  of  its  strategical  position 
and  agricultural  fertility,  and  also  because  it  offered 
markets  to  Japanese  industry  and  a  home  for  her 
surplus  population.  The  struggle  resulted  in  an  easy 
victory  for  the  army  of  Japan,  trained  by  European 
officers  and  equipped  in  occidental  fashion,  and  China 
quickly  agreed  to  a  peace,  which  was  recorded  in  the 
Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  (April  17,  1895).  According 
to  this  treaty  China  recognized  the  independence  of 
Korea,  but  on  such  terms  that  Japanese  commercial 
control  of  the  peninsula  would  be  possible;  and  also 
ceded  to  Japan  the  peninsula  of  Liao  Tung,  situated 
to  the  west  of  Korea,  with  Port  Arthur  at  its  southern 
extremity,  and  the  island  of  Formosa.16 

But  Japan  was  not  allowed  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of 
her  victory.  Her  triumph  over  China  was  displeasing 
to  Eussia  and  Germany,  since  it  interfered  materially 
with  their  own  Far  Eastern  policy;  and  three  days 
after  the  Chino-Japanese  treaty  had  been  signed,  the 
European  Powers  intervened.  Together  with  France, 
Eussia  and  Germany  invoked  the  principle  of  Chinese 
integrity,  declaring  that  Pekin  was  threatened  by 
Japan's  possession  of  Port  Arthur  and  that  Korea's 
independence  would  be  merely  nominal.  Their  lan- 
guage was  courteous,  but  they  made  it  plain  that  the 
treaty  must  be  revised.     Japan  swallowed  her  dis- 

16  Eeventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  PolitiJc,  82;  Hazen,  op.  cit., 
694-696;  Vladimir,  The  China  Japan  War. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  129 

appointment,  yielded  to  their  demands,  and  renounced 
the  acquisition  of  the  Liao  Tung  peninsula  and  Port 
Arthur.17 

It  was  easy  to  understand  Eussia 's  desire  to  prevent 
Japan  from  winning  a  foothold  on  the  Continent  and 
especially  in  Korea.  Since  the  early  nineties  she  had 
begun  practical  operations  which  she  hoped  would 
enable  her  to  secure  a  strong  commercial  and  strate- 
gical position  on  the  Pacific.  In  1891  she  began  the 
Trans-Siberian  railway,  which  was  destined  to  link 
St.  Petersburg  with  Vladivostok,  and  a  few  years  later 
planned  a  branch  line  running  across  Manchuria  and 
terminating  in  the  Liao  Tung  peninsula.18  With  such 
ambitions,  the  Japanese  terms  dictated  at  Shimonoseki 
directly  conflicted. 

The  Power  chiefly  responsible  for  the  tearing  up 
of  that  treaty,  however,  was  Germany.  The  Kaiser, 
as  we  saw,  was  at  this  time  beginning  to  evolve  plans 
of  world  empire  and  the  moment  seemed  opportune 
for  the  German  Government  to  establish  its  political 
influence  in  the  Far  East.  Furthermore  the  chance 
of  securing  a  trading  post  and  naval  base  similar  to 
that  of  the  British  at  Hong  Kong  won  the  approval 
of  the  Pan-Germanists,  who  enthusiastically  supported 
German  intervention  in  Eastern  affairs.  But  the 
most  important  reason  for  German  action  in  China 
was  doubtless  to  be  found  in  her  European  policy. 
During  the  nineties  Germany  was  constantly  working 
to  rob  the  Dual  Alliance  of  European  significance  by 
directing  the  attention  of  France  and  Eussia  away 
from  Europe,  and  fostering  their  desire  for  colonial 
power.    Eussia  especially  she  sought  to  "  tempt  Asia- 

f 

17  Kambaud,  Histoire  de  la  Bussie,  861. 
is  Rambaud,  Histoire  de  la  Eussie,  884  sq. 


130    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

wards,  with  a  view  to  getting  rid  of  her  influence  in 
Europe.' '  It  was  eminently  desirable  for  Germany 
that  Eussia  should  be  involved  in  distant  and  dan- 
gerous adventures,  and  that  Eussian  expansion  should 
embitter  the  Anglo-Eussian  rivalry.  The  position  of 
Germany  on  the  Continent  of  Europe  was  clearly 
strengthened  by  every  new  clash  of  interests  between 
Eussia  and  Great  Britain,  no  less  than  by  the  Anglo- 
French  feud.19 

The  hopes  of  Eussia  and  Germany  were  realized  for 
the  time  being,  although  they  were  destined  to  ultimate 
failure,  in  the  one  case  in  1905,  in  the  other  in  1914. 
But  for  the  moment  both  Powers  secured  their  desired 
position  on  the  Pacific.  Germany  took  advantage  of 
the  murder  of  two  missionaries  in  1897  to  send  out  an 
expedition  which  forced  China  to  lease  for  ninety- 
nine  years  the  bay  of  Kiau  Chau  and  a  zone  of  fifty 
kilometres  around  it.  She  thus  won  a  naval  and 
commercial  base  that  might  in  the  future  rival  Hong 
Kong.20  She  was  equally  successful  in  the  "egging- 
on"  of  Eussia.  The  latter  Power  secured  in  1898  the 
lease  of  the  all-important  Port  Arthur,  which,  as  she 
herself  had  declared  to  Japan,  allowed  the  possessor 
to  threaten  Pekin.  This  was  to  be  the  terminus  of  the 
Trans-Manchurian  Eailway,  which  connected  Eussia 
in  Europe  with  an  ice-free  port  on  the  Pacific.  The 
railway  itself,  under  an  agreement  made  in  1896,  was 
to  pass  ultimately  to  China ;  in  the  meantime,  Eussian 
soldiers  were  allowed  to  guard  it,  and  Eussia  already 
treated  Manchuria  as  though  it  were  her  own.21 

i»  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  213-216. 

20  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  108-115. 

21  Hawkesworth,  The  Last  Century  in  Europe,  409;  Krahmer,  Buss- 
land  in  Asien.  f 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  131 

The  advance  of  Eussian  influence  in  China  had  long 
been  a  cause  of  anxiety  to  British  statesmen,  and  in  I 
1900  they  realized  that  British  commercial  supremacy 
in  the  Far  East  was  directly  threatened.  The  trade 
of  Northern  China  was  falling  into  Russian  hands, 
and  even  in  the  valley  of  the  Yang-tse-kiang  Russian 
merchants  and  commission  agents  were  replacing 
British  agents.  In  the  meantime  Russia  was  strength- 
ening her  military  hold  on  Manchuria,  and  despite  her 
promises  seemed  likely  to  make  of  it  a  Russian 
province.  England  could  not  fail  to  see  that  Russian 
annexation  of  Manchuria  meant  not  merely  the  acqui- 
sition of  a  strategic  position  invaluable  to  Slavic 
development  on  the  Pacific,  but  also  the  closing  of 
Manchuria  to  British  trade. 

At  the  moment  the  attention  and  resources  of  Great 
Britain  were  occupied  by  the  Boer  War,  and  she 
realized  the  necessity  of  an  ally  in  the  Far  East  upon 
whom  she  could  depend  to  oppose  the  Russian 
advance}  She  turned  naturally  to  Japan,  whose 
interests  had  been  trampled  upon  by  Russia  and 
Germany  in  1895  and  who  was  also  searching  for 
some  ally  that  could  furnish  her  the  necessary  capital 
for  her  new  industrial  development.  Circumstances 
thus  brought  Great  Britain  and  Japan  together,  and 
on  January  30, 1902,  the  Eastern  and  Western  Powers . 
signed  a  defensive  alliance,  guaranteeing  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China  and  Korea,  and  equal 
opportunity  for  the  commerce  of  all  nations  in  those 
countries.22 

The  Anglo-Japanese  treaty  did  not  provide  that 
Great  Britain  should  assist  Japan  in  a  war  against 
Russia  alone,  but  it  naturally  resulted  in  an  increase 

22  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  217-221. 


132    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

of  hard  feeling  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain. 
The  mutual  hostility  of  the  two  countries  became  more 
acute  with  the  carrying  out  of  the  Eussian  policy  of 
aggression  in  Manchuria  in  1903  and  the  protests 
raised  against  it  in  the  British  press.  Finally  in 
January  of  the  next  year,  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
broke  out  as  a  result  of  Russia's  refusal  to  come  to 
terms  over  the  occupation  of  Manchuria,  and  although 
England  took  no  part  in  the  war,  her  sympathies 
were  frankly  with  her  Japanese  Ally  and  against  her 
"hereditary  enemy,' '  as  the  newspapers  called  Russia. 
The  possibility  of  war  between  Russia  and  England 
seemed  to  be  more  imminent  than  at  any  time  since 
the  Berlin  Congress.  Russian  newspapers  accused 
Great  Britain  of  having  caused  the  war  by  the  moral 
and  financial  assistance  given  to  Japan,  and  also  of 
instigating  Russian  revolutionaries.  British  feeling- 
was  excited  to  a  pitch  of  frenzy  by  the  cannonading  of 
British  trawlers  by  the  Russian  fleet  off  the  Dogger 
Bank.  Collision  between  the  two  nations  seemed 
inevitable.23 

The  avoidance  of  war  between  England  and  Russia 
was  due  in  part  to  the  skill  and  temper  of  the  diplomats 
who  represented  each  state;  it  was  also  due  in  large 
measure  to  the  importance  of  Anglo-Russian  trade, 
which  had  grown  constantly  and  was  too  valuable  to 
each  nation  to  be  imperilled  by  war.  Another  factor 
of  equal,  or  possibly  greater  weight  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  their  differences  was  that  both  Russia  and 
England  realized  the  enormous  advantage  that  Ger- 
many would  draw  from  an  Anglo-Russian  war.  In 
the  extraordinary  development  of  Germany  is  to  be 
found  the  explanation  of  the  continual  and  successful 

23  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  228-229. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  133 

efforts  of  the  diplomats  to  avoid  an  open  break  between 
Russia  and  England.  r  / 

England's  fear  of  Germany,  which  thus  led  to  a 
settlement  of  her  quarrel  with  Russia  as  well  as  of  y 
that  with  France,  did  not  arise  until  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth  century.  Her  relations  with  Germany 
had  always  been  determined  by  the  principle  of  British 
policy  which  we  have  already  observed,  namely,  the 
security  of  the  British  Empire.  During  the  generation 
that  followed  the  Franco-German  War,  Germany  was 
a  land  Power,  and  did  not  threaten  the  maritime  and 
colonial  supremacy  of  Great  Britain.  Hence  the  latter 
Power  viewed  the  development  of  German  strength 
with  equanimity  and  friendliness.  Personal  affection 
between  the  two  nations  was  by  no  means  strong,  and 
the  tone  of  the  British  press  was  not  always  cordial 
to  Germany.  But  official  relations  were  in  general 
perfectly  correct  and  a  close  understanding  between 
the  two  nations  was  desired  by  the  Governments  of 
both.  So  long  as  Germany  remained  the  land-rat,  as 
Bismarck  said,  there  was  no  danger  of  a  quarrel  with 
her  British  cousin,  the  water-rat. 
During  the  years  that  immediately  preceded  the 
jTnation  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  Great  Britain  and 
ermany  were  on  terms  of  increasing  intimacy.  The  Y 
ction  of  Lord  Derby  in  1875  in  joining  with  Russia / 
to  prevent  Germany's  rumored  attack  upon  France 
was  soon  forgotten,  and  the  policy  of  the  two  countries 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  brought  them  more  closely 
together.  When  in  1882  Italy  entered  into  alliance 
with  the  Teutonic  Powers,  the  cordiality  of  Anglo- 
German  relations  was  enhanced  by  the  friendliness 
^of  England  and  Italy,  which  had  existed  without  a 
DreaK  since  1860.    To  England  went  the  gratitude  of 


i 


134    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Italy  for  the  moral  support  she  had  received  during 
her  struggle  for  independence ;  England,  who  had  not 
raised  her  finger  for  Italian  freedom,  benefited  by 
the  distrust  and  bitterness  felt  in  Italy  towards 
France,  and  after  the  French  occupation  of  Tunis  the 
Anglo-Italian  understanding  was  of  the  most  cordial 
sort.  Considered  in  the  light  of  the  whole  inter- 
national situation,  this  understanding  was  almost  a 
Mediterranean  prolongation  of  the  Triple  Alliance.24 

The  tendency  of  Great  Britain  to  draw  closer  to  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  strengthened  by  the  colonial  crises 
which  took  place  in  the  early  eighties.  It  was  with 
France  that  England  was  contesting  for  colonial 
supremacy,  and  she  naturally  turned  for  support  to 
the  enemies  of  France.  That  support  she  received, 
and  Germany  constantly  took  the  British  side  in  the 
Egyptian  question,  possibly  because  of  hatred  for 
France,  possibly  because  she  desired  to  have  a  claim 
on  British  gratitude. 

It  is  true  that  at  times  the  ambitions  of  the  German 
colonial  party  brought  a  temporary  cloud  over  the 
mutual  cordiality  of  Anglo-German  relations  and  the 
path  of  friendship  was  not  always  smooth.  The  British 
were  disturbed  by  Germany's  policy  of  conquest  and 
expansion  in  Southwest  Africa,  Togoland,  and  the 
Cameroons.  German  ambitions  directed  towards  the 
vacant  islands  in  the  Pacific  also  seemed  to  impugn  the 
assumption  of  Great  Britain  that  she  was  legitimate 

24  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  13;  Schiemann,  in 
New  York  Times  Current  History  of  the  War,  Vol.  II,  no.  4,  785-786. 
"As  regards  England/ '  said  Bismarck,  "we  are  in  the  happy  situation 
of  having  no  conflict  of  interests,  except  commercial  rivalry  and  passing 
differences  such  as  must  always  arise;  but  there  is  nothing  that  can 
bring  about  a  war  between  two  pacific  and  hardworking  nations,' ' 
d'Avril,  Negotiations  relatives  au  Traitis  de  Berlin,  325. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  135 

mistress  and  had  a  sort  of  presumptive  claim  on  all  the 
islands  of  the  sea.  Such  an  assumption  was  charac- 
teristic of  all  the  British  diplomats.  "Although  the 
authority  of  England  has  not  been  proclaimed, ' '  said 
Lord  Granville,  "the  affirmation  by  a  foreign  govern- 
ment of  rights  of  sovereignty  or  jurisdiction  would  be 
considered  an  affront  to  the  legitimate  rights  of  Eng- 
land/ '  And  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  also  spoke  of 
territories  "which  without  being  actually  British  were 
nevertheless  British  by  their  character  and  history.7 ? 
It  was  inevitable  that  such  an  attitude  should  arouse 
the  heated  protests  of  the  colonial  party  in  Germany. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  British  considered  themselves 
threatened  by  Bismarck's  attitude  at  the  conference 
over  African  affairs  held  at  Berlin,  where  he  declared 
that  effective  occupation  was  the  sole  criterion  of 
sovereignty.25 

But  although  public  opinion  in  both  England  and 
Germany  was  at  times  aroused  to  mutual  hostility,  the 
Germans  protesting  against  the  British  assumption  of 
domination,  and  the  British  vexed  by  the  new  pre- 
tensions of  Germany,  the  relations  of  the  Governments 
remained  almost  invariably  friendly.  "England," 
said  Bismarck,  "is  more  important  for  us  than 
Zanzibar  and  the  whole  East  Coast."  And  after  the 
disgrace  of  the  old  Chancellor,  Caprivi,  who  replaced 
him,  emphasized  the  fact  that  in  this  respect  his 
foreign  policy  would  follow  on  the  lines  laid  down  by 
his  predecessor:  "We  have  before  everything,  sought 
to  assure  our  understanding  .with  England. '  ,26 

That  understanding  was  sealed  by  divers  treaties, 

25  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  the  Second  Earl  Granville,  ii,  chap.  X. 

26  De  Caix,  ' '  La  Politique  Anglaise, ' '  in  Questions  Actuelles  de 
Politique  Etrangere,  1911,  24. 


136    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

notably  in  1886  and  again  in  1890.  By  the  latter 
agreement  Germany  recognized  the  legitimacy  of 
British  pretensions  to  the  whole  basin  of  the  upper 
Nile  and  thus  set  her  seal  of  approval  upon  British 
supremacy  in  Egypt.  Again  in  1893  British  sover- 
eignty in  West  Central  Africa  was  acknowledged  by 
a  treaty  between  the  two  Powers  which  delimited 
Nigeria  and  the  German  Cameroons  and  excluded 
certain  disputed  districts  from  the  German  sphere 
of  influence.  Such  sacrifices  of  German  colonial 
ambitions  were  not  made  without  the  quid  jpro  .quQi 
for  while  British  colonial  interests  were  thus  furthered, 
the  position  of  Germany  on  the  Continent  was  strength- 
ened when  Heligoland  was  ceded  to  Germany  by  Lord 
Salisbury,  in  return  for  the  recognition  of  British 
rights  in  Zanzibar.27 

Curiously  enough  the  Boer  War  tended  on  the  whole 
to  bring  about  a  new  affirmation  of  the  Anglo-German 
understanding.  Public  opinion  in  each  country  was 
hostile  at  the  time.  In  England  the  memory  of  the 
Kaiser's  telegram  to  Kruger  rankled;  in  Germany 
sympathy  was  openly  expressed  for  the  Boers.  But 
Germany's  official  attitude  during  the  war  was 
undoubtedly  THendly.  At  the  moment,  England  was 
absolutely  isolated  and  it  was  in  the  power  of  the 
German  Government  to  embarrass  her  effectively. 
But  the  Kaiser  preferred  to  keep  his  hands  free  and 
await  the  outcome  of  the  war.  If  England  were 
victorious,  he  could  claim  payment  for  his  benevolent 
neutrality;  if  she  were  defeated,  then  would  be  his 
opportunity  for  action.28 

27  Keventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Folitik,  38-51. 

28  De  Caix,  op.  cit.,  33-34;  interview  with  the  Kaiser,  Daily  Telegraph, 
October  28,  1908. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  137 

It  was  during  the  Boer  War  that  the  most  important 
of  all  the  treaties  between  England  and  Germany  was 
signed,  namely,  that  of  1899,  when  Germany  secured 
the  chief  island  of  Samoa.  The  accord  of  this  year 
supplemented  that  of  1898,  when  the  possibility  of 
dividing  the  Portuguese  possessions  in  Africa  was 
considered,  and  it  assured  the  German  colonials  that 
any  railway  from  Rhodesia  to  the  Atlantic  would  pass 
through  their  territories.29  Lord  Salisbury  himself 
emphasized  the  importance  of  this  understanding  of 
1899  as  a  new  link  in  the  chain  of  friendship  which 
bound  the  two  nations:  "This  morning  you  have 
learned  of  the  arrangement  concluded  between  us  and 
one  of  the  continental  states  with  whom  more  than 
with  others  we  have  for  years  maintained  sympathetic 
and  friendly  relations.  The  arrangement  is  above  all 
interesting  as  an  indication  that  our  relations  with  the 
German  nation  are  all  that  we  could  desire. ' ,30 

In  some  quarters  there  even  existed  the  hope  of 
extending  this  Anglo-German  understanding  into  a 
definite  alliance,  possibly  including  the  United  States 
so  as  to  form  a  new  triple  "Teutonic"  alliance. 
Germany  had  come  into  close  relations  with  the 
American  Power  at  the  time  of  the  Samoan  settlement 
and  the  hard  feelings  that  resulted  from  Germany's 
sympathy  with  Spain  in  1898  had  disappeared;  the 
relations  of  Great  Britain  with  the  United  States 
were  placed  on  the  most  cordial  footing  by  their  treaty 
of  February  5,  -1900,  which  abrogated  the  old  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  to  the  advantage  of  the  United  States. 
"There  was  a  dream  of  a  sort  of  Tugendbund,  an 
alliance   of  the   supposedly   Teutonic   and   virtuous 

zoKeventlow,  op.  cit.,  135  sq. 

so  Speech  at  Lord  Mayor 's  banquet,  November  9,  1899. 


138    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

countries  against  the  decadent  nations,  whose  heritage 
might  arouse  conflicting  ambitions  amongst  the  strong 
states. ' ,31  In  his  Leicester  address,  Chamberlain  spoke 
distinctly  of  this  triple  Teutonic  alliance,  and  in 
February,  1900,  Eosebery  recognized  the  reality  of 
the  attempt  made  to  bring  it  about.  "The  Govern- 
ment," he  said,  "made  pressing  overtures  to  Germany 
and  the  United  States  for  an  alliance  last  December."32 
Thus  at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  there 
was  little  hint  of  the  coming  rivalry  and  bitterness  that 
was  destined  to  characterize  the  relations  of  England 
and  Germany  during  the  first  fifteen  years  of  the 
twentieth  century.  Intent  upon  the  preservation  of 
her  maritime  and  colonial  supremacy,  England  did 
not  yet  perceive  the  new  danger  that  threatened,  and 
continued  to  maintain  her  traditional  hostility  towards 
France  and  Russia.  The  centuries-old  conflict  with 
France  had  lost  none  of  its  venom,  and  the  jealousy 
of  the  two  nations  in  Africa  had  nearly  precipitated 
open  war  in  1898.  The  fear  of  Russia,  in  the  Near 
East,  in  Central  Asia,  and  on  the  Pacific,  kept  alive 
the  feud  which  seemed  destined  certainly  to  involve 
the  two  nations  in  another  war.  With  Germany,  on 
the  other  hand,  England  seemed  to  be  on  the  best  of 

si  Schiemann,  in  New  YorTc  Times  Current  History  of  the  War, 
Vol.  II,  no.  4,  787;  De  Caix,  op.  cit.,  35. 

32  Chamberlain  said :  l '  At  bottom  the  main  character  of  the  Teutonic 
race  differs  very  little  from  the  character  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  and  the 
same  sentiments  which  bring  us  into  close  sympathy  with  the  United 
States  of  America  may  also  be  evoked  to  bring  us  into  close  sympathy 
and  alliance  with  the  Empire  of  Germany.  ...  If  the  union  between 
England  and  America  is  a  powerful  factor  in  the  cause  of  peace,  a 
new  Triple  Alliance  between  the  Teutonic  race  and  the  two  great 
branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  will  be  a  still  more  potent  influence 
in  the  future  of  the  world/'  Annual  Register,  1899,  227.  Cf.  Eeventlow, 
Deutschlands  auswartige  PolitiTc,  146. 


BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  139 

terms.  The  clouds  that  had  arisen  between  the  two 
nations  had  been  dissipated;  and  if  public  opinion  in 
each  country  was  none  too  cordial  at  times,  the 
diplomats  and  Governments  seemed  determined  on  a 
close  and  friendly  understanding,  if  not  alliance. 

But  at  the  very  moment  when  relations  between 
Great  Britain  and  France  and  Eussia  were  most 
strained,  and  connections  with  Germany  closest, 
British  policy  was  about  to  pass  through  an  extraor- 
dinary transformation.  The  diplomatic  revolution 
that  took  place  during  the  first  years  of  the  twentieth 
century  gave  a  totally  new  direction  to  that  policy. 
Whole  centuries  of  hatred  and  rivalry  were  forgotten 
and  quarrels  of  long  standing  obliterated.  Great 
Britain,  for  years  the  implacable  foe  of  France  and 
Eussia,  within  three  years  concluded  conventions 
with  those  Powers;  and  after  maintaining  friendship 
with  Germany  for  a  generation,  discovered  in  the 
young  and  ambitious  empire  her  most  dangerous 
enemy.  The  character  and  scope  of  that  diplomatic 
revolution  forms  the  subject  of  the  chapter  which 
follows. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION 


The  student  of  recent  diplomacy  can  find  no  period 
of  such  significance  as  that  extending  from  1898  to 
1907,  for  during  these  years  took  place  the  diplomatic 
revolution  which  culminated  in  the  Triple  Entente, 
and  radically  altered  the  character  of  the  whole  inter- 
national situation.  Rarely  has  there  been  a  time  when 
the  course  of  coming  events  depended  so  closely  upon 
the  policy  of  the  diplomats  in  power,  and  of  which  we 
can  say  with  equal  confidence  that  if  these  statesmen 
had  not  been  in  office,  the  history  of  Europe  would 
have  been  different.  Broadly  speaking,  there  are  two 
aspects  to  this  diplomatic  revolution.  The  one  is  to^ 
be  found  in  the  new  attitude  of  independence  assumed 
by  France.  The  other  lies  in  the  emergence  of  Great 
Britain  from  her  magnificent  isolation,  and  the  liqui- 
dation of  her  ancient  feuds  with  France  and  Russia. 
The  result  was  a  combination  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia  in  an  entente  of  doubtful  solidity,  but 
pregnant  with  significance  and  destined  to  restore  the 
balance  that  Bismarck  destroyed. 

The  most  striking  aspect  of  the  change  is  certainly 
Great  Britain's  reversal  of  policy  when  she  entered 
into  conventions  with  her  traditional  foes,  so  soon 
after  the  sharpest  of  diplomatic  encounters.  But  the 
new  course  of  British  policy  would  hardly  have  been 
possible  except  for  the  new  spirit  that  began  to  inform 
French  diplomacy,  and  which  was  personified  by 
Theophile  Delcasse,  who  entered  the  cabinet  as  Foreign 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  KEVOLUTION  141 

Minister  in  1898  immediately  before  the  Faskoda 
crisis.  Delcasse  came  into  power  too  late  to  avert  the 
crisis  or  alleviate  immediately  the  hard  feeling  that 
resulted,  but  the  new  direction  that  French  foreign 
policy  assumed  under  his  guidance,  made  Fashoda 
the  last  of  the  incidents  that  endangered  Franco- 
British  relations. 

We  have  already  seen  that  so  long  as  Bismarck 
remained  in  power,  France  was  isolated  and  impotent. 
The  domination  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  the  friendly 
connections  which  Bismarck  maintained  with  Great 
Britain  and  Eussia,  prevented  her  from  reclaiming 
the  position  in  European  councils  that  she  had  lost 
in  1871.  Even  the  disgrace  of  Bismarck  and  the 
Franco-Russian  Alliance  of  1891  had  not  given  France 
an  opportunity  for  adopting  a  policy  of  initiative  and 
independence.  Russia  soon  made  it  plain  that  the 
alliance  was,  on  her  side  at  least,  intended  merely  to 
preserve  the  status  quo#  The  German  Kaiser  and 
diplomats  had  also  robbed  it  of  political  weight, 
partly  by  their  successful  conciliation  of  French  and 
Russian  sympathy,  partly  by  directing  the  attention  - 
of  each  nation  to  distant  colonial  ventures.  France 
thus  found  that  her  ally  was  devoting  all  her  energies 
to  Far  Eastern'  interests,  and  that  she  herself  was 
continually  involved  in  quarrels  with  Italy  and  Great 
Britain.  Germany,  by  following  Bismarck's  policy 
of  embittering  the  feeling  between  France  and  Great 
Britain,  and  France  and  Italy,  on  every  occasion, 
successfully  kept  the  victim  of  1871  in  diplomaticj 
leading-strings.1 

i  Millet,  Politique  Exterieure,  1898-1905,  227;  Reventlow,  Deutsch- 
lands  auswartige  Politik,  25,  sq.;  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances, 
12-25. 

,  \  ■ 


142    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

So  long  as  Gabriel  Hanotaux  guided  the  foreign 
policy  of  France,  Germany  was  able  to  carry  out 
the  Bismarckian  idea.  His  acquiescence  in  the  Far 
Eastern  schemes  suggested  to  Russia  by  the  diplomats 
of  the  Wilhelmstrasse  practically  nullified  the  value 
of  the  Dual  Alliance;  his  hostility  towards  England, 
combined  with  Lord  Salisbury's  German  tendencies, 
put  the  game  in  Germany's  hands.  But  with  the 
advent  of  Theophile  Delcasse  in  June,  1898,  the  foreign 
relations  of  France  were  entrusted  to  a  statesman 
of  remarkable  insight,  who  realized  clearly  the  factors 
responsible  for  French  impotence  in  foreign  affairs, 
and  who  believed  that  he  saw  the  means  by  which 
French  foreign  policy  might  be  regenerated. 

Delcasse  aimed  above  everything  else  at  two  lines 
of  action:  /^French  expansive  energy  should  be  con- 
centrated in  her  natural  field  of  influence,  the  Western 
Mediterranean;  and£French  diplomatic  independence 
of  action  should  be  established  by  a  reconciliation 
with  Italy  and  Great  Britain.  By  many  he  was 
branded  as  a  dangerous  reviver  of  the  " revanche' ' 
policy,  certain  to  embroil  his  country  with  the  Kaiser 
and  bring  about  a  conflict  that  must  result  in  new 
prostration  for  France  and  new  strength  for  Ger- 
many. Others,  constantly  increasing  in  numbers, 
approved  his  plans  as  the  sole  means  of  breaking  down 
the  hegemony  of  Germany  and  restoring  the  European 
balance.2 

Whatever  one  might  think  of  his  policy,  no  one 
could  deny  Delcasse 's  unconquerable  will,  the  lucidity 
of  his  insight,  and  the  charm  of  his  personality.    His 

2  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  97-110,  128-152  (unsympathetic) ; 
Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  52,  sq.;  Jaray,  La  Politique  franco- 
anglaise,  153;  Keventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  126-128. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  143 

meteoric  career  gave  proof  of  his  qualities.  He  had 
come  to  Paris  from  the  South,  poor  and  without 
friends,  but  equipped  with  a  facile  pen  and  a  mar- 
vellous capacity  for  making  foreign  affairs  intelli- 
gible to  the  man  in  the  street.  Entering  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  at  the  age  of  thirty-seven,  his  assiduous 
study  of  colonial  matters  marked  him  out  for  the  post 
of  Colonial  Secretary,  which  he  received  in  1894. 
Four  years  later,  at  the  time  of  the  most  serious 
crisis  of  the  decade,  he  entered  the  Quai  d'Orsay  as 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  a  post  which  he  was  to 
hold  continuously  during  the  next  seven  years. 

His  road  had  not  been  easy.  Insignificant  in  appear- 
ance, deprived  of  the  physical  proportions  which 
count  for  much  in  French  politics,  with  a  thin  voice 
so  often  fatal  to  a  speaker  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  lacking  the  gift  of  improvisation,  he  had  to 
prepare  his  speeches  with  the  utmost  care  and  fore- 
thought, often  only  to  see  them  utterly  drowned  in 
the  tumult  of  the  session.  But  his  energy  and  tenacity 
in  party  politics  were  as  notable  as  his  brilliance  in 
the  handling  of  foreign  affairs.  In  less  than  a  decade 
from  the  time  he  had  entered  the  Chamber  he  had  won 
the  authority  which  comes  to  most  only  after  a  long 
struggle.  Similar  to  Thiers  in  person,  manners,  and 
clarity  of  method,  he  was  now  to  exercise  as  definite 
an  effect  upon  French  history  as  did  the  first 
President  of  the  Republic.3  Without  hesitation  he 
proceeded  to  carry  out  the  diplomatic  revolution /.first 
by  completing  the  understanding  with  Italy  ^iext  by 
inaugurating  political  friendship  with  Great  Britain. 

Previous  to  1896  the  reconciliation  of  France  with 
Italy  seemed  to  be  excluded  from  the  realm  of  political 

s  Albin,  Le  Coup  d'Agadir,  23. 


144    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

possibilities.  From  1878  to  1896  the  predominant 
figure  among  Italian  statesmen  was  Crispi,  who  was 
filled  with  an  ardent  hatred  of  France,  regarding  that 
Power  as  the  friend  of  the  Pope,  and  therefore  Italy's 
worst  enemy ;  he  *  *  scented  the  Vatican  in  every  breeze 
from  the  Biviera."4  Crispi  was  also  susceptible  to 
Bismarckian  influence,  whenever  the  Chancellor  chose 
to  exert  it,  and  Bismarck  took  care  that  Italy  should 
be  encouraged  in  her  dreams  of  colonial  expansion, 
which  were  bound  to  bring  her  into  conflict  with 
France.  In  1882,  Italy  acquired  a  port  on  the 
Abyssinian  coast,  and  three  years  later  began  to 
develop  the  colony  of  Eritrea.  French  colonial 
influence  in  West  Africa  seemed  to  be  threatened 
thereby  and  French  jealousy  was  immediately  aroused. 
The  relations  between  the  two  countries  were  not 
improved  when  Italy  repudiated  her  commercial  treaty 
with  France  and  began  a  tariff  war.  A  series  of 
unfortunate  incidents  accentuated  the  animosity:  in 
1886  Italian  workmen  in  the  south  of  France  were 
maltreated;  in  1887  the  Florentine  police,  supported 
by  Crispi,  broke  open  the  French  archives;  in  the 
following  year  there  was  a  quarrel  over  the  status 
of  French  citizens  in  Massowah,  and  in  1888  the  rumor 
was  current  that  the  French  fleet  was  on  the  point 
of  attacking  the  Italian  coast.5  In  1891  a  Frenchman 
wrote  Vive  le  Pape  in  the  book  lying  near  the  tomb  of 
Victor  Emmanuel,  in  the  Pantheon,  with  the  result 
that  feeling  against  France  rose  to  an  unprecedented 
degree  of  warmth.  In  the  same  year,  when  Italy 
renewed  the  Triple  Alliance,  she  pledged  herself  in 

*Feiling,  Italian  Policy  since  1870,  6. 

6  Annual  Register,  1888,  243,  258,  259,  262;  Eeventlow,  op.  cit.,  17. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  145 

case  of  German  demand,  to  send  two  army  corps 
through  the  Tyrol  to  attack  France.8 

With  the  fall  of  Bismarck  in  1891  the  diplomatic 
tension  was  slightly  relaxed  and  the  chance  of  pre- 
serving a  peace  which  seemed  so  fragile,  became 
greater.  A  monument  to  Garibaldi  was  inaugurated 
at  Nice,  a  French  fleet  visited  Genoa  in  1892,  and  in 
1895  a  statue  of  MacMahon  was  unveiled  at  Magenta. 
Most  important  of  all  was  the  failure  of  Crispi's 
colonial  schemes  and  the  end  of  that  policy  of 
adventure  which  had  irritated  France.  On  March  1, 
1896,  the  Italian  army  sent  to  penetrate  into  Abyssinia, 
was  annihilated  at  Adowa  by  the  Abyssinian  Emperor 
Menelek,  and  Italy  was  forced  to  abandon  the  pro- 
tectorate she  had  claimed.  Crispi  's  career  was  doomed 
and  he  immediately  resigned.7 

The  fall  of  the  aggressive  anti-French  statesman 
and  tool  of  Bismarck  opened  the  door  for  a  recon- 
ciliation with  France.  Such  a  reconciliation  was 
endorsed  by  public  opinion  in  Italy  as  well  as  by  all 
the  commercial  interests.  Italy,  by  her  pro-German 
policy  had  gained  only  doubtful  advantages.  She  had 
sacrificed  her  dream  of  winning  the  Trentino  and 
Trieste  and  was  forced  to  limit  her  ambitions  in 
Albania,  out  of  deference  to  the  wishes  of  Austria. 
She  had  exposed  herself  to  the  danger  of  a  continental 
war  and  had  not  received  guarantees  from  Germany 
against  a  naval  war,  nor  had  she  strengthened  her 
position  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  economic  conse- 
quences of  the  break  with  France  were  nothing  less 
than   disastrous   to   Italy's   young  industries.     The 

e  Singer,  Geschichte  des  Dreibundes,  100. 

7  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815,  382-383 ;  Tardieu,  France  and  the 
Alliances,  86-87. 


vx 


I'  \ 


146    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

repudiation  of  the  French  commercial  treaty  had, 
within  a  space  of  two  years,  diminished  trade  to  a 
ruinous  extent;  Italian  exports  to  France  decreased 
by  61  per  cent ;  and  in  a  single  year  French  capitalists 
withdrew  seven  hundred  million  francs  from  Italian 
industrial  enterprises.8 

Thus  economic  circumstances,  as  well  as  the  dis- 
appearance of  Bismarck  and  Crispi,  facilitated  a 
settlement  of  the  Franco-Italian  quarrel.  Even  before 
Delcasse 's  accession  to  office,  conditions  were  ripe  for 
his  plan  of  an  understanding  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, and  a  manifestation  of  Italian  willingness  was 
given  in  September,  1896,  when  Italy  accepted  a 
revision  of  the  Tunisian  treaties,  implying  a  recog- 
nition on  her  part  of  the  French  protectorate  in  Tunis. 
Immediately  after  entering  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  Delcasse 
began  further  negotiations,  and  in  November,  1898, 
carried  out  the  first  step  in  his  policy  by  arranging  a 
treaty  of  commerce  with  Italy.9 

So  great  were  the  immediate  advantages  of  this 
treaty,  especially  to  Italy,  which,  according  to  her  own 
writers,  was  thereby  saved  from  economic  ruin,  that 
the  Franco-Italian  rapprochement  might  safely  have 
rested  upon  a  purely  commercial  basis.  Italy  would 
have  gained  from  it  the  economic  benefit  she  was 
seeking,  while  France  would  have  secured  the  political 
advantages  she  hoped  to  find  in  friendship  with  Italy. 
But  Delcasse  was  anxious  to  give  the  understanding 
a  rather  more  definite  political  character,  and  with 
this  in  mind  he  entered  into  diplomatic  negotiations 
with  Rome.  In  1900,  1901,  and  1902,  by  the  exchange 
of  notes  and  in  verbal  conversations,  the  political 

sReventlow,  op.  cit.,  53-54. 
•  Feiling,  op.  cit.,  9. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  147 

understanding  was  completed.  France  promised  to 
refrain  from  any  interference  with  Tripoli,  in  which 
quarter  Italy  was  to  have  free  hand;  and  Italy  in 
return  gave  France  the  assurance  that  she  would  do 
nothing  that  might  hamper  French  policy  in  Morocco. 
It  was  furthermore  understood  that  the  character 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  so  far  as  Italy  was  concerned, 
was  entirely  defensive ;  and  that  in  no  case  could  Italy 
become  "either  the  instrument  or  the  auxiliary  of  an 
aggression"  against  France.10 

The  understanding  with  Italy  marked  an  important 
step  towards  the  fulfilment  of  Delcasse's  double 
purpose;  it  was  essential  to  the  security  of  French 
power  in  the  Western  Mediterranean,  and  it  helped 
to  restore  the  independence  of  French  diplomatic 
action  in  Europe.  Morocco  is  contiguous  to  Algeria 
and  the  stability  of  the  Fren^j  fcpime  in  the  latter 
quarter  could  not  be  guarantB  I  Morocco  fell  into 
the  hands  of  a  hostile  Power,^fflt  France  were  not 
allowed  to  develop  her  interests  there.  Both  for  the 
preservation  and  the  extension  A£  her  Mediterranean 
influence,  France  must  have  a  S$  hand  in  Morocco. 
By  winning  the  assent  of  Itaiy  to  her  proposed 
expansion  westwards  on  the  African  seaboard,  France 
averted  all  difficulty  that  might  have  arisen  with  her 
chief  Mediterranean  rival.  The  rapprochement  with 
Italy  also  facilitated  the  future  autonomy  of  French 
diplomacy  by  blunting  the  edge  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
The  feud  between  the  two  nations,  which  was  so  long 
a  characteristic  feature  of  the  international  situation, 
had  been  one  of  the  chief  factors  of  French  weakness 

10  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  88-91 ;  on  Italian  schemes  in 
North  Africa,  see  Berard,  V Affaire  marocaine,  61;  Journal  des  Debats, 
December  30,  1905;  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  128-139. 


148    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

and  German  strength.  The  intensity  of  Italian  feeling 
against  France  was  the  club  that  Germany  held  over 
her  conquered  rival ;  with  its  disappearance  the  diplo- 
matic hegemony  of  Germany  was  no  longer  secure. 
J  The  second  phase  of  Delcasse's  policy  was  accom- 
plished with  equal  success  and  with  results  of  even 
greater  importance.  His  plan  of  freeing  France  from 
German  influence  and  of  strengthening  the  French 
position  in  the  Mediterranean  was  assisted  in  the 
highest  degree  by  the  second  reconciliation  that  he 
effected,  and  which  resulted  in  the  Anglo-French 
Entente  of  April  8,  1904.  Except  for  this  rapproche- 
ment with  England,  the  stability  and  value  of  the 
Franco-Italian  understanding  would  have  been  ques- 
tionable; French  expansion  in  Morocco  would  have 
been  difficult  if  not  impossible;  and  Germany's  domi- 
nation on  the  Continent  would  not  have  been  broken. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  Franco-Italian  understanding, 
the  personalities  of  the  leading  diplomats  were  of 
great  importance  in  determining  the  Anglo-French 
reconciliation.  So  long  as  men  like  Hanotaux  and 
Salisbury  were  in  office,  such  a  reconciliation  was  out 
y  of  the  question ;  only  with  the  entrance  of  new  figures 
upon  the  diplomatic  stage  could  the  settlement  of  the 
ancient  feud  be  attempted.  Delcasse's  accession  to 
power  in  1898  may  be  regarded  as  the  first  step  in 
the  formation  of  the  Entente.  Even  in  the  midst  of 
the  Fashoda  crisis,  he  attempted  to  appease  the 
general  hostility  of  French  feeling  towards  Great 
Britain,  believing  firmly  that  France  must  win  British 
friendship  if  she  were  to  regain  a  position  of  influence 
in  Europe.  "I  should  be  sorry  to  leave  office,' '  said 
he,  in  November,  1898,  "  before  I  had  established  a 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  149 

good  understanding  with  England."11  He  saw  in 
England  a  "potential  ally,  in  Germany  the  only 
enemy."12  And  the  new  French  Ambassador  to  St. 
James,  M.  Cambon,  left  for  his  post  with  similar 
intentions. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Channel  new  personalities 
were  coming  into  control  of  diplomatic  policy,  who 
were  less  closely  bound  by  the  traditions  of  the  British 
Foreign  Office.  In  October,  1900,  Lord  Salisbury 
ceased  to  be  Foreign  Secretary ;  for  half  a  generation, 
with  the  exception  of  one  brief  interval,  he  had  con- 
ducted British  foreign  relations  on  the  principle  that 
France  was  Great  Britain's  natural  enemy,  and  he 
had  concentrated  his  energies  on  British  expansion 
in  Africa  at  the  expense  of  France ;  invariably  he  had 
worked  to  affirm  the  understanding  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany.  Salisbury  was  succeeded  by 
Lansdowne,  who  although  he  was  no  enemy  of  Ger- 
many, soon  showed  himself  anxious  to  restore  the 
European  balance  and  end  the  diplomatic  situation 
which  Germany  had  long  exploited. 

Only  three  months  later  Queen  Victoria,  who  was 
noted  for  her  German  tendencies  and  her  inability 
to  understand  the  French,  was  succeeded  by  Edward 
VII.  England  was  fortunate  in  her  new  ruler. 
Already  past  middle  age  when  he  mounted  the  throne, 
he  showed  immediately  that  the  long  years  during 
which  his  mother  had  kept  him  at  arm's  length  fron; 
political  affairs,  had  by  no  means  been  wasted. 
Although  he  was  allowed  access  to  State  papers  only 
during    the    years    that    immediately    preceded    the 

11  Berard,  in  Revue  de  Paris,  July  1,  1905,  and  France  et  Guillaume 
II,  21. 

12  Eose,  The  Origins  of  the  War,  69. 


150    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Queen's  death,  it  was  clear  that  he  had  made  the  most 
of  his  opportunities,  for  he  displayed  an  ability  to 
grasp  international  questions  worthy  of  an  experienced 
diplomat.13 

Furthermore  the  time  spent  by  him  in  apparently 
frivolous  occupations  had  brought  him  into  touch  with 
men  of  all  classes  and  shades  of  opinion.  He  had 
acquired  a  broad  and,  with  the  help  of  his  extraordi- 
nary memory,  a  singularly  accurate  knowledge  of 
trade,  finance,  and  politics.  His  natural  magnetism 
and  geniality  had  not  withered  under  the  stress  of  his 
wearisome  social  duties ;  rather  had  it  developed  until 
there  were  few  who  could  resist  the  charm  of  his 
personality.  That  England  should  have  possessed  a 
sovereign  of  such  a  type  at  the  moment  when  her 
interests  pointed  to  a  reconciliation  with  two  tradi- 
tional enemies,  is  an  instance  of  the  special  providence 
that  seems  to  watch  over  the  British  Empire. 

The  new  monarch,  at  first  under  the  influence  of  his 
imperial  nephew  of  Germany,  was  not  slow  to  realize 
the  advantages  that  England  would  draw  from  a  close 
understanding  with  France,  and  the  dangers  that 
would  result  from  a  continuation  of  the  quarrel  at  the 
time  when  Germany  was  looking  forward  to  world 
empire.  Desirous  of  effecting  a  reconciliation,  and 
bringing  to  his  task  qualities  of  the  highest  value, 
the  impression  which  his  personality  produced  in 
France  proved  to  be  one  of  the  chief  factors  in  his 
success.  Well  liked  across  the  Channel  and  under- 
standing the  French  people,  "he  did  that  which  no 
Minister,  no  Cabinet,  no  Ambassadors,  neither  treaties, 
nor  protocols,  nor  understandings,  which  no  debates, 

is  Cf.  Lord  Redesdale,  Memoirs,  passim.  Sidney  Lee  in  his  article 
in  the  Dictionary  of  National  Biography  is  less  appreciative. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  151 

no  banquets,  nor  speeches,  were  able  to  perform.  He, 
by  bis  personality  alone,  brought  home  to  the  minds 
of  millions  on  the  Continent  .  .  .  the  friendly  feelings 
of  the  country  over  which  King  Edward  ruled. ' ,14 

The  new  diplomats  on  both  sides  of  the  Channel  thus 
desired  an  understanding.  They  were  warmly  sup- 
ported by  the  commercial  interests.  England  was 
France's  most  valued  customer,  capable  of  appre- 
ciating the  French  articles  of  luxury  and,  with  her 
capital,  capable  of  paying  for  them.  The  exports  of 
French  production  competed  only  to  the  smallest 
degree  with  those  made  in  England.  But  owing  to 
the  political  relations  between  the  two  countries 
commerce  had  not  developed  to  its  natural  limits,  and 
French  traders  believed  that  the  establishment  of 
more  friendly  political  connections  would  materially 
assist  the  extension  of  their  export  trade.  In  London, 
the  commercial  classes  considered  that  friendship  with 
France  would  be  the  best  means  of  meeting  the 
German  competition,  the  effects  of  which  were  plainly 
discernible.  In  1901  and  the  following  years  influen- 
tial traders  began  a  campaign  with  the  purpose  of 
ameliorating  the  relations  of  the  two  countries. 
Barclay  travelled  through  France  and  meeting  the 
various  Chambers  of  Commerce  brought  them  to  the 
point  of  vigorous  advocacy  of  an  economic  entente. 
And  in  England,  the  Associated  Chambers  of  British 
Commerce  passed  a  resolution  favoring  a  Franco- 
British  treaty  of  arbitration.15 

But  the  real  explanation  of  the  Entente  of  1904  is 
to  be  found  less  in  the  friendly  spirit  of  the  diplomats 

i*  Mr.  Balfour  in  the  House  of  Commons,  May  11,  1910. 
is  Sir  Thomas  Barclay,   Thirty   Tears '  Anglo-French  Reminiscences, 
175-229. 


152    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

and  the  material  interests  of  the  commercial  classes, 
than  in  the  fear  of  Germany  which  seized  the  British  *\ 
people  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century.  The 
economic  transformation  of  Germany  which  led  to  the 
building  up  of  her  mercantile  marine  and  overseas 
trade  was  an  ever-increasing  cause  of  anxiety  to  the 
British  commercial  classes.  German  commerce,  as 
we  saw,  doubled  in  value  during  the  decade  following 
1895.  Consular  reports  emphasized  the  success  of  the 
Germans  in  winning  markets,  and  expatiated  upon 
their  superiority  over  the  British  in  technical  educa- 
tion and  in  methods  of  salesmanship.  Every  year 
came  word  of  British  ports  declining  in  importance 
as  a  result  of  German  initiative,  of  the  growth  of 
German  ship-yards  and  docks,  of  mercantile  companies 
purchased  by  the  Germans  from  the  British,  and  of 
the  displacement  of  the  British  flag  by  the  German 
in  the  seas  of  China  and  the  Levant.  Even  in  London 
City,  Cockneys  were  being  replaced  by  German  clerks, 
who  furnished  greater  efficiency  at  a  lower  wage.16 

At  the  same  time  the  British  watched  with  conster- 
nation the  development  of  the  German  naval  plan. 
'  (The  first  scheme  of  1898,  in  itself  sufficiently  disquiet- 
ing to  Great  Britain,  was  speedily  judged  by  the 
Germans  to  be  inadequate  and  was  complemented  by 
the  programme  of  1900,  which  was  clearly  designed 
to  render  Germany  capable  of  coping  alone  with  any 
adversary  upon  the  sea.  The  cousin  land-rat  of  Bis- 
marck's day  was  learning  to  swim  and  was  turning 
water-rat.  With  a  clarity  that  was  as  unmistakable 
as  it  was  unpleasant,  Great  Britain  began  to  perceive 
that  the  danger  of  the  future  was  likely  to  proceed  not 

leReventlow,    Deutschlands    auswartige    PolitiTc,    86,    sq.;     Tardieu, 
France  and  the  Alliances,  54-60. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  153 

from  France  or  Kussia,  but  from  the  empire  founded 
by  Bismarck,  which  was  now  passing  beyond  the  scope 
of  Bismarck's  dreams. 

As  early  as  1897  a  bitter  article  in  the  Saturday 
Review  dilated  upon  the  danger  that  must  threaten 
Great  Britain  if  Germany  were  allowed  to  proceed 
upon  her  path  of  expansion  unchecked.  " England,' ' 
the  writer  says,  "with  her  long  history  of  successful 
aggression,  with  her  marvellous  conviction  that  in 
pursuing  her  own  interests  she  is  spreading  light 
among  nations  dwelling  in  darkness,  and  Germany, 
bone  of  the  same  bone,  blood  of  the  same  blood,  with 
a  lesser  will-force,  but  perhaps  with  a  keener  intelli- 
gence, compete  in  every  corner  of  the  globe.  In  the 
Transvaal,  at  the  Cape,  in  Central  Africa,  in  India 
and  the  East,  in  the  islands  of  the  Southern  Sea,  and 
in  the  far  Northwest,  wherever — and  where  has  it 
not? — the  flag  has  followed  the  Bible,  and  trade  has 
followed  the  flag,  there  the  German  bagman  is 
struggling  with  the  English  pedlar.  Is  there  a  mine 
to  exploit,  a  railway  to  build,  a  native  to  convert  from 
breadfruit  to  tinned  meat,  from  temperance  to  trade 
gin,  the  German  and  the  Englishman  are  struggling 
to  be  first.  A  million  petty  disputes  build  up  the 
greatest  cause  of  war  the  world  has  ever  seen.  If 
Germany  were  extinguished  tomorrow,  the  day  after 
tomorrow  there  is  not  an  Englishman  in  the  world 
who  would  not  be  richer.  Nations  have  fought  for 
years  over  a  city  or  a  right  of  succession.  Must 
they  not  fight  for  two  hundred  fifty  million  pounds  of 
commerce  V9 

The  article  does  not  stop  with  pointing  out  the 
conflict  that  existed  between  German  and  British 
interests  but  goes  on  to  show  that  England  could  make 


154    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

war  upon  Germany  with  every  prospect  of  success. 
' l  Her  partners  in  the  Triple  Alliance  would  be  useless 
against  England;  Austria  because  she  could  do 
nothing;  Italy  because  she  dare  not  lay  herself  open 
to  an  attack  by  France.  The  growth  of  Germany's 
fleet  has  done  no  more  than  to  make  the  blow  of 
England  fall  on  her  more  heavily.  A  few  days  and 
her  ships  would  be  at  the  bottom,  or  in  convoy  to 
English  ports ;  Hamburg  and  Bremen,  the  Kiel  Canal 
and  her  Baltic  ports  would  lie  under  the  guns  of 
England  waiting  until  the  indemnity  were  settled. 
Our  work  over  we  need  not  even  be  at  the  pains  to 
alter  Bismarck's  words  to  Ferry  and  to  say  to  France 
and  Russia,  'Seek  some  compensation.  Take  inside 
Germany  whatever  you  like.    You  can  have  it. '  ' m 

^  Here  is  a  spirit  no  less  fiery  and  belligerent  than 
that  of  Bernhardi  a  decade  later,  although  it  is  safe 
to  say  that  it  represented  the  feeling  of  the  mass  of 
the  nation  far  less  accurately  than  did  the  German 
soldier.  But  if  such  sentiments  were  held  by  only 
a  small  minority  in  1897  the  German  naval  programme 
of  the  next  years  converted  many  to  the  creed  of  the 
writer.  And  if  few  spoke  out  so  plainly  it  was  because 
the  reality  of  the  peril  was  so  clearly  recognized  that 
plain  speaking  could  no  longer  safely  be  indulged  in. 
Nor  were   British  fears   alleviated  by  the  moral 

y\  transformation  that  was  taking  place  in  Germany, 
which  demonstrated  to  the  more  clear-sighted  in 
England  that  the  menace  was  not  merely  of  an  economic 
character.  Germany's  dreams  of  world  policy,  of 
extending  her  political  as^  well  as  her  commercial 
empire  throughout  the  world,  could  not  but  disturb 

17  Saturday  Review,  September  11,  1897. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  155 

British  imperialists.  The  rather  indefinite  schemes 
for  the  acquisition  of  colonies,  the  beginning  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  the  money  spent  upon  fortifications 
at  Kiau  Chau,  seemed  to  Great  Britain  to  indicate  a 
carefully  conceived  plan  of  expansion  on  Germany's 
part.  The  belligerent  and  defiant  attitude  of  Germans, 
which  we  have  noticed,  increased  British  nervousness. 
Little  by  little  the  conception  of  a  German  imperialism 
making  use  of  German  continental  hegemony  to  raise 
a  European  league  against  England  and  destroy  her 
colonial  dominion,  became  current.  To  the  British, 
the  future  seemed  to  be  fraught  with  another  struggle 
like  those  they  had  formerly  waged  against  Philip  II, 
Louis  XIV,  and  Napoleon.  They  remembered  the 
words  of  Chatham,  "Our  first  duty  is  to  see  that 
France  does  not  become  a  naval,  commercial,  and 
colonial  Power,' '  and  they  applied  them  to  Germany. 

Under  these  conditions  a  continuation  of  the  under- 
standing with  Germany  which  had  seemed  so  solid 
in  1899,  was  clearly  impossible.  As  we  have  seen, 
British  policy  has  followed  invariably  a  single  prin- 
ciple, the  security  of  her  colonial  and  maritime  empire,^ 
and  in  the  first  years  of  the  new  century  British 
diplomats  remained  true  to  this  principle.  So  long  as 
Germany  remained  a  land  Power  they  could  afford 
to  be  indifferent  to  German  diplomatic  hegemony  on 
the  Continent.  But  with  Germany  menacing  tbeir 
maritime  empire,  it  was  imperative  that  the  conti- 
nental balance  of  power  should  be  restored.  The 
obvious  method  of  restoration  was  an  understanding 
with  France.  Splendid  isolation  was  no  longer  even 
dignified,  and  it  threatened  to  become  perilous  in  the 
extreme. 

To  Edward  VII  must  go  much  of  the  credit  for  theX^ 


y 


156    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

successful  termination  of  England's  ancient  quarrel 
with  France.  The  efforts  of  the  diplomats  were 
greatly  facilitated,  it  is  true,  by  the  eagerness  of  the 
commercial  interests  as  well  as  by  the  new  friendship 
of  France  and  Italy;  but  it  was  the  King  who  paved 
the  way  for  serious  negotiations  by  his  visit  to  Paris. 
With  Fashoda  only  five  years  away  and  the  attitude 
of  the  Parisians  by  no  means  certain,  Edward  VII 
risked  no  little  when  he  tested  French  sentiments  in 
1903;  he  was  at  first  received  unenthusiastically,  but 
immediately  awoke  in  Paris  and  in  all  France  the 
warm  and  kindly  feelings  for  the  genial  monarch  that 
have  ever  since  persisted.  With  the  return  visit  of 
M.  Loubet,  definite  conversations  became  possible. 
Negotiations  lasted  eight  months,  and  on  April  8, 1904, 
the  agreement  was  signed.18 

I  The  arrangement,  which  came  to  be  known  as  the 
Entente  Cordiale,  settled  once  and  for  all  the  conflicts 
which  had  arisen  between  England  and  France  as  a 
result  of  their  policies  of  expansion.  Of  these,  the 
most  serious  had  related  to  Africa  and  especially  to 
the  position  of  the  British  in  Egypt  and  the  possible 
development  of  French  schemes  in  Morocco.  In  each 
quarter  the  nation  chiefly  interested  was  granted  a 
free  hand  by  the  other.  France  recognized  the  British 
position  in  Egypt  and  promised  not  to  thwart  the 
British  Government  by  asking  that  a  date  should  be 
set  for  the  British  occupation  to  cease.  In  return, 
Great  Britain  recognized  the  special  interests  of 
France  in  Morocco,  promising  that  she  would  do 
nothing  to  hamper  her  liberty  of  action  in  carrying 
out  necessary  reforms.    The  two  signatories  further 

is  Barclay,  op.  cit.,  230-236. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  157 

agreed  to  lend  each  other  mutual  help  diplomatically 
for  the  execution  of  the  clauses  of  the  declaration.19 

The  direct  effects  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  are 
obvious.  For  France  it  completed  the  second  phase 
in  Delcasse 's  policy.  In  return  for  her  recognition 
of  the  British  position  in  Egypt,  which  was  no  more 
than  an  acknowledgment  of  actual  facts,  France 
received  the  necessary  guarantee  of  the  development 
of  her  Western  Mediterranean  policy.  Delcasse,  by 
narrowing  the  scope  of  French  colonial  activities  and 
surrendering  claims  which  could  be  enforced  only  with  / 
the  greatest  difficulty,  cleared  the  path  for  French  / 
control  in  Morocco,  and  increased  the  chance  of 
sovereignty  in  her  natural  sphere  of  influence.  The 
position  of  France  in  Morocco  was  further  assured 
a  few  months  after  the  Anglo-French  Convention,  by 
an  understanding  with  Spain  (September,  1904), 
according  to  which  the  spheres  of  influence  of  each 
nation  in  Northern  Africa  were  delimited.20  Taken  in 
conjunction  with  this  Spanish  understanding  and  the 
earlier  convention  with  Italy,  the  Anglo-French 
Entente  apparently  gave  to  Delcasse  the  full  liberty 
of  action  in  the  Western  Mediterranean  for  which  he 
had  been  striving  since  his  accession  to  office. 

But  the  Entente  Cordiale  had  a  wider  significance 
for  both  France  and  Great  Britain  than  lay  in  the 
settlement  of  African  questions.     It  was  a  general 
arrangement  of  the  national  quarrel  which  had  longV  v 
been  considered  an  axiom  of  international  diplomacy; 

19  The  terms  of  the  convention  are  printed  in  Price,  Diplomatic 
History  of  the  War,  274.  On  Europe  and  Morocco  see  Pinon,  Lf Empire 
de  la  Mediterranee.  On  the  bearing  of  the  convention  as  it  affected 
African  questions,  see  Cromer,  Modern  Egypt,  ii,  388-396. 

soTardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  95-106;  the  terms  of  the 
Convention  are  printed  in  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  286,  291. 


158    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

it  destroyed  the  tension  between  the  two  countries 
which  had  been  the  "postulate  of  European  policy, 
the  favorite  instrument  of  the  policy  of  Germany.  By 
putting  an  end  to  this  state  of  things,  the  Cabinets  of 
London  and  Paris  introduced  a  new  weight  into  the 
international  balance  of  power.  They  mutually  freed 
themselves  from  preoccupations  that  had  long  been 
a  burden;  and  they  guaranteed  each  other  a  liberty 
of  action  which  was  equally  precious  to  both."21 

Delcasse  thus  won  for  France  a  diplomatic  autonomy 
which  the  alliance  with  Eussia  had  not  given  her.  Her 
feuds  with  Italy  and  England  ended,  she  could  hope 
to  escape  from  the  diplomatic  domination  that  first 
Bismarck  and  then  William  II  had  imposed  upon  her, 
and  which  French  ministers  such  as  Hanotaux  had 
accepted.  Henceforth  she  might  hope  to  transform 
her  policy  from  one  of  passivity  and  impotence  to  one 
of  initiative.  For  Great  Britain,  oppressed  by  the  fear 
of  Germany,  the  liberation  of  France  was  of  the  utmost 
advantage,  because  it  lessened  the  chances  of  success 
in  what  was  believed  to  be  the  great  German  i  i  design. ' r 
So  long  as  Germany  held  the  hegemony  of  the 
Continent  there  was  always  possible  the  creation  of 
a  continental  league  against  the  British  Empire,  which 
would  revive  the  perils  of  the  Napoleonic  age.  The 
Entente  with  France,  as  a  step  in  the  restoration  of 
the  continental  balance  and  the  breaking  down  of 
German  primacy,  offered  the  best  defence  of  Britain's 
maritime  empire  against  the  German  menace. 

One  factor  in  the  European  situation,  however,  con- 
tinued to  maintain  Germany's  position  of  supremacy 
on  the  Continent  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo- 

21  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  66. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  159 

French  understanding,  namely,  the  mutual  antagonism 
of  Great  Britain  and  Russia.  So  long  as  these  two 
nations  were  on  bad  terms,  little  practical  effect  could 
be  expected  from  England's  new  friendship  with 
France,  a  nation  which  was  at  the  same  time  the  ally 
of  Russia.  "We  have  seen  how  the  interests  of  Russia 
and  Great  Britain  conflicted  in  the  Near  and  Central 
East,  and  how  the  danger  of  an  open  break  became 
acute  during  the  years  of  Russia's  aggression  in 
Manchuria  and  China.  But  as  in  the  case  of  Franco- 
British  relations,  the  tension  was  greatest  immediately 
before  it  relaxed  entirely. 

Curiously  enough,  the  defeat  of  Russia  by  Japan  on 
the  plains  of  Manchuria  did  much  to  render  a  recon- 
ciliation possible.  Great  Britain  had  no  intention  of 
allowing  Japan  to  dominate  the  Pacific,  and  after  1905 
was  willing  to  make  friends  with  Russia,  who  might 
be  found  useful  as  a  counterweight  against  an  ally 
that  was  too  strong;  it  was  to  Great  Britain's  obvious 
interest  that  neither  Japan  nor  Russia  should  secure 
a  position  of  control  in  the  Far  East,  and  if  Russia 
could  be  brought  to  an  understanding  with  herself  and 
Japan,  a  safe  balance  might  be  struck. 

In  the  Near  East  the  causes  of  Anglo-Russian 
hostility  were  also  disappearing.  With  the  develop- 
ment of  Germany's  world  policy  and  the  beginning 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  British  statesmen  perceived 
that  Teutonic  control  in  the  Balkans  and  on  the 
Dardanelles  threatened  India  and  the  route  to  India 
far  more  seriously  than  did  the  aspirations  of  Russia ; 
and  they  believed  that  an  essential  condition  of  defence 
against  German  development  in  the  Near  East  and 
Mesopotamia  was  an  understanding  between  Great 
Britain  and  Russia.    Thus  of  the  three  quarters  where 


160    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Anglo-Russian  rivalry  had  been  acute,  there  remained 
only  one,  the  Central  East,  in  which  possible  cause  for 
conflict  might  arise  in  the  future.  In  1907  a  convention 
between  the  two  nations  settled  disputes  relating  to 
Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  Thibet,  and  established  an 
understanding  which  was  destined  to  keep  the  general 
policies  of  the  countries  in  harmony. 

The  sudden  and  surprising  reconciliation  of  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  was  chiefly  facilitated  by  the 
attitude  of  each  nation  towards  Germany.  Great 
Britain  was  consumed  with  fear  of  the  economic 
development  of  that  nation  and  believed  herself 
threatened  directly  by  its  world  policy;  the  same 
factors  that  had  led  to  her  reconciliation  with  France 
S"  made  for  an  understanding  with  Russia.  Russia,  on 
the  other  hand,  after  seeing  her  dream  of  Far  Eastern 
domination  shattered,  was  not  grateful  to  Germany, 
who  was  largely  responsible  for  the  aggressive  policy 
of  Russia  in  China  and  Manchuria.  Furthermore,  the 
activity  of  Russia,  checked  in  the  Far  East,  must 
inevitably  be  turned  towards  the  Balkans  and  Con- 
stantinople, and  in  this  quarter  Russian  ambitions 
conflicted  with  Germany's  purpose  of  controlling  a 
sweep  of  territory  extending  from  the  North  Sea  to 
the  Persian  Gulf.  It  was  unthinkable  that  the  interests 
of  Pan-Germanism  and  Pan-Slavism  should  not  clash 
in  the  Near  East. 

The  settlement  of  the  Anglo-Russian  feud  was  also 
facilitated  by  the  example  of  the  Entente  Cordiale, 
which  demonstrated  the  ease  with  which  a  long- 
standing and  bitter  rivalry  might  be  terminated. 
The  arrangement  of  the  dispute  which  had  arisen 
between  England  and  Russia  over  the  Dogger  Bank 
incident,  further  proved  that  there  was  no  serious 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  161 

reason  why  the  two  nations  should  not  proceed  to  a 
general  settlement  of  their  differences. 

Almost  immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Japanese  War  the  press  of  both  countries  assumed 
a  cordial  tone  and  the  new  Foreign  Ministers,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  in  England  and  Isvolsky  in  Eussia, 
demonstrated  their  firm  determination  to  bring  about 
an  understanding.22  For  the  discussion  of  bases  of 
agreement  the  Conference  of  Algeciras,  in  1906,  re- 
furnished an  excellent  opportunity,  and  the  Russian 
and  British  plenipotentiaries  held  long  conversations, 
which  served  materially  to  clear  the  ground  for 
definite  negotiations.23  In  March,  1907,  a  semi-official 
note  announced  the  carrying  on  of  negotiations  by  the 
two  Governments  and  the  prospect  of  speedy  success. 
Finally,  on  August  31,  1907,  the  convention  was 
signed.24 

^  It  dealt  with  the  one  quarter  in  which  the  interests  — r" 
of  the  two  nations  might  conceivably  clash,  Central 
Asia.  Persia,  into  which  Russian  influence  had 
steadily  penetrated  during  the  previous  decade,  was 
divided  into  three  zones  of  influence:  a  British  one 
to  the  southeast,  a  Russian  to  the  north,  and  a  sort  of 
neutral  zone  between.  Arrangements  were  also  made 
to  provide  for  financial  reform  and  control  in  Persia, 
in  which  the  British  and  Russian  Governments  were 
to  act  together.  In  Afghanistan,  the  preponderant 
influence  of  Great  Britain  was  recognized,  and  Russia 
gave  up  her  right  of  sending  diplomatic  agents  to 
Cabul.     Great  Britain  was  to  maintain  commercial 

22  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  239-240. 

23  Tardieu,  La  Conference  d  'Algisiras,  284. 

2*Eeventlow,    Deutschlands    auswartige    Politik,    288-296 ;     Tardieu, 
France  and  the  Alliances,  242-253. 


162    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

liberty  and  the  political  status  quo.  Both  nations 
recognized  the  territorial  integrity  of  Thibet  and  the 
suzerainty  of  China  over  that  province,  and  agreed 
not  to  interfere  with  the  domestic  concerns  of  Thibet 
or  attempt  to  secure  special  concessions. 

The  Anglo-Russian  understanding  of  1907  was 
important  as  providing  a  modus  Vivendi  for  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  in  the  Central  East,  which  had 
long  been  a  breeder  of  trouble.  It  was  still  more 
important  as  a  general  settlement  of  the  ancient 
quarrel  between  the  two  countries,  and,  regarded  as 
a  complement  to  the  Anglo-French  Entente,  forms  the 
final  phase  of  the  diplomatic  revolution.  Taken  in 
conjunction  with  the  conventions  signed  in  June  and 
July,  1907,  between  France  and  Japan,  and  Russia 
and  Japan,  respectively,  it  made  an  essential  part  of 
a  system  of  arrangements  which  tended  to  remove 
all  risk  of  complications  arising  from  an  Asiatic 
conflict.  It  was  fortified  a  few  months  later  by  the 
understanding  reached  by  England  and  Russia  in 
1908  relative  to  Near  Eastern  affairs.25  The  three 
Powers,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  were  thus 
united  in  an  entente  of  less  solidity  than  a  hard  and 
fast  alliance,  but  possibly  of  equal  diplomatic  value. 
France  and  Russia  were  bound  by  the  Dual  Alliance 
of  1891 ;  France  and  Great  Britain  by  the  Entente  of 
1904;  Great  Britain  and  Russia  by  the  Convention 
of  1907.  The  permanent  character  of  the  Triple 
Entente  that  resulted,  was  enhanced  by  the  under- 
standing reached  in  1907  between  the  ally  of  Great 
j  Britain,  Japan,  and  France  and  Russia.26 

25  Pinon,  L' Europe  et  I f Empire  Ottoman,  183. 

26  Beventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  304;  Tardieu,  France 
and  the  Alliances,  230-237. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  163 

The  international  situation  in  1907  was  thus  far 
different  from  that  of  1898,  when  Delcasse  entered 
the  French  Cabinet  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
In  that  year  Germany  still  held  the  position  of  primacy 
in  continental  diplomacy  which  had  been  won  by 
Bismarck  and  maintained  by  William  II.  France  and 
Russia  had  allowed  themselves  to  undergo  the  domi- 
nation of  German  influence  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
effect  of  their  Dual  Alliance  was  practically  nullified. 
In  response  to  German  suggestions  France  had 
apparently  forgotten  the  gap  in  the  Vosges  and  was 
busily  devoting  herself  to  extra-European  interests; 
she  was  paralyzed  by  her  rivalry  with  Great  Britain. 
Russia  had  been  quietly  directed  to  the  East  where 
she  was  working  hand  in  hand  with  Germany.  Eng- 
land so  far  as  her  relations  with  continental  nations 
extended  was  on  the  worst  possible  terms  with  both 
France  and  Russia;  with  Germany  she  was  on  the 
best  of  terms,  British  statesmen  were  talking  of  an 
Anglo-German  alliance,  and  in  the  British  Foreign 
Secretary  Germany  saw  her  best  friend.  "  There  was 
left  for  Germany  the  simple  task  of  sitting  peacefully 
on  her  bulging  coffers,  while  her  merchants  captured 
the  trade  of  England  and  her  diplomatists  guided  the 
diplomatists  of  England  into  perpetual  bickerings 
with  other  countries.' m 

In  1907  it  seemed  like  a  different  Europe.  For  the 
scene  had  changed  abruptly  from  that  moment  in  1898 
when  the  tension  between  France  and  Great  Britain 
had  been  so  great  that  it  seemed  as  if  it  could  no  longer 
last  without  a  war.  The  appearance  of  Delcasse  and  \ 
the  foresight  of  British  statesmen  had  ruined  the*  ( 
position  of  Germany.    For  a  moment,  in  1898,  France 

27  Saturday  Beview,  September  11,  1897. 


164    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

and  England  had  stood  "  silent  and  face  to  face, 
blinking  in  the  new  light  that  illuminated  the  dread 
cross-roads  of  Fashoda  and  Ladysmith.  Simultane- 
ously they  saw  the  sardonic  grin  and  heard  the 
triumphant  chuckle  of  Germany.  France  and  England 
were  face  to  face  like  birds  in  a  cock  pit,  while  Europe, 
under  German  leadership,  was  fastening  their  spurs 
and  impatient  to  see  them  fight  to  the  death.  Then 
suddenly  they  both  raised  their  heads  and  moved  back 
to  the  fence.  They  had  decided  not  to  fight  and  the 
face  of  European  things  was  changed."28 

France  by  the  settlement  of  her  traditional  quarrel 
with  Great  Britain,  coming  after  the  reconciliation 
with  Italy,  had  taken  a  long  step  towards  emancipating 
herself  from  German  influence.  Russia,  having  tasted 
the  perils  of  the  East,  had  begun  once  again  to  direct 
her  attention  to  European  problems ;  it  was  certain,  in 
view  of  the  necessary  rivalry  with  Austria,  that  she 
should  oppose  the  ally  of  Austria.  Most  important 
of  all,  Great  Britain  had  frankly  entered  the  field  of 
continental  diplomacy  and  on  the  side  opposed  to 
Germany.  She  had  sunk  her  differences  with  France 
and  Russia,  and  had  formed  a  diplomatic  combination 
with  them  which  seemed  likely  to  prove  a  factor  of 
the  utmost  importance  in  the  future. 

It  is  true  that  the  various  conventions  that  settled 
so  many  national  quarrels  were  not  aimed  directly 
against  Germany,  although  the  fear  of  German 
domination  had  unquestionably  played  an  important 
part  in  the  conclusion  of  the  understandings.  But 
if  they  were  not  designed  to  isolate  Germany  and 
could  not  be  said  to  manifest  openly  hostile  intentions, 
they  restored  the  balance  of  power  that  had  been 

28  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  56-57. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  165 

destroyed  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  and  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Germany  could  no 
longer  dominate  Europe  by  means  of  the  diplomatic 
feuds  that  had  existed  between  Italy  and  France, 
France  and  Great  Britain,  and  Great  Britain  and 
Russia.  The  Bismarckian  system  had  passed  and  the 
Fiijinpr nn  nil lil iln in i a  in  t  restored.  It  remained  to 
be  seen  whether  or  not  Germany  would  accept  the 
new  international  situation  that  resulted  from  the 
diplomatic  revolution. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES 

The  effect  upon  German  foreign  policy  of  the 
diplomatic  combinations  and  understandings  that  took 
place  from  1898  to  1907  was  immediate  and  violent. 
It  was  inevitable  that  the  retirement  of  Great  Britain 
from  her  position  of  splendid  isolation  so  favorable 
to  the  German  position  on  the  Continent,  should  be 
a  cause  of  anxiety  at  Berlin.  It  is  true  that  the 
British  understanding  with  France  was  at  first  not 
taken  too  seriously,  but  it  indicated  future  difficulties 
for  the  German  Foreign  Office;  and  the  Convention 
of  1907  with  Russia  placed  further  obstacles  in  the 
path  of  German  diplomacy.  Equally  significant,  in 
the  minds  of  Germans,  as  a  sign  of  the  growing 
opposition  to  Germany  was  the  new  spirit  of  initiative 
manifested  in  French  diplomacy.  The  altered  inter- 
national situation,  suddenly  realized  by  Germany,  led 
that  Power  to  change  its  tone  from  one  of  conciliation 
to  one  of  bellicose  brutality,  and  resulted  in  the  atmos- 
phere of  diplomatic  tension  characteristic  of  Europe 
during  the  past  decade. 

We  may  remind  ourselves  that  German  foreign 
policy  from  1870  to  1900  was  essentially  pacific  in 
character.  Bismarck  was  undoubtedly  sincere  when 
he  emphasized  the  " satiation' '  of  Germany  and  the 
necessity  for  her  of  a  period  of  unruffled  international 
calm.      The    Kaiser    Wilhelm    II    also,    despite    his 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  167 

unguarded  statements  that  seemed  to  indicate  an 
aggressive  spirit,  worked  constantly  for  peace.  Peace 
was  necessary  for  the  economic  development  of  Ger- 
many, for  the  extension  of  German  commerce,  and  for 
the  unhampered  building  up  of  the  navy  that  was  to 
assure  to  Germany  her  position  in  the  world  at  large. 
Nor  did  the  aggressive  attitude  that  began  to  be 
characteristic  of  the  German  people,  find,  previous  to 
1904,  a  reflection  in  Germany's  official  diplomatic  tone. 
But  in  the  minds  of  both  Bismarck  and  the  Kaiser 
there  was  another  condition  of  still  greater  importance 
for  Germany  than  peace,  namely,  that  German  prestige 
on  the  Continent,  first  secured  by  the  victory  of  1870, 
should  be  constantly  maintained.  This  was  always  the 
great  preoccupation  of  the  Kaiser,  and  was  regarded 
by  him  and  by  his  ministers  as  the  sine  qua  non  of 
Germany's  further  development  as  a  world  power. 

Until  1900  German  prestige  was  successfully  main- 
tained. Largely  by  methods  of  moral  suasion  in 
dealing  with  France  and  Russia,  Germany~retained 
her  hegemony  on  the  Continent  and  preserved  intact 
the  position  that  Bismarck  had  bequeathed  to  the 
Kaiser.  The  German  eagle  could  afford  to  pose  as 
the  dove  of  peace:  there  was  no  need  for  threats  or 
violence,  since  the  rest  of  Europe  complaisantly 
accepted  her  sway. 

But  the  opening  years  of  the  twentieth  century 
forced  Germany  to  the  conclusion  that  a  continuation 
of  her  pacific  policy  was  impossible.  One  of  the  most 
important  factors  in  the  German  position  of  supremacy 
was  the  incapacity  of  France  to  practice  or  even 
conceive  a  policy  of. action.  The  principle  of  French 
passivity  seemed  to  Germans  the  surest  guarantee  of 
German  continental  power,  especially  when  taken  in 


168    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

conjunction  with  the  Anglo-French  fend.  So  long  as 
Germany  could  count  upon  British  friendship  towards 
herself  and  hatred  towards  France,  and  thus  upon 
French  weakness,  her  position  was  ensured.    But  the 

,  Entente  Cordiale  of  1904  proved  not  only  that  Great 
Britain  was  coming  to  regard  Germany  as  a  Power 
that  must  be  watched,  but  also  that  France  was 
assuming  a  new  attitude  and  one  that  could  not  fail 
to  arouse  the  fears  of  the  Kaiser.  The  understanding 
with  Great  Britain  seemed  in  itself  like  a  claim  on  the 
part  of  France  to  independence  of  action  such  as 
Germany  could  not  tolerate ;  and  it  appeared  the  more 
dangerous  as  being  but  one  of  many  indications  that 
France  was  conceiving  a  policy  of  initiative.  In  quick 
succession  France  had  come  to  an  understanding,  first 
with  Italy,  then  with  Great  Britain,  then  with  Spain; 
and  each  of  these  Powers  had  guaranteed  the  new 

v\ French  policy  of  colonial  development. 
\v^  There  was  naturally  something  disquieting  to  Ger- 

^  many  in  these  conventions  concluded  between  other 
nations,  delimiting  colonial  interests  at  the  very 
moment  when  Germany  herself  was  indulging  in 
dreams  of  empire  overseas.  But  the  uneasiness  of  the 
German  diplomats  was  at  bottom  caused  by  the  fear 
that  German  control  of  continental  diplomacy  was 
vanishing.  Europe  was  organizing  herself  without 
the  permission  of  the  Kaiser,  perhaps  against  him. 
France,  so  long  passive,  was  beginning  to  assume 
diplomatic  autonomy,  weakening  the  practical  force 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  by  her  understanding  with  Italy, 
threatening  to  become  formidable  by  her  combination 
with  England.  Germany  was  suddenly  seized  with 
the  nightmare  that  Europe  was  escaping  from  her 
grasp ;  it  was  time  to  strike  a  blow  for  German  prestige, 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  169 

to  show  the  world  that  no  affair  could  proceed  without 
Germany's  participation  and  seal  of  approval.  The 
diplomatic  control  she  had  so  long  exercised  by  moral 
suasion  must  be  maintained  by  more  active  measures 
if  necessary.  The  German  eagle  that  had  so  long  posed 
as  the  dove  of  peace  must  ruffle  its  feathers  and 
unsheathe  its  talons. 

The  necessity  of  preserving  German  prestige  by  all 
effective  means  was  recognized  by  even  the  firmest 
adherents  to  the  cause  of  peace.  For  without  the  firm 
basis  of  German  hegemony  on  the  Continent,  the 
projected  world  empire,  even  if  it  became  a  Colossus, 
would  have  "feet  of  clay."  Von  Biilow,  who  is  by 
no  means  a  fire-eater,  emphasized  this  point:  "Our. 
world  policy  is  based  upon  the  successes  of  our 
European  policy.  The  moment  the  firm  foundation 
constituted  by  Germany's  position  as  a  great  European 
Power  begins  to  totter  the  whole  fabric  of  our  world 
policy  will  collapse  ...  it  is  unthinkable  that  a 
sensible  diminution  of  power  and  influence  in  Europe 
would  leave  our  position  in  international  politics 
unshaken.  We  can  only  pursue  our  world  policy  on 
the  basis  of  our  European  policy  .  .  .  The  new  era 
must  be  rooted  in  the  traditions  of  the  old. ' n 

It  is  this  principle  that  to  a  large  extent  determined 
the  threatening  and  bellicose  tone  of  German  diplo- 
macy during  the  years  that  followed  the  Anglo-French 
Entente  of  1904.     Germany  was  consumed  with  the 

iVon  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  48.  Tardieu  points  out  (Questions 
Actuelles  de  Politique  Etrangere,  1911,  70-71)  that  in  the  eight  hundred 
public  speeches  of  the  Kaiser  there  is  always  to  be  found  the  same  idea: 
that  Germany  must  preserve  the  material  and  moral  position  acquired 
in  1871.  "We  would  sacrifice  our  eighteen  army  corps,' '  said  the 
Kaiser  in  1888,  "and  our  forty-two  millions  of  inhabitants  rather  than 
let  one  stone  fall  of  the  edifice  raised  by  William  I. ' ' 


170    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

fear  that  her  position  on  the  Continent  was  being 
shaken  by  the  new  combinations ;  she  was  unalterably- 
convinced  of  the  necessity  of  maintaining  that  position. 
Three  distinct  blows  were  struck  for  the  maintenance 
of  German  prestige,  and  at  intervals  of  three  years. 
The  first  was  in  1905  in  Morocco.  The  second  was  in 
1908  when  Austria  annexed  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
The  third  was  in  1911  when  the  gunboat  Panther  was 
sent  to  Agadir  on  the  African  coast.  It  was  a  similar 
attempt  to  strike  a  blow  for  German  prestige,  after 
another  interval  of  three  years  in  1914,  that  was  largely 
accountable  for  the  outbreak  of  the  general  war.  In 
each  of  the  crises  that  resulted,  the  colonial  and 
commercial  interests  of  Germany  played  an  important 
part  in  determining  her  action;  the  vital  motive, 
however,  was  her  desire  to  reinforce  her  prestige  at 
all  costs.  The  crises  were  Machtfragen — trials  of 
strength — to  decide  whether  or  not  Germany  was  to 
maintain  her  position  of  continental  dictatorship.     • 

It  was  becoming  clear  early  in  1904  that  Germany 
was  meditating  some  coup  de  force  that  would  enable 
her  to  assert  her  authority  and  put  an  end  to  the  new 
French  policy  of  initiative,  at  the  same  time  that  it 
demonstrated  the  hollowness  of  the  new  friendships 
of  France.  It  is  true  that  German  diplomats  rather 
ostentatiously  proclaimed  their  indifference  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Anglo-French  Entente  and  to  the 
French  policy  of  expansion  in  Morocco.2  But  it  was 
possible  to  deduce  from  the  language  of  the  Kaiser 

2  Von  Biilow  had  taken  the  Franco-Italian  reconciliation  lightly: 
' '  We  have  no  gable  front  on  the  Mediterranean ;  we  are  pleased  to  see 
that  France  and  Italy,  who  each  have  important  interests  there,  have 
come  to  an  understanding  on  the  question. "  On  April  4,  1904,  com- 
menting on  the  Entente  Cordiale,  he  said:  "We  have  nothing  to 
object  to  in  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  German   interests."     The 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  171 

that  these  developments  were  producing  a  profound 
discontent  at  Berlin.  Three  weeks  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  Franco-English  Accord  the  Kaiser,  speaking 
at  Karlsruhe  said:  "Let  us  think  of  the  great  epoch 
when  German  unity  was  created,  of  the  combats  of 
Woerth,  Weissenberg,  and  Sedan.  Present  events 
invite  us  to  forget  our  domestic  discords.  Let  us  be 
united  in  preparation  for  the  occasion  when  we  may- 
be constrained  to  intervene  in  the  policy  of  the  world.  • ' 
And  three  days  later,  when  dedicating  a  bridge  at 
Mainz,  and  when  no  military  allusion  was  apt  to  the 
occasion,  he  said:  "This  bridge,  designed  to  develop 
pacific  relations,  may  have  to  serve  forfnore  serious 
purposes. ' '  Such  language  was  far  removed  from  the 
tone  used  by  the  Kaiser  only  some  few  months  pre- 
viously, when  he  ' '  rendered  homage  to  the  adversaries 
of  1871."3 

For  ten  months,  however,  his  menacing  words  were 
not  translated  into  action.  The  moment  was  favorable 
for  the  striking  of  a  blow  so  far  as  France  was  con- 
cerned, for  the  Combes  Ministry  seemed  to  be  at  the 
mercy  of  socialists  and  pacifists ;  and  as  Germany  well 
knew,  Delcasse  in  his  development  of  an  active  colonial 
policy  had  not  seen  to  it  that  the  military  and  naval 
resources  so  necessary  to  such  a  policy,  were  equally 
developed.  France  was  in  no  position  to  resist  any 
strong  demand  made  by  Germany.  From  England, 
little  was  to  be  feared;  the  Conservatives  had  been 
losing  steadily  at  every  bye-election  and  the  advent 

Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  (semi-official)  said  on  March  25: 
"There  is  no  need,  so  far  as  Germans  are  concerned,  to  take  umbrage 
at  the  Franco-English  understanding  which  is  at  present  in  force,' ' 
French  Yellow  Book,  "Affaires  du  Maroc,  1901-1 905.' ' 

a  Tardieu,  ■ '  La  Politique  Exterieure  de  1  'Allemagne, ' '  in  Questions 
Actuelles  de  Politique  Etrangere,  1911,  85. 


172    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

of  the  Liberals  was  already  foreshadowed.  Germany 
did  not  believe  that  France  would  receive  effective 
assistance  from  such  men  as  Campbell-Bannerman  and 
Lloyd  George.  But  before  acting,  Germany  must  be 
sure  of  the  position  of  Eussia,  France  's  ally.  The  war 
with  Japan  was  still  indecisive  in  the  spring  of  1904, 
and  Germany  must  wait  until  the  exact  situation 
defined  itself.  In  September  the  Russian  armies 
underwent  their  first  check  at  Liao-Yang.  and  in 
March,  1905,  they  were  definitely  crushed  at;  Mukden. 
It  was  the  moment  for  Germany  to  act. 

The  blow  was  struck  in  Morocco,  on  March  31, 1905, 
;when  the  Kaiser  disembarked  at  Tangier  and  declared 
himself  ready  to  support  the  Sultan  in  the  maintenance 
of  his  complete  independence.  In  language  that  hardly 
veiled  a  threat  he  referred  to  the  efforts  of  the  French 
to  secure  a  monopoly  and  to  their  hopes  of  annexation ; 
he  insisted  that  their  policy  must  be  blocked.4  It  was 
a  declaration  of  diplomatic  war,  for  the  acceptance  of 
Germany's  veto  on  French  expansion  in  Morocco 
meant  the  crumbling  of  Delcasse's  whole  policy,  the 
renunciation  of  the  new  French  attitude  of  diplomatic 
independence,  and  the  demonstration  of  the  practical 
uselessness  of  the  Entente  Cordiale.  As  such  a 
declaration  rather  than  as  an  aspect  of  a  colonial 
question,  the  action  of  the  Kaiser  was  regarded  by 
the  more  acute  minds  in  both  Germany  and  France.5 

To  give  force  to  the  intended  humiliation  of  France, 

*  The  Kaiser 's  speech  is  printed  in  Gauss,  The  German  Emperor  as 
shown  in  his  Public  Utterances,  242.  See  also  Keventlow,  Deutschlands 
auswartige  Politik,  254-265. 

b  Tardieu  reports  a  personal  conversation  with  von  Biilow  {France 
and  the  Alliances,  190)  in  which  the  German  Chancellor  made  it  plain 
that  the  Kaiser's  Moroccan  policy  resulted  from  general  diplomatic 
motives  rather  than  from  commercial   ambitions:      "In  the   incidents 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  173 

Germany  further  insisted  upon  two  points:  an  inter- 
national conference  was  to  be  called  to  settle  the 
questions  at  issue,  and  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  was  to  present  his  resignation.  In  other  words 
France  must  appear  before  the  court  of  Europe  to 
answer  for  her  actions,  a  humiliation  which  later,  in 
1908  and  1914,  Germany  declared  to  be  impossible  for 
the  national  honor  of  Austria,  and  Delcasse,  the 
personification  of  the  new  French  policy,  must  be 
dismissed.  On  the  latter  point  the  personal  repre- 
sentative of  the  Kaiser  spoke  in  no  uncertain  language : 
"We  are  not  concerned  with  M.  Delcasse Js  person,  but 
his  policy  is  a  menace  to  Germany  and  you  may  rest 
assured  that  we  shall  not  wait  for  it  to  be  realized.  .  .  . 
If  you  are  of  opinion  that  your  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  has  engaged  your  country  in  too  adventurous 
a  course,  acknowledge  it  by  dispensing  with  his  services 
and  especially  by  giving  a  new  direction  to  your 
foreign  policy.  .  .  .  Give  up  the  minister  whose  only 
aspiration  is  to  trouble  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  adopt 
with  regard  to  Germany  a  loyal  and  open  policy,  the 
only  one  which  is  worthy  of  a  great  nation  like  yours, 
if  you  wish  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  world."6 

which  have  arisen  during  the  past  six  months  or  so  there  are  two  dis- 
tinct things  to  consider.  Morocco  is  the  first;  general  policy  is  the 
second.  In  Morocco  we  have  important  commercial  interests:  we 
intended  and  we  still  intend  to  safeguard  them. 

"In  a  more  general  way  we  were  obliged  to  reply  to  a  policy  which 
threatened  to  isolate  us  and  which  in  consequence  of  this  avowed  aim 
assumed  a  distinctly  hostile  character  with  regard  to  us.  The  Moroccan 
affair  was  the  most  recent  and  most  clearly  manifested  example  of  such 
policy.  It  furnished  us  with  an  opportunity  to  make  a  necessary  retort 
(riposte).' '    Cf.  also  Rachfahl,  Kaiser  und  Beich,  233. 

•  Interview  given  by  Prince  Henckel  von  Donnersmarck  and  published 
by  the  Gaulois,  June,  1905,  cited  by  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances, 
183. 


174    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

The  immediate  success  of  Germany  was  complete, 
for  the  French  Government  yielded  everything.  Con- 
scions  of  her  military  weakness  and  of  the  prostration 
of  her  ally,  Russia,  France  was  in  no  state  to  resist 
Delcasse  left  the  ministry  and  the  French  Government 
agreed  to  the  calling  of  an  international  conference 
that  would  take  up  the  whole  Moroccan  question.  The 
humiliation  of  France  was  absolute,  and  Germany 
made  it  plain  to  the  world  that  her  claim  to  the  diplo- 
matic mastery  of  Europe  was  no  mere  academic 
formula,  but  as  much  a  reality  under  William  II  as 
in  the  days  of  Bismarck.7 

The  victory  of  Germany,  however,  was  only  tem- 
porary. When  the  Conference  of  Algeciras  met, 
before  which  Germany  had  hoped  to  register  the 
principle  that  no  country  could  act  without  German 
consent,  she  found  that  she  could  by  no  means  impose 
her  absolute  will  upon  the  other  Powers.  During  the 
six  months  that  had  elapsed,  the  international  situation 
had  changed  essentially.  France  had  spent  large 
sums  upon  ammunition,  equipment,  and  railways;  if 
pushed  too  far  she  was  capable  of  fighting.  Russia 
had  signed  peace  with  Japan,  and  despite  the  chaotic 
condition  of  her  finances  and  domestic  politics,  was 
able  to  bring  invaluable  diplomatic  assistance  to 
France.  And  England  had  had  time  not  merely  to 
realize  the  immensity  of  the  danger  that  threatened 
from  Germany,  but  to  draw  up  military  plans  in  case 
Germany  should  push  the  matter  to  war.  Further- 
more, it  soon  became  apparent  that  Italy  would  not 
play  the  role  of  second  which  Germany  had  counted 
upon.  Without  denying  the  value  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  to  her  policy,  she  soon  made  it  plain  that  she 

7  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  152-167. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  175 

would  not  sacrifice  her  understandings  with  France 
and  with  England  at  the  behest  of  Germany.  Even 
Austria,  although  she  was  later  to  receive  the  personal 
thanks  of  the  German  Kaiser  for  her  assistance, 
adopted  at  times  an  independent  attitude  and  by  no 
means  played  the  part  of  German  agent. 

The  result  was  that  the  essential  demands  of  Ger- 
many were  refused  by  the  Conference  of  Algeciras  and 
the  approval  of  Europe  was  practically  granted  to  the 
French  policy  of  expansion.  All  the  vital  interests 
of  France  in  Morocco  were  safeguarded  by  the  powers 
of  policing  North  Africa  that  were  given  her  in 
conjunction  with  Spain.  On  none  of  the  crucial  issues 
discussed  during  the  Conference,  did  Germany  receive 
the  support  of  the  other  Powers.8  \ 

The  effect  of  the  humiliation  imposed  upon  France 
in  1905  was  not  entirely  effaced  by  the  setback  to 
German  policy  administered  by  the  Conference  of 
Algeciras  in  the  following  year.  The  striking  effect 
of  the  German  threats  was  not  forgotten  and  the 
prestige  won  by  Germany  was  not  entirely  dimmed. 
Nevertheless  the  real  failure  of  Germany  to  maintain 
her  success  in  1906  was  generally  recognized  by  the 
German  press.  The  Kaiser  had  brought  France  before 
the  court  of  Europe,  but  he  had  not  succeeded  in 
putting  a  stop  to  French  ©xpaitskm;  the  Entente 
Cordiale  with  England  had  not  been  dissolved,  but 
had  rather  acquired  weight;  "it  had  changed  from 
the  static  to  the  dynamic  condition. ' ,9  And  by  a 
curious  irony,  Germany  in  demanding  the  Conference 

s  Berard,  L' Affaire  Marocaine;  Tardieu,  La  Conference  d'Algesiras; 
Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  PolitiTc,  265-280;  Annual  Register, 
1906,  304. 

9  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  204. 


176    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

of  Algeciras  had  brought  English  and  Eussian  repre- 
sentatives together  upon  a  common  ground,  and  thus 
paved  the  way  for  the  Anglo-Bussian  Accord  of  1907.10 

We  have  already  remarked  that  one  of  the  chief 
qualities  of  William  II  is  his  capacity  for  making  the 
best  of  an  unpleasant  situation.  This  self-restraint 
he  exercised  admirably  during  the  months  that 
followed  the  Moroccan  crisis.  The  utmost  care  was 
taken  to  indicate  Germany's  entire  satisfaction  with 
the  results  of  the  Conference,  and  an  utter  indiffer- 
ence to  the  understandings  into  which  France  had 
entered.  With  an  almost  suspicious  vehemence  von 
Biilow  disclaimed  any  idea  of  attempting  to  cause  a 
rupture  of  the  newly  formed  friendship  between 
France  and  Great  Britain.11  For  the  moment,  French 
expansion  in  Morocco,  despite  the  wails  of  the  Pan- 
Germanists,  was  regarded  with  equanimity.  All  that 
Germany  had  striven  to  demolish  in  1905  she  proceeded 
to  accept  in  a  spirit  of  the  utmost  good-nature. 

But  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  Germany  "would 
definitely  accept  the  check  placed  upon  her  diplomatic 
position.  The  chief  aim  of  the  Kaiser  had  always 
been  to  preserve  the  situation  which  Bismarck  had 
bequeathed  to  him.    The  new  combinations  that  had 

loTardieu,  La  Conference  d'Algisiras,  284. 

11 « *  We  have  no  thought  of  attempting  to  separate  France  and  Eng- 
land. We  have  absolutely  no  idea  of  attempting  to  disturb  the  friendship 
of  the  western  Powers.  The  Franco-Kussian  Alliance  has  never  proved 
a  menace  to  peace;  on  the  contrary  it  has  acted  like  a  weight  which 
regulated  the  smooth  working  of  the  clock  of  the  world.  We  hope  that 
the  same  thing  can  be  said  of  the  Franco-English  entente.  Cordial 
relations  between  Germany  and  Eussia  have  not  in  any  way  disturbed 
the  Franco-Eussian  alliance;  cordial  relations  between  Germany  and 
England  are  in  perfect  consonance  with  the  entente,  if  the  latter  com- 
bination follows  pacific  purposes,' '  Speech  in  Beichstag,  November  14, 
1906. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  177 

grown  up  since  1900  disturbed  that  situation,  and  he 
was  not  likely  to  neglect  any  opportunity  of  restoring 
it.  Nor  was  his  determination  weakened  by  the 
Anglo-Russian  understanding  which,  as  we  saw,  was 
arranged  in  1907  and  which  seemed  to  indicate  more 
clearly  than  ever  the  termination  of  German  diplo- 
matic supremacy.  In  the  ;bosnian  crisis  of  1908  i 
Germany  believed  that  she  had  the  opportunity  for 
which  she  sought,  and  once  again  struck  a  blow  for 
the  rehabilitation  of  her  prestige. 

The  origin  of  this  crisis  dates  back  to  the  Congress 
of  Berlin  in  1878.    It  will  be  remembered  that  after 
the  Turkish  defeats  suffered  in  the  war  against  Russia, 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  parcelled  out  among  the) 
Balkan  States  the -greater  part  of  Turkey  in  Europe.) 
•  But  England  and  Austria,  fearing  the  predominance^ 
of  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  combined  j 
to  .prevent  the  proposed  arrangement  from  going  into 
effect.    The  revised  treaty,  signed  at  Berlin,  July  13, 
1878,  left  a  large  part  of  the  peninsula  in  the  hands 
of  Turkey  and  tended  to  offset  the  advance  of  Russian 
influence  in  that  quarter  by  granting  the  administra- 
tion of  the  Turkish  provinces  of|  Bosm^a^ad-Herfce- 
govina  to  Austria.    It  also  authorized  Austrian  troops 
to  occupy  the  district  of  Novi  Bazar,  which  separates 
Montenegro  from  Serbia.12  * 

During  the  generation  which  followed  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin,  Austria  busied  herself  in  reducing  the  two 
provinces  to  order,  and  worked  constantly  in  the  hope 
of  definitely  subjecting  them  to  Hapsburg  rule. 
Because  of  the  large  number  of  malcontent  Slavs 
with  which  the  provinces  were  peopled,  the  immediate 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  not  desir- 

12  Supra,  Chap.  II. 


178    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

able;  but  they  opened  a  pathway  to  the  Adriatic  and 
it  was  of  importance  that  they  should  not  be  taken 
over  by  Serbia  nor  complete  sovereignty  be  reassumed 
by  Turkey.  In  view  of  the  nationalist  spirit  of  the 
Slavs  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  Serbia,  if  she 
should  win  the  provinces,  would  threaten  the  peace 
and  integrity  of  Austria,  as  well  as  her  political  and 
economic  influence  in  the  peninsula.  It  was  essential 
that  Turkey  should  not  resume  her  rights  in  Bosnia, 
for  despite  tjie  friendship  of  the  Teutonic  Powers  with 
the  Porte,  ^Turkish  policy  was  not  to  be  entirely 
trusted.13    In 

In  1908  came  the  Young  Turk  Revolution,  which  led 
Austjria  to  a  fateful  step.  The  Young  Turks  aimed 
above  everything  at  a  regeneration  of  their  country's 
foreign  policy  and  especially  at  a  strengthening  of 
Turkish  power  in  the  Balkans.  Austria  and  Germany 
favored  a  strong  government  at  Constantinople,  since 

)  Turkey  was  guarding  the  Dardanelles  in  their  interests. 

1  But  a  Turkey  predominant  in  the  whole  Balkan 
Peninsula  was  undesirable,  for  it  would  threaten 
Austria's  road  to  the  Adriatic  and  ^Egean. '  Further- 
more it  seemed  likely  that  the  Young  Turks  .would  not 
hesitate  to  demand  the  termination  of  Austrian 
administration  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina;  the 
provinces  legally  belonged  to  Turkey,  and  if  the 
new  Government  could  prove  its  capacity,  the  Porte 
would  have  every  right  again  to  assume  direct 
administration  over  them.1* 
Under  the  circumstances,  Austria  decided  to  antici- 

13  Jaray,  "La  Question  d 'Autriche-Hongrie, ' '  in  Questions  Actuelles 
de  Politique  Etrangdre,  1911,  109-171. 

i*  Pinon,  L  'Europe  et  la  Jeune  Turquie,  149-193 ;  Reventlow, 
Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  311,  sq. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  179 

pate  any  action  on  the  part  of  Turkey,  and  determined 
to  tear  up  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  Without  consulting 
the  other  signatories  of  the  treaty^the  Austrian 
Government,  on  October  3,  1908,  proclaimed  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.15  It  was  the 
official  declaration  of  Treitschke's  doctrine  that  inter- 
national treaties  need  not  be  considered  binding  when 
they  conflict  with  the  higher  political  interests  of  the 
State. 

Austria 's  action  was  directed  most  obviously  against 
Turkey  and  at  once  brought  forth  a  strong  protest 
from  the  Porte  as  well  as  retaliatory  measures  which 
culminated  in  a  general  boycott  ojf  Austrian  goods. 
The  annexation  was  also  a  blow  ti  Serbia  and  more 
generally  to  Slavic  interests  in  the  Balkans.  To 
Eussia,  guardian  of  the  Slavs,  it  was  a  direct  affront 
and  one  that  could  not  be  disregarded.  From  St. 
Petersburg  came  a  protest,  cautious  in  language  but 
clear  in  its  firmness,  setting  forth  the  international 
bearing  of  the  question  and  demanding  that  it  should 
be  laid  before  a  European  congress,  as  had  been  done 
in  the  case  of  the  Moroccan  question  in  1905.  To  the 
protest  of  Eussia  was  added  that  of  France  and 
England.16 

But  Eussia 's  capacity  for  enforcing  her  protest  was 
regarded  by  Austria  with  contempt.  Eus'sianTmilitary 
resources   had  been   shattered  by   the   disasters   in 

18  Annual  Register,  1908,  309-310;  Moulin  et  de  Messin,  Vne  Annie 
de  Politique  Exterieure;  Printa,  "La  Bosnie  et  1  'HerzSgovine, ' '  in 
Questions  Diplomatiques  et  Coloniales,  February  16,  1909;  Eeventlow, 
op.  cit.,  324;  Sosnosky,  Die  BalkanpolitiJc  Oesterreich-Ungarns,  151;  for 
Aerenthal's  policy,  see  Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  224-230. 

ifl  Annual  Register,  1908,  323;  1909,  314,  326;  Pinon,  L'Europe  et  la 
Jeune  Turquie,  203-214;  Singer,  Geschichte  des  Dreibundes,  180; 
Sosnosky,  Die  BallcanpolitiJc  Oesterreich-Ungarns,  156-170. 


180    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Manchuria,  and  the  weight  of  her  opinion  in  inter- 
national affairs  was  shaken  by  the  political  chaos  that 
had  resulted  from  the  internal  revolution  of  1905. 
The  financial  disorganization  of  Eussia  had  prevented 
the  outlay  of  sums  necessary  for  the  development  of 
her  military  power,  and  it  seemed  improbable  that 
she  would  have  the  courage  or  the  foolhardiness  to 
resort  to  arms.  It  is  certain  that  Russian  weakness 
was  taken  into  consideration  by  Austria  before  she 
embarked  upon  her  aggressive  course  of  action;  as 
a  French  publicist  remarked,  "The  annexation  oi 
Bosnia  was  the  direct  corollary  to  the  battle  of 
Mukden."17^ 

Hence  it  Jwas  that  the  demand  for  a  congress  made 
by  Russia  was  evaded  by  Austria:  the  latter  Power 
was  willing  that  a  congress  should  be  held,  but  the 
annexation  of  the  provinces  must  first  be  considered 
a  fait  accompli™  The  congress  might  be  allowed  to 
register  and  approve  the  action  taken  by  Austria,  but 
it  was  not  to  discuss  it.  For  the  moment,  Russia, 
supported  by  France  and  England,  held  firm,  and  the 
crisis  assumed  a  more  serious  aspect.  Instead  of  a 
local  phase  of  the  Near  Eastern  question,  it  suddenly 
became  a  matter  of  European  concern,  ,  and  very 
clearly  began  to  appear  as  a  conflict  between  the 
Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente.10 

The  moment  the  crisis  was  transported  to  the  broad 
field  of  continental  diplomacy,  Germany  realized  that 
in  it  was  to  be  found  a  second  occasion  for  a  manifes- 
tation of  German  prestige.20     It  was  all  the  more 

it  Paul  Deschanel,  lecture,  1909.        J 

isPinon,  L' 'Europe  et  la  Jeune  Turquie,  203,  208. 

i»  Tardieu,  Le  Prince  de  Billow,  199,  sq. 

20  See  the  speech  of  von  Biilow  in  the  Reichstag,  March  29,  1909. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  181 

opportune  in  that  Germany  was  desirous  of  humilia- 
ting Russia,  as  a  punishment  for  her  understanding 
of  1907  with  England.  France  had  been  taught  in 
1905  that  she  could  not  assert  her  diplomatic  inde- 
pendence with  impunity,  and  a  similar  lesson  admin- 
istered to  Russia  would  not  be  amiss.  Furthermore, 
Germany's  diplomatic  temper  was  ruffled  over  the 
Casablanca  incident,  when  certain  German  deserters 
from  the  French  Foreign  Legion  had  been  arrested 
by  France,  and  no  apology  satisfactory  to  German 
pride  subsequently  offered.21  German  political  and 
economic  interests,  also,  coincided  in  this  instance 
with  those  of  Austria,  and  the  Balkan  policy  of  the 
latter  Power  received  Germany's  cordial  approval. 
But  even  if  that  had  not  been  so,  the  larger  diplomatic 
interests  of  Germany  would  have  impelled  her  to 
support  her  ally  with  all  her  resources. 

The  result  was  that  when  the  Entente  Powers 
showed  themselves  persistent  in  the  demand  for  a 
congress,  they  were  briefly  notified  of  Germany's 
determination  that. there  shoulcLbe  no  congress  until 
the  annexation  of  (  Bosni^was  first  recognized  as 
an  accomplished  raCt  Their  surrender  meant  the 
humiliation  of  Russia,  the  exaltation  of  German 
prestige,  and  a  serious  defeat  for  the  Triple  Entente 
in  the  second  year  of  its  existence.  /  Nevertheless  when 
the  German  sword  rattled  in  its  sheath  they  refused 
to  accept  the  risk  of  a  settlement  by  force  of  arms. 
France  and  England,  seeing  in  the  crisis  merely  an 
issue  of  the  Eastern  question,  and  not  considering  its 
broader  bearing,  would  not  imperil  themselves  for  the 
sake  of  Russia.    And  the  latter  Power,  weakly  sup- 

21  Annual  Register,  1908,  298-299;  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  184; 
Eeventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politilc,  308. 


182    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

ported  and  in  no  condition  for  a  war,  did  not  dare 
face  Austria  and  her  ally,  the  latter,  as  the  Kaiser 
said,  appearing  "in  shining  armor.' '  The  annexation 
was  recognized  by  the  Powers  that  had  signed*  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin,  Serbian  protests  were  unheeded, 
and  Turkey  was  mollified  by  pecuniary  compensation.22 

The  success  of  Austrian  aggression  supported  by 
German  threats  apparently  fortified  the  prestige  of 
the  Teutonic  Powers  as  fully  as  they  could  have 
desired.  Every  point  in  the  German  policy  seemed 
to  have  been  gained.  German  and  Austrian  commer- 
cial and  political  interests  in  the  Near  East  were 
ensured,  and  the  alienation  of  Turkey,  which  was 
threatened  for  the  moment,  was  avoided.  It  is  true 
that  a  rift  in  the  Triple  Alliance  was  foreshadowed 
by  Italy's  discomfiture  at  the  annexation  of  Bosnia; 
but  this  was  more  than  offset  by  the  incapacity  or 
unwillingness  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  take  common 
action.  Bussia's  weakness  was  made  manifest  by  the 
deep  humiliation  which  she  had  been  forced  to 
undergo,  and  the  rising  tide  of  Pan-Slavism  had 
received  a  very  obvious  check.  Most  important  of  all, 
Germany,  by  her  simple  statement  that  she  would 
support  Austria  in  her  high-handed  action,  had 
imposed  her  will  upon  Europe.  The  hegemony  jof 
Germany  in  Europe  was  reestablished:   | 

For  a  year  or  more  German  diplomats  seemed  to 
be  confident  that  the  European  revolt  against  the 
German  overlordship  had  collapsed.  The  triumph 
of  1908  appeared  to  them  to  be  conclusive.  Germany 
had  no  further  need  of  insisting  upon  her  position, 

22  Annual  Begister,  1909,  311;  Pinon,  L> 'Europe  et  la  Jeune  Turquie, 
229-231;  von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  50-61. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  183 

and  for  a  period  her  tone  became  almost  one  of 
benevolence.  By  the  accord  of  February  8,  1909,  she 
recognized  the  exceptional  position  of  France  in 
Morocco  and  admitted  that  the  political  interests  of 
the  French  in  that  quarter  gave  her  special  rights.23 
Having  established  the  fact  that  she  possessed  the 
controlling  voice  in  European  councils,  Germany 
seemed  inclined  to  allow  her  opponents  to  go  ahead 
about  as  they  pleased. 

In  another  quarter  Germany  apparently  reinsured 
her  diplomatic  position  by  her  accord  of  1910  wit 
Eussia.  The  result  of  the  Bosnian  crisis  had  been 
a  humiliation  for  Russia  and  a  set-back  to  Russian 
interests.  But  the  ~  skill  of  the  Kaiser,  who  had 
inflicted  that  humiliation  seemed  to  be  sufficient  to 
alleviate  the  rancour  of  the  Tsar.  In  November,  1910, 
Nicholas  visited  William  at  Potsdam  and  after  dis- 
cussing international  affairs  apparently  came  to  a 
complete  reconciliation.  He  agreed  that  Russia  should 
not  oppose  the  Bagdad  Railway  scheme  and  even 
promised  to  link  up  the  railway  with  Persian  lines. 
Germany,  on  her  side,  agreed  to  recognize  that  Russia 
had  special  interests  in  Persia.  The  German  and 
Russian  Governments  further  agreed  that  each  would 
enter  into  no  engagement  that  might  prove  unfavor- 
able to  the  interests  of  the  other.24  Thus  Germany 
not  merely  won  a  diplomatic  triumph  in  1908  and 
weakened  the  Triple  Entente,  but  by  this   special 

23  Annual  Register,  1908,  296;  1909,  310-311;  Pinon,  France  et 
Allemagne,  185-187;  Tardieu,  Le  Mystere  d'Agadir,  1-25;  Morel, 
Morocco  in  Diplomacy,  Chap.  X. 

24  Pinon,  L  'Europe  et  la  Jeune  Turquie,  243-250 ;  Eeventlow, 
Deutschlands  auswartige  PolitiJc,  367-369;  Bachfahl,  Kaiser  und  Beich, 
331-332. 


184    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

agreement  with  Russia  seemed  to  have  completely- 
emasculated  it.25 

The  triumph  of  1908,  however,  like  the  Potsdam 
Accord  of  1910,  did  not  permanently  satisfy  German 
diplomats,  and  early  in  1911  the  German  Foreign 
Office  began  to  consider  the  advisability  of  reinforcing 
their  prestige  by  another  victory.  Russia  no  longer 
threatened  directly,  but  on  the  other  side,  France__wa&. 
displaying  an  attitude  not  dissimilar  to  that  which  had 
resulted  in  the  first  conflict  of  1905.  In  December, 
1910,  an  influential  French  writer  declared,  with  the 
approval  of  a  cabinet  minister,  that  Germany  had 
failed  in  her  attempt  to  preserve  her  continental 
supremacy,  and  expressed  confidence  that  she  would 
not  draw  the  sword  to  regain  it.26  Such  was  not  the 
attitude  liked  by  Germany. 

Again,  in  March,  1911,  Delcasse  was  recalled  to  the 
Ministry,  and  his  mere  official  reappearance  seemed 
to  indicate  that  France  was  minded  again  to  embark 
upon  her  aggressive  and  adventurous  course.  Such 
fears  on  the  part  of  Germany  were  largely  justified 
by  the  trend  of  events.  Taking  advantage  of  a  Berber 
revolt,  a  French  army  entered  Morocco  in  April,  and 
on  May  21,  took  possession  of  the  capital,  Fez.  The 
Sultan  of  Morocco,  threatened  by  his  brother,  who 
assumed  the  role  of  pretender,  saw  himself  forced  to 
accept  the  protection  of  the  French.  It  was  the  end 
of  Moroccan  independence.27  J 

Germany  had  only  slight  economic  interests  in 
Morocco,  and  she  had  admitted  that  she  possessed  no 

25  La  Revue  des  Questions  diplomatiques,  January,  June,  1911. 

26  Tardieu,  in  Questions  Actuelles  de  Politique  Etrangere,  1911,  98. 
27Reventlow,  op.  cit.,  349,  sq.;  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe, 

75-77;  Picquet,  Campagnes  d'Afrique,  290,  sq. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  185 

political  interests  at  all  in  that  quarter.  But  she  could 
not  allow  France  to  proceed  unhindered,  if  she  cared  to 
maintain  the  principle  that  the  German  seal  of  approval 
must  be  secured  before  France  took  up  a,  policy  of 
initiative.  And  that  principle  was  believed  at  Berlin 
to  be  as  all-important  in  1911  as  it  had  been  in  1905. 

Furthermore  the  moment  was  propitious  for  another 
diplomatic  success.  The  Government  in  France  was 
weakened  by  domestic  difficulties  and  could  not  be 
expected  to  take  a  strong  position  on  foreign  affairs 
at  the  moment  when  it  was  harassed  by  opposing  fac- 
tions. On  June  23,  the  parliamentary  crisis  came  to  a 
head  and  the  Monis  Cabinet  was  overthrown.  To  it 
succeeded  one  led  by  Caillaux,  who  was  known  as  a 
skillful  financier  and  expert  politician,  but  whose 
capacity  in  dealing  with  foreign  questions  was  as  little 
known  as  were  his  sentiments.  At  the  Foreign  Office 
appeared  de  Selves,  well  considered  as  an  adminis- 
trative official,  but  who  lacked  the  experience  and 
special  knowledge  in  diplomatic  matters  such  as  would 
enable  him  to  guide  France  triumphantly  through  a 
delicate  international  situation.  Delcasse,  it  is  true, 
was  in  the  new  Ministry,  but  merely  as  Minister  of 
Marine,  and  his  influence  on  Caillaux  in  matters  of 
foreign  policy  seems  to  have  been  discounted.  The 
industrial  situation  in  France,  also,  was  believed  to 
preclude  the  possibility  of  a  strong  attitude  on  the 
part  of  France  in  the  face  of  the  projected  action  of 
Germany.  The  great  railway  strike  had  been  termi- 
nated with  difficulty,  and  had  resulted  in  acts  of 
sabotage,  which  to  German  minds  must  have  appeared 
immediate  precursors  of  an  internal  revolution.28 

From  Great  Britain,  Germany  believed  that  she  had 

28  Annual  'Register,  1911,  301-311;   Albin,  Le  Coup  d'Agadir,  7,  sq. 


186    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

nothing  to  fear.  The  Government,  in  which  the 
supposed  pacifist,  Lloyd  George,  exercised  prepon- 
derating influence,  appeared  to  have  little  interest  in 
foreign  questions.  British  policy  seemed  to  have 
become  a  "policy  of  parochialism.  The  Imperial 
Idea  seemed  to  have  vanished  from  the  brains  of 
British  politicians. ' ,29  The  British  Empire  was 
apparently  falling  apart,  and  the  suggested  reci- 
procity of  Canada  with  the  United  States  looked  like 
the  first  step  in  the  process  of  dissolution.  On  May 
18,  Haldane  said,  "We  are  going  to  leave  .  .  .  the 
British  Empire  to  hold  together  by  bonds  of  sym- 
pathy. ' ,30  In  such  a  spirit  as  that,  Germans  could  see 
no  possible  danger  of  British  interference  on  the 
Continent. 

Furthermore,  the  industrial  discontent  in  England, 
as  in  France,  had  culminated  in  a  gigantic  strike,  and 
the  inability  of  the  Liberal  Government  to  control  its 
own  political  allies,  seemed  to  Germany  the  clearest 
manifestation  of  weakness.  The  country  was  torn  by 
the  question  of  Home  Rule,  and  the  political  situation 
was  marked  by  a  constitutional  crisis  which  surpassed 
in  importance  and  danger  anything  that  England  had 
seen  since  1832.  \ 

Doubtless  German  diplomats  were  of  the  opinion 
that  a  fetter  opportunity  for  disrupting  the  Triple 
Entente  would  never  again  present  itself.  Russia 
they  believed  to  be  wavering  in  her  allegiance  to  the 
combination,  and  if  the  German  blow  were  delivered  ^-> 
in  Morocco,  she  would  probably  take  small  interest 
in  a  dispute  over  an  African  province.  France  might 
be  brought  to  perceive  the  futile  character  of  her 

so  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  178. 

so  Speech  in  House  of  Lords,  May  18,  1911. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  187 

understanding  with  England,  and,  if  bribes  were 
judiciously  mingled  with  the  German  threats,  might 
be  again  drawn  into  the  orbit  of  German  influence. 
England,  immersed  in  domestic  difficulties,  would  be 
again  isolated.  A  German  victory  under  the  circum- 
stances would  almost  certainly  result  in  a  revival  of 
the  conditions  that  had  existed  from  1891  to  1900, 
when  German  diplomacy  was  supreme. 

At  the  moment  when  it  was  least  expected,  Germany 
struck  her  blow.  At  noon  of  July  1,  1911,  the  German 
Ambassador  to  France  called  upon  M.  de  Selves  and 
informed  him  that  disturbances  in  Morocco  threatened 
the  interests  and  lives  of  German  citizens,  and  that 
to  give  them  protection  the  German  gunboat  Panther 
had  been  despatched  to  the  port  of  Agadir.  The 
meaning  of  the  action  was  clear,  namely,  that  France 
must  cease  her  policy  of  expansion  until  such  time 
as  she  had  given  satisfaction  to  Germany  and  received 
German  approval.81 "" 

The  peril  of  German  traders  in  Morocco  was 
obviously  a  pretext.  Agadir  was  a  town  that  had 
never  been  opened  to  foreign  commerce  and  where 
Europeans  entered  at  their  peril;  if  Germans  risked 
their  lives  by  going  there  it  was  their  own  fault. 
Furthermore,  German  trade  in  Morocco  was  so  small 
as  hardly  to  warrant  such  brusque  action  on  the  part 
of  the  German  Government ;  the  total  sum  of  German 
commerce  in  that  quarter  could  hardly  have  amounted 
to  fifty  thousand  marks  a  year.  Everyone  perceived 
that  the  despatch  of  the  Panther  did  not  result  from 
Germany's  commercial  policy,  but  was  rather  another 
attempt  to  enforce  the  position  of  Germany  as  arbiter 

3i  Annual  Register,  1911,,  312,  339;  Tardieu,  Le  Mystere  d' Agadir, 
423,  sq. 


188    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

of  European  affairs,  and  equally  designed  to  break 
up  the  Triple  Entente.  Germany  had  apparently  lost 
faith  in  the  policy  of  conciliation  inaugurated  after 
1908,  and  had  again  reverted  to  that  of  intimidation.32 

During  the  first  weeks  of  the  crisis  the  demands  of 
Germany  amounted  to  practically  a  partition  of 
;  Morocco  between  herself,  France,  and  Spain.  Such  a 
partition  would  satisfy  the  colonial  aspirations  of  the 
Pan-Germanists,  and  would  achieve  the  diplomatic 
purpose  of  Wilhelmstrasse  by  humiliating  France. 
But  Germany  miscalculated  the  international  situation. 
She  counted  on  a  France  which,  as  in  1905,  would 
succumb  at  the  first  threat,  on  a  Government  unsure 
of  its  position,  and  on  a  nation  riddled  with  socialism 
and  willing  to  make  all  sacrifices  in  the  cause  of  peace. 
The  news  of  the  despatch  of  the  Panther,  however, 
followed  by  the  extreme  demands  of  Germany  gal- 
vanized France  into  a  spirit  of  resistance.  All  parties 
agreed  that  no  concessions  should  be  made  to  Germany 
that  would  touch  the  national  honor.  The  French 
Government,  with  the  most  correct  attitude,  consented 
to  discuss  the  demands  of  Germany,  but  yielded 
nothing,  and  made  it  plain  that  France  would  undergo 
no  humiliation  like  that  of  Eussia  in  1908.33 

To  the  surprise  of  Berlin,  France  found  strong 
support  across  the  Channel.  In  the  heat  of  the  parlia- 
mentary struggle  over  the  Lords'  veto,  Asquith 
announced  publicly  that  England  would  not  allow 
Germany_ta_jide--£ough-shod  over  France  m  the 
Moroccan  affair.    And  the  "pacifist,"  Lloyd  George, 

82  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  173-175;  Albin,  op.  tit.,  11. 
S3  Turner,  "The  Morocco  Crisis  of  1911,"  in  South  Atlantic  Quarterly, 
January,  1912,  5-8;  Albin,  op.  cit.,  173-226. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  189 

who  had  risked  his  career  in  the  previous  decade  by  his 
opposition  to  the  Boer  War,  warned  Germany  that 
she  must  not  count  upon  British  passivity  as  a  result 
of  party  quarrels ;  the  British  Empire  was  still  intact 
and  the  security  of  Great  Britain's  international 
position  was  not  a  party  question.  Shortly  afterwards 
the  leader  of  the  Opposition  strengthened  the  firm 
attitude  of  the  Ministry  by  also  insisting  that  party 
differences  had  no  place  in  foreign  affairs.  "If,"  said 
Mr.  Balfour,  "  there  are  any  who  supposed  that  we 
would  be  wiped  from  the  map  of  Europe  because  we 
have  difficulties  at  home,  it  may  be  worth  while  saying 
that  they  utterly  mistake  the  temper  of  the  British 
people  and  the  patriotism  of  the  Opposition. ' m 

In  the  face  of  such  an  attitude  on  the  part  of  both  "> 
England  and  France,  the  easy  diplomatic  victory  that  - 
Germany  had  expected  was  out  of  the  question.  The 
reawakening  of  the  French  national  consciousness  and 
the  realization  on  the  part  of  England  that  her  own, 
position  was  endangered,  destroyed  the  value  of 
German  threats.  We  may  well  ask  ourselves  whether, 
if  circumstances  had  been  propitious  in  Germany,  the 
Great  War  might  not  have  begun  in  1911  instead  of 
1914.  Indeed  at  various  moments  during  the  crisis 
the  probability  of  war  seemed  great.  Even  after  Ger- 
many moderated  her  first  demands,  she  continued  to 
insist  that  special  economic  privileges  in  Morocco 
should  be  given  her,  as  well  as  certain  political  rights 
which  would  have  made  French  authority  in  that 
quarter  merely  nominal.  On  the  other  hand,  France, 
supported  by  England,  would  hear  of  nothing  but 
absolute  political  control  and  would  grant  no  special 

s*  Tardieu,  Le  Mystere  d'Agadir,  456-469;  Turner,  op.  cit.,  9. 


190    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

privileges  to  Germany.  It  seemed  like  a  deadlock  that 
could  only  be  broken  by  force.35 

But  the  situation  in  Germany  was  not  such  as  to 
favor  the  desires  of  the  militarist  party.  The  mass 
of  the  nation  cared  little  about  Morocco,  and  were  by 
no  means  eager  to  fight  France ;  the  fear  of  the  Slavs, 
which  in  1914  affected  all  classes  profoundly,  was  not 
a  factor  in  1911.  The  Socialists,  protested  against  a 
war  waged  solely  in  the  interests  of  German  prestige 
and  for  the  sake  of  the  Pan-Germanists.  Further- 
more, the  financial  condition  of  Germany  was  unsat- 
isfactory. French  bankers  began  to  call  in  their  loans 
from  Germany,  bank  reserves  were  low,  the  Berlin 
Bourse  was  weak,  discount  rates  were  raised,  and  a 
colossal  panic  threatened.  Almost  without  exception 
the  capitalists  exercised  their  great  influence  against 
war.36 

Under  such  circumstances  the  German  Government 
decided  to  yield,  and  after  the  beginning  of  September 
bent  all  its  efforts  towards  covering  up  its  diplomatic 
defeat.  In  this  task  it  was  assisted  by  France,  who 
showed  herself  ready  to  grant  such  territorial  com- 
pensations as  would  enable  the  diplomats  of  Berlin 
to  justify  their  efforts  at  home.    In  return  for  Ger- 

35  Tardieu,  op.  cit.,  476;  Annual  Register,  1911,  313,  339. 

seTardieu,  Le  Mystere  d'Agadir,  483,  sq.;  Turner,  op.  cit.,  11.  See 
also,  Singer,  Geschichte  des  Dreibundes,  219,  for  the  attitude  of  Austria 
and  Italy.  Army  officers  themselves  did  not  believe  that  Germany  was 
ready.  A  secret  report,  dated  March  19,  1913,  speaking  of  the  Agadir 
crisis,  says:  "At  that  time,  the  progress  made  by  the  French  army, 
the  moral  recovery  of  the  nation,  the  technical  advance  in  the  realm 
of  aviation  and  of  machine  guns  rendered  an  attack  on  France  less 
easy  than  in  the  previous  period.  Further,  an  attack  by  the  English 
fleet  had  to  be  considered.  This  difficult  situation  opened  our  eyes  to 
the  necessity  for  an  increase  in  the  army,'*  French  Yellow  Boole,  1914, 
No.  2. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  191 

many's  recognition  of  the  French  protectorate  in 
Morocco,  she  was  given  extensive  territories  of 
doubtful  value  along  the  Congo,  in  the  southern  and 
eastern  Cameroons.37 

But  the  accession  of  territory  thus  resulting  to  the 
German  colonial  empire  could  not  hide  the  fact  of 
Germany's  failure  in  her  Coup  d'Agadir.  It  was  in 
vain  that  official  communications  dilated  upoTFtlie* 
advantages  that  Germany  had  won;  the  Berlin  press 
could  not  restrain  its  intense  disappointment  and 
covered  the  diplomats  with  invective;  even  the  more 
staid  journals  fell  into  hopeless  melancholy  over  the 
set-back  to  Germany.  The  nation  had  not  wanted  to 
fight  in  the  summer  of  1911,  but  discontent  at  the  final 
settlement  was  general  and  profound.  Germany  had 
set  out  to  win  a  diplomatic  victory  over  France  and 
to  separate  her  from  Great  Britain ;  her  diplomats  had 
led  the  Pan-Germanists  to  believe  that  a  coaling- 
station  or  even  a  sphere  of  influence  in  Morocco  would 
result.  But  France  had  refused  to  be  humiliated,  she 
had  drawn  closer  to  Great  Britain,  and  had  definitely 
excluded  Germany  from  any  political  position  in 
Morocco.38 

Eemembering  the  stress  laid  by  German  diplomats 
upon  the  necessity  of  maintaining  German  prestige, 
and  the  blows  struck  for  this  purpose  in  1905  and  1908, 

37  Annual  Register,  1911,  340;  Morel,  Morocco  in  Diplomacy,  304- 
323;  Tardieu,  Le  Mystere  d'Agadir,  535,  sq.;  the  terms  of  the  convention 
are  printed  in  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  260,  267. 

38  Tardieu,  Le  Mystere  d  'Agadir,  599,  sq.  The  German  Chancellor 
made  an  attempt  to  show  that  Germany  had  not  undergone  a  humiliation, 
but  his  speech  was  received  in  dead  silence  except  for  derisive  laughter. 
He  was  followed  by  the  Conservative  leader,  who  in  a  furious  and 
chauvinistic  speech,  contended  that  the  settlement  had  put  France 
in  complete  mastery  of  Morocco  and  that  Germany's  compensation  was 
of  questionable  value.     He  was  bitter  in  his  denunciation  of  England, 


192    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

it  was  easy  for  the  more  far-sighted  to  judge  that  the 
defeat  of  Germany  in  1911  would  not  be  the  last  of 
.  the  conflicts  of  the  alliances.  If,  after  carrying  her 
point  in  the  Bosnian  crisis,  she  had  felt  it  necessary 
to  reinforce  her  position  by  another  blow  in  1911,  how 
much  more  important  was  it  for  her,  after  her  failure 
in  that  year,  to  regain  the  ground  then  lost!  It  was 
a  matter  of  certainty  that  at  the  next  favorable 
opportunity  she  wftuld  strike  another  blow,  similar  to 
those  delivered  itf  1905,  1908,  and  1911. 

The  occasion  presented  itself  in  1914  and  under 
circumstances  which  were  propitious  for  the  most 
energetic  action.  //The  financial  state  of  Germany  was 
such  as  to  enable  her  to  take  any  steps  thai-might 
seem  desirable.  2  The  crisis  involved  the  fear!  of  the 
Slav,  a  sentiment  which  united  the  whole  nation.39 
2?  Furthermore,  since  1911  there  had  occurred  changes 
in  the  Balkans,  so  that  in  1914  there  was  at  stake  the 
most  vital  purpose  of  Germany's  economic  policy, 
which  unlike  the  Moroccan  venture  inspired  the  com- 
mercial and  capitalist  classes  with  the  utmost  enthu- 
siasm. Then  if  ever  was  the  time  for  Germany  to 
insist  upon  the  peculiar  diplomatic  position  that  she 
had  claimed  since  the  days  of  Bismarck. 

The  crisis  found  the  Kaiser  and  his  Ministers  ready 
to  risk  everything,  even  the  long-dreaded  war,  pro- 
vided that  German  prestige  could  be  regained  and  the 
path  to  Asia  Minor  reopened.    William  II  had  long 

calling  Lloyd  George's  speech  a  ' ■ humiliating  challenge  of  a  kind  that 
German  people  would  not  put  up  with. ' '  The  Colonial  Minister  resigned 
almost  immediately,  and  even  the  Socialist  press  denounced  the  Govern- 
ment, Annual  Register,  1911,  342;  Andrillon,  L'Expansion  de  VAlle- 
magne,  65. 

•»  See  especially  the  pamphlet,  '  *  Truth  about  Germany, ' '  in  New 
York  Times  Current  History  of  the  War,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  244,  sq. 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  ALLIANCES  193 

ii 
and  sincerely  striven  to  keep  the  peace.    His  action 

in  the  three  preceding  crises  had  been  restricted  to 
threats.  But  because  of  his  failure  in  1911,  because 
of  the  influence  of  his  son  and  that  militarist  class  to 
which  he  instinctively  turned  for  advice,  he  was 
resolved  that  next  time  his  threats  should,  if  necessary, 
be  supported  by  arms.40  The  occasion  which  forced 
Germany  to  action  and  which  led  to  the  crisis  of  1914 
and  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  arose  from 
conditions  and  events  in  the  Near  East.  These  con- 
ditions are  obviously  worthy  of  special  consideration. 

40 For  the  change  in  the  Kaiser's  attitude,  see  the  letter  of  Jules 
Cambon,  dated  at  Berlin,  November  22,  1913,  published  in  the  French 
Yellow  Book,  1914,  No.  6. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Of  the  great  international  problems  which  were 
prominent  during  the  first  part  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  Near  Eastern  Question  was  one  of  the 
few  which  had  not  found  its  settlement  by  1871.  We 
have  already  had  occasion  to  refer  to  it  at  various 
times,  and  its  importance  in  affecting  the  policy  of 
the  Powers  is  obvious.  The  irreconcilable  interests 
of  Russia  and  Austria  in  the  BalJ^ajis  were  largely 
accountable  for  Bismarck's  failure  to  realize  his 
dream  of  transforming  the  League  of  the  Three 
Emperors  into  a  definite  alliance.  The  Balkan  crisis 
of  1887  furnished  impetus  to  the  movement  for  the 
bringing  together  of  France  and  Russia  into  the  Dual 
Alliance.  And  it  was  the  clash  of  Russian  and 
Austrian  interests  in  the  Near  East  that  produced 
the  international  crisis  of  1908-1909,  which  was  so 
skillfully  utilized  by  Germany.  For  a  generation 
after  1871  European  policy  was  "dominated  by  the 
Balkans/ '  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  when  the  long- 
feared  conflict  broke  forth,  its  occasion  was  to  be  found 
in  a  phase  of  this  ever  vexatious  problem* 

Historians  have  frequently  pointed  out  that  the 
Near  Eastern  Question  is  as  old  as  history  or  legend. 
Achilles  and  Hector  fighting  on  the  Trojan  plain, 
Spartans  at  Thermopylae,  Athenians  at  Salamis, 
Octavius'   victory   over    the    fleet    of    Cleopatra    at 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  195 

Actium — all  represent  various  phases  of  the  Eastern 
Question.  Eichard  Coeur  de  Lion  warring  against 
Saladin,  and  Prince  Eugene  defending  Vienna  from 
the  attacks  of  the  Ottoman  Turks,  may  likewise  be 
regarded  as  the  protagonists  in  the  twelfth  and  seven- 
teenth century  aspects  of  this  never-ending  problem. 
In  fact  whenever  occideTit.nl  mvi1i7n.tinn  has  conflicted 
with  near-oriental,  the  world  has  witnessed  some 
manifestation  of  the  Eastern  Question. 

In  recent  times  the  Near  Eastern  Question  has 
taken  on  a  more  exact  connotation  and  is  subject  to 
more  specific  definition.  In  the  sense  in  which^the 
term  is  generally  used,  it  means  the  problem  or  ^roup 
of  problems  that  result  from  the  ^occupation  of  .Con- 
stantinople and  the~Balkan  Peninsula  by  the  Turks. 
.Regarded  broadly  the  problem  may  be  said  to  have 
two  main  aspects^jjthe  one_c^ncerns_the_  position  of 
the  Christian  nations  of  ^hel^lkans  jhicji,  previous 
to  thenineteenth  centuryT  were  subject  to  Turfesh 
domination;  the  other  concerns  the9fettitude  taken  by 
the  great  European  Powers  towards  the  Balkans  and 
Dardanelles,  and  their  control.  The  solution  of  the 
^roblftTYi  lima  liftfl  depended  upon  the  answer  to  two 
questions :  Was  Turkey  to  be  excluded  entirely  from 
EuropeT  and  if  so^how  was  her  territory  to  be  dis- 
tributed? Was  !Russia,  or  Austria,  or  any  other 
Power  to  winpractical  mastery  ofthe  Danube  and 
Dardanelles  by  establishing  a  semi-protectorate  over 
t&e^gajSan  nations  or  Turkgy? 

jPhlT  crumbling  of  the  Turkish  dominion  in  Europe 
began  earlvin  the  nineteenth  century.  The  revolt 
of  jjferbia  in  18Q41_ed  to  a  long  and  bitter  jstruggle  for 
autonomy,  which  was  finally  conceded  bv~the  Sultan 
inJiSlg.    Six  years  later  a  far  more  serious  rebellion 


U 


196    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

in  Greece  inaugurated  an  eight  years '  warT  in  which 
5reat_Britain  and  Bussia  finally  participated.  The 
final  result  was  the  absolute  independence  of  Greece, 
which  was  granted  by  Turkey  in  1829.  The  dismem- 
berment of  the  Turkish  Empire,  thus  begun,  could  not 
be  arrested.  In  1862  the  provinces  of  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia  received  practical  autonomy_under  the  name 
of  Rumania,  and  in  1878  they  were  granted  complete 
independence.  The  rebellion  which  flared  out4nJ.876. 
led  two  years  later  to  the  autonomy  of  Bulgaria,  which 
was  in  1908  extended  into  absolute  independence.1 
^  Finally  in  1912  and  1913  a  successful  war  waged 
jby  the  Balkan  States  upon  Turkey  robbed  her  of 
Thrace,  Macedonia,  Albania,  Crete,  and  the  islands 
of  the  ^Egean.  With  the  exception  of  Albania  and 
some_of  the  islands,  the  territory  won  at  that  time 
was  distributed  between  Greece,  Serbia,  and  Bulgaria. 
But  the  answer  to  the  first  question  still  remains 
incomplete.  Turke^nas  not  been  driven  from  Europe^ 
although  her  tefffiSrTes  have  been  greatly  diminished 
and  she  has  been  ousted  from  the  Balkans.  And  the 
distribution  of  the  conquered  territory  has  not  been 
sufficiently  satisfactory  to  all  parties  to  assure  the 
permanency  of  the  settlement. 

The  second  question,  namelyT  which  of  the  great 
Powers  should  exercise  predominant  influence^  the 
J  Balkajo^JBgnjnsula,  has  been  the  one  most  difficult 
of  solution,  possibly,  of  modern  times,  and  has  been 
productive  of  numerous  diplomatic  crises  as  well  as 
wars.  In  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
rivalry  of  ftjgg^fif^gj11  flT1(l  Russia  in  thp  Npar  "East, 
was  acute,  and  was  perhaps  the  moipLESIaBg  char- 

iDriault,  La  Question  d' Orient,  passim;  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815, 
601,  sq. 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  197 

acteristic  of  the  situation.  jThis  rivalry  accounted 
for  the  joint  intervention  of  those  Powers  on  behalf 
'Tfij&reece  ^  1827,  for  Great  Britain  feared  that  if 
Russia  were  allowed  to  act  alone,  she  would  secure 
an  unassailable  position  on  the  Dardanelles.  It  also 
led  to  the  Crimean  War  of  1854,  when  Great  Britain 
combined  with  France  to  protect  the  Turkish  Empire 
_fr2jn  tbft  attack  of  Rnama  Again  in  1878,  Great 
Britain,  under  Beaconsfield,  found  herself  ranged  with 
Austria  to  prevent  the  complete  dismemberment  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  whiflh  seemed  likely  to  result 
in  the  mastery  of  the  Slavs  over  the.  Balkans. 

Since  1878,  however,  Great  Britain  has  come  to 
believe  that  the  extension  of  Russian  influence  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  would  be  comparatively  innocuous 
to  British  interests,  and  the  Anglo-Russian  rivalry- 
has  been  effaced  by  the  more  serious  conflict  of 
Austrian  and  Russian  ambitions.  Germany  has  stood 
behind  Austria  in  1:his  conflict,  and  it  may  fairly  be 
said  that  during  the  last  decade  the  international 
aspect  of  the  Eastern  Question  has  been  the  struggle 
of  the  forces  of  Pan-Slavism  and  JPan-Germanism. 

The  interests  of  all  the  great  Powers  in  the  Eastern 
Question  are  obvious.  Certain  of  the  European 
states  have  desired  that  Ottoman  power  should  be 
weakened  if  not  destroyed,  while  others  have  desired 
that  it  should  be  reaffirmed.  But  to  none  of  them  has 
the  fate  of  the  Turkish  Empii?e  been  a  question  of 
indifference.  For  Russia  it  has  always  been  a  matter 
of  vital  importance  that  the  Dardanelles  should  not 
be  held  byj^  strong  ,jnatjon.  Every  symptom  of 
convalescence  on  the  part  oithe  Sick  Man  has  caused 
tremors  of  agitation  at  St.  Petersburg.     To  secure 


198    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Byzantium  for  herself  has  been  the  dream  of  Russia 
since  the  days  of  Peter  the  Great  and  Catherine  II. 

Sentimentally,  the  Russians  look  to  Byzantium  as 
the  source  from  which  their  civilization  has  been 
derived,  and  they  regard  themselves  as  the  natural 
legatees  of  Justinian  and  Theodosius.     Strategically^ 

/  the  control  of  the  Dardanelles  w6uld"~give  them 
absolute  mastery  of  the  Northeast  Mediterranean; 
it  would  transform  the  Black  Sea  into  a  Russian  lake, 
from  which  in  time  of  war  their  vessels  might  emerge, 
perfectly  equipped  at  their  Crimean  base,  and  in  which 
they  might  take  refuge,  safe  from  pursuit.  And 
economically,  the  control  of  the  Straits  would  give 
to  Russia  a  prptected  outlet  for  those  vast  supplies 
of  food-stuffs  exported  from  Odessa.  South  Russia 
has  become  the  granary  of  Europe,  and  the  closing 
of  the  Straits  means  economic  paralysis  to  an  impor- 
tant part  of  the  Russian  Empire. 

Another  factor  has  vitally  affected  the  desire  of 
Russia  to  win  Constantinople.  Nature  has  been 
bounteous  to  her  in  many  respects,  but  in  one,  has 

7  laid  a  tremendous  handicap  upon  her ;  for  Russia 
has  no  outlet  to  the  open  sea  that  is  available  during  • 
the  whole  year,  and  notwithstanding  all  her  efforts 
has  never  been  able  to  secure  one.  Russia  has  seen 
her  attempts  to  win  an  ice-free  port  frustrated  one 
after  the  other;  her  history  has  been  the  endeavor 
to  reach  the  ocean  waterways,  and  she  has  always 
found  herself  blocked.  It  was  in  vain  that  Peter  the 
Great  moved  his  capital  from  Moscow  to  the  Baltic, 
for  the  Baltic  has  been  closed  by  the  rise  of  Germany. 
Hope  of  gaining  access  to  the  Pacific,  except  on  an  ■ 

1  ice-bound  coast,  has  been  cut  off  by  Japan.  And  the 
Russian  ambition  of  reaching  the  Persian  Gulf  was 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  199 

sacrificed  to  the  Convention  of  1907  with  Great 
Britain.  For  these  failures,  one  success  will  atone: 
the  winning  of  control  over  the  Dardanelles.2 

For  Eussia,  the  extension  of  her  influence  in  the 
Near  East  has  thus  become  more  important  in 
recent  years.  Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
exchanged  her  fear  of  the  Eussian  advance  in  this 
quarter  for  a  complaisance  almost  kindly.  Before 
the  last  years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Eussian 
control  of  the  Balkans  and  the  Dardanelles  seemed 
to  threaten  the  path  to  British  India.  The  Turk  was 
thus  the  protege  of  Great  Britain,  and  received  British 
support,  military  and  diplomatic,  in  1854  and  1878. 
But  when  Great  Britain  purchased  the  controlling 
interest  in  the  Suez  Canal  and  a  few  years  later 
established  a  practical  protectorate  in  Egypt,  she 
began  to  consider  that  the  route  to  India  was  safe. 
Egypt  is  the  key  to  the  East,  and  so  long  as  British 
influence  in  Egypt  was  assured,  Eussian  power  in  the 
Balkans  or  even  on  the  Dardanelles  might  be  regarded 
with  comparative  indifference.  Furthermore,  as  the 
century  came  to  a  close,  Germany  began  to  appear 
as  a  more  dangerous  rival  than  Eussia,  and  British 
statesmen  believed  that  the  advance  of  Germany  in 
the  Near  East  could  best  be  met  by  encouraging  or  at 
least  not  contesting  the  claims  of  Eussia.  Hence  when 
Eussia  and  Great  Britain  compromised  their  claims 
in  Afghanistan,  Persia,  and  Thibet  in  1907,  Great 
Britain  made  no  objection  to  Eussia 's  renewed  interest 
in  the  Balkans. 

Instead  of  Anglo-Eussian  rivalry,  the  conflict  of 
7  Slav  and  Magyar,  with  the  Teuton  in  the  background, 

2  Von  Biilow,  Deutschland,  Oesterreich-Ungarn  und  die  Ballcanstaaten, 
30,  sq. 


200    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

tended  to  dominate  the  Near  Eastern  Question.  The 
interest  of  Austria  in  the  Balkans  and  Dardanelles 
has  always  been  keen.  In  the  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries  Austria  was  on  the  defensive  against 
the  Turks.  So  long  as  the  Ottoman  power  was 
militant  and  aggressive,  she  acted  as  the  bulwark  of 
Europe  against  the  advance  of  Islam.  When  the 
Turkish  flood  receded,  Austria  began  to  take  great 
interest  in  the  control  of  the  Danube,  as  a  vital  outlet 
for  Austrian  trade.  But  the  trade  of  the  Danube 
depends  ultimately  upon  the  Dardanelles.  Were 
Eussia  to  control  the  Straits,  Austrian  control  of  the 
Danube  would  be  meaningless.  Austria  has  accord- 
ingly watched  Eussia's  attempts  to  extend  her  influence 
in  the  Balkans  with  jealousy;  in  1855,  at  the  time  of 
the  Crimean  War,  notwithstanding  the  debt  that  she 
owed  to  Eussia  for  her  invaluable  assistance  in  the 
Hungarian  rebellion  of  1848-1849,  she  mobilized 
against  her,  and  without  actually  entering  the  war, 
helped  to  determine  its  outcome.  Furthermore, 
Austria  has  always  looked  forward  to  free  access 
to  the  -ZEgean  and  Adriatic  Seas,  and  her  desire  to 
clear  the  path  to  Salonika  or  Avlona  has  determined 
her  interest  in  the  Balkan  settlement. 

After  1866  Austria's  Balkan  policy  received  new 
impetus.  Her  defeat  by  Prussia  established  the  fact 
that  she  could  no  longer  hope  to  pose  as  a  great 
German  Power^  and  that  she  must  seek  compensations 
in  Southeastern  Europe  for  loss  of  influence  in  Central 
Europe.  In  1867,  furthermore,  the  Magyar  and  Ger- 
man elements  reached  a  settlement  of  their  claims  to 
power  in  the  Hapsburg  Empire;  the  resulting  com- 
promise, which  excluded  the  Slav  element,  gave  the 
Magyars  opportunity  for  extending  their  domination 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  201 

over  the  Slavs  of  the  Danube.  But  such  domination 
could  be  made  firm  and  permanent  only  if  the  Slavs 
of  the  Balkans,  outside  of  the  Austrian  boundaries, 
were  also  brought  under  Hapsburg  influence.  The 
Austrian  Empire  would  never  be  safe  from  disinte- 
gration so  long  as  the  disaffected  Slavs  of  the  Empire 
were  encouraged  to  intrigue  and  revolt  by  their  kins- 
men across  the  border. 

Extension  of  Austrian  influence  in  the  Balkans, 
or  preferably  a  sort  of  protectorate  over  the  Christian 
nations  of  the  peninsula,  thus  became  a  cardinal  point 
in  Austrian  policy.  But  at  every  turn  she  met  the  « 
resistance  of  the  Slavs,  and  behind  the  Slavs  stood 
their  protector,  Russia.  For  each  nation  the  question 
was  of  the  most  vital  importance.  Russia  could  not 
afford  to  forego  her  ambition~of  winning  control  of 
the  Straits  and  extending  her  influence  in  the  Balkans. 
Austria  must  keep  the  Dardanelles  free  from  Russia 
unless  her  position  on  the  Danube  was  to  be  without' 
practical  value;  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkans 
meant  the  blocking  of  her  path  to  the  iEgean  and  the 
Adriatic ;  and  Slav  power  in  the  peninsula  threatened 
the  integrity  and  existence  of  the  Austrian  Empire.3^ 

Germany's  interest  in  the  Near  Eastern  Question*- 
dates  from  more  recent  times.  It  is,  in  fact,  only  since 
Germany  began  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  world 
empire  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  has  been  for 
her  a  point  of  vital  concern.  Prussia  took  no  part 
in  the  Crimean  War,  and  it  will  not  be  forgotten  that 
Bismarck  observed  that  the  whole  Eastern  Question 
was  not  worth  the  bones  of  a  single  Pomeranian 
grenadier.    So  long  as  the  scope  of  Germany's  policy 

3  Von  Biilow,  Deutschland,  Oesterreich-Ungarn  und  die  BalTcanstaaten, 
87,  sq. 


202    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

was  restricted  to  the  Continent,  she  had  no  axe  to 
grind  in  the  Balkans.  At  the  Congress  of,  Berlin, 
Bismarck's  action  was,  if  not  disinterested,  at  least 
confined  almost  altogether  to  the  support  of  Austria. 
As  a  ground  of  conflict  between  Austria  and  Russia, 
the  Eastern  Question  was  forced  upon  the  attention 
of  Germany ;  but  until  the  accession  of  William  II  her 
attitude  towards  the  problem  was  that  of  an  outsider. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  century,  as  we  have  seen, 
?  Germany  began  to  search  for  new  markets,  in  order 
to  provide  for  the  demands  of  those  growing  indus- 
tries upon  which  the  life  of  the  nation  seemed  to 
depend.  In  most  of  the  markets  of  the  world  she  had 
to  meet  the  long-established  trade  of  the  British. 
Such  was  the  case  in  the  Far  East  and  in  South 
America.  By  superiority  of  commercial  methods 
German  competition  often  proved  successful,  but  at 
best  it  was  a  fight  against  cruel  odds,  and  German 
traders  looked  for  a  region  in  which  their  commercial 
penetration  might  find  a  free  field.  Such  a  district 
was  to  be  found  in  the  great  valleys  of  the  Tigris  and 
Euphrates,  which  were  still  largely  untouched  by  alien 
commerce,  and  from  both  the  economic  and  strategic 
point  of  view  appeared  to  be  of  the  greatest  value. 
It  was  in  this  direction  therefore  that  Germany  turned, 
and  the  commercial  penetration  of  Mesopotamia 
received  enthusiastic  support  from  both  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  capitalists.4 

The  first  definite  disclosure  of  the  German  plans 
appeared  in  1899,  when  a  concession  was  granted  for 
the  construction  of  a  railway  from  Konia,  a  point  in 

♦  Andrillon,  L 'Expansion  de  VAllemagne,  236-243;  Verney  et  Damb- 
mann,  Les  Puissances  au  Levant;  Rene"  Henry,  La  Question  d' Orient 
and  Des  Monts  de  Boheme  au  Golfe  Persique. 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  203 

Mesopotamia,  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  This  was  the 
extension  of  a  line  projected  a  decade  previously  by 
a  group  of  German  financiers  who  received  the  sup- 
port of  the  powerful  Deutsche  Bank.  It  was  the 
beginning  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  revealed  the 
ambitions  of  Germany.  Four  years  later  the  Bagdad 
Railway  Company  was  formed.  The  line  was  designed 
so  as  to  connect  Haidar  Pasha,  one  of  the  Asiatic 
jjuburbs  of  Constantinople,  with  one  of  the  harbors 
conceded  to  Germany  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  German 
engineers  drew  up  plans  for  the  connection  of  the 
Asiatic  terminus,  by  means  of  a  tunnel,  with  the 
European  side  of  the  Bosphorus  and  with  the  Euro- 
pean railway,  which  was  under  German  management. 
The  railway  was  to  follow  the  route  of  Cyrus  and 
the  Ten  Thousand  in  the  Anabasis,  over  the  Taurus 
and  down  into  the  plains  of  Mesopotamia.  Two 
branch  railways  of  the  utmost  importance  were 
secured  by  the  German  company:  the  one  was  the 
most  direct  trade  route  to  Smyrna;  the  other  gave 
connection  with  the  port  of  Alexandretta.  Further- 
more, the  Germans  later  obtained  the  concession  of 
the  line  planned  to  run  between  Aleppo,  Damascus, 
and  Mecca,  the  route  which  would  naturally  be  taken 
by  all  Moslem  pilgrims.5  "Even  the  Holy  Land  will 
become  a  German  province.  The  network  of  German 
railways  will  radiate  from  Mecca  to  Constantinople, 
and  from  Smyrna  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  One  terminus 
will  be  within  twelve  hours  of  Egypt,  another  terminus 
will  be  within  four  days  of  Bombay."8 

e  See  especially,  Rohrbach,  Die  Bagdadbahn;  ChSradame,  Le  Chemin 
de  Fer  de  Bagdad;  Mazel,  Le  Chemin  de  Fer  de  Bagdad;  Fraser,  The 
Short  Cut  to  India;  Chirol,  The  Middle  East;  Martin,  Die  Bagdadbahn. 

e  Sarolea,  The  Anglo-German  Problem,  266-267. 


204    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

At  the  moment  when  German  plans  were  taking 
shape,  Russia  was  so  closely  involved  in  the  Far 
Eastern  problem  that  she  could  offer  no  effective 
resistance ;  she  did,  however,  prevent  the  construction 
of  a  line  following  the  most  convenient  and  cheapest 
route  along  the  imperial  road  of  the  Romans  and 
passing  through  the  plain  of  Nineveh,  which  would 
have  threatened  her  Transcaucasian  possessions 
directly.  France  not  merely  did  not  oppose  the 
German  plan,  but  her  financiers  offered  precious 
assistance  and  subscribed  large  and  necessary  sums. 
M.  Rouvier  himself,  who  allowed  Delcasse  to  be  ejected 
from  his  cabinet  in  1905  at  the  behest  of  Germany, 
was  said  to  be  financially  interested.7  Great  Britain, 
by  her  influence  over  the  Sheik  of  Koweit,  hoped  to 
close  the  most  desirable  terminus  on  the  Persian  Gulf 
to  the  German  line ;  but  the  Germans  evidently  hoped 
to  overcome  British  opposition.8  At  all  events  they 
never  faltered  in  their  determination  to  win  an  open 
path  from  Hamburg  to  the  Gulf,  with  a  branch  line 
and  terminus  on  the  Mediterranean. 

The  constitution  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  Company 
*  may  be  said  to  be  an  event  of  the  first  importance  in 
the  history  of  European  diplomacy.  It  was  the  first 
step  in  Germany's  southeastern  policy  which  was 
designed  to  win  for  German  traders  complete  economic 
control  over  the  Turkish  dominions  and  ultimately^ 
possibly,  a  political  protectorate;  Germany  was  to 
-  "add  to  her  sway  the  ancient  empire  of  Semiramis 
and    Nebuchadnezzar,    of    Cyrus    and    Haroun    al 

i  Cheradame,  Le  Chemin  de  Fer  de  Bagdad,  275. 

«Bose,  The  Origins  of  the  War,  83-84;  Spectator,  November  8,  1902, 
April  4,  1903,  June  5,  1909;  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  June,  1909. 
For  the  feebleness  of  the  opposition  of  the  French  and  British,  see 
Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  May,  June,  1914  (articles  by  M.  Geraud). 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  205 

Raschid."9  It  gave  Germany  an  outlet  for  her 
expanding*  industries  and  her  teeming  population. 
Asia  Minor  and  Mesopotamia  are  districts  which  have 
been  among  the  most  prosperous  and  productive  in 
the  whole  world.  It  is  true  that  stupid  deforestation 
on  the  part  of  Turkish  governors  has  led  to  climatic 
changes  and  lessened  the  fertility  of  the  soil.  But 
the  science  of  German  agriculturists  would  soon  revive 
the  prosperity  of  regions  which  because  of  short- 
sighted exploitation  have  become  arid.  The  natural 
resources  of  the  country  are  rich  and  merely  waiting 
for  development.10 

But  the  Germans  were  attracted  not  so  much  by  the 
commercial  and  industrial  opportunities  which  the 
Bagdad  Railway  was  to  open  to  them,  as  by  the 
political  advantage  which  control  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  would  offer.  If  in  the  future  there  should 
arise  a  struggle  with  Great  Britain  for  the  control 
of  the  seas  and  colonial  empire,  German  domination 
in  Mesopotamia  would  threaten  the  British  Empire 
in  two  vital  points:  India  and  Egypt.  This  was  the 
point  of  view  adopted  by  Rohrbach,  whose  views  on 
German  policy  were  accepted  as  sound  and  who  by 
no  means  belonged  to  the  belligerent  party  in  Ger- 
many. "One  factor,"  said  he  in  1911,  "and  one  alone 
will  determine  the  possibility  of  a  successful  issue  for 
Germany  in  such  a  conflict :  whether  or  not  we  succeed 
in  placing  England  in  a  perilous  position.  A  direct 
attack  upon  England  across  the  North  Sea  is  out  of 
the  question;  the  prospect  of  a  German  invasion  of 
England  is  a  fantastic  dream.  It  is  necessary  to 
discover  another  combination  in  order  to  hit  England 

»  Sarolea,  The  Anglo-German  Problem,  250. 
io  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  59-60. 


> 


206    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

in  a  vulnerable  spot — and  here  we  come  to  the  point 
where  the  relationship  of  Germany  and  Turkey  and 
the  conditions  prevailing  in  Turkey  become  of  decisive 
importance  for  German  foreign  policy,  based  as  it 
now  is  upon  watchfulness  in  the  direction  of  Eng- 
land .  .  .  England  can  be  attacked  and  mortally 
wounded  by  land  from  Europe  only  in  one  place — 
Egypt. 

"The  loss  of  Egypt  would  mean  for  England  not 
only  the  end  of  her  dominion  over  the  Suez  Canal, 
and  of  her  connections  with  India  and  the  Far  East, 
but  would  probably  entail  the  loss  also  of  her  posses- 
sions in  Central  and  East  Africa.  The  conquest  of 
Egypt  by  a  Mohammedan  Power  like  Turkey  would 
also  imperil  England's  hold  over  her  sixty  million 
Mohammedan  subjects  in  India,  besides  prejudicing 
her  relations  with  Afghanistan  and  Persia.  Turkey, 
however,  can  never  dream  of  recovering  Egypt  until 
she  is  mistress  of  a  developed  railway  system  in  Asia 
Minor  and  Syria,  and  until,  through  the  progress  of 
the  Anatolian  Railway  to  Bagdad,  she  is  in  a  position 
to  withstand  an  attack  by  England  upon  Mesopotamia. 
The  Turkish  army  must  be  increased  and  improved, 
and  progress  must  be  made  in  her  economic  and 
financial  position  .  .  .  The  stronger  Turkey  grows, 
the  more  dangerous  does  she  become  for  England  .  .  . 
Egypt  is  a  prize  which  for  Turkey  would  be  well  worth 
the  risk  of  taking  sides  with  Germany  in  a  war  with 
England.  The  policy  of  protecting  Turkey,  which  is 
now  pursued  by  Germany,  has  no  other  object  but  the 
desire  to  effect  an  insurance  against  the  danger  of  a 
war  with  England.,m 

At  the  moment  then  when  Great  Britain  had  come 

11  Rohrbach,  Die  Bagdadldhn,  18,  19. 


THE  NEAB  EASTERN  QUESTION  207 

to  the  conclusion  that  Russia  was  no  longer  dangerous 
and  had  given  up  her  role  of  protector  of  the  Porte, 
Germany  was  stepping  forward  to  save  and  strengthen 
the  Ottoman  Empire.  "She  saw  that  in  Asia  Minor 
and  Mesopotamia  there  was  a  great  field  open  for 
German  influence,  organizing  power,  and  capital.  The 
key  to  this  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment. Germany  would  give  her  support  to  the 
maintenance  of  Turkish  power;  Turkey  would  grant 
the  necessary  concessions  by  which  her  Asiatic  pos- 
sessions would  be  opened  up  to  German  enterprise. 
And  behind  was  a  more  grandiose  conception:  Ger- 
many, the  ally  and  patron  of  Turkey,  might  become 
the  organ  for  a  general  reassertion  of  Islam  which 
would  be  the  strongest  weapon  against  England  and 
France.  Here  at  least  was  a  field  for  expansion  in 
which  sea  power  would  be  useless;  once  let  a  reor- 
ganized and  powerful  Turkish  government,  with  an 
army  disciplined  and  trained  by  German  officers,  be 
established  in  Syria  and  Bagdad,  and  then  would 
come  the  time  for  a  move  from  the  most  vulnerable 
side  on  Egypt  and  on  India. ' ,12 

From  the  beginning  of  his  reign  William  II  had 
realized  the  necessity  of  winning  and  preserving 
friendship  with  the  Turk.13  His  first  official  journey 
in  1889  was  to  the  Holy  Land  when  he  inaugurated 
that  understanding  with  the  Porte  which  has  since 
been  broken  only  once  and  for  a  brief  period  after  the 
Young  Turk  Revolution  of  1908.  German  influence 
was  solidified  by  the  reorganization  of  the  Turkish 

izHeadlam,  "The  Balkans  and  Diplomacy, ' '  in  Atlantic  Monthly, 
January,  1916,  124-125. 

is  Friendship  between  Prussia,  and  Turkey  had  been  traditional  since 
the  days  of  Frederick  the  Great. 


208    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

army  by  von  der  Goltz.  German  diplomacy  saved  the 
Turk  from  reform  at  the  hands  of  the  Powers.  Ger^ 
many  not  only  enabled  Turkey  to  crush  Greece  and 
restore  her  military  prestige,  but  also  enabled  her  to 
reap  the  fruits  of  victory.14  Public  manifestations  of 
German  regard  for  Turkey  were  made  upon  every 
possible  occasion  by  the  Kaiser,  and  he  stirred  the 
world  by  his  proclamations  of  affection  towards  Islan>: 
"Say  to  the  three  hundred  million  Moslems  of  the 
world  that  I  am  their  friend. "  With  skill  and  tenacity 
German  agents  worked  at  the  Sublime  Porte,  exploit- 
ing the  affinity  that  exists  between  Prussian  and  Turk, 
an  affinity  which  German  writers  themselves  have 
pointed  out,  more  and  more  replacing  British  and 
French  by  German  influence.15 

If  Germany  was  to  carry  her  Mesopotamian  and 
Turkish  policy  to  success,  another  aspect  of  the  Near 
Eastern  Question  concerned  her  very  closely,  namely, 
,  the  position  of  the  independent  Balkan  States.  Should 
those  nations  become  powerful  and  diplomatically 
autonomous  the  security  of  the  path  from  Germany 
to  Constantinople  would  be  threatened.  They  must, 
therefore,  be  subjected  to  the  domination  of  Germany, 
or  better  still,  to  that  of  Germany's  ally,  Austria; 
for  Austria  has  always  had  greater  success  than 
Germany  in  dealing  with  the  Slavs.  In  no  event  could 
the  Slavs  be  allowed  to  control  the  Balkans,  lest  Ger- 
many's communications  with  Asia  Minor  be  cut.  Thus 
a  regenerated  Turkey  must  guard  the  Straits  while 
Austria    dominated    the    Balkans.      With    her    ally, 

i*  Sarolea,  The  Anglo-German  Problem,  263. 

is  Sir  H.  Rumbold,  Final  Becollections  of  a  Diplomatist,  296 ;  Head- 
lam,  The  Balkans  and  Diplomacy,  125;  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of 
Europe,  61,  62-64. 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  209 

Austria,  supreme  on  the  Danube,  and  her  friend, 
Turkey,  in  control  of  the  Dardanelles,  Germany  might 
reasonably  hope  to  be  master  of  a  sweep  of  territory 
extending  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 
She  would  cut  Russia  from  her  Mediterranean  trade, 
hold  the  shortest  route  to  the  East,  and  threaten  the 
position  of  the  British  in  Egypt  and  India.18 

Broadly  speaking,  the  attitude  of  the  Great  Euro- 
pean Powers  towards  the  Eastern  Question  in  1907 
was  thus  about  as  follows.  Great,  Britain,  relieved 
of  her  fear  of  the  Russian  peril,  was  willing  thai;  the 
Tsar  should  make  what  profit -be-  could  out  of  the 
weakness"  of  iurkey  ;,^ven  thepossibility  of  Russian 
control  over  the*  Dardanelles  was  regardeclJ^Great 
Britain  with  .equanimity.  Russia,  pushed  back  in  the 
Far  East^was__pr£siing  with' the  greater  eagesness 

iTpon_j(]onstantinople    and     spiring    to throw    her 

influence  more  and  ttwp  ™+"  +.lig  "Rati™ Tig  Pan- 
Slavism,  a  shadowy  but  a  potential  force,  was  aiming 
at-supremacy^lthe  Balkan.  Peninsula,  and  looking 
forward  to  driving  the  Turk  across  the  Straits.  But 
for  ^Austria  and  (formally,  thp  position  of  Turkey  as 
their  protege  guardian  of  the  Dardanelles  must  remain 
unassailed>  The  turbulent  Balkan  States  must  be 
discouraged  and  restrained,  and__the_  infliifinfift»of -the 


Slav  in  the  peninsula  elimmatedfe^flermanv  was 
regTaclng-GTeat  Britain  as  the  Power  that  protected 
Turkey  and  prevented  the  Bugpyni  ad^^g  r«  Con- 
stantmT3pte7~andlva^  timo  roplactBg  Russia 

a^"tfae"Power  that  threatened  the  BritiRh^doTYiiTiioTi 
of^rndia--and^the  route  to  ln^ia. 
For  ~a  generation  after  1878   the  not  infrequent 

i«  Bauer,   Der  Balkarikrieg   und   die   deutsche    Weltpolitilc,   45,   sq. ; 
Berard,  Le  Sultan  et  I'Islam,  225;  Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  235. 


210    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

crises  of  the  Eastern  Question  were  localized  and  the 
Powers  were  able  to  prevent  an  open  clash  of  the 
states  of  first  importance  whose  interests  conflicted. 
The  acquisition  of  Eastern  Eumelia  by  Bulgaria  in 
1885  and  the  defeat  of  Greece  by  Turkey  in  1897  were 
not  allowed  to  precipitate  serious  trouble  and  set  fire 
to  the  heap  of  combustible  material  that  was  gathered 
in  the  Near  East.17  But  in  1908  came  the  capital  event 
which  carried  in  its  train  a  whole  set  of  circumstances, 
and  was  destined  ultimately  to  bring  about  the  inevi- 
table contest  of  arms.  This  event  was  the  revolution 
of  the  Young  Turks. 

For  many  years  there  had  existed  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire  factors  productive  of  lively  dissatisfaction. 
The  inefficiency  of  Turkish  administration,  the  cor- 
ruption prevalent  among  the  official  classes,  and 
especially  the  anaemia  of  the  Sublime  Porte  in  its 
relations  with  foreign  Powers,  led  to  a  feeling  of 
humiliation  and  disgust.  A  large  number  of  Turks 
gradually  came  to  believe  that  Turkish  decadence 
resulted  in  great  part  from  the  despotic  regime  of 
Abdul  Hamid  and  trusted  that  her  recrudescence 
might  be  found  in  the  introduction  of  western  liberal 
institutions.  Amongst  the  civilian  class  the  liberal 
element  was  not  large,  inasmuch  as  the  Government 
had  sent  into  exile  or  imprisonment  every  one  sus- 
pected of  liberal  views.  In  the  army,  however,  there 
were  to  be  found  many  officers  who  had  received  their 
training  in  Germany  or  France  and  had  there  imbibed 
ideas  of  western  civilization  and  become  convinced 
of  its  benefits.  That  such  officers  really  understood 
the  principles  of  western  liberalism  may  be  questioned ; 

»  Hawkesworth,  The  Last  Century  in  Europe,  453-454;  Songeon, 
L'Histoire  de  la  Bulgarie,  358-367. 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  211 

but  they  were  all  imbued  with  a  sense  of  shame  for 
the  weakness  of  Turkey,  and  were  firm  believers  in 
the  necessity  of  change.  An  added  cause  of  dissatis- 
faction was  the  fact  that  their  pay  was  often  far  in 
arrears.18 

The  revolutionary  movement  was  thus  in  part  one 
of  liberalism,  an  aspect  represented  by  the  idealistic 
views  emitted  by  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Pro- 
gress; it  was  also,  and  perhaps  chiefly,  patriotic  and 
chauvinistic.  The  immediate  impetus  towards  revo- 
lutionary action  is  perhaps  to  be  found  in  the  agree- 
ment of  Great  Britain  and  Eussia  that  the  Powers 
must  intervene  to  settle  the  Macedonian  question. 
The  meeting  of  Edward  VII  and  Nicholas  II  at  Reval, 
in  June,  1908,  infuriated  the  Young  Turkish  officers 
beyond  measure.  It  was  the  public  manifestation  of 
the  fact  that  Turkey  was  unable  to  settle  her  own 
affairs,  another  proof  that  she  had  sunk  so  low  that 
her  private  concerns  were  to  be  made  the  business  of 
Europe.  The  direct  answer  was  the  revolution  of 
July  24,  1908,  when  the  Hamidian  regime  was  over- 
thrown and  constitutional  government  inaugurated. 
Abdul  Hamid,  however,  remained  on  the  throne  and 
continued  to  plot  for  the  restoration  of  his  absolute 
power.  This  first  revolution  was  the  work  of  the 
Committee  of  Union  and  Progress,  whose  power  was 
solely  moral,  and  in  April,  1909,  came  the  inevitable 
counter-revolution..  The  constitution  was  torn  up,  and 
the  Young  Turks  in  Constantinople  annihilated.1.9 

But  the  Sultan  had  not  realized  the  power  that  lay 

is  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  PolitiTc,  319 ;  Pinon,  L  'Europe 
et  la  Jeune  Turquie,  50,  sq. 

is  Annual  Register,  1908,  324-327 ;  Bauer,  op.  tit.,  18 ;  Beventlow, 
op.  cit.,  322,  sq. ;  Pinon,  op.  cit.,  78,  sq. 


212    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

behind  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress.  The 
real  force  of  the  revolution  lay  in  the  determination 
of  the  officers  in  the  army  to  resuscitate  Turkey.  When 
the  news  of  the  counter-revolution  came  to  Salonika, 
Shevket  Pasha,  the  commanding  officer,  immediately 
prepared  to  support  the  Young  Turkish  movement  by 
force  of  arms.  Marching  upon  Constantinople,  he 
brought  to  the  service  of  the  revolutionaries  his 
military  skill  and  the  best  troops  of  the  Empire.  The 
Sultan,  undefended,  was  compelled  to  revive  the 
constitution  and  to  abdicate  in  favor  of  his  brother. 
The  Young  Turks  immediately  assumed  control  of 
Ottoman  destinies.20 

A  full  consideration  of  the  Young  Turkish  regime 
would  pass  the  scope  of  this  book.  Everyone  remem- 
bers the  exalted  hopes  aroused  by  the  accession  to 
office  of  the  men  who  seemed  to  be  filled  with  the 
highest  ideals  for  the  regeneration  of  Turkey;  sym- 
pathy with  their  ambitions  was  freely  and  sincerely 
expressed.  Nor  will  be  forgotten  the  intense  disap- 
pointment when  it  became  obvious  that  they  were 
incapable  of  fulfilling  their  task  and  that  they  were 
merely  continuing  the  despotism  of  the  Hamidian 
regime.  Inexperienced  and  untaught,  they  soon  made 
it  clear  that  they  lacked  the  skill  of  their  predecessors, 
as  well  as  the  will  to  maintain  their  promises  of  justice 
and  efficiency.  An  authoritative  study  of  the  causes 
of  their  failure  is  yet  to  be  made.  Our  purpose  is 
merely  to  consider  the  effects  of  their  accession  to 
power  upon  the  international  situation. 

First  of  all,  perhaps,  should  be  noted  the  effect  upon 
Austrian  policy  and  Serbian  ambitions.     It  will  not 

20  Annual  Register,  1909,  328-333;  Pinon,  op.  cit.,  94,  sq.;  Kamsay, 
The  Revolution  in  Constantinople  and  Turkey. 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  213 

be  forgotten  that  in  1878  the  Congress  of  Berlin  had 
placed  the  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  nnder 
the  administrative  control  of  Austria.  The  Sultan* 
retained  nominal  sovereignty  over  the  provinces,  but 
Austria  was  determined  that  actual  sovereignty  should 
never  be  reclaimed  by  the  Sublime  Porte.  The 
Revolution  of  1908  caused  tremors  at  Vienna  and 
Buda-Pesth.  It  was  well  known  that  the  Young  Turk 
leaders  were  inspired  with  patriotic  if  not  jingoistic 
sentiments,  and  the  first  demand  that  Austria  might 
expect  from  a  rejuvenated  Turkey  was  the  return  of 
the  two  provinces.  To  forestall  such  a  demand  Austria 
determined  to  tear  up  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  On 
October  3, 1908,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Constan- 
tinople informed  the  Porte  that  his  Government  had 
annexed  the  provinces,  renouncing  the  right  of  military 
occupation  of  Novi  Bazar,  the  territory  belonging  to 
Turkey  and  lying  between  Serbia  and  Montenegro.21 
The  European  crisis  that  resulted  has  already  been 
discussed.  The  protests  of  Serbia  and  of  Russia,  her 
protector,  were  quelled  by  the  threat  of  force  on  the 
part  of  Germany.  Serbia's  ambitions  were  for  the 
moment  sacrificed  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  Turkey, 
after  a  boycott  of  Austrian  goods,  carried  on  for  four 
months,  agreed  to  accept  financial  compensation  for 
the  provinces.  But  the  importance  of  the  crisis  in  the 
history  of  the  Near  Eastern  Question  is  to  be  found 
in  the  desperate  spirit  of  the  Serbian  Government 
alter  the  surrender  of  Russia  to  Germany.  The 
annexation  of  the  provinces  seemed  to  Serbia  a  fatal 
blow  to  all  her  national  ambitions.  The  action  of 
Austria  apparently  destroyed  her  hope  of  winning  for 

2i  Supra,  Chap.  VIII;  Eeventlow,  op.  cit.,  324;  Annual  Register,  1908, 
309-310. 


214    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

herself  these  provinces,  the  centre  of  the  Serbian  race ; 
it  seemed  to  cut  her  off  forever  from  the  sea.  Not 
merely  was  her  dream  of  a  great  Serbian  Empire 
ruined,  but  she  must  look  forward  to  the  ultimate 
domination  of  Austria.  Any  change  in  the  status  quo 
would  be  for  her  a  relief.  Serbia's  action  in  1912 
against  Turkey  can  be  understood  only  if  we  realize 
that  her  people  believed  that  some  compensation  must 
be  found  for  the  loss  of  Bosnia,  if  she  were  to  preserve 
her  independence.22 

Another  vitally  important  result  of  the  Young 
Turkish  regime  is  to  be  found  in  Macedonia  and  in 
the  altered  attitude  of  Bulgaria  towards  the  Mace- 
donian problem.  Before  1908,  Bulgaria,  although 
aspiring  to  the  ultimate  lordship  of  Macedonia,  had 
favored  its  autonomy  rather  than  its  immediate 
independence.  The  absolute  independence  of  Mace- 
donia would  necessarily  give  rise  to  serious  trouble 
with  Serbia  and  Greece,  since  each  of  these  states 
claimed  much  of  Macedonia  on  racial  and  linguistic 
grounds.  Autonomy,  on  the  other  hand,  would  allow 
Bulgaria  to  carry  on  a  propaganda,  by  schools  and 
priests,  which  would  end  in  making  the  province  in 
reality  Bulgarian.  She  might  then  hope  to  imitate 
successfully  her  own  example  of  1885  when  she  had 
annexed  Eastern  Rumelia.23 

But  the  Young  Turks  soon  made  it  evident  that  the 
granting  of  autonomy  to  Macedonia  formed  no  part 

22  Georgevitch,  Die  serbische  Frage;  Kautskcy,  ' '  Oesterreich  und 
Serbian,"  in  Neue  Zeit,  xxvii,  1;  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige 
Politilc,  328. 

23  Annual  Register,  1912,  349;  Songeon,  L'Histoire  de  la  Bulgarie, 
383-385;  Dragonoff,  Macedonia  and  the  Reforms;  Pinon,  "La  Question 
de  Macedome  et  des  Balkans/'  in  Question  Actuelles  de  Politique 
Etrangtre,  1911,  181-233. 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  215 

of  their  policy.  They  immediately  began  a  process 
of  bringing  in  Turks  of  the  lowest  classes  to  strengthen 
the  Moslem  element  in  districts  where  it  was  weak, 
and  forcing  the  Christians  to  serve  in  the  Ottoman 
army.  Bulgaria  perceived  that  the  possibility  of 
autonomy  was  rapidly  receding.  Furthermore,  ter- 
rible persecutions  of  the  Bulgarians  in  Macedonia 
were  inaugurated.  A  cry  of  despair  went  up  from 
them  and  was  answered  by  a  cry  of  rage  from  their 
kinsmen  in  Bulgaria.  For  the  Tsar  of  Bulgaria  to 
refuse  the  aid  which  the  Macedonians  so  anxiously 
sought,  and  the  Bulgarians  so  eagerly  desired  to  give, 
possibly  meant  the  overthrow  of  the  dynasty.  Hence 
it  came  about  that  Bulgaria,  like  Serbia,  found  herself 
impelled  by  reasons  of  policy  and  of  sentiment, 
towards  a  disturbance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Near 
East.24 

The  accession  of  the  Young  Turks  to  power  had 
momentous  results  in  a  third  quarter,  namely,  in  Crete ; 
and  the  new  aspect  of  the  Cretan  question  which 
developed  after  1908  bulks  large  among  the  factors 
that  resulted  in  the  reopening  of  the  whole  Eastern 
Question,  and  ultimately  led  to  the  European  War. 
Crete,  which  lies  to  the  south  of  Greece  and  is  largely 
inhabited  by  Greeks,  had  taken  part  in  the  insurrection 
of  1821 ;  but  at  the  time  of  the  emancipation  of  Greece 
had  been  handed  over  to  Egypt,  and  ten  years  later 
reverted  to  Turkey.  Frequent  insurrections  broke  out 
and  the  Turks  were  never  able  to  reduce  the  island  to 

24  Report  of  the  International  Commission  to  Inquire  into  the  Causes 
and  Conduct  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (Carnegie  Endowment  for  Inter- 
national Peace,  Publication  No.  4),  36;  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of 
Europe,  206-210.  On  the  Balkan  States  from  1909-1912,  see  the  volume 
issued  by  the  Cambridge  Press,  Bussia  and  the  Balkan  States,  Appendix 
I,  177,  sq. 


216    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

complete  subjection.  Finally  in  1897,  as  a  result  of  a 
massacre  at  Canea,  popular  feeling  was  so  aroused  in 
Greece  that  the  Government  was  forced  to  intervene. 
A  Greek  army  was  sent  to  the  aid  of  the  Cretans,  and 
war  broke  forth  with  Turkey.25 

In  this  war  the  defeat  of  Greece  was  so  complete 
that  the  Powers  were  forced  to  intervene;  but  the 
purpose  of  the  war  was  at  least  partially  attained, 
for  Crete  was  granted  autonomy  and  placed  under 
the  protection  of  France,  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and1' 
Italy.  Prince  George  of  Greece  was  appointed  High 
Commissioner,  and  upon  his  resignation  in  1906  he 
was  succeeded  by  a  Greek  statesman,  Zaimis.  The 
autonomy  of  the  island  was  complete:  it  had  its  own 
postal  system,  flag,  and  laws;  in  its  relations  with 
Turkey  the  latter  Power  treated  it  like  a  foreign 
country.  Ultimate  union  with  Greece  was  confidently 
expected.26 

This  state  of  affairs  was  definitely  threatened  by 
the  Revolution  of  1908.  Here,  as  in  Macedonia,  the 
Young  Turks  began  to  make  it  clear  that  Turkish 
sovereignty  over  the  island  would  be  reclaimed. 
Annexation  to  Greece  would  never  be  allowed  by 
them.  Their  mission,  as  they  conceived  it,  was  to 
regenerate  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  smarting  under 
the  loss  of  Bosnia,  they  were  determined  to  find  com- 
pensation in  winning  back  Crete.  Their  policy  was 
clearly  manifested  in  the  spring  of  1910,  when  they 
began  to  press  the  Powers  for  the  restoration  of 
Turkish  rights,  and  demanded  from  Greece  renun- 

25  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  104-105;  B&rard,  Les 
Affaires  du  Crdte;  Cahuet,  La  Question  d' Orient,  477,  sq.;  Rambaud, 
L'Histoire  de  la  Eussie,  842,  sq. 

26  Hawkesworth,  The  Last  Century  in  Europe,  477-478. 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  217 

ciation  of  any  intention  of  annexing  the  island.  To 
enforce  their  demands  they  began  a  boycott  of  Greek 
goods,  with  disastrous  effects  upon  Greek  commerce.27 

The  leader  of  the  Cretans  during  the  latter  days 
of  the  island's  autonomy  was  Eleutherios  Venizelos. 
A  practical  statesman,  who  like  Cavour  knew  how  to 
be  prudent  and  also  daring,  he  had  advocated  con- 
tinuing the  regime  of  autonomy  until  Crete  was  so 
far  Hellenized  and  the  Powers  so  far  prepared,  that 
annexation  to  Greece  would  be  simple  and  peaceable. 
The  new  policy  of  the  Young  Turks  made  it  plain 
that  peaceable  annexation  as  a  result  of  diplomatic 
manoeuvres  was  out  of  the  question.  Crete  must  look 
to  Greece  for  liberation  by  force  of  arms.  In  1910 
Venizelos  left  Crete  for  Greece,  established  himself 
as  Prime  Minister  within  the  space  of  a  few  months 
and  began  the  reorganization  of  the  country.  In 
eighteen  months  he  had  so  far  succeeded  in  his  finan- 
cial and  constitutional  reforms,  and  in  his  improve- 
ment of  the  army  and  navy,  that  Greece  was  well 
prepared  for  any  policy  of  action  against  Turkey 
that  might  be  necessary.  By  taking  away  from  Crete 
her  prospect  of  continued  autonomy,  the  Young  Turks 
had  forced  Greece  to  prepare  for  attack  on  Turkey.28 

Three  states  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  Serbia,  Bul- 
garia,  and  Greece,  thus  had  strong  motives  for  a^ 
disturbance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Near  East.  It 
remained  for  the  Young  Turks  to  furnish  to  one  of 
the  great  European  Powers  equally  strong  motives 
for  reopening  the  Eastern  Question.  By  their  policy 
in  Tripoli  they  forced  Italy  to  make  the  first  attack 

27  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  220-240. 

28  Nikolaides,  Griechenlands  Anteil  an  den  Ballcankriegen,  12  j 
Schurman,  The  Balkan  Wars,  42-48. 


218    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

upon  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  begin 
the  series  of  wars  which  has  culminated  in  the  general 
struggle. 

To  the  interests  of  Italy  in  North  Africa  allusion 
has  already  been  made.  We  have  seen  how  the  dream 
of  Italian  control  of  Tunis  was  dissipated  by  French 
enterprise  in  1881,  thereby  opening  a  gulf  of  bitterness 
between  the  two  Latin  nations.  Shortly  afterwards 
England  assumed  control  of  Egypt,  and  in  the  nineties 
Italy's  ambitions  for  empire  in  Abyssinia  were 
destroyed  by  the  annihilation  of  her  expeditionary 
force  at  the  battle  of  Adowa.  But  in  1901  the  interests 
of  Italy  in  Tripoli  were  recognized  by  France,  in 
return  for  Italian  acquiescence  in  the  French  develop- 
ment of  Morocco ;  and  at  the  Conference  of  Algeciras 
the  principle  of  Italian  rights  in  Tripoli  was  accepted 
by  all  the  great  Powers.29 

Italy  was  not  slow  to  make  the  most  of  the  privileges 

v  which  Europe  recognized  and  which  Turkey  did  not 

.  protest,  and  began  to  develop  a  carefully  prepared 

campaign  of  commercial  penetration.    She  had  every 

hope  of  winning  economic  control  of  the  Tripolitaine 

I  and  of  so  increasing  the  prosperity  of  that  region  that 

'  the  native  inhabitants  would  prefer  Italian  rule  to 

that  of  the  Turks.    The  resources  of  the  country  were 

developed,    trading-posts    established,  /branches    of 

Italian  banks   set  up,   and   Italian   steamship   lines 

maintained;  Italian  capital  in  the  meantime  prepared 

to  finance  a  whole  system  of  railways.    The  trade  of 

the  hinterland  was  captured  by  the  Italian  parcel 

zaLapworth,   Tripoli  and   Young  Italy,  42-110;    McCJtrre,   Italy  in*. 
North  Africa,  1-19.    On  Italy's  recent  colonial  policy,  see  T^ttoni,  Italy  Zk 
Foreign  and  Colonial  Policy  (selections  from  the  speeches  given  by  the 
Italian  Foreign  Minister  in  Parliament,  translated  by  di  San  Sonnino). 


THE  NEAR  EASTERN  QUESTION  219 

post.  Except  for  its  political  status  Tripoli  was  in 
1908  practically  an  Italian  province. 

Italian  hopes  of  the  peaceable,  economic  conquest 
of  Tripoli  were  crushed  by  the  Young  Turk  Revolution. 
The  regenerators  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  were  deter- 
mined that  Tripoli  should  not  be  lost  like  Bosnia. 
They  sent  out  new  officials  to  Tripoli,  who  immediately 
began  a  campaign  of  systematic  obstruction  directed 
against  every  form  of  Italian  enterprise.  Italians 
were  subjected  to  consistent  persecution,  concessions 
were  refused  to  Italian  capital,  and  steps  of  a  military 
nature  taken,  which  indicated  clearly  that  Turkey 
intended  to  retain  what  was  left  of  her  African 
provinces  for  herself.80  If  Italy  was  not  to  lose  her 
last  chance  of  a  colony  on  the  North  African  seaboard, 
she  must  obviously  support  her  claims  to  Tripoli  by 
force  of  arms.  In  1911,  after  Italian  opinion  had  been 
prepared  by  a  long  press  campaign,  Italy  took  the 
fateful  step  of  declaring  war  on  Turkey  and  setting 
the  example  for  the  attack  on  the  integrity  of  the 
Turkish  Empire.81 

It  was  thus  that  the  accession  of  the  Young  Turks 
and  their  chauvinistic  policy  led  to  a  reopening  of  the 
Eastern  Question.  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Greece  were 
all  ready  for  the  opportunity  offered  by  the  Italian 
War  on  Turkey.  For  each  of  them  a  change  of  the 
status  quo  in  the  Near  East  seemed  vitally  necessary : 
for  Serbia,  because  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia,  which 

so  Letter  of  the  Foreign  Minister,  the  Marchese  di  San  Guilano, 
cabled  to  New  YorTc  Times,  September  30,  1911,  setting  forth  Italy's 
grounds  for  the  declaration  of  war;  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe, 
234-245. 

siMcClure,  Italy  in  North  Africa,  19,  sq.  The  documents  relating 
to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  are  published  in  Barclay,  The  Turco-Italian 
War  and  its  Problems,  109,  sq. 


220    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

followed  the  Revolution  of  1908 ;  for  Bulgaria,  because 
of  her  interests  in  Macedonia;  for  Greece,  because  of 
her  interests  in  Crete.  But  the  moment  that  the 
position  of  Turkey  was  threatened,  the  question 
became  one  of  European  concern.  Neither  Austria 
and  Germany  on  the  one  hand,  nor  Russia  on  the  other, 
could  for  the  sake  of  their  vital  interests  watch 
unmoved  any  alteration  in  the  Balkan  balance.  It 
was  for  this  reason  that  the  Turks  could  never  believe 
that  Italy  would  draw  the  sword.  "If  she  does  attack 
us,"  said  the  Grand  Vizier,  "all  Europe  will  be  eventu- 
ally drawn  into  the  bloodiest  struggle  of  history — a 
struggle  that  has  always  been  certain  to  follow  the 
destruction  of  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.,m 

32  Personal  conversation  related  by  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe, 
247. 


CHAPTER  X 
THE  BALKAN  WARS 

The  vital  significance  of  the  Italian  declaration  of 
war  upon  Turkey,  September  27,  1911,  was  not 
generally  realized  at  the  time.  None  of  the  Powers 
approved  Italy's  aggressive  action,  but  apparently 
they  failed  to  perceive  the  far-reaching  consequences 
that  might  result  from  it.  France  and  Great  Britain 
feared  that  it  would  lead  to  a  disturbance  of  the 
Mediterranean  balance,  and  although  they  had  con- 
sented to  Italy's  occupation  of  Tripoli,  when  it  was 
put  before  them  in  the  light  of  a  rather  indefinite 
possibility,  they  were  obviously  troubled  by  the  active 
steps  taken  by  Signor  Giolitti.  Germany  and  Austria 
were  naturally  digplpased  by  this  attack  made  by  their 
ally  upon  Turkey,  with  whom  they  themselves  were 
anxious  to  remain  on  terms  of  close  friendship.  But 
all  the  Powers  trusted  that  the  conflict  would  be 
confined  to  Tripoli  and  that  it  would  not  reopen  the 
Eastern  Question.1 

Italy  herself  desired  sincerely  to  avoid  any  disturb- 
ance of  Turkey's  position  in  the  Near  East;  she  hoped 
that  the  war  would  be  brief,  and  even  that  the  result 
of  her  declaration  of  war  would  be  the  peaceable 
surrender  of  Tripoli  by  the  Turks.  Hence  she  confined 
her  first  military  actions  to  the  African  seaboard. 

i  Barclay,  The  Turco-Italian  War  and  its  Problems,  38,  sq. ;  McClure, 
Italy  in  North  Africa,  35,  sq. 


Ws^s^Mk 


2£2    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 


Tripoli  was  bombarded  on  September  30,  and  a  week 
later  surrendered.  An  expeditionary  corps  disem- 
barked early  in  October  and  succeeded  in  foiling  all 
attempts  made  at  counter-attacks  by  the  Turks.  On 
November  5,  the  Italian  Parliament  approved  the 
decree  that  declared  the  annexation  of  the  Turkish 
provinces  in  North  Africa.  The  following  months 
were  spent  in  merely  securing  the  foothold  that  had 
been  won  on  the  coast.2  The  Government  continually 
made  clear  its  unwillingness  to  prosecute  an  aggres- 
sive war  against  the  Porte,  provided  Tripoli  were 
surrendered. 

But  the  Turkish  Government  refused  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  opportunity  offered  her  of  escaping  from 
further  attack,  and  the  position  of  Italy,  both  from 
the  military  and  diplomatic  point  of  view,  was  difficult. 
Turkey  was,  it  is  true,  incapable  of  winning  back  the 
military  positions  that  she  had  lost,  or  of  driving  out 
the  invaders.  But  the  Arabs  continued  a  vexatious 
and  at  times  effective  resistance  under  Turkish  leader- 
ship, and  in  February,  1912,  it  became  clear  that  if 
Turkey  refused  to  acknowledge  the  Italian  conquest, 
it  would  be  years  before  Italy  could  hope  to  pacify 
and  control  her  new  possessions.  The  sole  way  of 
striking  Turkey  and  forcing  her  to  admit  defeat  was. 
to  shift  the  war  to  the  Adriatic  or  the  iEgean.  Action 
in  the  Adriatic  was  not  possible  because  of  the  interests 
of  Austria,  Italy's  ally.  An  jittack  upon  the  Dar- 
danelles threatened  the  position  of  Turkey  so  vitally 
that  it  might  reopen  the  whole  Eastern  Question ;  and 

2  The  decree  of  annexation  is  printed  in  Barclay,  op.  cit.,  113.  The 
expedition  and  the  occupation  of  Tripoli  is  briefly  described  in  Beehler, 
The  History  of  the  Italian- Turkish  War,  5-23.  See  also,  Corradini,  La 
Conquista  di  Tripoli  (letters  from  the  front) ;  McClure,  op.  cit.,  38,  sq~ 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  223 

as  we  have  seen,  the  ambitions  of  Italy's  other  ally, 
Germany,  demanded  that  the  status  of  the  Eastern 
Question  remain  unchanged.  Turkey's  position  as 
guardian  of  the  Straits  was  essential  to  the  German 
policy  in  Mesopotamia. 

Italy  had  promised  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  that 
she  would  not  under  any  circumstances  disturb  the 
status  quo  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  But  by  April, 
1912,  as  the  deadlock  in  North  Africa  was  becoming 
more  and  more  apparent,  it  was  obvious  that  a  direct 
attack  upon  Turkey  must  be  undertaken.  Only  thus 
could  Turkey  be  forced  to  recognize  the  Italian  con- 
quest of  Tripoli.  On  April  18th  the  forts  of  Kum 
Kale  at  the  mouth  of  the  Dardanelles  were  bombarded, 
and  early  in  May,  Rhodes  was  invaded.  Other  islands 
in  the  JEgean  were  also  occupied.  Turkey's  answer 
was  the  closing  of  the  Dardanelles.  Had  the  hands 
of  Turkey  been  absolutely  free,  Italy  would  have  found 
difficulty  in  wringing  acceptance  of  her  conditions 
from  the  Porte,  even  after  the  direct  attack  upon  the 
Ottoman.  Empire.  The  Dardanelles  were  impene- 
trable and  Turkey  might  well  have  prolonged  the 
deadlock.  But  revolution  had  broken  out  in  Albania 
and  taxed  the  military  resources  of  the  Young  Turks 
to  their  fullest  extent.8  Furthermore,  the  Balkan 
States  were  assuming  a  hostile  attitude  and  an  out- 
break in  that  quarter  began  to  appear  imminent. 

The  result  was  that  ki_June,  1912,  Turkish  repre- 
sentatives met  the  Italians  to  discuss  bases  for  a 
settlement  of  the  conflict.  Oriental  methods  prolonged 
the  negotiations  until  October,  when  Italian  patience 
was  finally  exhausted  and  a  distinct  threat  conveyed 

3  Annual  Register,  1912  347-348 ;  Beehler,  The  History  of  the  Italian- 
Turkish  War,  23,  sq. 


224    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

to  Turkey  that  in  case  of  war  in  the  Balkans,  Italy- 
might  be  found  in  alliance  with  the  Balkan  States. 
Turkey  yielded  and  the  preliminaries  of  peace  were 
signed  on  October  15, 1912.4  TheJTreaty  of  Lausanne 
provided  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Turkish  army  from 
Tripoli  and  of  the  Italian  army  from  the  islands  of 
the  -ZEgean;  nothing  was  said  about  the  cession  of 
Tripoli  to  Italy  for  the  sake  of  Turkish  pride,  but  the 
recognition  of  the  conquest  was  absolute,  although 
merely  tacit.  Italy's  restoration  of  the  islands,  pro- 
vided for  in  the  treaty,  has  never  taken  place.  Nor 
has  Turkey  complained,  inasmuch  as  they  must  later 
have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  Greece  had  they  not  been 
held  by  Italy. 

The  real  significance  of  Italy's  war  with  Turkey  is 
not  to  be  found  in  the  conquest  of  Tripoli.  That  was 
an  eventuality  already  foreseen  by  the  Powers,  and 
before  1911  Italy  had  taken  long  steps  toward  its 
accomplishment.  The  importance  of  the  war  lies 
rather  in  the  example  of  direct  attack  upon  Turkey 
that  had  been  set  by  Italy.  •■  It  was  too  much  to 
expect  that  the  Balkan  States  would  not  follow  the 
lead  thus  given,  and  take  advantage  of  the  favorable 
opportunity  offered  in  1912/ 

We  have  seen  that  three  of  tffeTBalkan  States  had 
very  strong  motives  for  an  alteration  of  conditions 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  The  horrible  persecution  of 
7  Christians  in  Macedonia  affected  sentimentally  both 
Bulgaria  and  Greece.  Of  equal  importance  was  the 
fact  that  the  diplomats  of  both  nations  realized  that 
the  attitude  of  the  Young  Turks  threatened  their 
dearest  policies.  Bulgaria  had  been  willing  to  accept 
autonomy  for  Macedonia  in  the  belief  that  by  vigorous 

*  Annual  Begister,  1912,  352. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  225 

propaganda  she  could  prepare  the  way  for  ultimate 
annexation.  But  the  Young  Turks  made  it  plain  that 
Macedonia  was  to  remain  under  Turkish  authority. 
They  had  also  destroyed  the  autonomy  of  Crete  and 
thus  driven  Greece  into  a  state  of  desperation.  Serbia, 
moreover,  had  been  rendered  equally  desperate  by  the 
definite  loss  of  Bosnia  and  looked  forward  to  com- 
pensation in  the  conquest  of  Novi  Bazar,  and  possibly 
the  opening  up  of  a  pathway  to  the  Adriatic,  through 
Albania. 

It  was  obvious  that  the  Balkan  States  could  bring 
effective  pressure  upon  Turkey  only  by  means  of  an 
alliance.  The  defeat  of  Greece,  in  1897,  was  in  the 
minds  of  all  and  a  second  attempt  of  the  same  kind 
promised  no  better  success.  On  the  other  hand,  Serbia 
and  Bulgaria  together  could  not  hope  to  stand  out 
against  the  Turk  without  the  assistance  of  Greece. 
The  cooperation  of  the  Greek  navy  was  essential,  since 
that  alone  could  prevent  the  disembarkation  of  Turkish 
reinforcements  from  Asia  on  the  shores  of  Thrace. 
The  possibility  of  a  Balkan  Alliance  was  scoffed  at 
by  Turkey  and  generally  regarded  by  foreign  diplo- 
mats as  a  dream  that  could  never  be  realized.  The 
hatred  of  Serbia  for  Bulgaria  was  only  surpassed  by 
that  of  Bulgaria  for  Greece ;  and  all  three  Powers  had 
interests  in  Macedonia  which  seemed  absolutely 
irreconcilable.  i  Circumstances,  however,  forced  them 
to  sink  their  differences  and  act  together,  and  it  was 
obvious  that  the  advantages  to  be  gained  from  union 
outweighed  the  disadvantages  that  would  result  from 
mutual  compromise. 

It  is  probable  that  the  organization  of  the  Balkan 
League  resulted  from  the  determination  of  Venizelos 
to  bring  such  pressure  upon  Turkey  as  would  lead  to 


226    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

%a  restoration  of  Cretan  autonomy.  His  position  as 
Prime  Minister  of  Greece  made  him  practically  arbiter 
of  the  situation,  for  the  naval  power  of  Greece  was 
the  sine  qua  non  of  a  successful  attack  upon  Turkey. 
That  Venizelos,  as  weir  as  the  Governments  of  Bul- 
garia and  Serbia,  hoped  to  avoid  a  war  with  Turkey 
is  almost  certain.  Military  success  was  by  no  means 
assured  even  to  their  combined  forces.  It  was  known 
that  the  Ottoman  Empire  could  put  large  armies  in 
the  field,  which  were  supposed  to  be  perfectly  disci- 
plined and  well  equipped;  no  one  will  forget  that  the 
unanimous  verdict  of  military  experts  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  was  entirely  favorable  to  Turkey.  Further- 
more it  was  certain  that  any  attack  upon  Turkey  would 
be  viewed  by  the  Powers  with  disapproval,  a  consid- 
eration, possibly,  of  far  less  weight  in  the  minds  of 
the  Greek,  Serbian,  and  Bulgarian  diplomats.  But 
even  in  the  event  of  a  successful  war  it  was  by  no 
means  clear  that  the  results  would  be  commensurate 
with  the  costs.6 

Events,  however,  forced  the  Balkan  Allies  to  give 
up  their  hopes  of  a  peaceable  adjustment.  Turkish 
arrogance  and  incredulity  as  to  the  possibility  of  a 
real  alliance  between  the  Balkan  States,  forbade  any 
concession  to  the  demand  that  effective  reforms  be 
introduced  in  Macedonia.6  It  was  obvious  that  if  the 
new  Allies  were  to  maintain  their  position  they  must 
act  vigorously  and  quickly.  Fear  of  Turkish  military 
strength  vanished  before  the  opportunity  that  was 
open:  for  the  war  with  Italy  had  demoralized  the 

5  Statement  of  Herr  von  Jagow  to  the  Budget  Committee  of  the 
Reichstag,  April  3,  1913;  Annual  Register,  1912,  349-350;  Songeon, 
Histoire  de  la  Bulgarie,  388-392;  Schurman,  The  Balkan  Wars,  34,  sq. 

«  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  267. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  227 

Turkish  administration,  and  the  revolution  in  Albania 
had  weakened  her  strength.  If  they  were  to  strike, 
it  was  advisable  to  strike  before  the  full  effects  of  the 
money  spent  upon  army  reorganization  in  Turkey  were 
realized. 

But  the. real  force  that  led  the  Balkan  Allies  to  war 
was  popular  opinion.  There  is  a  limit  to  the  capacity 
of  Governments  for  resisting  the  temptation  to  make 
war;  and  that  limit  came  when  it  was  evident  that 
the  dynasties  of  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  faced  the  choice 
of  war  or  internal  revolution.  The  massacres  of  the 
summer  of  1912  in  Macedonia  had  so  inflamed  the 
Bulgarians  that  there  was  no  holding  them  back. 
The  inevitable  result  of  popular  sentiment  and  Turkish 
refusals  was  the  declaration  of  war  by  Montenegro 
on  October  8,  1912,  and  the  ultimatum  of  Serbia, 
Bulgaria,  and  Greece  a  week  later,  demanding  the 
autonomy  of  the  European  provinces  of  the  Turkish 
Empire.7  *  * 

Too  late  Turkey  perceived  that  the  Balkan  Alliance 
was  an  accomplished  fact  and  that  the  Allies  were 
serious.  Hastily  the  Ottoman  Government  offered  to 
Bulgaria  the  complete  reversal  of  its  Macedonian 
policy,  and  to  Greece  the  annexation  of  Crete.  These 
offers  were  refused,  although  had  they  been  carried 
out  the  ambitions  of  both  states  would  have  been 
largely  realized.  For  the  sake  of  her  dignity  Turkey 
could  not  accept  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum  and  on 
the  eighteenth  of  October  declared  war  on  Serbia  and 
Bulgaria.  On  the  same  day  Greece  declared  war  on 
Turkey.8 

The  course  of  the  conflict  that  followed  is  well- 

7  Annual  Begister,  1912,  352. 

s  Songeon,  Histoire  de  la  Bulgarie,  395-404. 


228    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

remembered.  According  to  the  plan  of  the  Allies, 
Greece  and  Sertea^arere  to  keep-tho  Turkish  army  in 
Macedonia  in  check  and  prevent  reinforcements  being 
sent  from  Albania.  The  Greek  navy  was  to  win  control 
of  the  water  communications  between  Constantinople 
and  Asia  Minor,  so  that  no  troops  could  be  hastily 
transported  to  Macedonia.  It  fell  to  the  lot  of  Bulgaria 
to  advancejnto^Thrace  and  meet  the  main  attack  of 
the  TurksT  In  each  field  the  snccess_o^the  Allies  was 
complete. 

In  Thrace  the  Bulgarians  began  immediately  the 
investment  of  Adrianople,  and  from  the  twenty-first 
to  the  twenty-third  of  October  were  engaged  with  the 
Turkish  armies,  which  were  attempting  an  encircling 
movement.  The  valor  of  the  Bulgarians  and  the 
tendency  to  panic  displayed  by  the  Turkish  troops, 
as  well  as  the  mistakes  of  the  Turkish  generals,  led 
to  an  overwhelming  victory  of  th&J3ulgarians  at  Kirk 
Kilisse.  A  week  later  the  Turks  made  a  desperate 
stand  at  Lule  Burgas,  where  for  three  days,  despite 
their  faulty  equipment  and  lack  of  food,  they  threw 
back  the  furious  Bulgarian  charges.  But  on  November 
1,  their  powers  of  resistance  broke  and  they  fled  to 
the  Tchatalja  lines,  the  final  bulwark  of  defence  before 
Constantinople.9 

The  Bulgarian  attack  on  these  lines  was  halted, 
largely,  as  seems  probable,  because  of  the  success  of 
the  Grggko  and  Sorbiana  in  Macedonia.  The  major 
parfof  the  Greek  army,  under  the  command  of  the 
Crown  Prince  Constantine  had  crossed  the  frontier 
into  Thessaly  and,  advanciligLhi  the  face  of  rather 
slight  opposition,  had  cleared  the  way^J^JSalonika. 

9  Annual  Register,  1912,  353-356;  Songeon,  Eistoire  de  la  Bulgarie, 
404-445. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  229 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  city  was  well 
garrisoned  and  completely  supplied,  it  surrendered 
unconditionally  on  November  9,  and  the  Greek  army 
took  possession.  On  the  following  day  an  auxiliary 
corps  of  Bulgarians  also  entered  the  city  and  placed 
the  Bulgarian  flag  on  the  towers  of  St.  Sophia.10 

In  the  meantime  the  Serbians  had  expelled  the 
Turks  from  Novi  Bazar,  and  driving  them  back, 
marched  upon  Monastir.  By  skillful  strategy,  com- 
bined with  the  utmost  daring,  the  Turks  were  forced 
to  withdraw,  and  ultimately  encircled  by  the  Serbian 
left  wing,  they  were  compelled  to  surrender.  Monastir, 
coveted  by  each  of  the  three  Balkan  nations,  was 
captured.11 

The  disasters  of  Turkey  had  led  to  the  fall  of  the 
Young  Turk  Administration,  and  the  return  to  power 
of  the  veteran  Kiamil  Pasha.  Realizing  the  necessity 
of  peace,  he  had  authorized  negotiations  with  the 
Balkan  States,  and  on  December  3,  1912,  an  armistice 
was  signed.  The  demands  of  the  Allies  for  the  cession 
of  European  Turkey,  with  the  exception  of  a  strip 
to  the  north  of  Constantinople  as  well  as  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula,  were  not  excessive  when  one  considers  the 
desperate  situation  in  which  the  Ottoman  armies 
found  themselves.  And  the  opinion  of  Kiamil  Pasha 
that  even  the  holy  city  of  Adrianople  must  be  sacrificed 
to  win  the  respite  so  necessary  for  Turkey,  was 
endorsed  by  a  Divan,  or  congress  of  Turkish  notables. 
But  the  Young  Turks  were  unbending  in  their  deter- 
mination to  continue  the  struggle.  On  January  23, 
1913,  they  carried  out  a  palace  revolution.  Led  by 
Enver    Bey,    they    assassinated    Nazim    Pasha,    the 

io  Nikolaides,  Griechenlands  Anteil  an  den  BalJcanJcriegen,  47,  sq. 
ii  Schurman,  The  Balkan  Wars,  53-54. 


230    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

military  representative  of  the  Kiamil  administration, 
and  forced  the  Sultan  to  reinstate  Shevket  Pasha  with 
a  cabinet  pledged  to  the  continuation  of  the  struggle. 
Further  negotiations  were  clearly  useless  and  the  war 
reopened.12 

During  the  second  period  of  the  war  little  was 
accomplished  except  the  capture  by  the  Allies  of  the 
fortresses  of  Adrianople,  Janina,  and  Scutari.  The 
Bulgarians  were  unwilling  to  push  their  attack  against 
Constantinople,  inasmuch  as  their  interests  lay  rather 
to  the  west,  in  Thessaly,  and  they  were  occupied  in 
watching  the  Greeks.  Shevket  Pasha  soon  realized 
the  hopelessness  of  the  Turkish  position,  and  early 
in  February  began  secret  negotiations  with  the  great 
Powers  for  their  mediation.  After  the  fall  of  Adrian- 
ople a  basis  of  negotiations  was  proposed,  accepted 
at  once  by  Turkey,  and  on  April  20,  after  a  month's 
delay,  by  the  Allies.13 

The  Treaty  of  London,  which  resulted  from  the 
negotiations  that  followed,  decreed  the  dismember- 
ment of  Turkey  in  Europe.  Everything  was  ceded 
by  the  Porte  except  the  strip  of  territory  bounded  on 
the  west  by  a  line  running  from  Enos  on  the  iEgean 
to  Midia  on  the  Black  Sea.  Albania  was  given  to  the 
Powers,  who  were  to  decide  upon  its  status  and 
frontiers.  The  rest  of  the  territory  west  of  the  Enos- 
Midia  line  was  ceded  to  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Greece 
for  division  amongst  themselves,  doubtless  in  the  well- 
founded  hope  that  they  could  not  agree.  Crete  was 
given  to  the  Allies,  but  the  -ZEgean  Islands  were  left 
to  the  Powers. 

12  Annual  Begister,  1913,  342-347;  Songeon,  Eistoire  de  la  Bulgarie, 
446-451. 

is  Annual  Begister,  1913,  347-348. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  231 

It  was  generally  understood  that  Crete  would  be 
handed  over  to  Greece,  but  two  circumstances  made 
the  division  of  conquered  territory  on  the  mainland 
an  extremely  delicate  operation.  The  first  of  these 
circumstances  was  the  disposition  of  Albania  made 
by  the  great  Powers.  This  province  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  strategically  because  of  its  position  guard- 
ing the  entrance  to  the  Adriatic_Se_a ;  it  was  coveted 
by  Austria .  and  Italy  for  this  reason,  and  by  Serbia 
as  offering  an  outlet  to  the  ocean  waterways.  It 
possesses  no  really  national  character  that  would 
allow  of  its  absorption  by  any  state  or  enable  it  to 
stand  alone ;  and  yet  the  forcible  conquest  and  annexa- 
tion of  Albania  presented  extraordinary  difficulties; 
the  sturdy  and  half -civilized  mountaineers  have  never 
been  actually  subjected  by  any  of  the  dominant  states 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

Since  the  establishment_of_j.init.p.d  Ttaly,  the  rivalry 
of  Austriajind  Italy  jor^the-eentroL of  the  Adriatic 
has  beejL-kefiiu  Italy's  coastline  is  the  longer,  but 
Austria's  possession  of  the  indented  shore  of  Dalmatia 
has  assured  her  the  advantage.  Italy's  ambition  of 
winning  an  Albanian  port  in  order  to  control  the 
Straits  of  Otranto  has  not  been  veiled;  Austria,  on 
the  other  hand,  has  been  equally  determined  that  Italy 
should  not  thus  establish  herself  at  the  point  of  vital 
importance.  For  thirty  years  each  state  has  main- 
tained a  constant  propaganda  in  the  hope  of  winning 
an  economic  and  intellectual  ascendancy  in  Albania. 

The  two  states,  however,  were  allies  and  felt  it 
essential  to  their  larger  relations  to  arrive  at  some 
sort  of  accord  on  the  Albanian  question.  After  1907 
they  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  point  of  greatest 
importance  was  to  prevent  Albania  from  falling  into 


232    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  hands^of  Serbia  in  the  event  of  the  dismember- 
ment of  European  Turkey.  For  behind  Serbia  they 
saw  Eiosgia,  and  Serbian  control  of  Albania  seemed 
to  presage  the  extension  of  Pan-Slavism  to  the 
Adriatic,  an  eventuality  that  neither  of  the  Powers 
could  afford  to  consider.  Accordingly  they  agreed  to 
support  the  national  movement  in  Albania,  as  the 
solution  least  inimical  to  their  interests;  and  the 
principle  of  an  independent  Albania  was  maintained 
by  them  and  accepted  by  the  other  Powers.14 

The  result  was  that  after  the  close  of  the  first  Balkan 
War,  8ftTJ2Jj_jLQfi  ICantenegfo  saw  themselves  forced 
to  renounce  the  compgat  nf^  AlWiia.  Montenegro 
surrendered  her  claim  on  Scutari,  which  was  to  have 
been  the  outlet  to  the  sea  for  that  State  and  the  Serbs, 
and  Albania  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Powers.  An 
independent  state  was  created,  and  a  German  prince, 
William  of  Wied,  put  upon  the  new  throne.15  Even 
apart  from  his  lack  of  ability  as  a  ruler,  his  failure 
might  have  been  expected,  for  there  was  in  the  turbu- 
lent province  no  spirit  of  national  consciousness  that 
would  enable  it  to  stand  by  itself  as  a  separate  entity. 
With  the  outbreak  of  the  general  war  the  supporting 
contingents  of  the  Powers  left  Durazzo,  and  were 
shortly  followed  by  William  himself.  Albania  was 
left  to  itself,  and  Durazzo  fell  into  the  hands  of  Essad 
Pasha,  self-appointed  ruler. 

The  disposition  of  Albania  had  important  effects 
upon  the  Balkan  situation  in  the  spring  and  summer 

i*  Chlumecky,  Oesterreich-Ungarn  und  Italien;  Bauer,  Der  Balkan- 
Tcrieg  und  die  deutsche  Weltpolitik,  28;  Hanotaux,  La  Guerre  des 
Balkans,  209. 

is  Annual  Register,  1912,  356;  Hid.,  1913,  332,  339,  344-345,  356; 
Sosnosky,  Die  Balkanpolitik  Oesterreich-Ungarns,  301. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  233 

of  1913.  When  the  division  of  conquered  Turkish 
territory  was  brought  under  consideration,  Serbia 
could  justly  complain  that  her  share  of  the  booty  had 
been  snatched  from  her  by  the  Powers.  The  Serbian 
Government  had  signed  a  treaty  of  partition  with 
Bulgaria,  in  Marchj,  1912,  by  which  the  greater  part 
of  Macedonia  was  allotted  to  Bulgaria;  but  this  was 
on  the  understanding  that  Serbia  was  to  find  her 
aggrandizement  in  Albania.  If  Albania  were  inde- 
pendent and  the  partition  treaty  were  carried  out, 
Bulgaria  would  gain  everything  and  Serbia  practically 
nothing.  Furthermore,  Monastir  and  Salonika,  the 
portions  of  Macedonia  that  were  coveted  by  Bul- 
garia, were  in  the  hands  of  the  Serbian  and  Greek 
armies,  which  were  in  a  position  to  defend  them. 
To  strengthen  their  position,  Serbia  and  Greece, 
early  in  1913,  concluded  an  alliance  against  Bul- 
garian ambitions,  reciprocally  guaranteeing  their 
Macedonian  conquests. 

^or  Bulgaria  the  situation  was  difficult.  Her 
armies  had,  it  was  felt,  borne  the  brunt  of  ttje 
Turkish  campaign  and  deserved  the  recompense.  Bui 
the  territory  she  had  won  was  Thrace,  which  she  dM 
not  care  for,  while  Macedonia,  which  had  been 
conquered  by  the  Serbs  and  Greeks,  was  the  home 
of  the  Bulgarian  race  and  the  object  of  all  Bulgarian 
efforts.  Her  conquest  of  Adrianople  meant  little  to 
her ;  but  the  acquisition  of  Salonika  and  Monastir  was 
all  important.  The  Bulgarians  felt  "that  they  had 
accomplished  everything  to  receive  nothing."16 

Bulgarian  discontent  became  constantly  keener,  as 

i«  Annual  Register,  1913,  349-352;  International  Commission  Report, 
21 ;  Dehn,  Die  V biker  Siideuropas  und  ihre  politischen  Probleme. 


234    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  resolve  of  Serbia  to  secure  her  hold  on  Macedonia 
became  more  obvious.  That  discontent  was  increased 
by  the  stories  of  Serbian  cruelty  towards  the  Bulgarian 
inhabitants  of  Macedonia.  At  first  the  Bulgarian 
Government  hoped  to  bribe  Greece  by  the  offer  of 
Salonika,  if  Greece  would  assist  Bulgaria  against 
Serbia.  With  the  refusal  of  this  offer  by  Venizelos, 
the  extreme  party  in  Sofia  began  their  schemes  for 
carrying  through  their  ambitions  by  force  of  arms. 

The  belligerent  policy  of  Dr.  Daneff,  the  leader  of 
the  Macedonian  party  in  Bulgaria,  who  replaced  the 
pacific  minister,  Gueshoff,  was  supported  by  the 
Germanic  Powers.  For  Austria  and  Germany  the 
outcome  of  the  first  Balkan  War  had  been  by  no  means 
pleasant.  German  military  prestige  had  been  dimmed 
by  the  defeats  of  Turkey,  and  the  effectiveness  of  the 
French  Creusot  guns  as  well  as  the  faults  of  Turkish 
army  organization,  led  to  many  whispers  that  German 
military  superiority  was  not  what  it  was  supposed  to 
be.  Austrian  opinion  had  supported  Turkey,  and 
Austrian  diplomatic  prestige  had  been  lowered  by 
this  backing  of  the  wrongs  horse.  Furthermore,  if 
Serbia  and  Greece  carried  out  their  scheme  of  parti- 
tion it  meant  a  vast  increase  of  Serbian  power  in  the 
Balkans,  which  must  threaten  the  safety  of  the 
Austrian  Empire.  Nothing  would  suit  the  policy  of 
Germany  and  Austria  better  than  to  see  an  internecine 
quarrel  between  the  victorious  Balkan  States.  "" 

The  attack  of  Bulgaria,  designed  to  win  for  her 
Macedonia  and  destined  to  end  in  Bulgarian  humilia- 
tion, began  suddenly.  On  June  29,  1913,  a  general 
advance  against  the  Greeks  and  Serbs  was  ordered, 
without   declaration   of   war   or   any  intimation   of 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  235 

attack.17  Apparently  it  was  believed  at  Sofia  that 
merely  a  demonstration  would  suffice  to  result  in  an 
immediate  arrangement  according  to  the  Bulgarian 
demands.  But  the  positions  held  by  the  Greeks  and 
Serbs  were  excellent  and  Bulgaria  was  worn  out  by 
her  efforts  of  the  year  before.  Instead  of  negotiations, 
both  states  ordered  a  counter-advance  on  the  Bulgarian 
armies.  The  retreat  of  the  Bulgarians  began  on  July 
6,  and  continued  for  three  weeks.  The  victories  of 
the  first  week  satisfied  the  Serbs,  who  then  rested 
quietly ;  the  Greeks,  on  the  other  hand,  pushed  forward 
rapidly,  so  much  so  that  on  July  29,  they  found 
themselves  in  a  difficult  position. 

But  any  chance  of  Bulgarian  success  against  Greece 
at  the  end  of  July  was  eliminated  by  the  action  of 
Eumania.  This  Power  saw  in  the  circumstances  of 
1913  an  opportunity  for  winning  advantage  out  of 
what  at  first  seemed  to  her  a  distinctly  unfavorable 
situation.  The  initial  success  of  Bulgaria  in  1912 
against  the  Turks  had  threatened  Rumania's  position, 
for  it  seemed  to  lead  towards  the  supremacy  of 
Bulgaria  in  the  Balkans.  %  To  neutralize  the  advantage 
of  Bulgaria,  Rumania  asked  in  the  spring  of  1913  for 
a  cession  of  territory  from  Bulgaria  that  would  give 
to  Rumania  a  strategically  defensible  frontier  on 
her  southern  border.  She  adduced  her  benevolent 
neutrality  in  1912  as  well  as  her  assistance  in  the  lib- 
eration of  Bulgaria-  in  1877  as  claims  upon  Bulgarian 
gratitude.18 

Bulgaria  refused  to  admit  the  justice  of  the  Ruma- 

17  Nikola  ides,  Griechenlands  Anteil  an  den  Balkarikriegen,  252,  sq.; 
Schurman,  The  Balkan  Wars,  94-108;  International  Commission  Report, 
65-69. 

is  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  338-340 ;  Schurman,  The  Balkan 
Wars,  112-116. 


236    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

nian  demands,  although  a  small  part  of  the  territory- 
asked  for  was  ceded  in  April,  1913.  Rumania  was  not 
satisfied,  and  the  victorious  advance  of  the  Serbian 
and  Greek  armies  in  the  first  week  of  July  furnished 
her  with  the  opportunity  for  which  she  had  been 
waiting.  She  declared  war  on  JulylO,  invaded 
Bulgaria,  and  advanced  upolTSona.  Her"  action  ended 
the  war.  On  July  30,  an  armistice  was  declared  and 
the  delegates  of  the  five  states  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
met  in  confer encg_at  Bukarest.19 
^he  terms  of  the  settlement  of  Bukarest  were 
naturally  unfavorable  to  Bulgaria;  with  a  Rumanian 
army  in  her  rear  she  could  not  hope  to  continue  the 
war  with  Greece  and  Serbia,  and  must  perforce  submit 
to  their  demands.  Greece  not  only  secured  Salonika  ^ 
but  extended  her  coastline  to  the^eajt  so  as  to  include 
Kavalla,  thus  taking  from  Bulgaria  the  port  on  the 
iEgean  so  vitally  essential  to  the  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  small  portion  of  Macedonia  won  by 
Bulgaria.  Crete  was  granted  to  Greece_  without 
serious  discussion.  Serbia  extended  her  territories 
southwards  as  far  as  Monastir,  and  Rumania  took 
from  Bulgaria  the  territory  on  her  own  southern 
border,  the  desire  for  which  had  caused  her  entrance 
into  the  struggle.  Another  humiliation  was  reserved 
for  Bulgaria,  namely,  the  successful  reclamation  of 
Adrianople  by  Turkey.  The  frontier  running  from 
Enos'onTthe  -<3Egean  was  to  take  a  sweep  to  the  north- 
wards, cutting  the  railway  communications  of  Bulgaria 
with  the  sea.20      ^ 

is  Annual  Register,  1913,  352-353 ;  Hanotaux,  La  Guerre  des  Balkans, 
374,  sq.;  Nikolaides,  Griechenlands  Anteil  an  den  Balkarikriegen,  321,  sq. 

20  Annual  Register,  1913,  355;  see  map  published  in  International 
Commission  Report,  70. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  237 

It  has  been  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  the 
Balkan  settlement  of  1913  was  so  unsatisfactory  as 
to  make  it  extremely  improbable  that  it  could  remain 
permanent.  The  discontent  of  Bulgaria  at  her  portion 
can  be  realized  when  we  remember  that  though  in 
weakened  condition  she  had  gone  to  war  in  order  to 
prevent  exactly  this  settlement.  Serbia  had  won 
territory  in  Macedonia  to  which  her  claim  on  racial 
and  linguistic  grounds  was  very  shadowy,  and  which 
at  Sofia  was  regarded  as  Bulgaria  irredenta.  The 
aggrandizement  of  Greece  on  the  Macedonian  littoral 
was  so  great  as  to  threaten  Bulgarian  economic 
development,  at  the  same  time  that  it  brought  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  Bulgarian  race  under 
Grecian  domination.21 

^But  the  Balkan_States  were  so  worn_out  by  the 
efforts  made  during  the  two  wars,  especially  during 
the  second,  that  pure  exhaustion  might  have  ensured 
peace  in  the  Balkans,  had  it  not  been  for  the  effect 
of  the  settlement  at  Bukarest  on  the  great  Powers. 
All  the  Powers  were  troubled  by  the  upsetting  of  the 
status  quo  in  the  Near  East.  For  Great  Britain, 
Russia,  and  France,  who  were  involved  in  domestic 
difficulties,  the  crisis  of  1912-1913  had  occurred  at  a  \*S 
most  inopportune  moment;  internal  troubles  in  each 
country  were  such  that  the  prospect  of  international 
affairsUeing  thrown  back  into  the  Balkan  melting-pot, 
from  which  might  emerge  the  unknown,  had  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  terrified  the  Foreign  Ministers 
of  all  three  nations. 

21  Dominian,  ' ( Linguistic  Areas  in  Europe :  Their  Boundaries  and 
Political  Significance, ' '  in  Bulletin  of  the  American  Geographical 
Society,  Vol.  XLII,  No.  6,  435-437;  Leger,  Turcs  et  Grecs  contre  Bui- 
gares  en  Macedoine. 


238    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

The  diplomatic  prestige  of  the  Powers  suffered  all 
through  the  wars.  They  had  in  effect  prohibited  any 
armed  attack  upon  Turkey,  and  the  Balkan  States, 
led  by  Montenegro,  laughed  at  the  prohibition.  They 
had  insisted  that  there  should  be  no  alteration  in  the 
territorial  status  quo,  and  Turkey  in  Europe  had  been 
carved  up.  Their  impotent  efforts  largely  justified 
the  remark  of  Venizelos  that  the  Powers  were 
" venerable  old  women." 

Nevertheless  the  settlement  of  Bukarest  calmed 
the  Powers  with  the  exception  of  Austria  and  Ger- 
many. If  only  that  settlement  could  be  made  solid, 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  by  no  means  dissat- 
isfied with  the  result.  These  Powers  took  no  direct 
interest  in  the  Near  East,  except  for  their  desire  that 
a  permanent  peace  in  that  quarter  might  be  obtained. 
The  victory  of  Serbia  and  Greece  was  not  displeasing 
to  Russia.  And  Italy,  although  she  watched  the  rise 
of  these  two  states  with  alarm,  was  content  with  the 
settlement,  since  it  ensured  an  independent  Albania, 
where  the  Italian  propaganda  might  be  continued. 

But  to  Austria  and  Germany  the  settlement  of  1913 
presented  itself  in  far  different  colors.  For  both 
Powers  it  was  a  humiliation  to  their  prestige  and  a 
menac£_toJtlieirJLnteresls^  It  is  "true  that  Austria  had 
prevented  Serbian  influence  from  touching  the  littoral 
of  the  Adriatic  by  insisting  successfully  on  the  inde- 
pendence of  Albania.  But  this  triumph  of  Austrian 
diplomacy  was  more  than  offset  by  Serbia's  vast 
accession  of  territory  in  Macedonia.  Austria's  politi- 
cal and  economic  control  of  the  Balkans,  which  in  1908 
seemed  on  the  point  of  establishment,  was  threatened 
with  annihilation.  Salonika,  toward  which  Austria  had 
long  cast  covetous  eyes  was  in  the  hands  of  Greece. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  239 

Bulgaria,  bitter  at  the  results  of  the  war  of  1913,  was 
in  bad  temper  and  blamed  the  Hapsburgs.  Rumania 
could  no  longer  be  counted  upon  by  Austria  and  Ger- 
many, and  seemed  to  be  moving  towards  the  Russian 
side.  Turkey  herself,  apparently  abandoned  by  her 
Teutonic  friends,  was  overtly  being  brought  under  the 
influence  of  the  Entente  Powers. 

Furthermore  Austria  was  threatened  at  home.  An 
echo  of  the  waxing  greatness  of  Serbia  ran  through 
Bosnia,  already  honeycombed  with  disaffection,  and 
the  Hapsburgs  were  facing  an  internal  revolution  of 
their  Slav  subjects.  The  disintegration  of  their 
Empire  seemed  to  be  at  hand,  unless  the  newly  won 
power  of  Serbia  were  broken.  Magyar  domination 
over  Slav,  so  carefully  planned  by  Andrassy  a  gene- 
ration before,  ran  the  risk  of  destruction,  not  merely 
in  the  Balkans  but  in  Austria-Hungary  itself.22 

Austrianjpres.t,ige  as  well  as  Austrian  interests  had 
received  a  staggering  blow  by  the  Balkan  Wars.    In 

22  ■ '  Since  the  annexation  crisis, ' '  wrote  Freiherr  von  Giesl  to  Count 
Berchtold,  "the  relations  between  the  monarchy  and  Serbia  were  on 
the  part  of  the  latter  poisoned  through  national  chauvinism,  enmity, 
and  an  effective  propaganda  of  the  Greater  Serbian  aspirations  in  our 
countries  populated  by  Serbs;  since  the  last  Balkan  war  the  success 
of  Serbia  increased  this  chauvinism  to  a  paroxysm,  the  outbursts  of 
which  at  some  points  bear  the  stamp  of  madness.  ...  an  accounting 
with  Serbia,  a  war  for  the  position  of  the  monarchy  as  a  great  Power, 
yes  for  its  very  existence  as  such,  cannot  permanently  be  evaded.  If 
we  neglect  to  bring  clarity  into  our  relations  with  Serbia,  we  shall 
become  accomplices  in  blame  for  the  difficulties  and  disadvantage  of 
the  relations  in  a  future  conflict  which  after  all,  whether  sooner  or 
later,  must  be  settled.  For  the  local  observer  and  the  representative 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  interests  in  Serbia,  the  question  has  so 
constituted  itself  that  we  cannot  endure  a  further  damaging  of  our 
prestige,' '  Austrian  Bed  Book,  1914,  No.  6.  Cf.  also  Ibid.,  No.  8,  Count 
Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  at  Berlin,  Eome, 
St.  Petersburg,  Paris,  London,  and  Constantinople. 


240    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

each  of  them  the  Austrian  diplomats  had  guessed 
badly  and  supported  the  losing  side.  In  the  first  they 
had  counted  upon  Turkey  and  trusted  in  its  victory 
over  the  Allies.  In  the  second,  Austria  had  instigated 
Bulgaria  and  had  given  moral  support  to  the  attempt 
made  to  alter  the  partition  of  territory.  In  each  of 
these  struggles  the  protege  of  Austria  had  been  woe- 
fully unsuccessful.  In  all  respects  but  one  (the 
autonomy  of  Albania),  the  settlement  of  1913  was  thus 
a  disaster  to  Austria  and  she  felt  that  it  must  be 
speedily  retrieved.  Some  blow  must  be  struck  that 
would  rehabilitate  Austrian  prestige  and  recover  the 
political  and  economic  influence  that  she  had  lost  in 
the  Balkans.  So  early  as  the  autumn  of  1913  the 
determination  of  Austria  was  indicated,  when  she 
suggested  to  Italy  that  the  latter  Power  join  with  her 
in  an  attack  on  Serbia.23 

'TTor  Germany,  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest  was  no  less 
inacceptable.  The  diplomatic  defeat  of  Austria  was 
her  own,  and  the  general  feeling  in  Germany  was  "that 
what  was  a  danger  for  their  ally,  was  also  a  danger 
for  them,  and  that  they  must  do  all  in  their  power  to 
maintain  Austria-Hungary  in  the  position  of  a  great 
Power."24  German jnilitary  prestige  had  further- 
more received  a  direct  blow  in  the  defeat  of  the 
German-trained  Turkish  army  in  1912;  like  Austria 
she  had  failed  manifestly  in  her  diplomacy  when  she 

23  Speech  of  Signor  Giolitti,  in  Italian  Chamber,  December  5,  1914, 
For  the  conditions  that  were  tending  to  separate  Austria  and  Italy  and 
possibly  disrupt  the  Triple  Alliance,  see  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power, 
276;  statement  of  Signor  di  Sonnino'in  New  York  Times  Current  History 
of  the  War,  Vol.  II,  No.  3,  495. 

24  *' Truth  about  Germany,"  in  New  York  Times  Current  History 
of  the  War,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  248.  Cf.  also  Ibid.,  260;  Annual  Register, 
1912,  229-342. 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  241 

instigated  Bulgaria  against  Serbia  and  Greece  in 
1913.  Remembering  the  stress  laid  by  German 
diplomats  on  the  importance  of  maintaining  German 
prestige,  and  the  blows  struck  in  1905,  1908,  and  1911 
for  that  purpose,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that 
Germany  woulcL  suffer  quietly  the  verdict  of  1913  to 
pass  unprotested. 

Germany's  political  and  economic  interests  also, 
like  those  of  Austria,  demanded  that  the  settlement 
of  1913  should  not  be  allowed  to  stand.  We  have 
noticed  the  interest  taken  by  Germany  in  the  develop- 
ment of  her  Mesopotamian  policy  and  her  efforts  for 
the  realization  of  her  Bagdad  Railway  scheme.  After 
1910  the  success  of  this  scheme  was  a  factor  of  greater 
importance  in  her  aspirations  than  ever  before,  owing 
to  the  exclusion  of  Germany  from  Persia.  At  first 
German  commercial  .and  political  agents  had  hoped 
to  find  a  field  for  exploitation  in  Persia,  <and  to  slip 
in  between  the  ancient  rivals  in  that  country,  Russia 
and  England.  But  the  Accord  of  1907  between  those 
Powers  apparently  closed  the  door  in  Germany's  face. 
Despite  her  strenuous  efforts,  Germany  found  that 
Russia  and  England  were  in  Persia_to  stay,  and, 
making  the  best  of  the  situation,  she  accepted  the  fact 
of  her  exclusion.  In  November,  1910,  Germany  and 
Russia  exchanged  views,  which  were  embodied  in  the 
Accord  of  Potsdam:  Russia  promised  not  to  inter- 
fere with  theBagSad  Railway,  in  return  for  which 
Germany  agreed  to  declare  that  she  had  no  political 
interests  in  Persia.25 

"T^he  retirement  of  Germany  from  Persia  naturally 
made  the  development  of  her  Mesopotamian  policy 

25  Keventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik,  367-369 ;  Bachf ahl, 
Kaiser  und  Reich,  331-332. 


242    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

more  than  ever  essential  to  the  carrying  out  of  German 
world  policy.  The  raison  d'etre  of  the  Potsdam 
Accord  is  to  be  found  partly  in  the  hope  of  separating 
Russia  from  England;  but  chiefly  in  the  desire  of 
ensuring  Germany's  position  in  the  valleys  of  the 
Tigris  and  Euphrates.  But  the  Balkan  settlement 
of  1913,  if  it  proved  to  be  permanent,  would  be  fatal 
to  German  control  of  Mesopotamia,  for  it  threatened 
to  block  the  road  to  Asia  Minor.  So  long  as  Austria 
was  supreme  in  the  Balkans  and  Turkey  on  the  Dar- 
danelles, the  path  from  Hamburg  to  Bagdad  was 
clear.  But  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest  seemed  likely  to 
give  control  of  the  Balkans  to  the  Slavs.  The  power 
of  the  Turks  was  weakened  and  their  allegiance  to  the 
Teutonic  cause  possibly  shaken.  The  islands  of  the 
.iEgean  were  held  by  Greece,  the  protege  of  the 
Entente  Powers,  and  by  Italy,  who  would  not  sacrifice 
her  interests  in  the  cause  of  Pan-Germanism.  Bul- 
garia was  crushed  and  the  chance  of  Rumanian 
assistance  doubtful. 

Germany,  like  Austria,  was  thus  forced  to  regard 
the  Balkan  settlement  as  inimical  to  her  interests  as 
well  as  a  humiliation  to  her  prestige,  and  determined 
that  it  must  be  upset.  By  diplomacy  or  force  the  new 
Serbia  must  be  paralyzed  and  Turkey  strengthened.  \y 
Bulgaria  must  be  dragged  back  under  German  influence 
and  reinforced  by  the  Macedonian  provinces  which 
she  had  failed  to  secure  in  1913.  Greece  must  sur- 
render the  islands  to  Turkey,  and  Rumania  again  be 
attracted  within  the  Teutonic  orbit.  If  possible  this 
rearrangement  must  be  rendered  permanent  by  the 
creation  of  an  understanding  or  league  between 
Turkey,  Bulgaria,  and  Rumania,  into  which  Greece 
also  might  be  drawn;  such  a  league,  supported  by 


THE  BALKAN  WARS  243 

Germany  and  Austria,  would  offset  the  influence  of 
Serbia  and  ensure  the  exclusion  of  Russian  interests 
from,  as  well  as  the  predominance  of  German  interests 
upon,  the  Danube  and  Dardanelles.  Towards  the 
execution  of  this  plan  Austrian  and  German  diplomats 
are  said  to  have  worked  during  the  autumn  of  1913.26 

But  it  speedily  became  apparent  that  direct  diplo- 
matic efforts  would  prove  unavailing.  The  demand 
that  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest  should  be  laid  before 
EuTppObx.xevisiony  was  refused  by  the  Powers ;  and 
Rumania,  the_jcoosl  important  of  the  Balkan  States, 
soon  made  plain  her  determination  to  uphold  the 
settlement  at  all  costs.  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  were 
disorganized  and  could  give  no  assistance.  Obviously 
the  destruction  of  the  Balkan  settlement  must  come 
through  force,  and  preferably  in  a  direct  conflict  with 
Serbia,  such  as  Austria  secretly  suggested  to  Italy. 

During  the  autumn  of  1913  and  the  spring  of  the 
following  year  Austria  watched  and  waited  for  the 

2«  E.  J.  Dillon,  whose  knowledge  of  secret  diplomacy  is  extensive 
if  not  always  critical,  asserts  (A  Scrap  of  Paper,  23)  on  what  he  says 
to  be  first-hand  knowledge  but  without  adducing  proof,  that  ever  since 
the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest  it  was  the  inflexible  resolve  of 
the  Central  Powers  to  upset  it.  Furthermore  Berchtold  admitted  to  the 
British  Ambassador  that  the  settlement  was  unsatisfactory  to  Austria, 
British  Correspondence,  1914,  No.  161.  We  find  moreover  in  the  ' '  Truth 
About  Germany' '  (New  York  Times  Current  History  of  the  War,  Vol.  I, 
No.  2,  248),  that  as  soon  as  the  Balkan  troubles  began  the  Central 
Powers  had  been  preparing  for  war,  a  war  specially  directed  against 
Serbia,  because  it  was  felt  that  behind  Serbia  stood  the  great  Slav 
Power.  The  German  White  Book  (preface)  states  the  belief  prevalent 
in  Austria  and  Germany  that  Eussia  was  busy  in  attempting  to  direct 
a  Balkan  League  against  Austria,  and  goes  on  to  say  that  ' '  under  these 
circumstances  it  was  not  compatible  with  the  dignity  and  the  spirit  of 
self-preservation  of  the  monarchy  to  view  idly  any  longer  this  agitation 
across  the  border.' '  And  cf.  the  speech  of  Giolitti,  December  5,  1914, 
-cited  above. 


V 


244    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

opportunity  that  might  furnish  a  pretext  for  the  attack 
on  Serbia.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment exercised  the  utmost  skill  in  preserving  a  per- 
fectly correct  attitude.  The  national  aspirations  of 
the  Serbs  could  not  be  extinguished,  and  the  nation- 
alistic secret  society,  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  flourished 
and  wove  its  web  of  plots  and  intrigues  in  Bosnia. 
But  no  official  sanction  was  given  by  the  Belgrade 
Cabinet  to  the  anti-Austrian  propaganda,  and  the 
Austrian  agents  could  discover  no  casus  belli.  Austria, 
with  Germany  behind  her,  was  ready  to  strike,  but 
the  occasion  was  lacking. 

Suddenly,  on  Juna_2S^JL£LL4,  the  opportunity  waited 
for,  came  in  startling  form.  Archduke  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand, heir  apparent  to  the  Austrian  imperial  crown, 
was  assassinated  with  his  wife,  in  the  streets  of  the 
Bosnian  town,  Serajevo.  The  murder  was  done  by  a 
member  of  the  Serb  nationalistic  society,  and  clearly 
formed  part  of  a  Serb  intrigue,  whether  or  not  it  had 
been  sanctioned  by  Belgrade.  The  pretext  for  the 
projected  attack  on  Serbia  was  at  hand,  and  Austria 
and  Germany  realized  that  the  moment  for  action 
had  come.27 

27  Austrian  Bed  Boole,  1914,  Nos.  6,  8  j  German  White  Boole,  preface. 


\ 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  CRISIS  OF  1914 

It  is  incontestable  that  the  murder  of  the  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand  furnished  an  unexpected  but  not 
altogether  unwelcome  opportunity  to  German  diplo- 
mats. Sincerely  horrified  by  the  brutality  of  the 
assassination  of  the  heir  apparent  to  the  neighboring 
throne,  they  could  not  but  realize  that  in  it  lay  an 
opening  for  the  aggressive  action  which  their  general 
policy  demanded.  Ever  since  the  formation  of  the 
Franco-British  Entente  in  1904,  Germany  had  watched 
the  rise  of  an  international  opposition  with  increasing 
anxiety.  The  conditions  under  which  Bismarck  had 
maintained  German  hegemony  had  departed.  Delcasse, 
by  arranging  the  quarrels  of  France  with  Italy  and 
Great  Britain,  had  enabled  France  to  free  herself 
from  German  control  and  establish  her  diplomatic 
autonomy.  Germany's  failure  to  maintain  her  mas- 
tery of  continental  diplomacy  was  further  manifested 
in  1907  when  Great  Britain  and  Russia  ended  their 
long  quarrel  and  came  to  an  understanding. 

The  conventions  made  by  the  Powers  of  the  Triple 
Entente  were  not  openly  directed  against  Germany. 
But  she  saw  in  them  a  concerted  policy  designed  to 
isolate    the    German    Empire.1      In    any    case    they 

i  A  very  clear  exposition  of  the  belief  prevalent  in  Germany  since 
1911  that  Great  Britain  built  up  the  Triple  Entente  in  order  to 
' '  encircle ' '  and  throttle  Germany  is  to  be  found  in  an  article  by 
Th.  Schiemann  in  New  York  Times  Current  History  of  the  War,  Vol.  II, 


246    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

destroyed  the  peculiar  position  of  primacy  that  she 
had  held  under  Bismarck  and  during  the  first  decade 
of  the  reign  of  William  II ;  German  diplomatic  prestige 
suffered  undeniably  by  the  restoration  of  the  balance 
of  power.  Such  a  situation  was  intolerable  to  the 
diplomats  of  Wilhelmstrasse.  The  diplomatic  as  well 
as  the  military  primacy  of  Germany  had  been  laid 
down  by  Bismarck  as  an  essential  condition  of  Ger- 
many's success  and  even  of  her  existence.  With  the 
economic  transformation  of  the  Empire,  the  mainte- 
nance of  her  position  in  Europe  became  still  more 
vitally  necessary.  The  Kaiser  and  his  ministers 
firmly  believed  that  the  commercial  and  political 
world  empire  of  Germany  must  be  founded  upon 
continental  hegemony,  and  that  any  serious  defeat 
for  German  prestige  on  the  Continent  would  destroy 
her  scheme  for  the  future.2 

To  disrupt  the  opposing  combination  and  regain  the 
position  which  she  had  lost,  Germany,  as  we  saw, 
struck  a  blow  at  France  in  1905,  when  the  Kaiser 
disembarked  at  Tangier  and  offered  to  protect  the 
Sultan  of  Morocco  from  French  aggression.  France 
was  humiliated  for  the  moment  and  Delcasse  was 
forced  to  resign.  But  Germany's  victory  was  in  a 
large  measure  cadmean  and  she  did  not  receive  all 
that  she  sought  in  the  following  year  at  Algeciras; 
and  in  1907  was  compelled  to  witness  the  reconciliation 
of  Great  Britain  and  Russia.  She  struck  another  blow, 
accordingly,  in  1908,  this  time  levelled  at  Russia,  and 

No.  4,  784-795.  Cf.  also  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik, 
280,  and  Rohrbach,  German  World  Policies,  159;  the  latter  holds  that 
the  object  of  the  Triple  Entente  was  to  isolate  Germany,  so  that  France 
might  win  back  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Great  Britain  divide  Turkey  for 
her  own  profit. 

2  Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  45-46. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  247 

by  supporting  Austria  in  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  * 
imposed  her  will  upon  Europe.  Again  in  1911  she 
made  another  attempt  to  reinforce  her  prestige  and 
destroy  the  Triple  Entente,  by  the  Coup  d'Agadir. 
But  she  failed  in  her  double  purpose.  Her  diplomacy 
did  not  succeed  in  imposing  itself  upon  the  other 
Powers,  and  France  and  Great  Britain  were  brought 
still  more  closely  together  by  her  aggressive  move. 
General  considerations  forced  the  diplomats  at  Berlin 
to  believe  in  the  necessity  for  some  new  aggressive 
action  which  would  retrieve  the  fiasco  of  1911  and 
reestablish  conditions  similar  to  those  that  had 
guaranteed  German  hegemony  under  Bismarck  and 
in  the  nineties.3  Surely  no  better  pretext  for  such 
action  could  be  found  than  that  presented  by  the 
murder  of  the  Archduke. 

The  special  conditions  that  had  resulted  from  the 
Balkan  Wars  also  seemed  to  call  for  some  action  that 
would  rectify,  from  the  German  point  of  view,  the 
settlement  of  1913.  German  military  prestige  had 
suffered  in  the  Turkish  ^and  Bulgarian  defeats,  and 
German  diplomatic  prestige  had  been  lowered  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bukarest.  The  advantages  won  l^y  Serbia 
were  regarded  in  Germany  as  an  affront,  ta.hpr  all^, 
Austria,  and  as  a  victory  for  Russia.  The  fear  of  a 
great  Slavic  advance  and  of  the  annihilation  of 
Teutonism  by  an  inferior  civilization  was  oppressing 
Germany.  Furthermore,  the  commercial  classes  and 
the  Pan-Germanists  saw  in  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest 
the  end  of  their  plan  of  penetration  into  Mesopotamia 
and  of  a  Greater  Germany  extending  from  Hamburg' 
to  the  Persian  Gulf.  For  the  execution  of  such  a  plan 
Germany  must  control  the  Balkans  and  Dardanelles 

s  Supra,  Chap.  VIII. 


248    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

by  means  of  Austria  and  Turkey.  But  the  Balkan 
Wars  had  shaken  Austrian  influence  in  the  peninsula, 
and  the  position  of  Turkey  on  the  Straits  was  not  one 
of  strength.4 

General  and  special  considerations  thus  impelled 
German  diplomats  to  strike  a  blow  similar  to  those 
of  previous  years,  and  one  which  would  simultaneously 
reinforce  her  diplomatic  prestige  and  benefit  her 
political  and  commercial  interests  in  the  Near  East. 
By  forcing  Serbia  to  disgorge  what  she  had  won  at 
Bukarest,  Germany  would  win  a  great  diplomatic 
victory  over  Eussia,  the  protector  of  Serbia,  would 
weaken  the  Slavic  element  in  the  Balkans,  and  open 
the  way  to  Constantinople  and  Mesopotamia. 

It  was  probable  that  Germany  could  never  hope  to 
find  more  propitious  circumstances  for  such  action 
than  those  of  the  early  summer  of  1914.  Her  ally, 
Austria,  would  grant  her  hearty  assistance  in  the 
overturning  of  the  Balkan  settlement  and  the  humilia- 
tion of  Serbia,  for  in  this  case  Austrian  interests 
coincided  with  those  of  Germany.  The  diplomats  of 
Vienna  and  Buda-Pesth  had  not  always  enjoyed  the 
role  of  brilliant  second  accorded  to  Austria,  and  could 
not  be  counted  upon  invariably  as  tools  for  the 
furtherance  of  German  prestige  or  German  world 
policy.  But  Austria  had  every  reason  to  desire  the 
weakening  of  Serbia  and  the  checking  of  Slavic 
development  in  the  Balkans;  she  would  willingly 
exercise  her  right  to  punish  Serbia  for  the  crime  of 
Serajevo,  in  order  to  reestablish  her  own  prestige  and 
influence  in  the  peninsula,  as  well  as  to  protect  herself 
from  the  intrigues  of  disaffected  Serbs. 

Certain  of  Austrian  co-partnership  in  any  attack 

«  Supra,  Chaps.  IX,  X. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  249 

upon  the  status  quo  in  the  Near  East,  Germany 
believed  that  she  could  count  upon  the  abstention  of 
the  other  Powers  from  any  interference.  The 
brutality  of  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  had  horrified 
the  whole  world  and  aroused  the  keenest  sympathy 
with  Austria.  The  ministers  of  the  various  Powers, 
even  of  Russia,  agreed  that  Austria  would  be  justified 
in  taking  strong  measures  calculated  to  prevent  a 
repetition  of  such  an  atrocity.5  Serbia  was  identified 
with  crime  of  the  most  monstrous  sort  and  Austria 
became  the  representative  of  law  and  justice.  If,  as 
seemed  to  be  the  case,  the  assassination  of  June  28 
was  merely  a  typical  act  of  one  of  the  Serbian 
societies  with  which  Bosnia  was  honeycombed,  Austria 
had  every  right  to  maintain  the  forces  of  civilization 
and  preserve  her  own  existence,  even  if  the  most 
stringent  action  should  prove  necessary.  It  was  not 
impossible  that  the  Serbian  Gavernment  itself  had 
been  concerned  in  the  murderous  intrigues  of  the 
secret  political  organizations,  and  the  memory  of  the 
murder  of  Alexander  and  Draga  in  1903  did  not 
weaken  the  general  belief  throughout  the  world  that 
Serbia  merited  severe  punishment. 

Even  if  the  projected  action  of  Austria  proved  to 
be  wider  in  its  scope  than  was  generally  expected,  it 
would  not,  in  the  belief  of  Germany,  lead  to  the  inter- 
vention of  the  Entente  Powers.  They  had  accepted 
the  high-handed  action  of  Austria  and  Germany  in 
1908,  when  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  annexed, 
and   would   doubtless   allow   Serbia   and   Russia   to 

5  Cf .  British  White  Paper,  Cd.  7467,  1914,  Nos.  5  and  62,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  and  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
This  collection  of  documents  is  hereafter  referred  to  as  British  Corre- 
spondence to  distinguish  it  from  the  German  White  Book. 


250    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

undergo  a  similar  humiliation  in  1914.  Furthermore, 
any  protests  they  might  enter  would  be  futile  because 
of  their  total  incapacity  of  supporting  them  by  force 
of  arms. 

Eussia,  the  natural  protector  of  the  Serbs  and  the 
Power  most  directly  interested  in  preventing  the 
annihilation  of  Slavic  influence  in  the  Balkans,  was 
believed  in  both  Austria  and  Germany  to  be  in  no 
condition  to  risk  a  war.  Every  report  from  St. 
Petersburg  emphasized  the  fact  that  Russia  could  not 
take  the  field  and  was  acutely  aware  of  her  own 
impotence.  It  was  known  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment had  borrowed  barely  enough  money  to  cover 
the  cost  of  the  Japanese  War,  and  that  entirely 
insufficient  amounts  had  been  spent  upon  the  rebuild- 
ing of  her  naval  and  military  equipment.  Ammunition 
and  guns  demand  heavy  expenditure  and  such  expen- 
diture had  not  been  made.  There  were  hardly  three 
million  rifles  in  Russia  and  the  lack  of  high  explosives 
was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.  It  was  under- 
stood that  Russia  was  on  the  point  of  beginning  a 
thorough  military  reorganization  and  development; 
but  at  the  moment  she  was  ill-prepared  and  her  own 
experts,  with  few  exceptions,  believed  that  a  war 
against  the  Teutonic  Powers  would  be  suicidal.6 

Confidence  in  Russia's  inability  to  take  the  field 
was  increased  by  Germany's  conviction  that  the 
financial  condition  of  the  Slav  Empire  was  chaotic. 
German  agents  reported  that  the  gold  reserve  sup- 

e  Dillon,  A  Scrap  of  Paper,  28-39.  In  using  this  work,  of  which  the 
thesis  is  often  utterly  unsupported  by  evidence,  the  reader  must  dis- 
tinguish between  Dillon's  theories  and  his  statements  of  fact.  Much 
of  the  book  seems  rather  fantastic,  but  the  author's  knowledge  of 
general  conditions  and  especially  of  the  German  attitude  may  be  accepted 
as  exact. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  251 

posedly  kept  in  the  Imperial  Bank  for  a  national 
emergency,  had  been  loaned  out,  and  that  a  large 
amount  of  it  was  in  the  hands  of  private  corporations 
and  individuals,  many  of  them  actually  German. 
Should  a  political  crisis  occur,  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment would  face  bankruptcy.  Furthermore,  the 
internal  dissensions  of  Russia  would  necessarily 
prevent  her  from  entering  into  war:  the  Finns,  the 
Poles,  and  the  Jews  would  take  advantage  of  the 
situation  to  create  a  revolution;  industrial  discontent 
would  find  its  opportunity;  the  greater  part  of  the 
Russian  army  could  never  be  used  on  a  campaign, 
for  it  would  be  needed  at  home  to  preserve  order  and 
maintain  the  dynasty  on  the  throne.  Add  to  all  this 
the  fact  that  Russia's  system  of  transportation, 
inadequate  at  best,  was  paralyzed  by  serious  strikes 
and  labor  difficulties.  All  such  factors  were  com- 
mented upon  by  German  and  Austrian  diplomats  with 
acrimonious  pleasure  and  they  felt  abundantly  justi- 
fied in  their  confidence  that  no  effective  protest  would 
come  from  Russia.7 

With  Russia  inactive,  it  was  not  likely  that  France 
or  Great  Britain  would  take  any  step  to  oppose  the 
humiliation  of  Serbia  and  the  breaking  down  of 
Slavic  influence  in  the  Balkans.  And  even  if  they 
should  desire  to  do  so,  like  Russia  they  were  practi- 

l  According  to  the  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  Germans  realized 
that  Russia  was  making  great  improvements  in  her  army  and  her  navy, 
but  that  those  improvements  were  by  no  means  completed,  French 
Yellow  Book,  1914,  No.  14.  A  few  weeks  later  the  German  Ambassador 
in  Petrograd  reported  that  Russia  would  never  go  to  war,  British 
Correspondence,  No.  139,  Sir  George  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
An  interesting  point  to  note  in  this  connection  is  that  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  Austria,  which  ought  naturally  to  be  fearful  of  Russia, 
sent  heavy  siege  guns  and  a  considerable  force  of  troops  to  Belgium. 


252    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

cally  impotent.  Germany  believed  France  to  be 
politically  and  nationally  decadent.  Her  distaste  for 
war,  and  her  desire  for  material  comfort  and  well- 
being  were  definitely  manifested  by  the  debates  on 
the  three  year  military  system.  She  was  pacifist  to 
the  core.  The  French  army  was  ill-trained  and  ill- 
equipped,  according  to  the  testimony  of  the  French 
Minister  of  War  himself.  Her  system  of  trans- 
portation, the  most  important  of  auxiliary  factors 
in  modern  warfare,  was  totally  lacking  in  the  essen- 
tial qualities  of  order  and  rapidity;  it  was  inevitable 
that  the  French  mobilization  should  go  to  pieces. 

Furthermore,  the  political  system  of  France  was 
thought  by  Germans  to  be  totally  incapable  of  stand- 
ing the  stress  and  strain  of  war.  The  corruption 
characteristic  of  the  republican  form  of  government 
would  be  fatal  to  the  efficiency  of  operations.  The 
weakness  and  division  of  the  nation  was  being  demon- 
strated at  the  very  moment  by  the  scandals  of  the 
Caillaux  case,  which  in  itself  so  paralyzed  the  nation 
that  the  Ministry  would  be  incapable  of  taking 
effective  action  in  foreign  affairs.8 

Great  Britain  also  was  believed  to  be  in  no  condition 
to  intervene  in  continental  matters.  The  German 
secret  service  agents  laid  great  stress  upon  the  fact 
that  British  public  opinion  was  opposed  to  war,  and 
that  the  Radicals  and  Laborites,  upon  whom  the 
Liberal  Ministry  depended,  were  invariably  hostile 
to  any  action  upon  the  Continent.  The  Government 
was  in  the  throes  of  the  Ulster  crisis,  and  the  proba- 
bility of  a  civil  war  in  Ireland  seemed  undeniable; 

s  Annual  Register,  1914,  272-273,  281;  British  Correspondence,  No 
32,  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey;  French  Yellow  Booh,  No.  14; 
Dillon,  A  Scrap  of  Paper,  43-49. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  253 

at  the  moment  when  this  fratricidal  struggle  was 
about  to  begin,  Great  Britain  would  be  in  no  position 
to  devote  attention  to  the  situation  in  the  Balkans. 
Add  to  this  the  impression  created  in  Germany  by 
the  British  Government's  impotence  in  attempting  to 
deal  with  the  militant  feminists;  a  state  which  could 
not  suppress  its  own  women  must  realize  its  total 
incapacity  to  oppose  a  Power  like  Germany!9 

Such  were  the  arguments  upon  which  Germany  and 
Austria  based  their  conviction  that  the  moment  was 
ripe  for  the  destruction  of  the  Serb  power  in  the 
Balkans  and  the  clearing  of  the  path  to  Constanti- 
nople. Serbia  was  to  be  stung  to  a  resistance  which 
would  justify  the  entrance  of  an  Austrian  army  and 
the  subsequent  annihilation  of  Serb  power.  Austria 
herself  need  not  annex  any  portion  of  Serbian  terri- 
tory, but  the  districts  acquired  by  the  Treaty  of 
Bukarest  could  be  divided  between  Eumania,  Bul- 
garia, and  possibly  Greece,  who  would  thus  be 
reclaimed  by  Austrian  influence.  Such  a  humiliation 
of  Serbia  would  result  in  a  diplomatic  victory  over 
Eussia,  a  striking  reaffirmation  of  Teutonic  primacy 
in  Europe,  and  the  reestablishment  of  favorable 
commercial  conditions  in  the  Near  East.  The  danger 
of  a  general  war,  which  might  result  if  Eussia  dared 
to  intervene,  was  slight  in  the  extreme,  because  of 
the  unreadiness  of  all  the  Entente  Powers.  But 
should  Eussia  refuse  to  accept  the  humiliation 
designed  for  her  and  her  protege,  Germany  was 
thoroughly  prepared  and  could  hardly  hope  to  find 
a  better  opportunity  for  enforcing  her  position  by 
means  of  war. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ed Eose,  The  Origins  of  the  War,  151-152. 


254    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

ment  prepared  the  note  to  Serbia  which  set  forth  the 
punishment  she  must  undergo  for  the  murder  of  the 
Archduke,  and  which  gave  the  first  indication  of 
the  Austro-German  scheme  of  destroying  Slavic 
influence  in  the  Near  East.  Whether  or  not  Germany- 
assisted  in  the  drafting  of  the  note  is  a  matter  of 
doubt.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  she  was  fully 
aware  of  the  general  character  of  the  Austrian 
demands  and  that  she  had  given  her  promise  to 
support  them  to  the  uttermost.  Germany  later 
admitted  that  the  two  Governments  consulted  together 
with  regard  to  the  measures  that  should  be  taken, 
and  that  Austria  received  carte  blanche  from  her 
more  powerful  ally.  The  German  White  Booh  says 
in  this  connection:  "The  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment advised  us  of  its  view  of  4he  situation  and  asked 
our  opinion  in  the  matter.  We  were  able  to  assure 
our  Ally  most  heartily  of  our  agreement  with  her 
view  of  the  situation,  and  to  assure  her  that  any 
action  that  she  might  consider  it  necessary  to  take 
in  order  to  put  an  end  to  the  movement  in  Serbia 
directed  against  the  existence  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  would  receive  our  approval."10 
Thus  supported  by  Germany,  Austria  presented 
her  note  to  Serbia  on  July  23,  1914.  The  moment 
chosen  for  the  despatch  of  the  note  was  carefully 
selected  and  the  situation  seemed  to  favor  the  chances 

io  German  White  BooJc,  preface;  Bunsen  wrote  that  he  had  private 
information  that  the  German  Ambassador  had  knowledge  of  the  text  of 
the  note  before  it  was  sent  and  wired  it  to  the  Kaiser,  British  Corre- 
spondence, No.  95,  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey;  the  Bavarian 
Prime  Minister  admitted  that  he  "had  knowledge  of  the  note  to 
Serbia,' '  and  it  was  hardly  likely  that  under  such  circumstances  the 
Imperial  German  Government  would  have  been  kept  in  ignorance, 
French  Yellow  BooTc,  No.  21. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  255 

of  Austria's  carrying  through  her  project  before  the 
Powers  could  intervene,  even  if  they  dared.  During 
the  weeks  immediately  preceding,  Austria  had  given 
assurances  that  her  demands  would  be  moderate,  and 
expressed  the  belief  that  there  would  be  no  serious 
crisis.11  None  of  the  diplomats  were  prepared  for 
extreme  measures  on  the  part  of  Austria.  The 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  having  received 
formal  assurances  that  the  situation  was  not  grave, 
had  left  Vienna  for  a  fortnight's  vacation.  The 
French  President,  Poincare,  was  in  Russia  with 
Viviani,  the  Prime  Minister.12  The  French  Ambas- 
sador to  Serbia  was  away  from  Belgrade.  The 
attention  of  British  statesmen  was  wholly  directed 
towards  the  Home  Rule  conference;  the  note  to 
Serbia,  in  fact,  was  ^despatched  upon  the  very  day 
that  the  conference  failed  and  when  civil  war  in 
Ulster  seemed  unavoidable.  The  diplomats  of  the 
Entente  Powers  thus  could  not  easily  meet  to  arrange 
a  concerted  protest  to  the  Austrian  demands,  and  the 
Germanic  Powers  would  be  dealing  solely  with  Serbia. 
The  character  of  the  demands  made  in  the  note  of 
July  23  was  such  as  to  indicate  the  extent  to  which 
Germany  and  Austria  meant  to  alter  the  Balkan 
situation.18      Only    forty-eight    hours    was    allowed 

ii  French  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  11  and  12.  On  July  23  the  general 
secretary  of  the  Austrian  Foreign  Office  assured  the  French  Ambassador 
that  "a  pacific  conclusion  could  be  counted  on,"  Ibid.,  No.  20. 

12  British  Correspondence,  No.  161,  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey;  French  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  18  and  25. 

is  The  terms  of  the  note  to  Serbia  are  printed  in  British  Corre- 
spondence, No.  4,  and  in  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  of  July 
25,  1914,  with  comments  illustrating  the  German  point  of  view.  Both 
England  and  Italy  agreed  that  the  terms  of  the  note  were  of  the  most 
threatening  character,  British  Correspondence,  Nos.  5  and  41  j  French 
Yellow  Book,  No.  56. 


256    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Serbia  in  which  to  make  her  reply;  clearly  she  was 
not  to  have  time  to  consult  her  friends,  or  place  the 
question  before  Europe.  She  was  given  her  choice 
of  complete  submission  before  the  end  of  this  period, 
or  of  war.  And  the  conditions  laid  down  for  her 
acceptance  were  such  that  if  she  submitted  she  would 
become  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  vassal  state  of 
Austria. 

The  Hapsburg  Monarchy  demanded  that  the  Serb 
Government  should  officially  condemn  the  anti- 
Austrian  propaganda  and  promise  to  punish  all 
Serb  officials  who  should  later  take  part  in  it;  that 
it  should  dissolve  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  the  great 
j  nationalistic  organization,  suppress  all  publications 
directed  against  Austria,  dismiss  all  teachers  con- 
nected with  the  anti-Austrian  movement  and  all 
military  officers  and  civil  functionaries  named  by  the 
Austrian  Government  as  being  concerned  in  that 
propaganda;  that  it  should  arrest  two  Serbians, 
specially  named  as  implicated  in  the  plot  of  Serajevo, 
prevent  all  illicit  traffic  in  arms  across  the  frontier 
and  punish  the  officials  who  had  facilitated  such 
traffic.  These  terms  were  such  that  Serbia  might 
possibly  have  accepted  them  without  loss  of  anything 
but  pride.  But  there  followed  two  further  demands 
which  no  state  claiming  to  be  independent  could 
accord:  Austria  insisted  that  representatives  of  her 
;  Government  should  be  allowed  to  collaborate  in  the 
suppression  of  the  anti- Austrian  movement,  and, 
furthermore,  that  Austrian  officials  take  part  in 
the  judicial  investigation  relating  to  the  plot  that 
culminated  on  June  28. 

The  acceptance  of  the  two  latter  conditions  would 
have  rendered  the  Serbian  Ministers  liable  to  a  charge 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  257 

of  high  treason,  for  such  cooperation  as  Austria 
suggested  was  not  merely  contrary  to  criminal  pro- 
cedure but  also  to  Serbian  law.14  As  an  independent 
nation  Serbia  could  not  be  expected  to  surrender  her 
sovereign  rights  and  quietly  accept  the  suzerainty  of 
Austria,  which  the  note  suggested.  It  seemed  obvious 
that  Austria  had  so  constructed  her  demands  as  to 
make  their  acceptance  an  impossibility,  in  order  that 
she  might  have  an  excuse  for  the  military  invasion 
of  Serbia  and  a  complete  overturning  of  the  balance 
in  the  Balkans.  The  Austrian  people  were  clamoring 
for  war  and  the  diplomats  realized  that  their  plans 
found  popular  support.  "The  impression  left  on  my 
mind,"  said  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  "is 
that  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  was  so  drawn  up  as 
to  make  war  inevitable;  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  are  fully  resolved  to  have  war  with 
Serbia;  that  they  consider  their  position  as  a  Great 
Power  at  stake;  and  that  until  punishment  has  been 
administered  to  Serbia  it  is  unlikely  that  they  will 
listen  to  proposals  of  mediation.  This  country  has 
gone  wild  at  the  prospect  of  war  with  Serbia,  and 
its  postponement  or  prevention  would  undoubtedly 
be  a  great  disappointment. ' m 

From  the  first,  Germany  showed  an  uncompromis- 
ing attitude:  the  affair  was  a  local  one,  according  to 
her  expressed  views  of  the  situation,  and  any  inter- 
im Russian  Orange  Boole,  No.  25. 

15  British  Correspondence,  No.  161,  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  Cf.  also  letter  of  the  Freiherr  von  Giesl  to  Count  Berehtold, 
Austrian  Bed  Book,  No.  6 :  "An  accounting  with  Serbia,  a  war  for  the 
position  of  the  monarchy  as  a  great  Power,  yes  for  its  very  existence 
as  such,  cannot  permanently  be  avoided.' '  The  Militarische  Rundschau 
said:  "If  we  do  not  make  up  our  minds  to  go  to  war  now,  we  shall 
have  to  do  so  in  two  or  three  years'  time  and  under  much  less  favorable 


258    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

vention  of  the  other  Powers  was  not  to  be  considered. 
Nor  did  the  German  press  conceal  their  pleasure  at 
the  prospect  of  seeing  Serbia  brought  under  the 
suzerainty  of  Austria,  and  Austrian  influence  once 
more  predominant  in  the  Balkans  to  the  profit  of 
Germany.  The  one  fear  expressed  was  that  the 
Austrian  conditions  would  be  accepted  en  bloc,  and 
that  there  would  be  no  war  against  Serbia.16 

That  fear  was  almost  realized,  for  the  Serbian 
reply  to  the  note,  delivered  on  July  25,  was  practically 
a  complete  submission.  Serbia  promised  to  make  the 
official  declaration  against  the  anti-Austrian  propa- 
ganda that  was  demanded  of  her,  and  of  the  other 
ten  conditions,  she  agreed  to  accept  eight.  Two  she 
accepted  with  reserves:  the  Serbian  Government 
expressed  its  inability  to  understand  the  kind  of 
collaboration  which  Austria  demanded  in  the  attack 
on  the  propaganda,  but  promised  to  permit  such 
collaboration  as  was  in  conformity  with  international 
law  and  criminal  procedure;  the  cooperation  of 
Austria  in  the  judicial  investigation  was  impossible, 
since  it  was  contrary  to  law,  but  Serbia  promised  to 
communicate  the  results  of  such  investigations  to  the 
Austrian  officials.  Finally,  if  Austria  were  not 
satisfied  with  the  terms  of  the  reply,  the  Serbian 
Government  declared  itself  ready  to  place  the  matter 
either    before    the    Hague    Tribunal    or    the    great 

conditions. ' '  The  Neue  Freie  Presse  was  indignant  at  the  thought 
of  attempting  a  pacific  arrangement;  it  believed  that  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment could  follow  only  a  "war  to  the  knife  against  Pan-Slavism, ' ' 
French  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  12,  17.  Bunsen  wrote  to  Grey  that  "the 
language  of  the  press  leaves  the  impression  that  the  surrender  of  Serbia 
is  neither  expected  nor  really  desired,"  British  Correspondence,  No.  20. 
i«  British  Correspondence,  Nos.  2,  32,  33,  71. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  259 

Powers.17  Thus  even  in  the  two  points  that  were  not 
completely  accepted,  Serbia  left  wide  opportunity 
for  a  peaceful  understanding,  if  Austria  so  desired. 

Had  Austria  accepted  the  Serbian  reply  as  satis- 
factory, she  would  have  secured  a  notable  diplomatic 
victory  and  would  probably  have  been  able  to  cripple 
Serb  influence  so  effectively  as  to  nullify  the  effect  of 
the  Treaty  of  Bukarest  and  reestablish  her  own 
influence  in  the  Balkans;  she  would  have  punished 
Serbia  for  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  and  would 
have  received  guarantees  for  the  future.  But  Austria 
was  apparently  determined  that  her  troops  should 
enter  Serbia  and  to  all  appearances  had  made  up  her 
mind  to  find  the  Serb  reply  unsatisfactory.  The 
Austrian  Minister  in  Belgrade  spent  only  forty 
minutes  in  an  examination  of  the  document,  supposed 
to  be  of  all-importance,  declared  it  unsatisfactory, 
and  immediately  left  for  Vienna.18  At  the  moment, 
no  reason  was  given  for  the  rejection  of  Serbia's 
response,  and  it  was  not  until  July  28,  that  a  brief 
note  explained  that  the  Serb  answer  made  no  real 
concessions,  and  was  entirely  evasive  in  character.19 

Once  more  Serbia  attempted  to  avert  the  open 
hostilities  that  threatened.  On  July  28,  the  Serbian 
Charge  d'affaires  at  Rome  made  a  proposition  to  the 
Italian  Foreign  Minister  which  displayed  Serbia's 
eagerness  to  find  any  solution,  no  matter  how  humiliat- 
ing for  herself:  "If  some  explanation  were  given 
regarding  the  mode  in  which  Austrian  agents  would 

it  British  Correspondence,  No.  39;  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
July  29,  1914  (with  official  comments). 

is  Durkheim  et  Denis,  Qui  a  voulu  la  guerre?  19. 

is  German  White  Book;  French  Yellow  Boole,  No.  75;  British  Corre- 
spondence, No.  31;  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  July  29,  1914. 


260    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

require  to  intervene  .  .  .  Serbia  might  still  accept 
the  whole  Austrian  note.,,  And  the  Italian  Minister 
suggested  that  if  Austria  considered  that  she  would 
compromise  her  dignity  by  giving  explanations  to 
Serbia,  she  might  communicate  them  to  the  Powers, 
who  would  pass  them  on  to  Serbia.20  But  Austria 
would  not  consider  this  last  proposal  and  on  the 
evening  of  July  28,  declared  war  on  Serbia.21 
y  Everything  now  depended  upon  the  attitude  taken 
by  Russia.  If  that  Power  accepted  the  German 
demand  that  the  question  between  Austria  and  Serbia 
should  be  localized,  and  permitted  Austria  to  prose- 
cute her  aggressive  action  against  Serbia,  it  was  not 
likely  that  France  or  Great  Britain  would  intervene. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  made  it  perfectly  clear  that 
the  Austro-Serb  quarrel  in  itself  did  not  interest 
Great  Britain,  and  that  if  Russia  did  not  step  in,  he 
would  not  act.22  In  Austria  the  belief  was  strong  that 
Russia  would  not  intervene  and  that  war  with  Serbia 
would  not  result  in  a  general  European  conflict;  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  wrote  that  few  seemed 
to  reflect  that  the  forcible  intervention  of  a  great 
Power  in  the  Balkans  must  inevitably  call  other  great 
Powers  into  the  field.23  In  Germany  the  possibility 
of  Russian  intervention  began  to  be  regarded  more 
seriously;  but  on  July  24,  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  expressed  his  conviction  that  Russia  would 
stand  aside.24  Hence  the  uncompromising  brutality 
with  which  Austria  disposed  of  every  attempt  to 
prevent  war  with  Serbia. 

20  British  Correspondence,  No.  64,  Sir  E.  Rodd  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

21  British  Correspondence,  No.  50. 

22  British  Correspondence,  Nos.  10,  24,  44. 

23  British  Correspondence,  No.  161. 

24  British  Correspondence,  Nos.  32,  161. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  261 

And  yet  from  the  very  first  Russia  attempted  to 
make  it  clear  that  she  could  not  afford  to  stand  aside 
from  the  unequal  quarrel;  it  was  morally  and  politi- 
cally impossible  for  her  to  remain  an  indifferent 
spectator  of  Serbia's  annihilation  by  Austria.  The 
bonds  of  ethnic  relationship  and  historical  tradition 
that  connected  the  two  nations,  the  role  of  protector 
of  the  Slavic  peoples  assumed  by  Russia,  definitely 
prevented  her  from  leaving  Serbia  defenceless.  All 
the  political  interests  of  Russia  in  the  Near  East, 
moreover,  impelled  her  to  intervene  and  save  Serbia 
from  falling  under  Austrian  suzerainty.  During  the 
Balkan  crisis  of  the  previous  year  Russia  had  made 
it  clear  to  Austria  that  war  with  Russia  must  inevi- 
tably follow  an  Austrian  attack  on  Serbia;  should 
Russia  tolerate  such  action,  in  the  opinion  of  M. 
Sazonof,  she  would  have  to  face  a  revolution.25 
Russia  felt  with  equal  intensity  in  1914  that  "  Austrian 
domination  of  Serbia  was  as  intolerable  for  Russia 
as  the  dependence  of  the  Netherlands  on  Germany 
would  be  to  Great  Britain.  It  was,  in  fact,  for  Russia 
a  question  of  life  and  death."28 

Such  sentiments  were  frankly  expressed  by  the 
Russian  diplomats  and  had  not  Germany  and  Austria 
been  deceived  by  the  reports  of  their  secret  service 
agents  and  the  obtuseness  of  certain  of  their  own 
diplomats,  they  must  have  realized  that  Russia  would 
not  allow  herself  and  Serbia  to  be  humiliated  as  in 
1908,  but  would  certainly  intervene.  From  the  first, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  feared  that  Russia  could  not 
stand  aside,  and  that  the  clash  between  Austria  and 

25  British  Correspondence,  No.  139. 

26  British  Correspondence,  No.  139,  Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. 


262    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Russia  would  at  once  bring  in  Germany  and  precipi- 
tate a  general  war.  He  had  therefore  suggested  that 
the  Powers  should  exercise  concerted  pressure  upon 
both  Austria  and  Russia  in  the  hope  of  discovering 
a  peaceful  solution  of  the  Austro-Serb  crisis.27  But 
for  this  the  cooperation  of  Germany  was  necessary, 
and  when  suggested  it  was  categorically  refused;  the 
German  Government  replied  that  it  could  not  "mix 
in  the  conflict."  Germany  desired  that  pressure 
should  be  brought  upon  Russia  to  prevent  her  inter- 
vention on  Serbia's  behalf,  but  at  the  same  time 
insisted  that  Austria  should  be  left  with  free  hands.28 
On  July  26,  after  the  diplomatic  rupture  between 
Austria  and  Serbia  but  before  the  former's  declara- 
tion of  war,  Sir  Edward  Grey  made  another  attempt 
at  conciliation.  He  proposed  that  the  four  Powers 
not  directly  interested  should  authorize  their  Ambas- 
sadors to  meet  in  conference  and  seek  some  formula 
of  agreement;  in  the  meantime  Serbia,  Austria,  and 
Russia  should  enter  upon  no  military  operations.29 
To  this  suggestion  France  and  Italy  agreed,  and  it 
was  also  favored  by  Russia,  who  had  already  made 
overtures  to  Austria  for  the  purpose  of  entering  into 
direct  conversations.80  But  Germany  refused  the 
project  of  this  conference  although  she  approved  its 
"principle";  it  would  be,  in  her  opinion,  tantamount 
to  calling  Austria  and  Russia  before  an  international 
court,  which  was  out  of  the  question.81    In  vain  did 

27  British    Correspondence,    No.    24,    Sir    Edward    Grey   to    Sir    G. 
Buchanan. 

28  French  Yellow  Boole,  Nos.  36,  37. 

29  British  Correspondence,  No.  36,  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie, 
Sir  H.  Eumbold,  and  Sir  B.  Rodd. 

so  British  Correspondence,  Nos.  49,  51,  53,  55. 
8i  British  Correspondence,  Nos.  43,  67,  71. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  263 

the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Cambon,  point  out  to 
Herr  von  Jagow,  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  that 
in  such  a  crisis  questions  of  form  should  be  left  on 
one  side,  and  that  if  a  peaceable  solution  could  not  be 
speedily  discovered,  the  responsibility  for  the  catas- 
trophe would  rest  upon  Germany.  The  German 
diplomat  replied  in  evasive  terms  and  still  refused 
the  conference.32  The  Russian  proposition  for  con- 
versations was  likewise  refused  by  Austria,  and  on 
July  28,  Count  Berchtold  withheld  from  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  the  powers  necessary  if  he  was  to  discuss 
with  Russia  the  terms  of  the  note  to  Serbia.83    — 

Previous  to  the  Austrian  declaration  of  war  upon 
Serbia  (July  28),  there  were  thus  three  definite 
attempts  made  by  the  Entente  Powers  in- the  hope  of 
preventing  the  crisis  from  becoming  so  acute  as  to 
force  the  entrance  of  Russia  into  a  conflict  with 
Austria.  The  offers  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  bring 
pressure  upon  Russia  if  Germany  would  act  in  similar 
fashion  at  Vienna,  and  his  suggestion  of  a  conference 
of  the  Powers  not  directly  interested,  had  been  refused 
by  Germany.  Russia's  offer  to  enter  into  conversa- 
tions with  Austria  had  been  equally  refused  by  that 
Power.  Evidently  both  Germany  and  her  ally  still 
clung  to  their  belief  that  Russia  would  stand  aside. 
So  firmly  convinced  had  they  been  of  the  impossibility 
of  any  effective  protest  on  the  part  of  the  Slav  Power, 
that  they  still  failed  to  realize  that  Russia  was  serious 
in  her  expressed  determination  to  support  her  protege, 
and  still  believed  that  they  could  carry  through  their 
plan  for  overturning  the  Balkan  balance  of  power 
without  a  general  war. 

82  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  74. 
33  British  Correspondence,  No.  61. 


264    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

For  another  forty-eight  hours,  following  the  Aus- 
trian declaration  of  war  upon  Serbia,  the  situation 
was  not  materially  changed.  It  is  true  that  Germany 
gave  assurances  that  she  was  working  for  peace,  but 
she  continued  to  reject  all  pacific  proposals,  and  in 
her  White  Book  there  is  no  document  suggesting  that 
she  attempted  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  Austria 
which  would  lead  the  latter  Power  to  moderate  her 
action. 

Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  although  she  had  ordered 
partial  mobilization  in  answer  to  that  of  Austria, 
continued  to  offer  suggestions  that  were  calculated 
to  facilitate  an  arrangement.  On  July  29,  the  Eussian 
Government  signified  its  willingness  to  concur  in  any 
procedure  proposed  by  France  or  England  for  the 
safeguarding  of  peace.34  And  on  the  same  day,  M. 
Sazonof,  in  a  conversation  with  the  German  Ambas- 
sador, made  an  offer  which,  if  accepted,  would  have 
provided  the  delay  necessary  for  a  peaceful  arrange- 
ment. "If  Austria,' '  he  said,  "recognizing  that  the 
Austro-Serbian  question  has  assumed  the  character 
of  a  European  question,  declares  herself  ready  to 
eliminate  from  her  ultimatum  the  points  which  are 
an  infringement  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  Serbia, 
Eussia  undertakes  to  cease  her  military  operations. ' ,35 
But  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  without  even 
consulting  the  Austrian  Government,  declared  that 
this  suggestion  could  not  be  accepted  at  Vienna.36 

Previous  to  July  30,  both  Austria  and  Germany  thus 
maintained  their  uncompromising  attitude.     But  on 

34  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  86. 

ss  Russian  Orange  Book,  No.  60 ;  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  103. 
so  Russian    Orange   Book,    No.    63 ;    French    Yellow   Book,   No.    107. 
There  is  no  trace  of  these  latter  negotiations  in  the  German  White  Book. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1914  265 

that  day  certain  effects  of  the  partial  mobilization 
of  Russia  were  discernible  in  Vienna.  On  July  31, 
Austria  having  decreed  general  mobilization,  Russia 
also  ordered  the  mobilization  of  her  entire  army  and 
fleet  a  few  hours  later  ;37  the  fact  was  capital  and  from 
this  moment  the  scene  changed  abruptly.  Austria 
suddenly  realized  that  the  execution  of  her  plan  was 
impossible,  since  it  had  become  obvious  that  the  pro- 
jected annihilation  of  Serbia  would  not  be  quietly 
permitted  by  Russia,  who  was  serious  in  her  deter- 
mination to  intervene.  Austria  found  herself  facing 
a  general  war  and  began  to  draw  back  in  fear  of  the 
consequences.38 

Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  accepted  the  conse- 
quences. Disappointed  that  the  crisis  was  not  to  end, 
as  she  had  hoped,  in  a  diplomatic  victory,  she  was 
nevertheless  determined  that  the  position  she  had 
taken  up  should  be  maintained,  even  at  the  cost  of 
war.  Although  she  had  been  convinced  that  Russia 
would  allow  herself  to  be  quietly  humiliated,  she  had 
weighed  the  possibility  of  Russian  resistance  and  was 
well  prepared  to  break  down  that  resistance  by  force 
of  arms.  From  two  o'clock  of  July  31,  Germany 
began  to  force  the  issue,  anxious  for  military  reasons 
that  the  war  which  seemed  to  her  inevitable,  because 
of  her  own  and  Russia's  determined  attitude,  should 
be  precipitated  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

37  German  White  Book,  preface;  French  Yellow  Boole,  Nos.  115,  118. 
ss  Austrian  Bed  Book,  Nos.  48,  49 ;  British  Correspondence,  No.  96. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK 

The  realization  on  the  part  of  Austria  that  she  haa 
gone  too  far  and  was  treading  on  dangerous  ground, 
seems  to  have  been  first  awakened  by  the  partial 
mobilization  of  Russia.  M.  Sazonof  had  hoped  that 
this  military  measure  would  be  regarded  as  a  clear 
intimation  that  Russia  must  be  consulted  regarding 
the  fate  of  Serbia,  and  the  hope  was  largely  justified. 
Count  Berchtold,  who  two  days  before  had  brusquely 
refused  to  allow  direct  conversations  with  Russia  by 
withholding  the  necessary  powers  from  the  Austrian 
Ambassador,  agreed  on  July  30,  to  a  resumption  of 
such  conversations;  his  refusal,  he  explained,  had 
been  due  to  a  misunderstanding.  And  for  the  first 
time  Austria  made  a  concession  of  enormous  import- 
ance when  she  admitted  the  subject  of  the  Austro- 
Serb  quarrel  to  discussion.  The  Austrian  Ambassador 
was  authorized  "to  discuss  what  arrangement  would 
be  compatible  with  the  dignity  and  prestige  which 
was  of  equal  importance  to  both  Empires.,,  And 
the  Russian  Ambassador  gave  his  assurance  that 
"his  Government  would  take  into  consideration  the 
demands  of  the  Austrian  Monarchy  in  a  far  more 
generous  spirit  than  was  expected.,n 

The  general  mobilization  of  the  Russian  forces  on 
the  next  day   (July  31)   increased  the  pacific  spirit 

i  Austrian  Bed  Boole,  Nos.  50,  51 ;  French  Yellow  Booh,  No.  104. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  267 

of  Austria  in  the  most  striking  fashion.  The  Austrian 
Government  agreed  to  discuss  the  substance  of  their 
ultimatum  of  July  23  to  Serbia.  They  further  agreed; 
to  accept  the  mediation  of  the  Powers,  based  on  a 
proposition  suggested  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  and 
drafted  by  M.  Sazonof,  to  the  effect  that  after  the 
occupation  of  Belgrade,  Austria  would  cease  her 
advance  into  Serbia  and  would  discuss  a  settlement, 
Eussia  also  agreeing  to  suspend  further  military 
preparations.2  Austria  thus  conceded  the  main  point 
of  the  Russian  demands  and  showed  clearly  her 
desire  for  a  peaceful  settlement.  Count  Berchtold 
begged  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  do  all  that  lay  in 
his  power  to  remove  the  false  impression  that  St. 
Petersburg  had  received  of  the  Austrian  attitude; 
it  was  not  true,  he  said,  that  Austria  had  "  brutally 
banged  the  door  on  negotiations. ' '  And  he  hastened 
to  inform  Paris  and  London  that  the  Austrian 
Government  had  no  intention  of  impugning  the 
sovereign  rights  of  Serbia.3  It  was  all  that  Russia 
asked  for. 

The  willingness  of  the  diplomats  of  the  Ballplatz 
to  compromise,  once  they  were  convinced  that  Russia 
would  not  stand  aside,  was  thus  complete,  and  the 
path  to  a  peaceable  arrangement  seemed  clear. 
Russia  was  prepared  to  accept  any  reasonable  settle- 
ment which  would  not  force  humiliation  upon  Serbia 
and  herself,  and  Austria  was  negotiating  in  the  most 
amicable  spirit.  Provided  no  other  factor  obtruded 
itself,  the  peace  of  Europe  was  assured.  But  now 
for  the  first  time   Germany   definitely   entered  into 

2  Austrian  Bed  Book,  Nos.  53,  55,  56;  Kussian  Orange  Boole,  No.  67; 
British  Correspondence,  103,  120,  133,  135. 

3  Kussian  Orange  Book,  No.  73;  British  Correspondence,  No.  137. 


268    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

the  situation  and  her  intervention  cnt  short  the 
conciliatory  conversations  between  St.  Petersburg 
and  Vienna.  Germany  has  constantly  maintained 
that  her  influence  with  the  Austrian  diplomats  had 
always  been  of  a  moderating  character,  that  she  was 
' '  pressing  jt^e  v  button ' '  for  peace ;  but  the  first 
moment  that  her  action  can  be  clearly  traced,  it  was 
evidently  calculated  to  prevent  the  concessions  offered 
by  Austria. 

From  the  moment  of  Russian  mobilization,  which 
marked  the  beginning  of  Austria's  conciliatory  tone, 
the  attitude  of  Germany  became  increasingly  bellicose. 
The  news  of  Russia's  mobilization,  received  at  Vienna 
without  protest  or  feeling,  provoked  the  sharpest  of 
rejoinders  at  Berlin.  At  two  o'clock  on  July  31,  the 
Kaiser  sent  to  the  Tsar  a  telegram  conceived  in  the 
spirit  of  menace  and  warning  him  in  threats  hardly 
veiled  that  unless  Russia  ceased  her  military  prepara- 
tions war  must  result,  and  the  responsibility  would 
be  Russia's.4  At  the  same  time  the  German  Govern- 
ment declared  Kriegsgefahr,  thus  allowing  the  virtual 
mobilization  of  the  German  forces.5  Finally,  at 
midnight,  Germany  delivered  an  ultimatum  to  Russia, 
demanding  that  she  cease  all  military  preparations, 
whether  on  the  side  of  Austria  or  Germany;  a  reply 
was  requested  within  twelve  hours.6 

The  brevity  of  the  period  allowed  for  response  by 
the  ultimatum  was  such  that  regard  for  her  own 
dignity  made  an  acceptance  by  Russia  difficult,  if  not 
impossible.  It  would  not  have  been  illogical  for 
Germany  to  point  out  that  the  Russian  mobilization 

4  German  White  Book,  Annex  24. 
6  German  White  Boole,  Annex  25. 
e  German  White  Boole,  Annex  26. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  269 

on  the  German  frontier  could  not  be  regarded  with 
equanimity  at  Berlin,  although  Eussia  had  specifically 
declared  that  her  military  preparation  did  not  signify 
hostile  intentions.7  But  it  was  beyond  reason  that 
Germany  should  insist  that  Eussia  cease  to  protect 
herself  on  her  Austrian  frontier  at  the  moment  that 
Austria  was  arming  in  that  quarter  and  although 
Austria  herself  had  not  taken  umbrage  at  the  Eussian 
mobilization.  Germany's  intervention  in  the  fashion 
she  employed  clearly  signified  that  she  meant  to 
insist  on  the  complete  surrender  of  Eussia,  and  she 
backed  her  demand  by  a  threat  of  war.  As  the  German 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  said,  "if  it  was  not  c 
yet  war,  it  was  not  far  from  it." 

Thus  at  the  moment  when  the  situation  between 
Austria  and  Eussia  was  growing  brighter,  Germany 
transferred  the  dispute  to  the  more  dangerous  ground 
of  a  direct  conflict  between  Eussia  and  herself.  Nor 
would  she  accept  the  mediation  proposed  by  Sir  t 
Edward  Grey,  the  principle  of  which  was  almost 
eagerly  seized  by  Austria.  In  vain  did  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  point  out  to  the  German 
Foreign  Secretary  that  the  dispute  was  in  reality 
between  Austria  and  Eussia,  and  that  Germany's 
interest  in  it  was  merely  as  Austria's  ally.  If  Austria 
and  Eussia  were  ready  to  discuss  matters,  it  seemed 
only  logical  that  Germany  should  hold  her  hand,  "if 
she  did  not  desire  war  on  her  own  account.' '  Von 
Jagow  only  replied  that  it  was  too  late ;  if  Eussia  had 
not  mobilized,  all  would  have  been  well;  Eussia  had 

7  The  despatches  of  the  German  military  attache  at  St.  Petersburg 
show  that  Russia's  mobilization  was  directed  against  Austria  and  not 
against  Germany:  "Mobilization  has  been  ordered  for  Kiev  and  Odessa. 
It  is  doubtful  at  Warsaw  and  Moscow,  and  elsewhere  it  has  probably  not 
been  ordered,' '  German  White  Boole,  Annex  7. 


270    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

forced  Germany  to  demand  demobilization,  and  if  that 
demand  were  not  heeded,  war  would  result.8 

The  ultimatum  of  Germany  to  Russia,  drawn  up  in 
terms  which  were  manifestly  inacceptable  for  a  great 
Power,  threw  the  Serbian  aspect  of  the  crisis  totally 
into  the  background.  Russia  and  Germany  were  now 
face  to  face  and  neither  would  yield.  It  is  true  that 
the  Tsar,  without  accepting  the  German  demand, 
made  one  last  effort  to  prevent  war.  "I  can  see  that 
you  are  obliged  to  mobilize,' '  he  telegraphed  the 
Kaiser,  "but  I  would  have  from  you  the  same  guar- 
antee that  I  have  given — that  these  measures  do 
not  mean  war  and  that  we  shall  pursue  our  negotia- 
tions for  the  good  of  our  two  countries  and  the 
general  peace,  which  is  so  dear  to  our  hearts.' '  But 
the  Kaiser  remained  deaf  to  what  he  doubtless 
considered  to  be  merely  an  attempt  to  gain  time.  "An 
immediate  reply  from  your  Government,"  he  tele- 
graphed, "clear  and  unequivocal,  is  the  sole  means 
of  preventing  an  infinite  calamity.  Until  I  receive 
that  reply  it  is,  to  my  great  regret,  impossible  to  take 
up  the  subject  of  your  telegram."9 

The  reply  was  never  sent  by  Russia.  The  demobili- 
zation of  her  army,  with  Germany's  threats  hanging 
over  her  and  at  the  moment  when  her  principal 
antagonist  accepted  that  mobilization  and  yet  nego- 
tiated, would  have  meant  the  deepest  humiliation 
ever  undergone  by  a  first-class  Power.  For  the  sake 
of  her  national  honor  and  her  position  in  Europe, 
Russia  could  not  consent  to  the  reply  that  Germany 
demanded.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  was  deter- 
mined to  carry  through  her  plan,  cost  what  it  might. 

8  British  Correspondence,  No.  138. 
»  Exchange  of  telegrams,  August  1. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  271 

From  the  first  she  seems  to  have  set  her  heart 
on  the  reaffirmation  of  German  prestige  and  to  have 
believed  that  her  scheme  could  be  executed  by- 
means  of  diplomatic  threats,  as  in  1908.  To  draw 
back  at  the  last  moment  would  mean  a  diplomatic 
reverse  not  less  serious  than  that  of  1911.  Now 
that  it  became  apparent  that  her  hegemony  was  not 
to  be  reestablished  by  a  diplomatic  victory,  she  was 
prepared  to  assert  it  by  means  of  war.  At  ten 
minutes  past  seven,  on  August  1,  having  received  from 
St.  Petersburg  no  reply  to  her  ultimatum,  Germany 
officially  declared  war  upon  Russia.10 

That  France  would  be  included  in  the  war  thus 
begun,  no  one  doubted.  Germany  had  expected  it  and 
her  mobilization  had  been  carried  out  upon  her 
western  as  upon  her  eastern  front.  Premier  Viviani 
had  in  effect  given  warning  that  France  would  assist 
her  ally  against  Germany,  when  he  had  answered  the 
German  question  as  to  whether  she  would  remain 
neutral,  by  stating  that  France  would  do  that  which 
her  interests  dictated.11  But  France,  in  order  to 
demonstrate  the  defensive  character  of  the  war  on 
her  part,  carefully  abstained  from  inaugurating  any 
act  of  hostility;  the  French  Government  believed  that 
it  was  of  importance  to  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  she 
was  the  attacked  party,  both  to  win  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world  and  to  ensure  the  neutrality  of  Italy. 
Hence  the  French  troops  received  orders  to  retire 
ten  kilometres  from  the  frontier.12 

Germany,  however,  because  of  her  plan  of  campaign, 
which  called  for  an  immediate  advance  into  France, 

io  Kussian  Orange  Boole,  No.  76. 
ii  German  White  Boole,  Annex  27. 
12  French  Yellow  Boole,  No.  136. 


272    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

could  not  afford  to  wait.  On  the  morning  of  Sunday, 
August  2,  the  Germans  crossed  the  French  frontier, 
and  on  the  evening  of  the  following  day  the  German 
Ambassador  asked  for  his  passports  and  handed  in  a 
declaration  of  war.  Acts  of  aggression  alleged  to 
have  been  committed  by  French  aviators  in  Germany, 
formed  the  justification.13 

Germany  was  entirely  prepared  for  war  with 
France  and  Eussia.  She  had  long  realized  that  the 
maintenance  of  her  continental  hegemony  might  lead 
to  a  conflict  of  arms,  and  since  1912  had  been  putting 
herself  in  condition  to  carry  on  the  war  on  both  of 
her  frontiers.  Although  she  was  disappointed  that 
the  scheme  of  annihilating  Slavic  influence  in  the 
Balkans  could  not  be  carried  through  by  means  of  an 
Austro-Serb  war  solely,  as  had  been  planned,  and 
although  she  was  equally  surprised  that  Eussia  and 
France  dared  to  pick  up  the  gauntlet,  she  recognized 
that  war  with  these  Powers  could  be  waged  with 
better  hopes  of  success  in  1914  than  a  few  years  later. 
War  with  Great  Britain,  however,  she  earnestly 
desired  to  avoid.  Such  a  contingency  might  ultimately 
arrive,  as  Germany  pressed  on  her  path  towards 
world  empire,  but  she  hoped  steadfastly  that  it  would 
not  be  necessary  before  she  had  regained  control  of 
the  Continent  through  the  defeat,  either  diplomatic 
or  military,  of  Eussia  and  France.  She  must  not 
fight  all  the  Entente  Powers  at  once. 

is  The  truth  of  these  allegations  must  remain  in  doubt.  It  was  said 
that  bombs  were  thrown  on  the* railway  near  Nuremberg,  but  the 
Franlcische  Eurrier  made  no  mention  of  them  on  August  2,  and  it  was 
only  on  August  3  that  Nuremberg  received  word  of  the  attack  by  a 
telegram  from  Berlin.  The  Kolnische  Zeituna  of  August  3  reported 
that  the  Bavarian  Minister  of  War  doubted  the  story  of  aviators  and 
bomb -dropping  near  Nuremberg. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  273 

During  the  Balkan  crisis  of  1912  and  1913,  when 
Germany  realized  that  the  struggle  for  primacy  on 
the  Continent  might  be  precipitated  at  any  moment, 
she  had  done  her  best  to  improve  her  relations  with 
Great  Britain.  Her  attempts  had  found  response  in 
the  British  Liberal  Ministry,  and  it  was  largely  due 
to  the  combined  efforts  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Lord 
Haldane,  and  Bethmann-Hollweg  that  the  first  Balkan 
War  had  been  localized.14  With  the  opening  of  the 
crisis  that  resulted  from  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Serbia,  the  German  Chancellor  immediately  renewed 
his  efforts  to  secure  British  neutrality  in  case  of  a 
general  continental  war. 

He  made  his  first  attempt  on  July  29,  at  the  moment 
when  Germany  was  beginning  to  menace  Russia  with 
threats  of  war  if  that  Power  continued  its  mobilization. 
In  a  conversation  with  Sir  W.  E.  Goschen,  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin,  Bethmann-Hollweg  promised 
that  if  Great  Britain  would  stand  aside,  Germany 
would  seek  no  territorial  aggrandizement  at  the 
expense  of  France,  although  she  could  promise 
nothing  in  respect  to  the  French  colonies.  The 
neutrality  of  Holland  would  be  respected,  and  although 
Germany  could  give  no  assurance  as  to  Belgium  until 
the  French  plan  of  action  was  revealed,  her  integrity 
would  be  respected  at  the  end  of  the  war,  if  she  had 

14  Qft  1 1  Truth  about  Germany, ' '  in  New  York  Times  Current  History 
of  the  War,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  247;  and  Schiemann,  "England  and  Ger- 
many," Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  No.  4,  788,  794.  Schiemann  tells  of  the  pacific 
attitude  of  British  statesmen  during  his  visit  to  London  in  March, 
1914,  and  quotes  a  personal  letter  from  Haldane:  "My  ambition  is, 
like  yours,  to  bring  Germany  into  relations  of  ever  closer  intimacy  and 
friendship.  Our  two  countries  have  a  common  work  to  do  for  the- 
world  as  well  as  for  themselves,  and  each  of  them  can  bring  to  bear 
on  this  work  special  endowments  and  qualities.  May  the  cooperation 
which  I  believe  to  be  now  beginning,  become  closer  and  closer. ' ' 


L~ 


274    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

not  sided  against  Germany.  Finally  the  German 
Chancellor  recalled  the  fact  that  his  policy  had 
always  aimed  at  an  understanding  with  England,  and 
said  that  he  "had  in  mind  a  general  neutrality  agree- 
ment between  England  and  Germany  .  .  .  and  the 
assurance  of  British  neutrality  in  the  conflict  which 
the  present  crisis  might  produce,  would  enable  him 
to  look  forward  to  the  realization  of  his  desire."15 

The  offer  of  a  general  neutrality  agreement  would 
doubtless  prove  a  great  temptation  to  British  Radi- 
cals, and  Germany  probably  hoped  thus  to  keep  Great 
Britain  out  of  the  way  while  she  was  engaged  in 
dealing  with  Kussia  and  France.  The  British  Ambas- 
sador, however,  refused  to  fetter  his  Government's 
liberty  of  action  by  any  promises,  and  on  the  same 
day  Sir  Edward  Grey  warned  the  German  Ambas- 
sador at  London  not  to  be  misled  by  England's 
friendly  tone  into  thinking  that  she  would  necessarily 
stand  aside.  He  said  frankly  that  it  was  impossible 
to  say  who  might  not  be  drawn  into  the  conflict.16  And 
on  July  30,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  definitely 
refused  the  German  offer  of  the  day  before,  in  terms 
that  could  hardly  be  misunderstood.  What  Germany 
asked,  he  said,  was  in  effect  "to  engage  to  stand  by 
while  French  colonies  are  taken  and  France  is  beaten, 
so  long  as  Germany  does  not  take  French  territory 
as  distinct  from  the  colonies.  From  the  material 
point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is  unacceptable,  for 
France,  without  further  territory  in  Europe  being 
taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crushed  as  to  lose  her 
position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  become  subordinate 

15  British  Correspondence,  No.  85,  Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. 

i«  British  Correspondence,  Nos.  89,  90. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  275 

to  German  policy.  Altogether  apart  from  that,  it 
would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this  bargain  with 
Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from 
which  the  good  name  of  the  country  would  never 
recover.  The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to 
bargain  away  whatever  obligation  or  interest  we  have 
as  regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could  not 
entertain  that  bargain  either."17 

Germany  therefore  had  clear  warning  that  the 
neutrality  of  Great  Britain  was  not  a  postulate  upon 
which  she  could  count.  And  the  German  Ambassador 
in  London  became  convinced  that  in  the  event  of  a 
German  attack  upon  France,  Great  Britain  would 
surely  support  the  latter  Power.18  But  at  Berlin, 
confidence  in  the  British  pacifist  spirit  still  persisted. 
The  diplomats  there  counted  upon  Lord  Haldane, 
who  was  regarded  as  Germany's  friend  and  had  been 
prominent  in  favoring  an  understanding  with  Ger- 
many; the  peace-making  influence  of  Lord  Morley 
and  John  Burns  was  also  believed  to  be  such  that  no 
Cabinet  advocating  war  would  receive  the  support 
of  the  Radical  and  Labor  elements,  which  were  not 
likely  to  refuse  the  offer  of  a  general  agreement  of 
neutrality  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 
Above  all,  the  diplomats  of  Wilhelmstrasse  counted 

17  British  Correspondence,  No.  101. 

is  The  diplomats  at  Berlin  apparently  left  England  so  completely 
out  of  their  calculations  that  Grey's  very  serious  warning  was  received 
by  the  German  Chancellor  without  any  comment  except  that  his  mind 
was  so  full  of  grave  matters  that  he  could  not  be  certain  of  remembering 
it  unless  a  written  memorandum  were  given  him,  British  Correspondence, 
No.  109.  The  German  Ambassador  to  St.  James,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
so  perturbed  at  the  danger  of  British  intervention  that  he  tried  to 
extract  the  promise  that  Great  Britain  would  remain  neutral  if  Ger- 
many promised  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  Ibid.,  No.  123. 


276    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

upon  the  consciousness  of  unreadiness  which  they 
felt  must  be  in  the  minds  of  the  British  statesmen. 

It  is  true  that  notwithstanding  the  firm  attitude  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  neither  Cabinet  nor  people  in 
England  were  undivided  as  to  the  policy  that  Great 
Britain  should  follow.  So  long  as  the  question  was 
one  of  Balkan  diplomacy  and  seemed  to  involve 
merely  a  struggle  between  Austria  and  Russia  for 
leadership  in  the  Near  East,  British  public  opinion 
remained  cold  to  the  idea  of  intervention.  Even  the 
danger  that  Great  Britain  would  face  if  France  were 
attacked  and  subjugated  by  Germany  was  not  univer- 
sally appreciated.  For  a  decade  the  fear  of  Germany 
in  England  had  been  a  very  real  fact  and  had  led  to 
popular  approval  of  the  understandings  with  France 
and  Eussia.  But  it  was  one  thing  to  recognize  the 
German  menace  abstractly,  and  quite  another  to  enter 
into  a  concrete  war  against  Germany  for  the  defence 
of  France. 

Of  such  sentiments  the  Berlin  Government  was  well 
aware,  and  the  reports  of  German  agents  in  England 
buoyed  up  the  German  hope  that  England  would  not 
approve  intervention  on  the  Continent  for  the  pro- 
tection of  France.  It  is  almost  inconceivable  that  the 
opinions  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  would  not  finally  have 
triumphed,  but  it  is  possible  that  if  Germany  had  not 
herself  forced  to  the  front  the  one  issue  that  could 
unite  Great  Britain  against  her,  the  latter  Power 
might  have  found  great  difficulty  in  making  up  her 
mind.  But  Germany  made  up  Great  Britain's  mind 
for  her  on  August  3,  by  the  invasion  of  Belgium;  it 
was  practically  impossible  for  Great  Britain  to  stand 
aside  after  this  violation  of  a  treaty  which  she  was 
pledged  to  maintain,  and  with  Germany  threatening 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  277 

to  occupy  a  strategic  position  which  would  render 
England  practically  defenceless. 

The  neutrality  of  Belgium  is,  perhaps,  hardly  less 
essential  for  the  safety  of  England  than  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  British  fleet,  and  ever  since  the  Middle 
Ages  it  has  been  a  definite  principle  of  British  policy 
that  the  Low  Countries  should  not  be  held  or  con- 
trolled by  a  first-class  Power.  Geography  and  history 
have  alike  emphasized  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
this  principle,  if  British  security  is  to  be  assured.19 
The  Scheldt  is  directly  opposite  the  mouth  of  the 
Thames,  and  control  of  this  river  is  one  of  the  first 
conditions  of  a  successful  raid  on,  or  invasion  of  the 
east  coast  of  England,  which  is  far  easier  to  approach 
than  the  south  coast.  This  fact  has  been  recognized 
by  the  enemies  of  England  as  by  her  statesmen; 
Napoleon  once  said,  "  Antwerp  is  a  pistol  aimed 
point-blank  at  the  heart  of  England.' ' 

All  through  her  history  England  has  never  hesitated 
to  oppose  with  all  her  power  the  acquisition  of  the 
Low  Countries  by  one  of  the  great  continental  nations. 
The  Hundred  Years'  War  began  in  1340  with  the 
battle  of  Sluys,  when  England  protected  the  Flemish 
burghers  from  the  King  of  France.  Howard  and 
Drake  fought  the  Spanish  Armada  in  1588  when 
England  was  helping  the  Low  Countries  win  their 
independence  from  Spain.  Pitt  attacked  France  in 
1793,  not  so  much  because  Robespierre  and  Danton 
had  cut  off  the  head  of  Louis  XVI  as  because  France 
was  conquering  Belgium.  As  between  England  and 
Napoleon,  Belgium  was  always  one  of  the  chief  issues, 
and  it  was  the  French  Emperor's  determination  to 
hold  on  to  this  strategical  position  that  largely  deter- 

19  Cf.  Rose,  The  Origins  of  the  War,  176-177. 


278    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

mined  the  undying  enmity  of  the  British  Government 
towards  him. 

After  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  Belgium  was  united  with 
Holland,  but  revolted  in  1830  and  demanded  the 
recognition  of  her  independence.  To  this  demand  the 
Powers  agreed,  but  as  it  was  impossible  to  form  of 
Belgium  a  state  strong  enough  to  defend  itself,  they 
imposed  upon  her  the  condition  of  perpetual  neu- 
trality. Belgium  thus  received  the  guarantee  of 
security  from  foreign  invasion  or  absorption  by  a 
great  Power,  and  paid  for  it  the  price  of  remaining 
neutral  under  all  circumstances.  In  1831  her  neu- 
trality was  confirmed,  and  on  April  19,  1839,  Belgium 
and  Holland  signed  a  treaty  which  provided  that 
"Belgium  forms  an  independent  state  of  perpetual 
neutrality";  on  the  same  date  Prussia,  France,  Great 
Britain,  Austria,  and  Eussia  signed  a  treaty,  by 
which  those  states  became  the  "guarantors"  of  such 
neutrality.20 

Upon  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-German  War,  in 
1870,  Gladstone  entered  into  special  treaties  with 
France  and  Prussia  which  reinsured  Belgian  neu- 
trality, but  which  did  not  abrogate  the  Treaty  of 
1839.21     Bismarck  also   emphasized  the   security  of 

20  The  treaties  of  1831  and  1839  are  published  in  Hertslet,  Map 
of  Europe  by  Treaty,  ii,  858,  979,  Nos.  153,  183.  For  discussion  of  the 
status  of  Belgium,  see  Descamps,  La  Neutrality  de  la  Belgique  (1902) 
and  L'Etat  neutre  d  litre  permanent  (1912). 

2i  The  treaties  of  1870  are  published  in  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by 
Treaty,  iii,  1886,  1889,  Nos.  427,  428.  For  Gladstone  on  the  importance 
of  Belgian  neutrality,  see  Beer,  in  New  YorJc  Times  Current  History  of 
the  War,  Vol.  I,  No.  3,  448-450.  The  necessity  of  Belgian  neutrality 
for  Great  Britain  also  appears  from  a  letter  of  Queen  Victoria  written 
to  the  King  of  the  Belgians  in  1852,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  designs 
of  Napoleon  III  on  Belgium:  "Any  attempt  on  Belgium  would  be 
casus  belli  for  us,M  Letters  of  Queen  Victoria,  ii,  438. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  279 

Belgium's  position  by  promising  to  respect  her 
neutrality,  a  promise  which  he  declared  to  be  quite 
superfluous  in  view  of  the  treaties  in  force.22  The 
Hague  Convention  of  1907  laid  further  emphasis  on 
the  fact  that  the  territory  of  neutral  countries  is 
inviolable  and  the  transport  of  troops  through  them 
forbidden.23 

During  the  crises  that  marked  the  first  decade  of  the 
twentieth  century,  the  possibility  of  an  invasion  of 
Belgium  by  Germany  was  more  than  once  considered. 
And  it  appears  that  in  1906  and  1912,  officials  of  Great 
Britain  and  Belgium  discussed  what  measures  of 
defence  Belgium  could  take  and  what  assistance  Great 
Britain  could  offer  if  Belgian  neutrality  were  violated 
by  Germany.24  But  in  1911  and  1913,  the  German 
Foreign  Secretary  stated  distinctly  that  "the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  is   determined   by   international 

22 Bismarck  wrote:  "In  confirmation  of  my  verbal  assurance  I 
have  the  honor  to  give  in  writing  a  declaration,  which  in  view  of  the 
treaties  in  force  is  quite  superfluous,  that  the  Confederation  of  the 
North  and  its  allies  will  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  on  the 
understanding,  of  course,  that  it  is  respected  by  the  other  belligerent, ' ' 
cited  by  Beck,  The  Evidence  in  the  Case,  194. 

23  The  Hague  Convention  in  its  chapter  on  *  *  The  Eights  and  Duties 
of  Neutral  Powers,"  declares:  "Art.  I:  The  territory  of  neutral 
Powers  is  inviolable  .  .  .  Art.  II:  Belligerents  are  forbidden  to  move 
troops  or  convoys  of  either  munitions  of  war  or  supplies  across  the 
territory  of  a  neutral  Power  .  .  .  Art.  X:  The  fact  of  a  neutral  Power 
resisting,  even  by  force,  attempts  to  violate  its  neutrality  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  hostile  act." 

24  Papers  discovered  in  Belgium  by  the  invading  Germans  show  that 
Col.  Barnardiston  discussed  the  problem  of  Belgium's  defence  with  the 
chief  of  the  Belgian  military  staff  in  1906.  There  is  nothing  to  show 
that  the  conversations  were  official,  and  it  is  clear  that  British  interven- 
tion was  not  to  be  considered  unless  Belgium  found  herself  unable  to 
withstand  invasion,  "Official  abstract  of  Papers/ '  in  New  York  Times 
Current  History  of  the  War,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  370. 


280    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

conventions,  and  Germany  is  resolved  to  respect 
those  conventions."25 

Nevertheless  the  construction  of  strategic  railway- 
lines  by  Germany  on  the  Belgian  frontier,  which  did 
not  seem  to  be  entirely  justified  by  the  commercial 
necessities  of  the  territory,  kept  alive  the  suspicion 
that  in  case  of  war  with  France,  Germany  would  seek 
the  speediest  means  of  striking  into  the  heart  of 
France,  which  was  through  Belgium.  And  on  July 
31, 1914,  when  it  became  obvious  that  a  European  war 
could  be  averted  only  with  difficulty,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
asked  both  France  and  Germany  whether  they  were 
prepared  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality,  provided  it 
were  violated  by  no  other  Power.26  To  this  question 
France  immediately  replied  in  the  affirmative.27  But 
the  German  Government  refused  to  give  a  definite 
answer,  and  the  British  Ambassador  reported  his 
belief  that  for  strategic  reasons  they  would  probably 
decline  to  give  any  assurance.28 

It  was  thus  plain  that  Germany  was  actually 
meditating  an  advance  through  Belgium  and  on 
August  2,  the  German  Government  sent  a  note  to 
Belgium  which  definitely  expressed  the  determination 
to  violate  her  neutrality  with  or  without  her  consent. 
The  note  stated  that  "reliable  information"  gave 
evidence  that  France  was  planning  an  entrance  into 
Belgium,  and  explained  that  Germany  was  thus 
obliged  to  violate  Belgian  territory.  If  Belgium 
consented  to  the  invasion  and  took  up  an  attitude 
of  benevolent  neutrality  she  was  promised  that  her 

25  Belgian  Gray  Book,  No.  12. 

26  British  Correspondence,  No.  114. 

27  Belgian  Gray  Book,  No.  15;  British  Correspondence,  No.  125. 

28  British  Correspondence,  No.  122. 


S 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  281 

territorial  integrity  would  be  respected  at  the  end 
of  the  war  and  that  Belgium  would  be  immediately 
evacuated  by  the  German  army.  If  she  opposed  the 
German  advance,  she  would  be  treated  as  an  enemy.29 

Although  Germany  adduced  the  prospect  of  a 
French  invasion  of  Belgium  as  justification  for  her 
violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1839,  in  which  Prussia 
appeared  as  a  guarantor  of  Belgian  neutrality,  the 
material  reason  for  Germany's  action  was  laid  bare 
in  a  speech  by  the  German  Chancellor.  In  this  speech 
he  admitted  the  illegality  and  wrong  committed  by 
Germany  and  entered  the  plea  of  military  necessity. 
"We  are  now  in  a  state  of  necessity,"  said  Herr  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  to  the  Reichstag,  "and  necessity 
knows  no  law.  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg 
and  perhaps  are  already  on  Belgian  soil.  Gentlemen, 
that  is  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  international  law. 
It  is  true  that  the  French  Government  has  declared 
at  Brussels  that  France  is  willing  to  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  her  opponent 
respects  it.  We  knew,  however,  that  France  stood 
ready  for  invasion.  France  could  wait  but  we  could 
not  wait.  A  French  movement  upon  our  flank  might 
have  been  disastrous.  So  we  were  compelled  to  over- 
ride the  just  protests  of  the  Luxemburg  and  Belgian 
Governments.  The  wrong — I  speak  openly — that  we 
are  committing  we  will  endeavor  to  make  good  as  soon 
as  our  military  goal  has  been  reached.  Anybody  who 
is  threatened  as  we  are  threatened,  and  is  fighting  for 
his  highest  possessions,  can  only  have  one  thought — 
how  he  is  to  hack  his  way  through. ' ,30 

The  efforts  of  the  German  diplomats  to  persuade 

29  Belgian  Gray  Book,  Nos.  20,  21 ;  British  Correspondence,  No.  153. 
so  The  Times,  August  11,  1914. 


282    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Great  Britain  to  stand  aside,  which  in  any  event  could 
hardly  have  been  expected  to  succeed,  were  completely 
frustrated  by  the  military  designs  of  the  German 
staff.  The  invasion  of  Belgium  was  contrary  to  a 
solemn  treaty  guaranteed  by  Great  Britain  which  both 
Conservative  and  Liberal  statesmen  felt  bound  to 
protect.  Belgium  had  been  the  special  protege  of 
Gladstone,  and  even  that  advocate  of  a  pacific  policy 
had  expressed  clearly  his  feeling  that  Belgian  neu- 
trality must  be  maintained  at  all  costs.  If  it  was  a 
matter  of  life  and  death  to  Germany's  military  success 
that  she  should  advance  through  Belgium,  so  it  was, 
in  the  opinion  of  British  statesmen,  a  "  matter  of  life 
and  death  for  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  that  she 
should  keep  her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost 
to  defend  Belgium's  neutrality,  if  attacked.  That 
solemn  compact  simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what 
confidence  could  anyone  have  in  engagements  given 
by  Great  Britain  in  the  future  Vm 

Nor  was  it  merely  a  question  of  honor  for  Great 
Britain,  but  also  one  of  vital  security.  The  control 
of  Belgium  by  Germany  meant  that  she  would  acquire 
naval  bases  of  inestimable  value  in  time  of  war,  which 
might  be  used  either  for  attacks  upon  British  shipping 
or  for  launching  an  invasion  against  the  east  coast 
of  England.  Should  portions  of  the  French  coast  fall 
into  German  hands  during  the  war  and  be  retained 
at  its  close,  Germany  would  have  what  she  so  ardently 
desired,  ports  on  the  open  sea  with  all  the  advantages 
they  would  give  her  in  the  commercial  competition 
with  Great  Britain. 

It  is  true  that  Germany  had  promised  to  respect 
the  territorial  integrity  of  Belgium,  but  in  the  event 

*i  British  Correspondence,  No.  160. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  283 

of  a  successful  war  she  could  not  be  held  to  that 
promise.  She  would  even  have  the  legal  right  to 
break  it,  for  Belgium,  if  she  had  quietly  permitted 
the  German  violation  of  her  neutrality  would  have 
forfeited  her  right  to  independence,  which  had  been 
guaranteed  her  only  on  the  condition  of  her  perpetual 
neutrality  and  with  the  assumption  that  she  would 
do  all  in  her  power  to  preserve  it.  Germany's  promise 
to  withdraw  ultimately,  made  at  the  very  moment 
when  she  was  violating  a  solemn  treaty,  seemed  to 
indicate  that  the  German  diplomats  were  possessed 
of  a  peculiar  sense  of  cynical  humor  or  of  extraor- 
dinary confidence  in  British  naivete.  And  British 
statesmen  could  not  escape  the  conviction  that  if  they 
peacefully  accepted  the  German  invasion  of  Belgium, 
they  would  be  surrendering  in  the  twentieth  century 
all  that  England  had  fought  and  risked  her  existence 
for,  in  the  sixteenth  and  eighteenth  centuries. 

On  August  3,  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
Belgium  delivered  her  reply  to  the  German  demand 
and  expressed  her  resolve  to  repulse  by  every  means 
in  her  power  any  attack  upon  her  rights.32  Later  in 
the  day  German  troops  having  crossed  the  frontier, 
the  King  of  the  Belgians  sent  to  England  an  appeal 
for  diplomatic  intervention.83  On  the  following  day, 
Great  Britain,  with  her  national  honor  and  vital 
interests  at  stake,  protested  to  the  German  Govern- 
ment, and  Sir  Edward  Grey  sent  word  to  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  hand  in  what  was  practically 
an  ultimatum :  he  was  again  to  ask  for  German  assur- 
ances that  Belgian  neutrality  would  be  respected  and 
warn  the  German  Government  that  if  a  satisfactory 

32  Belgian  Gray  Book,  No.  22. 

83  British  Correspondence,  No.  153 ;  Belgian  Gray  Boole,  No.  25. 


284    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

reply  were  not  received  by  midnight,  he  would  ask  for 
his  passports;  Great  Britain  was  determined  to  take 
all  steps  in  her  power  to  uphold  the  treaty  to  which 
both  she  and  Germany  were  parties.34 

As  might  have  been  expected,  Germany  refused  to 
give  the  required  assurances ;  her  troops  were  already 
being  despatched  across  the  Belgian  border,  and  the 
plans  of  her  military  staff  could  not  at  that  moment 
be  altered  for  diplomatic  reasons.  At  midnight  of 
August  4,  Great  Britain  thus  entered  the  war. 

Although  the  German  diplomats  must  have  realized 
that  the  invasion  of  Belgium  almost  certainly  meant 
the  intervention  of  Great  Britain,  it  was  with  undoubt- 
edly sincere  emotion  that  they  saw  their  hopes  of 
keeping  her  out  of  the  conflict  shattered.  Nor  could 
they  conceal  the  bitterness  of  their  disappointment. 
"Just  for  a  word — neutrality — ,"  said  the  German 
Chancellor,  "a  word  which  in  war-time  had  been  so 
often  disregarded — just  for  a  scrap  of  paper,  Great 
Britain  was  going  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation 
who  desired  nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with 
her. ' '  '  '  What  Great  Britain  had  done, ' '  he  continued, 
"was  unthinkable;  it  was  like  striking  a  man  from 
behind  while  he  was  fighting  for  his  life  against  two 
assailants. ' ,35 

There  is  no  gainsaying  the  fact  that  the  emotion 
of  the  German  diplomats  was  justified,  for  the 
entrance  of  Great  Britain  into  the  war  changed  its 
character  materially,  and  affected  vitally  Germany's 
chances  of  success.  The  violation  of  Belgian  neutral- 
ity was  thus  a  great  diplomatic  blunder ;  for  if  British 
statesmen  had  decided  to  intervene  in  the  war  purely 

s*  British  Correspondence,  No.  159. 
85  British  Correspondence,  No.  160 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  285 

for  the  defence  of  France,  they  would  have  been 
supported  by  far  less  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  the 
British  people  than  was  aroused  by  the  German 
attack  on  Belgium.  Germany  thus  provided  Great 
Britain  with  an  occasion  for  the  intervention  which  in 
any  event  was  demanded  by  British  interests. 

But  if  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  was  a 
diplomatic  blunder,  it  was  one  that  could  hardly  have 
been  avoided,  nor  can  the  German  diplomats  be  held 
responsible.  For,  as  von  Jagow  pointed  out,  Ger- 
many's sole  hope  for  success  in  a  war  against  Russia 
and  France  lay  in  a  speedy  invasion  of  France,  which 
could  be  carried  out  only  through  Belgium.  The 
Germans  "had  to  advance  into  France  by  the  quickest 
and  easiest  way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead 
with  their  operations  and  endeavor  to  strike  some 
decisive  blow  as  early  as  possible.  It  was  a  matter 
of  life  and  death  for  them,  as  if  they  had  gone  by 
the  more  southern  route,  they  could  not  have  hoped, 
in  view  of  the  paucity  of  roads  and  the  strength  of 
the  fortresses,  to  have  gone  through  without  formid- 
able opposition  entailing  great  loss  of  time.  This 
loss  of  time  would  have  meant  time  gained  by  the 
Russians  for  bringing  up  their  troops  to  the  German 
frontier.  Rapidity  of  action  was  the  great  German 
asset,  while  that  of  Russia  was  an  inexhaustible  supply 
of  troops."36 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  participation  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  war  was  thus  the  inevitable 
result  of  Germany's  forcing  of  war  upon  Russia  and 
France.  The  aggressive  character  of  her  diplomacy 
all  through  the  crisis  of  1914  resulted  with  almost 
equal  directness  from  the  policy  she  had  followed 

3«  British  Correspondence,  No.  160. 


286    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

since  1871.  Bismarck  had  believed  in  the  necessity 
of  German  hegemony  on  the  Continent,  and  had 
maintained  that  hegemony  by  means  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  until  his  downfall.  The  Kaiser  William  II 
was  equally  determined  to  maintain  the  position  that 
Bismarck  had  won  for  Germany,  and  largely  succeeded 
in  so  doing  for  the  first  ten  years  of  his  reign.  But 
the  reconciliation  of  France  with  Italy  and  Great 
Britain,  and  the  termination  of  Anglo-Russian  hos- 
tility which  culminated  in  the  formation  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  unquestionably  threatened,  if  it  did  not 
destroy,  Germany's  position  of  primacy.  Hence  the 
attempts  made  to  reinforce  German  prestige  in  1905, 
1908,  and  1911.  Hence  also  in  large  measure,  the 
determined  attitude  of  Germany  in  1914,  which  was 
also  actuated  by  her  desire  to  readjust  the  Balkan 
settlement  of  the  previous  year.  Germany  believed 
that  the  time  had  come  definitely  to  settle  two  ques- 
tions :  the  one  related  to  general  policy,  the  second  to 
her  aspirations  in  the  Near  East.  She  must  reaffirm 
her  continental  position,  the  necessary  foundation 
of  her  world  policy;  she  must  also  destroy  Slavic 
influence  in  the  Balkans,  so  as  to  reopen  the  path  to 
Constantinople  and  Mesopotamia. 

As  to  the  moral  justification  for  the  uncompromising 
tone  assumed  by  Germany  in  the  crisis  of  1914,  a 
completely  unbiassed  verdict  can  hardly  be  rendered 
by  our  generation.  Without  question  the  extraordi- 
nary growth  of  German  population  and  the  resulting 
development  of  German  industry  forced  a  natural 
expansion  of  commerce  and  led  to  the  demand  for 
a  protecting  navy.  It  was  inevitable,  given  the 
German  mentality,  which  has  been  dominated  by 
Prussia  in  recent  years,  that  there  should  follow  a 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  BREAK  ^87 


7 


demand  for  political  influence  in  the  world  at  large, 
proportionate  to  the  commercial  influence  exercised 
by  Germany. 

The  moral  right  of  the  German  nation  to  such 
political  influence  can  hardly  be  determined.  The  fact 
to  remember,  if  we  would  explain  to  ourselves  the 
origin  of  the  conflict,  is  that  the  Germans  sincerely 
believed  that  they,  as  well  as  the  nations  first  in  the 
field,  had  a  right  to  world  empire,  and,  if  they  were 
capable  of  seizing  it,  to  supreme  world  empire.  It 
was  because  political  primacy  on  the  Continent  seemed 
the  essential  basis  of  Germany's  world  empire  that 
she  was  determined  to  give  the  law  to  Europe  in  1914, 
either  by  diplomacy  or  by  war. 


<T. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  brief  bibliography  that  follows  is  designed 
merely  to  introduce  the  lay  reader  to  the  more 
interesting  and  important  books  on  recent  aspects  of 
European  diplomacy;  it  makes  no  pretence  of  giving 
a  complete  list  of  authorities.  An  effort  has  been 
made  to  select  books  which  are  easy  of  access  and, 
so  far  as  possible,  books  published  in  English  are 
preferred. 

Chapter  I 

Introduction 

There  is  no  book  in  English  that  covers  fully  the  general 
diplomatic  history  of  Europe  from  1870  to  the  present  time. 
For  the  most  important  aspects  of  international  relations 
the  general  histories  may  be  consulted;  see  especially,  The 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XII;  Hazen,  Europe  since 
1815;  Hawkesworth,  The  Last  Century  in  Europe;  Seignobos, 
History  of  Contemporary  Europe;  Rose,  The  Development 
of  the  European  Nations;  Andrews,  Contemporary  Europe, 
Asia,  and  Africa;  Gooch,  History  of  our  Time.  The  annuals 
published  in  the  different  countries  give  a  resume  of  the  most 
significant  events,  year  by  year;  the  most  important  are  the 
Annual  Register;  Viallate,  La  Tie  politique  dans  les  deux 
mondes;  Schiemann,  Deutschland  und  die  grosse  Politik. 
See  also  Driault,  Le  Monde  actuel  (1909).  Books  of  especial 
value  on  general  diplomatic  history  are,  Debidour,  Histoire 
diplomatique;  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances;  Fullerton, 
Problems  of  Power;  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige 
Politik;  and  Rose,  The  Origins  of  the  War.    For  the  estab- 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  289 

lishment  of  united  Germany,  see  Denis,  La  Fondation  de 
V Empire  allemand;  Sybel,  The  Founding  of  the  German 
Empire;  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen  (Bismarck) ;  Valfrey, 
Eistoire  du  Traite  de  Francfort;  Marcks,  Das  Zeitalter  des 
Kaisers  Wilhelm  I. 

Chapter  II 

Bismarck  and  the  Triple  Alliance 

For  the  policy  of  Bismarck,  see  Bismarck:  His  Reflections 
and  Reminiscences  (translated  by  A.  J.  Butler),  which 
should,  however,  be  used  with  caution  and  preferably  should 
be  checked  by  the  critical  studies  of  Ehrich  Marcks;  consult 
also,  Busch,  Prince  Bismarck  (Busch  was  the  Chancellor's 
secretary) ;  Matter,  Bismarck  et  son  Temps,  Vol.  Ill  (a  clear 
account  embodying  the  French  point  of  view) ;  Lowe,  Prince 
Bismarck;  and  Oncken,  Das  Zeitalter  des  Kaisers  Wilhelm  I, 
Vol.  III.  On  the  relations  between  France  and  Germany, 
Thiers,  Notes  et  Souvenirs,  Correspondence  relative  a  la 
Liberation  du  Territoire;  Gavard,  Le  Proces  dfArnim; 
Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France;  Broglie,  Le  Due  de 
Gontaut-Biron  a  Berlin.  For  the  war  scare  of  1875,  Blowitz, 
Memoirs.  For  the  relations  of  Germany,  Russia,  and  Austria, 
Beust,  Memoirs,  Vol.  II;  Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy; 
Beer,  Die  orientalische  Politik  Oesterreichs;  Bourgeois, 
Manuel  historique  de  Politique  Etrangere,  Vol.  III.  For 
Italian  policy,  Crispi,  Memoirs;  Feiling,  Italian  Policy  since 
1870  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Chapter  III 

Consult  especially  Daudet,  Histoire  diplomatique  de 
V Alliance  franco-russe,  the  main  facts  in  which  are  sum- 
marized in  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  Chapter  I. 
For  the  policy  of  William  II,  Reventlow,  Deutschlands 
auswdrtige  Politik  and  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor's 
Speeches.     See    also    Hansen,    L'Ambassade   du   Baron    de 


290    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Mohrenheim;  Adam,  Apres  V Abandon  de  la  Revanche; 
Rambaud,  Histoire  de  Russie  and  Jules  Ferry;  Berard,  La 
France  et  Guillaume  II;  Hippeau,  Histoire  diplomatique  de 
la  troisieme  Republique;  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne; 
Prince  Chlodwig  of  Hohenlohe,  Memoirs. 


Chapter  IV 

German  World  Policy:  Economic  Factors 

The  statistics  of  German  industry  and  commerce  are  pub- 
lished in  the  various  trade  reports  and  summarized  in 
Statesman's  Year  Booh,  in  Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur  den 
Deutschen  Reich,  and  briefly  in  61st  Congress,  2d  Session, 
Senate  Documents,  No.  578;  German  success  in  commerce  is 
strikingly  portrayed  by  the  British  Consular  Reports. 
Dawson,  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany,  gives  a  com- 
prehensive and  authoritative  survey  of  German  development ; 
see  also  Schierbrand,  Germany;  J.  Ellis  Barker,  Modern 
Germany;  Collier,  Germany  and  the  Germans  (readable,  but 
based  on  hasty  observations  and  conclusions) ;  Lair,  L'lmpe- 
rialisme  allemande;  Hubert,  L} 'Effort  allemand.  The  signifi- 
cance of  Germany's  economic  development  in  its  relation 
to  her  diplomatic  policy  is  clearly  exposed  in  von  Billow's 
Imperial  Germany,  the  study  of  which  is  essential  to  an 
understanding  of  the  German  attitude.  See  also  Rohrbach, 
German  World  Policies;  Andrillon,  LyExpansion  de  V Alle- 
magne; and  Fraser,  The  Short  Cut  to  India.  On  German 
colonies,  Keller,  "Beginnings  of  German  Colonisation  and 
Colonial  Policy,7 '  Yale  Review,  x,  30;  xi,  390;  xii,  57. 

Chapter  V 

German  World  Policy  :  Moral  Factors 

See  the  works  of  von  Biilow  and  Dawson  cited  for  the 
previous  chapter.  An  exhaustive  study  of  the  German  men- 
tality in  its  relation  to  the  growth  of  the  German  nation  is 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  291 

to  be  found  in  Lichtenberger,  L'Allemagne  moderne.  Con- 
sult also  Rohrbach,  Deutschland  unter  den  Weltvblkern  and 
German  World  Policies;  Cramb,  Germany  and  England; 
Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War;  Usher,  Pan-Ger- 
manism; Andrillon,  L' Expansion  de  VAllemagne;  Sarolea, 
The  Anglo-German  Problem;  Von  der  Goltz,  La  Nation 
armee  (Fr.  trans.) ;  Elkind,  The  German  Emperor's 
Speeches;  Gauss,  The  German  Emperor  as  shown  in  his 
Public  Utterances;  Emery,  "German  Economics  and  the 
War,"  in  Yale  Review,  January,  1915;  and  Abbott,  "Ger- 
many and  the  Prussian  Propaganda/'  Yale  Review,  July, 
1915.  On  Treitschke,  see  Davis,  The  Political  Thought  of 
Eeinrich  von  Treitschke;  Hausrath,  Treitschke;  Go  wans, 
Selections  from  Treitschkefs  Lectures  on  Politics;  Hadley, 
"The  Political  Teachings  of  Treitschke/'  in  Yale  Review, 
January,  1915;  Ernest  Barker,  Nietszche  and  Treitschke 
(Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Chapter  VI 

British  Foreign  Policy 

For  British  imperial  policy,  see  Dilke,  Problems  of  Greater 
Britain  and  The  British  Empire;  Lucas,  Historical  Geography 
of  the  British  Empire;  Zimmerman,  Die  Europaische 
Kolonien;  Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu,  La  Colonisation  chez  les 
Peuples  modernes;  Berard,  British  Imperialism  (trans. 
Foskett) ;  Cromer,  Modern  Egypt;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  the 
Second  Earl  Granville;  Roberts,  Forty-one  Years  in  India; 
Blunt,  With  Gordon  at  Khartoum.  For  the  rivalry  with 
France,  Picquet,  La  Colonisation  francaise  dans  VAfrique 
du  Nord  and  Campagnes  d'Afrique.  For  the  Far  Eastern 
struggle,  Douglas,  Europe  and  the  Far  East;  Driault,  La 
Question  d' extreme  Orient;  Pinon,  La  Lutte  pour  la  Paci- 
fique;  Berard,  La  Revolt e  de  VAsie;  Skrine,  The  Expansion  of 
Russia;  Kuropatkin,  "Revelations,"  in  McClure's  Magazine, 
September,  1908. 


292    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

Chapter  VII 

The  Diplomatic  Revolution 

For  French  policy,  see  Millet,  Politique  Exterieure,  1898- 
1905;  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik;  Mevil, 
De  la  Paix  de  Franc  fort  a  la  Conference  d'Algesiras; 
Despagnet,  La  Diplomatic  de  la  troisieme  Republique  et  le 
Droit  des  Gens.  For  the  relations  of  France  and  Italy,  Billot, 
La  France  et  Vltalie;  Pinon,  L' Empire  de  la  M edit err anee; 
Feiling,  Italian  Policy  since  1870.  For  the  Franco-British 
understanding,  Barclay,  Thirty  Years'  Anglo-French  Remin- 
iscences; Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances  and  Questions 
diplomatiques  de  VAnnee  1904;  Jaray,  La  Politique  franco- 
anglaise;  Darcy,  La  France  et  V Angleterre.  For  the  texts 
of  the  conventions,  Albin,  Les  grands  Traites  politiques; 
Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne. 


Chapter  VIII 

The  Conflict  of  Alliances 

For  an  excellent  resume  of  the  diplomatic  conflict,  consult 
Albin,  La  Querelle  franco-allemande:  Le  Coup  d'Agadir. 
On  the  crisis  of  1905  the  chief  authority  is  Tardieu,  La 
Conference  d'Algesiras;  see  also  Morel,  Morocco  in  Diplo- 
macy; Berard,  L' Affaire  marocaine;  Albin,  Les  grands 
Traites  politiques;  and  the  speeches  of  von  Biilow  in  the 
Reichstag.  On  the  crisis  of  1908,  see  Tardieu,  Le  Prince  de 
Billow  and  the  works  suggested  for  Chapter  IX.  On  the 
crisis  of  1911,  Tardieu,  Le  Mystere  d'Agadir;  the  works  of 
Albin  referred  to;  Schiemann,  Deutschland  und  die  grosse 
Politik,  1911;  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswartige  Politik; 
Turner,  "The  Morocco  Crisis  of  1911,"  in  South  Atlantic 
Quarterly,  January,  1912. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  293 

Chapters  IX  and  X 

The  Near  Eastern  Question  and  the  Balkan  Wars 

For  these  chapters  the  chief  general  authorities  are: 
Driault,  La  Question  dy  Orient,  Bamberg,  Geschicte  der 
orientalischen  Angelegenheit,  Landemont,  L'Europe  et  la 
Politique  orientate,  Beer,  Die  orientalische  Politik  Oester- 
reichs,  Pinon,  L'Europe  et  V Empire  Ottoman,  Urquhart, 
The  Eastern  Question  (Oxford  Pamphlets).  See  also  Bar- 
bulesco,  Relations  des  Roumains  avec  les  Serbes,  les  Bulgares, 
les  Grecs  et  la  Croatie  en  liaison  avec  la  question  macedo- 
serbe,  and  Geffcken,  Frankreich,  Russland  und  der  Dreibund. 
Important  articles  dealing  with  the  earlier  aspects  of  the 
Eastern  Question  are  to  be  found  in  the  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes:  December,  1876,  '  *  Panslavisme, ' '  by  Leroy-Beau- 
lieu;  October,  December,  1878,  "Les  evolutions  du  probleme 
orientale,"  by  Klaczko;  July,  1880,  ' * L 'Angleterre  et  la 
Russie  en  Orient, ■ '  by  Laveleye.  On  Germany 's  Near  Eastern 
Policy  there  are  excellent  chapters  in  Sarolea,  The  Anglo- 
German  Problem,  and  Rose,  The  Origins  of  the  War.  Most 
important  are  Rohrbach,  Die  Bagdadbahn,  and  Cheradame, 
Le  Chemin  de  Per  de  Bagdad.  On  the  Young  Turks,  Ramsay, 
The  Revolution  in  Constantinople  and  Turkey;  Berard, 
La  Revolution  Turque,  and  La  mort  de  Stamboid;  Pinon, 
Lf Europe  et  la  Jeune  Turquie.  On  the  Turkish  Italian  "War, 
McClure,  Italy  in  North  Africa,  Barclay,  The  Turco-Italian 
War  and  its  Problems.  On  the  wars  of  1912-1913,  Schurman, 
The  Balkan  Wars;  Gueshoff,  The  Balkan  League.  The  clear- 
est statement  in  English  of  the  Near  Eastern  problem  in  its 
most  recent  aspects  is  to  be  found  in  Gibbons,  The  New  Map 
of  Europe. 

Chapters  XI  and  XII 

The  Crisis  of  1914  and  the  Diplomatic  Break 

For  these  chapters  the  reader  should  consult  the  documents 
published  by  the  various  Governments,  especially  the  German 


294    DIPLOMATIC  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

White  Book,  the  British  White  Papers,  the  Russian  Orange 
Book,  the  French  Yellow  Book,  the  Belgian  Gray  Book,  and 
the  Austrian  Red  Book.  The  chief  documents  together  with 
important  treaties  of  preceding  years  are  published  in  Price, 
Diplomatic  History  of  the  War.  An  unbiassed  analysis  of 
the  documents  is  to  be  found  in  Stowell,  The  Diplomacy  of 
the  War.  The  German  White  Book  gives  the  official  justi- 
fication for  German  diplomacy ;  the  most  skillful  presentation 
of  the  German  case  is  Schiemann,  Deutschland  und  die  grosse 
Politik,  1914.  The  opposite  point  of  view  is  developed  in 
Durkheim  and  Denis,  Qui  a  voulu  la  Guerre  (a  detailed  and 
scientific  analysis) ;  Dillon,  A  Scrap  of  Paper  (valuable 
because  of  the  author's  special  sources  of  information) ; 
Beck,  The  Evidence  in  the  Case;  Rose,  The  Origins  of  the 
War.  See  also  Headlam,  The  History  of  Twelve  Days.  On 
the  question  of  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  see  Descamps,  La 
Neutralite  de  la  Belgique;  Weiss,  La  Violation  de  la  Neu- 
trality beige;  Von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  View.  The 
New  York  Times  Current  History  of  the  War  has  published 
the  gist  of  the  official  and  newspaper  comment  upon  the 
crisis  on  both  sides. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abbott,  291. 

Abdul  Hamid,  Sultan  of  Turkey, 
210,  211  j  deposed,  212. 

Abyssinia,  Italian  penetration 
into,  144. 

Adam,  290. 

Adowa,  Italian  defeat,  145,  218. 

Adrianople,  invested  by  Bulga- 
rians, 228;  captured,  230. 

Afghanistan,  threatened  by  Rus- 
sia, 123,  124;  influence  of  Great 
Britain  in  recognized  by  Eussia, 
161. 

Agadir,  crisis  of  1911,  187,  sq. 

Agriculture,  intensive,  in  Ger- 
many, 64. 

Albania,  Italian  ambitions  in,  145, 
231;  revolt  in,  223;  interests  of 
Powers  in,  231;  independence 
of,  232. 

Albin,  292. 

Aleppo,  203. 

Alexander  II,  Tsar  of  Russia,  af- 
fection for  William  I,  17;  inter- 
view with  Francis  Joseph  and 
William  I,  19;  attitude  towards 
France,  20;  pacific  influence  of 
in  1875,  24,  43. 

Alexander  III,  Tsar  of  Russia,  45. 

Alexander  of  Serbia,  murdered, 
249. 

Alexandretta,  203. 

Alexandria,  revolt  in,  118. 

Algeciras,  Conference  of,  174,  175. 

Alsace-Lorraine,  taken  from 
France,  9;  effects  of  annexation, 
14,  21;  closed  to  French  citi- 
zens, 46. 


Andrassy,  leader  of  Magyar 
party,  18;  understanding  with 
Bismarck,  19;  attitude  towards 
League  of  Three  Emperors,  20; 
understanding  with  Russia,  25. 

Andrews,  288. 

Andrillon,  290,  291. 

Anglo-French  Convention  of  1904, 
see  Entente  .Cordiale. 

Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  1902, 
131. 

Anglo-Russian  Convention  of  1907, 
161,  162. 

Arabi  Pasha,  leads  rebellion  in 
Egypt,  118. 

Asquith,  British  Premier,  on  Ger- 
many's Moroccan  policy,  188. 

Austria,    defeated   by    Prussia    in 

1866,  8;  relations  with  Prussia 
after   1866,   17;    compromise  of 

1867,  18;  understanding  with 
Russia,  19;  interests  in  Near 
East,  25,  200,  201;  attitude 
towards  Treaty  of  San  Stefano, 
27;  takes  administration  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  28, 
177;  clash  of  interests  with 
Russia,  28;  alliance  with  Ger- 
many, 30;  attitude  towards 
Italy,  33;  Triple  Alliance,  35; 
attitude  at  Conference  of  Alge- 
ciras, 175;  annexes  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  179,  213;  disre- 
gards Russian  protests,  180; 
effect  of  Young  Turk  Revolu- 
tion upon,  213;  interests  in 
Albania,  231;  attitude  towards 
Treaty   of    Bukarest,    238,    239, 


298 


INDEX 


240;  position  in  1914,  248; 
sends  note  to  Serbia,  254;  popu- 
lar desire  for  war,  257;  de- 
clares Serbian  reply  unsatisfac- 
tory, 259;  orders  mobilization, 
264,  265;  conciliatory  attitude, 
266,  267. 

Austrian  Bed  Book,  294. 

Austro-German  Alliance  of  1879, 
30. 

Avlona,  200. 

Bagdad  Railway,  87;  feared  by 
Great  Britain,  159;  not  opposed 
by  Russia,  183;  German  devel- 
opment of,  203,  204. 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  on  Afghanistan, 
124;  on  Edward  VII,  150,  151; 
on  German  policy,  189. 

Balkan  League,  formation  of,  225, 
226. 

Balkan  States  see,  Bulgaria,  Mon- 
tenegro, Rumania,  Serbia. 

Balkan  War  of  1912,  228,  sq. 

Balkan  War  of  1913,  234,  235,  236. 

Balkans,  interests  of  Powers  in, 
200,  sq.;  settlement  of  1912, 
230,  sq. ;  settlement  of  1913,  236, 
237;  attitude  of  Powers,  238. 
See  Near  East. 

Bamberg,  293. 

Banks,  in  Germany,  growth  of 
activities,  67. 

Barbulesco,  293. 

Barclay,  Sir  Thomas,  works  for 
understanding  between  England 
and  France,  151,  292,  293. 

Barker,  Ellis,  290. 

Barker,  Ernest,  291. 

Barnardiston,  279  n. 

Bavaria,  jealousy  of  Prussia,  8, 
13  n. 

Beaconsfield,  Lord,  see  Disraeli. 

Beck,  294. 


Beer,  289. 

Belgian  Gray  Booh,  294. 

Belgium,  neutrality  guaranteed, 
278;  conversations  with  Great 
Britain,  279;  Germany  demands 
free  passage  through,  280;  rea- 
sons for  German  invasion  of, 
281,  285;  invaded  by  Germans, 
appeals  to  England,  283. 

Berard,  290,  291,  292,  293. 

Berchtold,  refuses  conversations 
with  Russia,  263;  conciliatory 
attitude  of,  266,  267. 

Berlin,  Congress  of,  28,  44. 

Berlin,  Treaty  of,  28,  17.7;  in- 
fringed by  Austrian  annexation 
of  Bosnia,  179. 

Bernhardi,  General  von,  on  Ger- 
man superiority,  97;  on  neces- 
sity of  war,  98  n;  on  blessing 
of  war,  105,  291. 

Berthallet,  71. 

Berthelot,   71. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  von,  German 
Chancellor,  proposition  to  Great 
Britain,  273,  274;  exposes  rea- 
son for  German  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium, 281. 

Beust,  Austrian  Chancellor,  hatred 
of  Prussia,  17,  289. 

Billot,  292. 

Bismarck,  accomplishes  German 
unity,  7-9;  pacific  policy  after 
1871,  11,  13,  166;  fear  of  coali- 
tion, 15;  desires  alliance  with 
Austria  and  Russia,  16-17;  op- 
position to  Beust,  18;  under- 
standing with  Andrassy,  19;  at- 
titude towards  France  after 
1871,  21;  threatening  language 
of,  23;  attitude  towards  Near 
Eastern  Question,  29,  201;  al- 
liance with  Austria,  30;  Triple 
Alliance,  35;   cultivates  Russian 


INDEX 


299 


friendship,  36-37,  45;  on  pos- 
sibility of  Franco-Russian  al- 
liance, 43;  tone  of  intimidation 
in  1888,  47;  dismissal  of,  49; 
on  Dual  Alliance,  53;  colonial 
policy,  81;  on  necessity  of  war, 
104  n;  on  Anglo-German  friend- 
ship, 133,  134  n,  135;  influence 
over  Crispi,  144;  end  of  his 
diplomatic  system,  165;  belief 
in  necessity  of  maintaining  Ger- 
man prestige,  167;  on  Belgian 
neutrality,  279. 

Bismarck  Archipelago,  German 
colony,  81. 

Blowitz,  journalist,  on  war  scare 
of  1875,  24,  289. 

Blunt,   291. 

Boer  War,  131,  136. 

Bokhara,  captured  by  Russia,  123. 

Bombay,  203. 

Bosnia,  revolt  of  1875  in,  26; 
administered  by  Austria,  28, 
177;  annexed  by  Austria,  179, 
213. 

Bosnian  crisis  of  1908,  179,  sq. 

Bosphorus,  10. 

Boulanger,  46. 

Bourgeois,  289. 

Brazil,  German  commercial  pene- 
tration into,  85. 

Bremen,  76;  Kaiser's  speech  at, 
96. 

British  foreign  policy,  see  Great 
Britain. 

British  White  Papers,  294. 

Broglie,  289. 

Bukarest,  Treaty  of,  236,  237; 
attitude  of  Powers  towards,  238, 
sq. 

Bulgaria,  becomes  autonomous,  28, 
196;  acquisition  of  Eastern 
Rumelia,  210;  ambitions  in 
Macedonia,  214;  effect  of  Young 


Turk  policy  upon,  215;  war  de- 
clared by  Turkey  upon,  227; 
campaign  in  Thrace,  228;  atti- 
tude towards  Balkan  settlement 
of  1912,  233,  234;  attacks 
Greece  and  Serbia,  234;  cam- 
paign of  1913,  235,  236;  atti- 
tude towards  Treaty  of  Buka- 
rest, 237. 

Biilow,  Prince  von,  on  growth  of 
German  trade,  76;  on  German 
navy,  78;  on  isolation  of  Ger- 
many, 109  n;  on  necessity  of 
maintaining  Germany's  position 
on  Continent,  169;  on  Franco- 
Italian  understanding  and 
Entente  Cordiale,  170  n,  176  n; 
on  Morocco  as  a  Machtfrage, 
172  n. 

Bunsen,  55. 

Burgess,  J.  W.,  on  Slavonic  dan- 
ger, 109  n. 

Burns,  John,  275. 

Busch,  289. 

Butler,  289. 

Caillaux,  French  Premier,  185. 

Caillaux  case,  252. 

Cambon,  Jules,  French  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin,  attempts  at  con- 
ciliation in  1914,  263. 

Cambon,  Paul,  French  Ambassa- 
dor at  St.  James,  anxious  for 
understanding  with  England, 
149. 

Cambridge  Modern  History,  288. 

Cameroons,  German  colony  in,  81, 
82;    acquisitions  in,  191. 

Canea,  revolt  in,  216. 

Canton,  126. 

Caprivi,  German  Chancellor,  atti- 
tude towards  Great  Britain,  135. 

Carlos,  King  of  Portugal,  1. 


300 


INDEX 


Caroline   Islands,   German   colony, 

82. 
Casablanca,  181. 

Cavour,   116. 

Central  East,  rivalry  of  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  in,  123,  124. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  on  German 
alliance,   138. 

Chatellerault,  French  arms  fac- 
tory, 51. 

Chatham,  Earl,  on  British  policy, 
155. 

Checkerboard  diplomacy,  41. 

Chemistry,  use  of  by  German  man- 
ufacturers, 70. 

Cheradame,  293. 

Cherbourg,  German  commercial 
success  in,  73. 

China,  commercial  penetration 
into,  127;  war  with  Japan,  128. 

Collier,  290. 

Combes,  French  Premier,  171. 

Commerce,  of  Germany,  growth 
of,  69;  factors  in  German  suc- 
cess, 70,  sq.;  competition  with 
British,  72,  73;  German  trade 
statistics,   75. 

Commerce,  of  Italy  with  France, 
146. 

Colonies,  of  Germany,  80,  sq. 

Constantine,  Crown  Prince  of 
Greece,  228. 

Constantinople,  coveted  by  Eussia, 
198. 

Cramb,  291. 

Crete,  215;  Young  Turk  policy  in, 
216,  217;  annexed  to  Greece, 
236. 

Crimean  War,  41,  123,  197. 

Crispi,  Italian  statesman,  policy, 
144;    resignation,   145,  289. 

Cromer,  291. 

Curzon,  Lord,  Persian  policy,  125. 


Damascus,  203. 

Daneff,  234. 

Danube,  trade  of,  200. 

Darcy,  292. 

Dardanelles,  closed  to  ships  of 
war,  123;  control  of  coveted  by 
Eussia,  199;  Austrian  interest 
in  control  of,  201. 

Daudet,  289. 

Davis,  291. 

Dawson,  290. 

Debidour,  288. 

Delcasse,  French  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, 141;  aims  and  career,  142- 
143 ;  arranges  understanding 
with  Italy,  146-147;  desires  un- 
derstanding with  England,  148; 
Entente  Cordiale,  156;  effects 
of  his  policy,  157,  158;  resigna- 
tion forced  in  1905,  174;  re- 
enters French  cabinet,  184; 
member  of  Caillaux  Ministry, 
185. 

Denis,  289,  294. 

Derby,  Lord,  pacific  influence  in 
1875,  24. 

Dernburg,  German  Colonial  Secre- 
tary, 83. 

Descamps,  294. 

Despagnet,  292. 

Deutsche  Bank,  growth,  66;  sup- 
ports Bagdad  Eailway  scheme, 
203. 

Dilke,  291. 

Dillon,  294. 

Diplomatic  revolution,  140,  sq. 

Disraeli,  at  Congress  of  Berlin, 
123,  197;  policy  in  Central 
East,  124. 

Dogger     Bank,     British     trawlers 

sunk  by  Eussian  fleet,  132,  160. 

Donnersmarck,      Prince      Henckel 

von,     demands     resignation     of 

DelcassS,  173. 


INDEX 


301 


Douglas,  291. 

Draga,  murder  of,  249. 

Drake,   277. 

Driault,  288,  291,  293. 

Dual  Alliance,  of  France  and 
Russia,  3;  events  leading  up  to, 
49,  sq.;  effects  of,  53,  sq.,  141. 

Dual  Control,  of  France  and 
Great  Britain  in  Egypt,  118. 

Durazzo,  232. 

Durkheim,  294. 

Edward  VII,  King  of  England, 
149;  character  and  policy,  150; 
visit  to  Paris,  156;  interview 
of  Eeval  with  Nicholas  II,  211. 

Egypt,  British  and  French  inter- 
ests in,  117,  sq.;  Fashoda  crisis, 
121;  British  position  recog- 
nized by  France,  156. 

Elizabeth,  Empress  of  Austria,  1. 

Elkind,  289,  291. 

Emery,  291. 

Emigration,  from  Germany,  dis- 
couraged, 65. 

England,  see  Great  Britain. 

Enos,  230,  236. 

Entente  Cordiale,  conditions  lead- 
ing up  to,  148-155;  arranged, 
156;  effects,  157,  158;  attitude 
of  Germany  towards,   170,  171. 

Enver  Bey,  229. 

Eritrea,  Italian  colony,  144. 

Essad  Pasha,  in  Albania,  232. 

Euphrates  River,  202. 

Far  East,  Russian  advance  in, 
126;  British  interest  in,  126; 
Chinese- Japanese  War,  128;  in- 
terests of  Powers  in,  129,  130; 
Russo-Japanese  War,  132. 

Fashoda,  119,  120;  crisis  result- 
ing from,  121. 

Favre,  Jules,  33. 


Feiling,  289,  292. 

Ferry,  Jules,  colonial  policy,  34, 
35;  resignation,  46. 

Fez,  occupied  by  French,  184. 

Fitzmaurice,  Lord  Edmond,  135, 
291. 

Floquet,  42  n. 

Force,  necessity  of  emphasized  by 
German  economists,  100,  101; 
Treitschke  upon,  103. 

Formosa,  acquired  by  Japan,  128. 

France,  defeated  by  Germany  in 
1870,  9;  revenge  spirit  in,  14; 
attitude  towards  Germany,  22; 
attitude  towards  Italy,  33; 
occupies  Tunis,  35;  isolation  of 
after  1882,  36;  necessity  of  ally 
in  East  for,  39,  40;  relations 
with  Russia  previous  to  1878, 
41,  42;  reinvigoration  of  na- 
tional policy,  46;  effect  of  Wil- 
liam II 's  accession  upon,  49; 
financial  assistance  to  Russia, 
51;  alliance  with  Russia,  52; 
understanding  with  Germany, 
58;  rivalry  with  Great  Britain 
in  Africa,  117,  sq.;  Fashoda 
crisis,  120,  121;  intervenes 
against  Japan,  128;  relations 
with  Italy,  143,  sq.;  understand- 
ings with  Italy,  146,  147;  de- 
sires understanding  with  Eng- 
land, 148;  Entente  Cordiale, 
156;  convention  with  Spain, 
157;  position  in  1905,  171; 
Morocco  crisis,  172-174;  accord 
of  1909  with  Germany,  183; 
expansive  activities  in  Morocco, 
184;  condition  of  in  1911,  185; 
Agadir  crisis,  187,  sq.;  attitude 
towards  Bagdad  Railway,  204; 
believed  by  Germany  to  be  deca- 
dent in  1914,  252;  agrees  to 
conference  on  Serbian  question, 


302 


INDEX 


262;  orders  retirement  of  troops 
from  border,  271;  promises  to 
respect  Belgian  neutrality,  280. 

Francis  Joseph,  accepts  German 
unification  under  Prussia,  17; 
interviews  with  William  I,  19; 
attitude  towards  Italian  occu- 
pation of  Eome,  33. 

Franco-British  Convention  of  1904, 
see  Entente  Cordiale. 

Franco-German  Accord  of  1909, 
183. 

Franco-German  Accord  of  1911, 
191. 

Franco-German   War,    9,    10. 

Franco-Japanese  Convention  of 
1907,  162. 

Franco -Eussian  Alliance,  see  Dual 
Alliance. 

Franco-Spanish  Convention  of 
1904,  157. 

Frankfort,  Treaty  of,  9;  Thiers 
upon,  22. 

Franz  Ferdinand,  Austrian  arch- 
duke, assassinated,  1,  244. 

Fraser,  290. 

Frederick  Barbarossa,  5. 

Frederick  III,  German  Emperor, 
49. 

Frederick  William  IV,  King  of 
Prussia,  55. 

French  Yellow  Boole,  294. 

French  Eepublic,  proclaimed,  22. 

Fullerton,  288. 

Galicia,  Eussian  fear  of  Poles  in, 

19. 
Gambetta,  22. 
Gavard,  289. 
Geffcken,  293. 
George,  King  of  Greece,  1. 
George,    Prince    of    Greece,    High 

Commissioner  of  Crete,  216. 


German    foreign   policy,    see    Ger- 
many. 

German    Liberals,    fail    to    create 
united  Germany  in  1848,  6. 

German  White  Book,  294. 

German  world  policy,  see  Germany, 
World  policy. 

Germany,  creation  of  Empire,  4, 
9;  attempts  at  unity,  5-6;  diffi- 
culty of  fusing  different  states 
after  1871,  13;  inspires  fears 
of  smaller  states,  14;  war  spirit 
in  1875,  23;  alliance  with  Aus- 
tria, 30;  Triple  Alliance,  35; 
success  of  policy  after  1891, 
56;  understanding  with  France 
and  Eussia,  58;  diplomatic 
hegemony  after  1891,  60;  eco 
nomic  transformation  of,  62, 
sq. ;  growth  of  population  in, 
63;  intensive  agriculture  in,  64; 
shifting  of  population,  64; 
emigration  from  discouraged, 
65;  industry  in  previous  to 
1870,  65;  effect  of  unification 
upon,  66;  activities  of  banks, 
67;  mining  and  steel  industries, 
67;  growth  of  commerce,  69; 
factors  in  commercial  success, 
69,  sq.;  scientific  methods  in 
manufacturing  and  commerce, 
70;  adaptive  skill  of  Germans, 
71,  72;  successful  competition 
with  British,  73;  trade  statis- 
tics, 75;  mercantile  marine,  76, 
77;  growth  of  navy,  78;  colo- 
nies, 80,  sq.;  attitude  towards 
colonies,  82,  sq.;  commercial 
penetration  into  Brazil,  85;  in- 
to Central  East,  86,  sq.;  world 
policy  of,  88,  90,  sq.;  moral 
transformation  of,  89,  sq. ;  be- 
lief in  destiny,  95,  96;  belief 
in  superiority,  96,  97;   belliger- 


INDEX 


303 


ent  attitude  of,  99-106,  109, 
110,  111,  113;  belief  in  neces- 
sity of  force,  101;  belief  in 
blessing  of  war,  103-105;  con- 
tempt for  rivals,  107;  nervous- 
ness in  certain  quarters  of,  108, 
109;  fear  of  Slavonic  advance, 
109;  effect  of  new  attitude  of 
upon  other  Powers,  112,  113; 
conditions  on  which  success  of 
foreign  policy  of  depended,  115; 
intervenes  with  France  and 
Eussia  against  Japan,  128;  ac- 
quires Kiau  Chau,  130;  rela- 
tions with  Great  Britain,  133, 
sq.;  recognizes  British  preten- 
sions in  Egypt  and  Zanzibar, 
136;  treaties  of  1898  and  1899 
with  Great  Britain,  137;  sug- 
gested alliance  with  England, 
138 ;  diplomatic  hegemony, 
threatened  by  new  policy  of 
France,  147,  148,  158;  reasons 
for  change  in  German  attitude, 
168,  169;  attitude  towards 
Entente  Cordiale,  170,  171;  de- 
mands cessation  of  French  ex- 
pansion in  Morocco,  172;  de- 
mands resignation  of  Delcasse, 
173;  Conference  of  Algeciras, 
174;  supports  Austrian  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia,  180,  181,  182; 
accord  of  1909  with  France, 
183;  Potsdam  accord  of  1910, 
183;  despatch  of  Panther,  187; 
Agadir  crisis,  188-191;  position 
in  1914,  192;  interests  in  Near 
East,  201,  sq.;  plans  Bagdad 
Railway,  203,  204;  friendship 
with  Turkey,  207;  interests  in 
Balkans,  208;  attitude  toward 
Treaty  of  Bukarest,  240,  243, 
247;  attitude  toward  Austro- 
Serb  quarrel,  257,  258;   refuses 


conference,  262;  refuses  Sazon- 
off's  proposal,  264;  declares 
Kriegsgefahr  and  sends  ulti- 
matum to  Russia,  268;  declares 
war  on  Russia,  271;  declares 
war  on  France,  272;  proposition 
to  Great  Britain,  273,  274;  re- 
fuses to  promise  to  respect 
Belgian  neutrality,  280;  invades 
Belgium,  283;  reasons  for  in- 
vasion of  Belgium,  285. 

Gervais,  French  admiral,  visits 
Kronstadt,  52. 

Gibbons,  293. 

Giesebrecht,  on  superiority  of 
Germans,  96. 

Giesl,  Freiherr  von,  on  Serbian 
aspirations,  239  n. 

Giolitti,  240  n. 

Gladstone,  sends  Gordon  up  Nile, 
120;  policy  in  Central  East, 
124;  enters  into  special  treaties 
guaranteeing  Belgian  neutrality, 
278. 

Goltz,  von  der,  on  necessity  of 
war,  98;  reorganization  of  Turk- 
ish army,  208,  291. 

Gooch,  288. 

Gordon,  General,  massacred  at 
Khartoum,  120. 

Gortchakoff,  Russian  Chancellor, 
20;  animosity  towards  Bis- 
marck, 25,  29;  on  Congress  of 
Berlin,  29;  assistance  to  France 
in  1875,  44;  resignation,  37. 

Goschen,  Sir  W.  E.,  British  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  273. 

Gowans,  291. 

Granville,  Earl,  135. 

Great  Britain,  saves  Turkey  in 
1856,  26,  197;  attitude  towards 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  27;  un- 
derstanding with  Italy,  36;  com- 
merce  threatened   by   Germany, 


304 


INDEX 


73,  152,  sq.;  German  belief  in 
weakness  of,  107;  principles  of 
foreign  policy,  115,  116,  155; 
relations  with  France,  117,  sq.; 
purchase  of  Suez  Canal  shares, 
117;  position  in  Egypt,  118, 
119;  Fashoda  crisis,  120,  121; 
hostility  towards  France,  122; 
relations  with  Eussia,  122,  sq. ; 
rivalry  with  Eussia  in  Near  East, 
123,  196,  197;  interests  in  Cen- 
tral East,  124;  ambitions  in 
Thibet,  125;  interests  in  Far 
East,  126;  fear  of  Eussia,  131; 
alliance  with  Japan,  131;  hos- 
tility towards  Eussia,  132;  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  133,  sq.; 
cedes  Heligoland,  136;  treaties 
of  1898  and  1899,  137;  sug- 
gested alliance  with  Germany, 
138;  desires  understanding  with 
France,  150,  151;  fear  of  Ger- 
many, 152-155,  160;  Entente 
Cordiale,  156;  effects,  157,  158; 
fear  of  Germany  in  Near  East, 
159;  factors  in  reconciliation 
with  Eussia,  160;  Convention  of 
1907,  161,  162;  position  in 
1905,  172;  condition  of  in  1911, 
186;  crisis  of  1911,  189;  atti- 
tude towards  Near  Eastern 
Question,  199;  attitude  towards 
Bagdad  Eailway,  204;  believed 
by  Germany  to  be  weak  in  1914, 
252,  253;  suggests  compromise 
on  Austro-Serbian  question,  262; 
refuses  offer  of  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  274,  275;  attitude 
towards  Belgian  neutrality,  277, 
282,  283;  sends  ultimatum  to 
Germany,  283;  enters  war,  284. 

Great  Elector,  55,  99. 

Greece,  obtains  independence,  196; 
defeated    by    Turkey    in    1897, 


210,  216;  campaign  of  1912, 
228,  229;  alliance  with  Serbia, 
233;  campaign  of  1913,  234, 
235. 

Grevy,  President  of  France,  op- 
posed to  alliance  with  Eussia, 
42;  resignation,  46. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  on  British 
rights  in  Soudan,  121;  desire 
for  understanding  with  Eussia, 
161;  efforts  for  peace  in  1913, 
273;  on  Austro-Serb  quarrel, 
260;  attempts  conciliation,  262; 
refuses  offer  of  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  274,  275;  asks  France 
and  Germany  to  respect  Bel- 
gian neutrality,  280;  sends  ul- 
timatum to  Germany,  283. 

Gueshoff,  Bulgarian  statesman, 
234,  293. 

Hadley,  291. 

Hague  Convention  of  1907,  279. 

Haidar  Pasha,  203.  — 

Haldane,  Lord,  on  British  Empire, 
186;  pacific  attitude,  273  n,  275. 

Hamburg,  German  shipping  in,  77. 

Hamburg-American  Line,  growth 
of,  77. 

Hannover,  annexed  to  Prussia,  8. 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  French  Foreign 
Minister,  57;  attitude  towards 
Germany,  59;  on  French  rights 
in  Central  Africa,  121;  foreign 
policy,  142,  289. 

Hansen,  289. 

Hartmann,  on  superiority  of  Ger- 
mans, 97. 

Hausrath,  291. 

Hawkesworth,  288. 

Hazen,  288. 

Headlam,  294. 

Heine,  on  destiny  of  Germany,  95. 

Herzegovina,       administered       by 


INDEX 


305 


Austria,    28,    177;    annexed    by 

Austria,  179,  213. 
Hippeau,  290. 
Hohenlohe,  290. 
Holstein,  disposal  of  leads  to  war 

of     1864,    7;     incorporated    by 

Prussia,  8. 
Home    Eule,    for    Ireland,    effect 

upon    British   position   in    1911, 

186. 
Hong    Kong,    acquired    by    Great 

Britain,  126. 
Howard,  277. 
Hubert,  290. 

Humbert,  of  Italy,  1,  33. 
Hundred  Years'  War,  277. 

Industry,  in  Germany,  condition 
of  previous  to  1870,  65;  effect 
of  unification  of  Germany  upon, 
66;  mining  and  steel,  67;  indus- 
trial occupations,  68. 

Ireland,  prospects  of  civil  war  in, 
252,  255. 

Irredentism,  in  Italy,  32;  checked, 
34. 

Ischl,  interview  of  Francis  Joseph 
and  William  I,  19. 

Isvolsky,  .Russian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, desire  for  understanding 
with  England,  161. 

Italy,  unified  in  1870,  10;  rela- 
tions with  France  previous  to 
1870,  31;  hostility  towards  Aus- 
tria, 32;  ambitions  in  North 
Africa,  34;  Triple  Alliance,  35; 
understanding  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, 36;  relations  with  France 
after  1881,  143,  sq.;  Crispi's 
policy,  144;  understanding  with 
France,  146,  147;  attitude  at 
Conference  of  Algeciras,  174, 
175;  attitude  on  annexation  of 
Bosnia,    182;    declares    war    on 


Turkey,  219,  221;  interests  in 
Albania,  231;  agrees  to  confer- 
ence on  Austro-Serb  quarrel, 
262. 

Jagow,  von,  German  Foreign  Min- 
ister, 263,  269;  on  reasons  for 
German  invasion  of  Belgium, 
285. 

Janina,  captured,  230. 

Japan,  policy  of  isolation  aban- 
doned, 127;  war  with  China, 
128,  129;  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  131;  war  with  Russia, 
132;  Conventions  of  1907  with 
Russia  and  France,  162. 

Jaray,  292. 

Kaiser  Wilhelmsland,  German  col- 
ony, 81. 
Kant,  102. 

Karlsruhe,  Kaiser's  speech  at,  171. 
Kavalla,  acquired  by  Greece,  236. 
Keller,  290. 
Khartoum,  captured  by  Mahdists, 

120. 
Kiamil  Pasha,  229. 
Kiau  Chau,  acquired  by  Germany, 

82,  85. 
Kiel  Canal,  opened,  58. 
Kirk    Kiliss6,    defeat    of    Turks, 

228. 
Kitchener,     Lord,     at    Omdurman 

and  Fashoda,  119,  120. 
Klaczko,  293. 
Konia,  202. 
Korea,  independence  of  recognized, 

128. 
Koweit,  204. 
Kronstadt,   visit    of    French    fleet 

to,  52. 
Kruger,   telegram   of   William   II 

to,   136. 
Kulturkampf,  22. 


306 


INDEX 


Kum  Kal6,  forts  bombarded,  223. 
Kuropatkin,  291. 

Laboulaye,  French  diplomat,  works 
for  Russian  alliance,  51. 

Lair,  290. 

Landemont,  293. 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  succeeds  Lord 
Salisbury  as  British  Foreign 
Secretary,  149. 

Lausanne,  Treaty  of,  224. 

Laveleye,  293. 

Lavoisier,  71. 

League  of  the  Three  Emperors, 
character,  20;  dissolution,  21, 
25. 

Leroy-Beaulieu,  291,  293. 

Liao-Yang,  defeat  of  Russians, 
172. 

Lichtenberger,  291. 

Lloyd  George,  British  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer,  186;  on  Ger- 
many's Moroccan  policy,  188. 

London,  Treaty  of,  230. 

Loubet,  French  President,  156. 

Lowe,  289. 

Lucas,  291. 

Liideritz,  81. 

Lul6  Burgas,  defeat  of  Turks,  228. 

Luther,  upon  blessing  of  war,  104. 

Luxemburg,  invaded  by  Germany, 
281. 

McClure,  293. 

Macedonia,    Bulgarian     ambitions 

in,  214;  campaign  of,  1912,  228, 

229. 
Mach,  Dr.  von,  294. 
Magyars,     position     in     Austrian 

Empire,  18. 
Mahdi,  The,  120. 

Mahdists,  capture  Khartoum,  120. 
Mainz,  Kaiser's  speech  at,  171. 
Manchuria,    Russian    advance    in, 

130;   Russo-Japanese  War,   132. 


Marchand,  Captain,  at  Fashoda, 
119,  120. 

Marcks,  289. 

Maritime  Province,  acquired  by 
Russia,  126. 

Marshall  Islands,  German  colony, 
81. 

Massowah,  144. 

Matter,  289. 

Mazzini,  on  Italian  ambitions  in 
North  Africa,  34. 

Mecca,  203. 

Meisendorf,  von,  on  destiny  of 
Germany,  95. 

Menelek,  Abyssinian  Emperor,  145. 

Mercantile  marine,  of  Germany, 
growth,  76,  sq. 

Mesopotamia,  German  penetration 
into,  86,  202,  205. 

Metz,  taken  from  France,  22. 

Mevil,  292. 

Midia,  230. 

Millet,  292. 

Mining,  in  Germany,  growth  of, 
67. 

Moltke,  General  von,  8,  9;  attitude 
towards  France  in  1875,  23;  on 
blessing  of  war,  104. 

Monastir,  229,  233,  236. 

Monis,  French  Premier,  18*5. 

Montenegro,  declares  war  on 
Turkey,  227. 

Morel,  292. 

Morley,  Lord,  pacific  attitude,  275. 

Morocco,  French  position  in,  147; 
French  interests  in  recognized 
by  England,  156;  crisis  of  1905, 
172,  173;  Conference  of  Alge- 
ciras,  175;  Franco-German  Ac- 
cord of  1909,  183;  French  ex- 
pansion in,  184;  crisis  of  1911, 
187,  sq. 

Mukden,  defeat  of  Russians,   172. 


INDEX 


307 


Nanking,  Treaty  of,  126. 

Napoleon  I,  effect  on  German 
unity,  5;  on  position  of  Ant- 
werp, 277. 

Napoleon  III,  8. 

Narodna  Odbrana,  244;  dissolu- 
tion demanded  by  Austria,  256. 

Nationality,  principle  of,  violated 
in  1870,  10. 

Naval  estimates,  of  Germany,  79. 

Naval  League,  of  Germany,  80. 

Nazim  Pasha,  229. 

Near  East,  crisis  of  1875-1878,  26, 
sq.;  crisis  of  1887,  47;  German 
friendship  with  Turkey,  86,  207; 
rivalry  of  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  in,  123,  196,  197;  break- 
up of  Turkish  Empire,  195,  196 ; 
Eussian  interests  in,  198,  199; 
British  attitude  towards,  199; 
Austrian  interests  in,  200,  201; 
German  interests  in  201,  sq.; 
Young  Turk  Eevolution,  210, 
211,  212;  Bosnian  crisis  of  1908, 
179,  213;  Young  Turk  policy, 
215-219;  Italo-Turkish  War,  221, 
sq.;  Balkan  League,  225;  cam- 
paign  of  1912,  228,  229;  Treaty 
of  London,   230;    settlement  of 

1912,  230-233;   Balkan  War  of 

1913,  234,  235,  236;  settlement 
of  1913,  236,  237;  attitude  of 
Powers,  238,  sq. 

Near  Eastern  Question,  character, 
194,  sq.     See  Near  East. 

Nice,  monument  to  Garibaldi,  145. 

Nicholas  II,  Tsar  of  Russia,  Pots- 
dam interview  with  William  II, 
183;  interview  of  Reval  with 
Edward  VII,  211;  telegram  to 
William  II,  270. 

Nietzsche,  on  virtue  of  force,  102. 

Nihilists,  arrested  in  France,  51. 

North  German  Confederation,  8. 


North  German  Lloyd,  78. 

Novi  Bazar,  occupied  by  Austria, 
177;  right  of  military  occupa- 
tion in  renounced  by  Austria, 
213. 

Odessa,  198. 

Okhotsk,  founded  by  Russia,  125. 

Omdurman,       Kitchener       crushes 

Mahdists  at,  120. 
Opium  War,  126. 
Otto  the  Great,  5. 

Pan-Germanists,  colonial  schemes, 
85,  90,  110;  on  Conference  of 
Algeciras,  176. 

Pan-Slavism,  209,  232. 

Panther,  sent  to  Agadir,  187. 

Paris,  Treaty  of,  10,  26,  41. 

Paulsen  on  German  navy,  78  n. 

Perry,  Commodore,  visit  to  Japan, 
127. 

Persia,  Anglo-Russian  rivalry  in, 
124,  125;  delimited  by  Conven- 
tion of  1907,  161;  Russian  in- 
terests in  recognized  by  Ger- 
many, 183;  exclusion  of  Ger- 
many from,  241. 

Picquet,  291. 

Pinon,  290,  291,  292,  293. 

Pitt,  277. 

Poincarg,  President  of  France, 
255. 

Population,  of  Germany,  growth 
of,  62,  63;  shifting  of,  64. 

Port  Arthur,  acquired  by  Japan 
but  surrendered,  128. 

Potsdam  Accord  of  1910,  183,  241. 

Prague,  Treaty  of,  8,  17. 

Price,  294. 

Prussia,  war  with  Denmark,  7; 
war  with  Austria,  8,  war  with 
France,    9;    wins    Venetia    for 


308 


INDEX 


Italy,  32;  domination  in  Ger- 
many, 91,  95;  military  power, 
106. 

Badical  party  in  France,  policy 
in  1885,  46. 

Kambaud,  290. 

Eamsay,  293. 

Eealpolitik,  116. 

Eeinsurance  Treaties,  37,  45. 

Eeval,  interview  of  Edward  VII 
and  Nicholas  II,  211. 

Eeventlow,  288,  289,  292. 

Khodes,  invaded  by  Italians,  223. 

Kibot,  French  Foreign  Minister, 
works  for  Eussian  alliance,  51. 

Eoberts,  Lord,  sent  into  Afghan- 
istan, 124,  291. 

Eohrbach,  on  German  colonies,  84; 
on  position  of  Germany  and 
England,  109  n;  on  necessity  of 
maintaining  peace,  111  n;  on 
Bagdad  Eailway,  205,  206,  290, 
291,  293. 

Boon,  8. 

Eose,  288,  293,  294. 

Bosebery,  Lord,  on  alliance  with 
Germany,  138. 

Eouvier,  French  Premier,  attitude 

towards  Bagdad  Eailway,  204. 
Eumania,   wins    independence,    28, 

196;  attacks  Bulgaria,  236. 
Bumelia,  Eastern,  acquired  by  Bul- 
garia, 210. 
Eussia,  violates  neutrality  of 
Black  Sea,  10,  16,  41;  relations 
with  Prussia,  16;  understand- 
ing with  Austria,  19;  attitude 
towards  France  in  1875,  25; 
interests  in  Near  East,  25,  197, 
198;  declares  war  on  Turkey  in 
1877,  26;  bitter  attitude  to- 
wards Germany  in  1878,  29;  iso- 
lation of  after   1878,  39;   rela- 


tions   with    France    previous    to 
1878,    41,    sq.;    effect    of    Bis- 
marck's    dismissal     upon,     50; 
loans  floated  on  French  market, 
51;    Dual   Alliance,   52;    under- 
standing   with    Germany    after 
1891,     57,    58;     relations    with 
Great   Britain,    123,   sq.;    ambi- 
tions in  Central  East,  124,  125; 
advance  in  Far  East,   126;    in- 
tervenes   against    Japan,    128; 
secures    lease    of    Port    Arthur, 
130;  war  with  Japan,  132;  fac- 
tors   making    for    reconciliation 
with  Great   Britain,    160;    Con- 
vention of  1907,  161,  162;  pro- 
tests   Austria's    annexation    of 
Bosnia,    179;    diplomatic   humil- 
iation,    182;     Potsdam    Accord 
with  Germany,  183 ;  rivalry  with 
Great  Britain  in  Near  East,  196, 
197;    attitude    towards    Bagdad 
Eailway,  204;   believed  by  Ger- 
many to  be  weak  in  1914,  250, 
251;   attitude  towards  Austrian 
demands    on    Serbia,    261 ;     at- 
tempts   to     open     conversations 
with  Austria,  262;  orders  mobil- 
ization, 264,  265,  266;  does  not 
reply  to  German  ultimatum,  271. 

Eussian  Orange  Boole,  294. 

Eusso-Japanese  Convention  of 
1907,  162. 

Eusso-Japanese  War,  132. 

Eusso-Turkish  War,  26,  27. 

Saalburg,  Kaiser's  speech  at,  95. 

Sadowa,  8. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  German  tenden- 
cies, 36,  142;  cedes  Heligoland, 
136;  ceases  to  be  British  For- 
eign Secretary,  149. 

Salonika,    200,    212;     entered    by 


INDEX 


309 


Greeks  and  Bulgarians,  228,  233, 
236. 

Salzburg,  interview  of  Francis 
Joseph  and  William  I,  19. 

Samoa,  82. 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  27,  177; 
revised  at  Berlin,  28. 

Sarolea,  291,  293. 

Saturday  Eeview,  on  German  men- 
ace, 153,  154. 

Sazonof,  on  Austrian  demands  on 
Serbia,  261;  attempts  concilia- 
tion, 264. 

Scheldt  River,  strategical  position, 
277. 

Schiemann,  288,  292,  294. 

Schierbrand,  290. 

Schleswig,  disposal  of  leads  to 
war  of  1864,  7;  incorporated 
by  Prussia,  8. 

Schmoller,  on  necessity  of  force, 
101. 

Schnoebele,  arrest  of,  46. 

Schurman,   293. 

Science,  in  German  manufactures 
and  commerce,  70. 

Scutari,  captured,  230;  surren- 
dered by  Montenegro,  232. 

Sedan,  9. 

Seignobos,  288. 

Selves,  de,  French  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, 185,  187. 

Serajevo,  244. 

Serbia,  wins  autonomy,  195;  effect 
of  annexation  of  Bosnia  upon, 
213,  214;  war  declared  by 
Turkey  upon,  227;  campaign  of 
1912,  229;  alliance  with  Greece, 
233;  campaign  of  1913,  234, 
235;  anti-Austrian  agitation  in, 
244;  Austrian  note  to,  254-257; 
reply  to  Austrian  note,  258. 

Bering,  on  future  of  Germany, 
108  n. 


Shantung,  German  commercial  po- 
sition in,  82. 

Shevket  Pasha,  Young  Turk  lead- 
er, 212,  230. 

Shimonoseki,  Treaty  of,  128. 

Silesia,  conquered  by  Prussia,  17. 

Skiernevice,  interview  of  the  three 
Emperors  at,  45. 

Skobelef,  Russian  general,  124. 

Skrine,  291. 

Slavs,  in  Austro-Hungary,  18,  201, 
239. 

Smyrna,  203. 

Socialists,  in  Germany,  not  op- 
posed to  naval  development,  92; 
nationalistic  attitude  of,  113  n; 
on  Moroccan  policy,  190. 

Solomon  Islands,  German  colony, 
81. 

Soudan,  119,  sq. 

Southwest  Africa,  German  colo- 
nial difficulties  in,  82. 

Spain,  friendliness  toward  Ger- 
many, 36. 

Steed,  289. 

Steel  industry,  in  Germany,  67. 

Stowell,  294. 

Straits,  Treaty  of,  123. 

Suez  Canal  shares,  purchased  by 
Great  Britain,  117,  199. 

Sybel,  289. 

Tardieu,  288,  289,  292. 

Tchatalja  lines,  228. 

Thibet,    Younghusband    expedition 

in,     125;      territorial     integrity 

recognized  by  Great  Britain  and 

Russia,  162. 
Thiers,   President   of   France,    20; 

on    Treaty    of    Frankfort,     22; 

resignation,  33,  289. 
Thrace,  campaign  of  1912  in,  228. 
Tigris  River,  202. 


310 


INDEX 


Togoland,  delimited,  58;  German 
colony  in,  81,  82. 

Trans  -Manchurian    Eailway,    130. 

Trans-Siberian  Eailway,   129. 

Treitschke,  Heinrich  von,  on  the 
State,  102 ;  on  use  of  force,  103. 

Trentino,  retained  by  Austria  in 
1866,  32;  Italian  ambitions  for 
winning,  145. 

Trieste,  32,  145. 

Triple  Alliance,  2;  formation  of, 
16,  35;  effect  upon  German 
position,  36;  effect  upon  posi- 
tion of  Eussia,  45;  text  of  pub- 
lished, 47;  diplomatic  conflict 
with  Triple  Entente,  180.  See 
Germany,  Austria,  Italy. 

Triple  Entente,  3;  formation  of, 
162;  diplomatic  conflict  with 
Triple  Alliance,  180;  position 
of  in  1911,  186,  187;  belief  that 
it  isolated  Germany.  See  Great 
Britain,  France,  Eussia. 

Tripoli,  interests  of  Italy  in,  218; 
Young  Turk  policy  in,  219;  war 
in,  221,  sq. 

Tunis,  coveted  by  Italy,  34; 
French  expedition  to,  35 ;  French 
protectorate  in  recognized  by 
Italy,  146. 

Turkey,  decadence  of,  26,  195, 
196;  war  with  Eussia,  27; 
Treaty  of  Berlin,  28;  German 
friendship  with,  207;  defeats 
Greece  in  1897,  210,  216;  revo- 
lution of  1908  in,  178,  210,  211, 
212;  Young  Turk  policy,  215- 
219;  war  declared  by  Italy 
upon,  219,  221;  declares  war 
upon  Serbia  and  Bulgaria,  227; 
war  of  1912,  228,  sq. 
Turner,  292. 


Ulster  crisis,  252,  255. 
Universities,  in  Germany,  influence 

of,  100. 
Urquhart,  293. 
Usher,  291. 

Valfrey,  289. 

Valona,  see  Avlona. 

Venizelos,  Prime  Minister  of 
Greece,  217;  attitude  towards 
Turkey,  225,  226;  refuses  to  as- 
sist Bulgaria  against  Serbia, 
234;  upon  Powers,  238. 

Viallate,  288. 

Victor  Emmanuel,  King  of  uni- 
fied Italy,  10,  32. 

Victoria,  Queen  of  England,  pa- 
cific influence  in  1875,  24;  death 
of,  149. 

Viviani,  French  Premier,  255,  271. 

Vladivostok,  established  as  naval 
base  by  Eussia,  126. 

Voigt,  on  necessity  of  force,  101. 

Wallenstein,  5. 

War,  doctrine  of  blessing  of,  103- 
105. 

War  scare  of  1875,  23-24,  43. 

Weiss,  294. 

White,  289. 

William  I,  King  of  Prussia,  7; 
German  Emperor,  9;  affection 
for  Alexander  II,  17;  inter- 
views with  Francis  Joseph,  19; 
opposition  to  Austrian  alliance, 
30;  death  of,  48;  attitude  on 
colonial  aggrandizement,  81. 

William  II,  German  Emperor,  ac- 
cession, 49;  character,  55,  176; 
mitigates  effects  of  Dual  Al- 
liance, 57,  59;  attitude  towards 
France,  58;  maintains  hegem- 
ony  of   Germany,   60;    on    Ger- 


INDEX 


311 


man  navy,  80;  on  German 
world  policy,  92,  93;  on  destiny 
of  Germany,  95,  96;  on  supe- 
riority of  Germans,  97;  on 
necessity  of  maintaining  peace, 
111,  112,  167;  telegram  to 
Kruger,  136;  belief  in  neces- 
sity of  maintaining  German 
prestige,  167;  attitude  towards 
Entente  Cordiale,  171;  speech 
at  Tangier,  172;  Potsdam  inter- 
view with  Nicholas  II,  183; 
change  in  attitude  after  1911, 
193;  policy  of  friendship  to- 
wards Turkey,  207;  telegrams 
to  Tsar,  268,  270. 

William  of  Wied,  in  Albania,  232. 

Wolseley,  Sir  Garnet,  118. 


Woltmann,  on  superiority  of  Ger- 
mans, 97. 

World  policy,  of  Germany,  3; 
partly  a  result  of  economic 
necessity,  87;  partly  result  of 
moral  factors,  88,  91,  105; 
characteristics,  90,  sq.,  110. 

Younghusband,  Colonel,  mission 
in  Thibet,  125. 

Young  Turks,  Revolution  of  1908, 
178,  210,  211,  212;  policy  in 
Macedonia,  215;  policy  in  Crete, 
216,  217;  policy  in  Tripoli,  219; 
palace  revolution  of  1913,  229. 

Zaimis,     High     Commissioner     of 

Crete,  216. 
Zimmerman,   291. 


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